



S E C R E T // N O F O R N // 20330708

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
HEADQUARTERS, JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO
U.S. NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA
APO AE 09360



JTF-GTMO-CDR

8 July 2008

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Southern Command, 3511 NW 91st Avenue,
Miami, FL 33172

SUBJECT: Detainee Assessment Brief ICO Guantanamo Detainee, ISN PK9AG-001452DP (S)

JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment

1. (S) Personal Information:

- JDIMS/NDRC Reference Name: Adil Hadi al-Jaza'iri Bin Hamlili
- Current/True Name and Aliases: Adil Hadi al-Jazairi, Abu Adil, Adel Ameen al-Tayeb Bu Felgah Mohammad Talib Tayeab Bin Hamlili, Adil al-Jazairi, Hadi al-Jaziri, Abdel Daher, Haslet, Mohammed, Sayed, Sulieyman, Sultani, Taieb
- Place of Birth: Oran, Algeria (AG)
- Date of Birth: 26 June 1975
- Citizenship: Algeria
- Internment Serial Number (ISN): PK9AG-001452DP



2. (U//FOUO) Health: Detainee is in good health.

3. (U) JTF-GTMO Assessment:

a. (S//NF) Executive Summary: Detainee is assessed to be an al-Qaida operative, a facilitator, courier, kidnapper, and an assassin with numerous ties to al-Qaida senior leaders. Detainee has admitted to killing another al-Qaida member to enforce an extremist interpretation of *Sharia* (Islamic religious law). Detainee was involved in a plot to attack the US consulate in Peshawar, Pakistan (PK) and was possibly the leader of an extremist cell that carried out a string of bombing attacks against civilian targets in 2002. Detainee has made statements to JTF-GTMO personnel indicating his intent to kill US citizens upon his eventual release. Detainee is an admitted member of several terrorist organizations, including the

CLASSIFIED BY: MULTIPLE SOURCES
REASON: E.O. 12958, AS AMENDED, SECTION 1.4(C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 20330708

S E C R E T // N O F O R N // 20330708

JTF-GTMO-CDR

SUBJECT: Detainee Assessment Brief ICO Guantanamo Detainee, ISN PK9AG-001452DP (S)

Algerian Armed Islamic Group (GIA),¹ Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG),² al-Takfir Wa al-Hijra,³ and is associated to others linked to terrorism. Detainee admitted to working for the Taliban Foreign Ministry and Intelligence Ministry. Detainee claimed he was involved in a 1995 attempt to transfer allegedly stolen nuclear material to al-Qaida and the governments of Iraq and Sudan. Detainee received basic and advanced militant training, including training in improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and poisons, and participated in preparations to conduct attacks on US forces in Afghanistan (AF). **[ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ABOUT THIS DETAINEE IS AVAILABLE IN AN SCI SUPPLEMENT.]** JTF-GTMO determined this detainee to be:

- A **HIGH** risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests, and allies
- A **MEDIUM** threat from a detention perspective
- Of **HIGH** intelligence value

b. (S//NF) Summary of Changes: The following outlines changes to detainee's assessment since the last JTF-GTMO recommendation. (Changes in this assessment will be annotated by ➤ next to the footnote.)

- Updated detainee's account of events
- Updated evaluation of detainee's account
- Added reporting detainee possibly murdered a second individual
- Incorporated additional reporting of detainee's links to a senior Al-Qaida member

4. (U) Detainee's Account of Events:

The following section is based, unless otherwise indicated, on detainee's own account. These statements are included without consideration of veracity, accuracy, or reliability.

¹ Analyst Note: The GIA is a National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF) Priority 3 counterterrorism (CT) target. Priority 3 targets are defined as issues, opportunities, or threats, other senior policymakers and IC managers believe must receive attention from the IC that are not already identified as Priorities 1 or 2. These include terrorist/extremist groups that have demonstrated both intention and the capability to attack US persons and interests, but are believed to pose somewhat less threat than Priority 2 groups, or terrorist/extremist groups that have demonstrated intention to attack US persons and interests and are taking action to develop or acquire WMD capability.

² Analyst Note: The HIG is an NIPF Priority 2 CT target. Priority 2 targets are defined as issues, opportunities, or threats that rise to, or are expected to rise to, the level of interest of the Combatant Commanders or DNI EXCOM Principals, not already identified as Priority 1. This includes terrorist groups, especially those with state support, countries that sponsor terrorism or countries that have state organizations involved in terrorism that have demonstrated both intention and capability to attack US persons or interests.

³ Analyst Note: Al-Takfir Wa al-Hijra is an NIPF Priority 5 CT target. Priority 5 targets are defined as longer-term issues, opportunities, or threats the IC believes should receive attention that are not already identified as Priorities 1 to 4. This includes other foreign terrorist groups, countries that sponsor terrorism, or countries that have state organizations involved in terrorism, which are considered to be anti-US but are not included in Priorities 1-4

JTF-GTMO-CDR

SUBJECT: Detainee Assessment Brief ICO Guantanamo Detainee, ISN PK9AG-001452DP (S)

a. (S//NF) Prior History: Circa 1986, at approximately 11 years of age, detainee left Algeria and headed to Afghanistan with his father, his brother, detainee's second cousin (Mustafa Ahmad Hamlily ISN US9AG-000705 (AG-705)), and another associate named Abu Bakr Muhammad Boulghiti, aka (Abu Yasir al-Jazairi).⁴ Detainee's father was committed to *dawa*, (missionary work) and decided to go to Afghanistan to fight against the Soviet Union.⁵

b. (S//NF) Recruitment and Travel: They traveled for three months across the desert through Burkina Faso to Mali where they stayed at a mosque for almost nine months. Their vehicle and all of their goods were stolen by thieves and they were forced to obtain new passports and health cards from the United Nations (UN).⁶ His father told the UN representatives that they were Moroccans in order to obtain their new identity cards. With their paperwork in order they continued on their way to Afghanistan via Mecca, Saudi Arabia (SA) where Yasir left them. Detainee's family then traveled to Jeddah, SA where they lived in a park until a charity organization, possibly the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) group headed by Ayman al-Zawahiri, brought them to a Usama Bin Laden (UBL) guesthouse.⁷ After three months at the guesthouse, Yasir returned and the group moved to the Babi Refugee Camp in the Sada area near Peshawar, PK.⁸

c. (S//NF) Training and Activities: Detainee attended training at the nearby Sada, PK camp several times between 1986 and 1991. The Sada Training Camp was run by the Saaaf group and it was mandatory for all fighters to attend this camp to attain combat skills before entering Afghanistan to fight against the Soviets.⁹ Detainee fought against the Soviets and the Soviet-backed Afghan regime beginning in 1986, at the age of 11.¹⁰ From 1991 to 1993, detainee was a fighter with the HIG. From 1993 through 1994, detainee affiliated with the GIA and was a recruiter based in Peshawar, PK. From 1995 to 1996, detainee led the Khalifa Group in Peshawar, a Takfir group established to engage in militant combat in Algeria. In 1997 detainee attempted to travel to London, United Kingdom with a false passport but was

⁴ 001452 SIR 25-MAY-2005, Analyst Note: A variant of Abu Yasir al-Jazairi is Abu Yassir al-Jazaieri. Abu Yasir al-Jazairi is Abu Bakr Muhammad Boulghiti, a senior al-Qaida facilitator who is currently in the custody of a friendly foreign government. Abu Yasir is reported to have facilitated this movement (see TD-314/33366-05).

⁵ TD-314/45079-03

⁶ 001452 SIR 16-MAR-2006, 001452 FM40 21-APR-2005

⁷ Analyst Note: Though detainee characterized EIJ as a charity organization, it was an Egyptian-based terrorist group that merged with al-Qaida. Ayman al-Zawahiri is currently UBL's second-in-command.

⁸ 001452 FM40 21-APR-2005, TD-314/45079-03

⁹ IIR 6 034 0113 05, Analyst Note: Escaped Bagram detainee Mahmood Ahmad Muhammed al-Rashid, aka (Umar Faruq), ISN US9KU-001206DP, stated he met detainee at the Khaldan Camp in 1991 (see 001206 FM40 14-Apr-2005). The Sada training camp was identified in the founding minutes of al-Qaida as an open camp from which the best would be selected to join al-Qaida (see Arnaout 892, page 33).

¹⁰ 001452 FM40 02-AUG-2004

JTF-GTMO-CDR

SUBJECT: Detainee Assessment Brief ICO Guantanamo Detainee, ISN PK9AG-001452DP (S)

arrested at the behest of Abd al-Hayy and jailed for two days in Pakistan.¹¹ Detainee then spent one and a half years in prison in Peshawar for criminal activity. In 1998, detainee worked as a translator for the Taliban Foreign Ministry. In 1999, he was self-employed and sold honey. Some time later, for about four to five months, detainee again worked for the Taliban Foreign Ministry. By 2001, detainee had switched jobs to work for Taliban Intelligence. Detainee traveled back and forth several times between Afghanistan and Pakistan after the commencement of hostilities in October 2001.¹² Detainee and an Afghan friend fled Kabul, AF after the US campaign began, and traveled to Peshawar approximately 20 November 2001. Detainee has provided little information about his activities from November 2001 until his capture in June 2003.¹³

5. (U) Capture Information:

a. (S//NF) Pakistani authorities captured detainee during a raid in Peshawar, PK on 17 June 2003. Detainee was captured with al-Qaida facilitator Muhammad Shah, and was transferred to US forces within two weeks.¹⁴

b. (S) Property Held: None

c. (S) Transferred to JTF-GTMO: 19 September 2004

d. (S//NF) Reasons for Transfer to JTF-GTMO: To provide information on the following:

- Affiliations, recruitment, personalities, and operations of the GIA, HIG, Khalifa-Takfir group, Taliban, and al-Qaida
- Facilities of the GIA, HIG, Khalifa, Taliban, and al-Qaida in both Pakistan and Afghanistan

6. (S//NF) Evaluation of Detainee's Account: Detainee has a long history of involvement with Islamic extremists and extremist groups. Detainee has admitted to his affiliation with key terrorist groups including the GIA and HIG, traveling to Afghanistan to participate in combat (initially against the Soviets), training at terrorist camps, and of being involved with the Taliban Foreign Ministry and Intelligence Ministry. Detainee has provided a good deal of consistent

¹¹ 001452 FM 40 OGA CAP DOCS, Analyst Note: Abd al-Hayy is assessed to be Shaykh Abd al-Hayy, a retired Pakistani officer who ran the Rabita Trust Foundation office in Lahore, PK. Al-Hayy is known to have provided support to fleeing al-Qaida members and their families (see TD-314/54572-06, TD-314/32138-04, TD-314/25743-04, TD-314/19954-03, TD-314/58087-03).

¹² IIR 6 034 0007 05, Analyst Note: Detainee was well known in Peshawar, PK for criminal activities and the kidnapping of foreigners (see IIR 6 034 0379 07).

¹³ 001452 KB 05-NOV-2004, 001452 FBIS reporting, 001452 FM40 21-APR-2005

¹⁴ 001452 KB 05-NOV-2004, 001452 FBIS reporting, 001452 FM40 21-APR-2005

JTF-GTMO-CDR

SUBJECT: Detainee Assessment Brief ICO Guantanamo Detainee, ISN PK9AG-001452DP (S)

information regarding his activities for earlier periods of his life, but has omitted key details of his pre-arrest history. The significant gaps during key parts of detainee's timeline make it difficult to fully assess his threat and intelligence value. Detainee has provided little information about his activities between November 2001 and his capture in Pakistan in June 2003. Upon his transfer to US authorities, the CIA, after numerous custodial interviews with detainee, found detainee to have withheld important information from the Canadian Secret Intelligence Service (CSIS) and British Secret Intelligence Service (BSIS) (for whom he served as a HUMINT source), and to be a threat to US and allied personnel in Afghanistan and Pakistan.¹⁵

7. (U) Detainee Threat:

a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be a **HIGH** risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests, and allies.

b. (S//NF) Reasons for Continued Detention: Detainee is assessed to be an al-Qaida operative, a facilitator, courier, kidnapper and assassin with numerous ties to al-Qaida senior leaders. Detainee has admitted to killing another al-Qaida operative to enforce an extremist interpretation of *Sharia* law. Detainee was involved in a plot to attack the US consulate in Peshawar, and was possibly the leader of an extremist cell that carried out a string of bombing attacks against civilian targets in Pakistan in 2002. Detainee has made statements to JTF-GTMO personnel indicating his intent to kill US citizens upon his eventual release. Detainee is an admitted member of several terrorist organizations, including the GIA and HIG, and an associate of others linked to terrorism. Detainee admitted to working for the Taliban Foreign Ministry and Intelligence Ministry. Detainee claimed he was involved in a 1995 attempt to transfer stolen nuclear material to al-Qaida and the governments of Iraq and Sudan. Detainee received basic and advanced militant training, including training in IEDs and poisons, and participated in preparations to conduct attacks on US forces in Afghanistan.

- (S//NF) Detainee is assessed to be an al-Qaida operative, a facilitator, courier, kidnapper, and assassin with numerous ties to al-Qaida senior leaders. Detainee has admitted to killing another al-Qaida member to enforce an extremist interpretation of *Sharia* law.
 - (S//NF) The Pakistani Intelligence Bureau (IB) identified detainee as an Algerian terrorist, hired assassin, kidnapper, and member of UBL's "umbrella organization,"

¹⁵ Analyst Note: According to OGA reporting, in December 2000 detainee was recruited as HUMINT source for the CSIS and the BSIS because of his connections to members of various al-Qaida linked terrorist groups that operated in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Detainee was a HUMINT source until his capture by Pakistani authorities in June 2003. The reporting noted detainee withheld important information during his service as a HUMINT source (see 001452 FM 40 OGA CAP DOCS).

JTF-GTMO-CDR

SUBJECT: Detainee Assessment Brief ICO Guantanamo Detainee, ISN PK9AG-001452DP (S)

al-Qaida. The IB also reported detainee was involved in a plot to conduct an attack on the US consulate in Peshawar.¹⁶

- (S//NF) Detainee murdered al-Qaida member Asadullah al-Sindhi and al-Sindhi's wife in 1997. Al-Sindhi was UBL's commercial representative to Pakistan and the brother of Abdallah al-Sindhi. Detainee's Takfiri beliefs were his primary justification for this assassination. Detainee killed al-Sindhi because he married a woman within one month of her divorce, instead of waiting four months as required by *Sharia*, or Islamic law. Detainee was jailed by Pakistani authorities for 13 months, possibly in connection with this killing. (Analyst Note: It is notable that, although al-Qaida members were aware of detainee's responsibility for the killing, no retaliatory actions were taken against him by al-Qaida. Detainee claimed he was jailed in Pakistan for his membership in the Khalifa Group, not for murder.)¹⁷

- (C//REL TO USA, GCTF) Abdullah Bin Omar, ISN US9TS-000721DP (TS-721, transferred), and other unidentified individuals suspected detainee also killed a Sudanese named Sami al-Sudani. However, detainee denied the accusations and stated he was in prison when Sami was killed in 1999.¹⁸

- (C//REL TO USA, GCTF) Detainee has been identified by multiple sources as an al-Qaida facilitator and courier. According to Abd al-Aziz Abd al-Rahman Abd al-Aziz al-Baddah, ISN US9SA-000264DP (SA-264, transferred), detainee was a facilitator who couriered money between UBL, other al-Qaida operatives, and Abu Aman (the cousin of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi).¹⁹ Pakistani intelligence sources confirmed SA-264's claim in interviews with news reporters, noting detainee served al-Qaida by arranging money transfers, procuring visas and identity cards, and performing other duties. Pakistani press reports identified detainee as a forger and reporting about the arrest of detainee and al-Qaida facilitator Muaz Bin Abd al-Qadir Bin Ahmad Fezzani, aka (Abu Nasim al-Tunisi), identified them both as members of al-Takfir wa al-Hijra.²⁰

- (S//NF) Detainee's association with UBL, al-Qaida, and its predecessor organizations date back to his childhood. In 1986, detainee and his father stayed at UBL's guesthouse in Jeddah, SA, during which detainee's father met with UBL.²¹ Detainee also stated he (detainee) had contacts with UBL at various dinner functions.²² In Peshawar, detainee attended a school for the children of fighters,

¹⁶ TD-314/15651-99; Analyst Note: Detainee is identified with the alias Abu Adil Somyaa. Detainee's name is Adil and his daughter's name is Somyaa.

¹⁷ TD-314/45079-03, TD-314/58087-03, TD-314/15651-99

¹⁸ IIR 6 034 0379 07

¹⁹ IIR 6 034 0254 06

²⁰ 001452 FBIS Reporting, Analyst Note: Detainee and al-Tunisi were captured separately.

²¹ TD-314/45079-03

²² 001452 FM40 21-APR-2005

JTF-GTMO-CDR

SUBJECT: Detainee Assessment Brief ICO Guantanamo Detainee, ISN PK9AG-001452DP (S)

sponsored by Shaykh Abdullah Azzam, who was UBL's mentor and founder of a militant network that was an early predecessor to al-Qaida.²³

- (S//NF) Detained senior al-Qaida facilitator Abu Yasir al-Jazairi, aka (Abu Bakr Muhammad Boulghiti), traveled with detainee and his family from Afghanistan to Pakistan in 1986.²⁴ Zayn al-Abidin Muhammad Husayn, aka (Abu Zubaydah), ISN US9GZ-010016DP (GZ-10016), reported detainee and Abu Yasir al-Jazairi were long time associates.²⁵

- (S//NF) Abu Yasir al-Jazairi was a UBL associate responsible for al-Qaida transportation and safe houses in Pakistan. Abu Yasir was the head of finance and propaganda for al-Qaida in Afghanistan prior to September 2001,²⁶ and also assisted GZ-10016's escape from Afghanistan.²⁷

- (S//NF) Detainee acknowledged an association with GZ-10016, reporting they first met during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.²⁸

- (S//NF) Detainee is an associate of Midhat Mursi al-Sayyid Umar, aka (Abu Khabab al-Masri),²⁹ a senior al-Qaida poison and explosives expert who helped train the perpetrators of the 2000 terrorist attack against the USS COLE in Yemen.³⁰ Al-Masri's son, Muhammad, identified detainee as an associate of al-Masri.³¹

- (S//NF) Detainee provided lodging for Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Abu Hamza al-Jazairi, detainee's longtime friend and fellow Takfiri member, was imprisoned with Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in Pakistan. According to detainee, Hamza pressured detainee into providing lodging for Zarqawi in Kabul when Zarqawi was released from prison in 2000.³²

- (S//NF) Detainee is possibly Abu Adil, the leader of a militant cell that was responsible for attacks on multiple civilian targets in Pakistan in 2002. (Analyst Note: Abu Adil is an alias used by detainee.)

- (S//NF) Senior al-Qaida member Khalid Shaykh Muhammad, aka (KSM), ISN US9KU-010024DP (KU-10024), stated he met Abu Adil once in early 2002 at which time KU-10024 provided 300,000 Pakistani Rupees (approximately \$5,250 US) to support Abu Adil's cell in the Punjab region. KU-10024 stated Abu Adil was responsible for the 17 March 2002 attack on a Protestant church in

²³ TD-314/45079-03

²⁴ 001452 SIR 25-MAY-2005, TD-314/33366-05

²⁵ TD-314/37159-03

²⁶ TD-314/57502-03

²⁷ TD-314/37587-03, TD-314/51896-03, TD-314/02585-03, TD-314/25623-04

²⁸ TD-314/27132-04, IIR 6 034 0095 05

²⁹ ➤ IIR 4 201 0540 06

³⁰ ➤ Al-Qaida CBRNE Program DIA Report 1-JAN-2004, Analyst Note: Detainee gave a physical description of Khabab and identified his sons, Husayn Mursi al-Sayyid Umar and Muhammad Midhat Mursi al-Sayyid Umar. Muhammad was apprehended by Pakistani authorities in Peshawar. See IIR 4 201 0540 06.

³¹ ➤ TD-314/50239-02, TD-314/44990-02

³² TD-314/58087-03, 001452 SIR 16-Feb-2005, 001452 FM40 11-Aug-2004, Analyst Note: Hamza is aka (Abu Hamza al-Maghrebi) aka (Kumas).

JTF-GTMO-CDR

SUBJECT: Detainee Assessment Brief ICO Guantanamo Detainee, ISN PK9AG-001452DP (S)

Islamabad.³³ (Analyst Note: This attack occurred during a significant gap in detainee's timeline. Detainee has not accounted for his activities after November 2001, but claimed to have been in Pakistan at that time.)

- (S//NF) KU-10024 also stated Abu Adil was responsible for the 24 December 2002 attack on the Chuwanwali Church in Punjab, PK. KU-10024 provided money to support Abu Adil's cell and funded an attack against Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf. KU-10024 added that Hamza Zubayr knew Abu Adil and trained him in Afghanistan. Hamza coordinated KU-10024's meeting with Abu Adil.³⁴
- (S//NF) Detainee was possibly involved in the 8 May 2002 attack on the Sheraton Hotel in Karachi, PK in which 11 French and three Pakistani citizens were killed. Reporting on the attack identified four members of the Muttahida Quami Movement as perpetrators in the attack. The four escaped Pakistan under the cover of a carpet export business. Detainee's wife has reported detainee operated a small carpet business. (Analyst note: KU-10024 noted Abu Adil's (possibly detainee) associate, Amjad Husayn Faruqi, may have assisted Shujah in the 8 May 2002 attacks on the Sheraton Hotel in Karachi. KU-10024 added that Abu Adil and Faruqi would likely be aware of each other's operational plans.)³⁵
- (S//NF) According to al-Qaida facilitator Abdul Rahim Ghulam Rabbani, aka (Abu Rahman), ISN US9PK-001460DP (PK-1460), Abu Adil (possibly detainee) was associated with 11 September 2001 coordinator Ramzi bin al-Shibh, ISN US9YM-010013DP (YM-10013).³⁶
- (S//NF) Detainee has made threats to kill JTF-GTMO service members or other US personnel upon his release. A US debriefer reported detainee stated if they (detainee and debriefer) were on the street, detainee would kill the debriefer.³⁷
- (S//NF) Detainee is an admitted member of several terrorist organizations and an associate of others linked to terrorism.
 - (S//NF) Detainee is a confirmed member of the al-Takfir wa al-Hijra. Detainee acknowledged leading the Khalifa in Peshawar from 1995 to 1996. The Khalifa is a Takfir group, assessed to be aka (Jamaat Muslimeen), in Pakistan. Jamaat Muslimeen was dedicated to overthrowing the Pakistani government.³⁸

³³ TD-314/41264-04

³⁴ TD-314/41264-04

³⁵ 001452 FBIS Reporting, TD-314/32874-02, TD 314/41264-04

³⁶ TD-314/25875-03

³⁷ 001452 MFR 20-JUN-2007

³⁸ 001452 FBIS Reporting, 001452 FM40 14-JUN-2005, IIR 6 034 0007 05, TD-314/41264-04, FBIS Jihad Groups 17-Oct-2001, TD-314/45079-03

JTF-GTMO-CDR

SUBJECT: Detainee Assessment Brief ICO Guantanamo Detainee, ISN PK9AG-001452DP (S)

- (S//NF) Detainee's phone number and name are included on a list of Jamaat Muslimeen worldwide members and contacts.³⁹
- (S//NF) GZ-10016 identified detainee as a member of the Takfiri movement in Pakistan.⁴⁰ GZ-10016 called detainee a fanatic.⁴¹ Detainee's cousin AG-705, other detainees, and the press also identified detainee as a *Takfiri*.⁴² (Analyst Note: *Takfiris* are considered among the most dangerous Islamists in the world. Many *Takfiris* consider al-Qaida to be too pragmatic and liberal, although many *Takfiris* have ties to al-Qaida, received training or funding from al-Qaida, and fought alongside al-Qaida members.⁴³)
- (S//NF) Detainee has acknowledged membership or affiliation with other extremist organizations including the Taliban, HIG, GIA, Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), and the Haqqani Network.⁴⁴
- (S//NF) Detainee worked as a translator for the Taliban Foreign Ministry between 1998 and 1999, and for the Taliban Intelligence Ministry during 2001.⁴⁵
- (S//NF) Detainee aligned himself with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar during the Afghan Civil War.⁴⁶ GZ-10016 corroborated detainee's membership with the HIG and reported detainee joined the HIG forces on the front lines in Afghanistan again in 1996.⁴⁷
- (S//NF) Detainee joined the GIA in Peshawar and remained with them for several years. Detainee claimed the GIA intended to overthrow the Algerian government and to attack French interests to persuade the French to cease their support of the Algerian government.⁴⁸ Detainee stated the head of the GIA in Algiers, Qari Said, was his relative. Before returning to Algiers, Qari Said was in charge of the GIA at the Khalid Bin Walid Training Camp in Afghanistan, during which Qari Said pledged *bayat* (oath of allegiance) to UBL.⁴⁹

³⁹ TD-314/10433-99; Analyst Note: Detainee's phone number, 833258, and was provided by Pakistani intelligence (see TD-314/15651-99). Detainee's cousin, AG-705, reported this phone number was that of AG-705's father-in-law (see 000705 KB 15-Dec-2005).

⁴⁰ TD-314/66435-04

⁴¹ TD-314/37159-03, TD-314/27132-04, IIR 6 034 0095 05

⁴² TD-314/33366-05, IIR 6 034 0161 06, IIR 6 044 1319 07, 0001466 KB 19-MAR-2005, Analyst Note: TS-1466, who is not held at JTF-GTMO, reported detainee was a member of the Takfiri Sect.

⁴³ Takfiri Connections in the SOUTHCOM AOR 10-SEP-2004, 001452 FBIS Reporting

⁴⁴ TD-314/57502-03, TD-314/58087-03, 001452 FM40 04-NOV-2004, 001452 FM40 11-AUG-2004, TD-314/56437-03, 001452 FM40 11-Nov-2000, 001452 FM40 2-Nov-2004

⁴⁵ 001452 KB 05-NOV-2004, TD-314/51397-03

⁴⁶ TD-314/45079-03

⁴⁷ TD-314/37159-03

⁴⁸ TD-314/45079-03, 001452 FM40 02-AUG-2004

⁴⁹ TD-314/57502-03, 001452 Notes 01-Oct-2004, 001452 KB 05-NOV-2004

JTF-GTMO-CDR

SUBJECT: Detainee Assessment Brief ICO Guantanamo Detainee, ISN PK9AG-001452DP (S)

- (S//NF) Detainee indicated he had a previous association with the LIFG and was knowledgeable of the locations of LIFG members in Peshawar and their leadership.⁵⁰
- (S//NF) Detainee stated he was involved in a 1995 attempt to transfer stolen nuclear material to al-Qaida, the Khalifa Group, and the governments of Iraq and Sudan.
 - (S//NF) In 1995, Muhammad Shah, a close associate of detainee (with whom detainee was captured), attempted to sell uranium and red mercury to detainee, al-Qaida senior military commander Abu Hafis al-Masri, aka (Mohammad Atef), the Iraqi government, and the Khalifa Group. The Khalifa Group also subsequently offered the red mercury to the Sudanese government. Detainee claimed he did not accept the offer and was not sure the material was genuine.⁵¹ (Analyst Note: Red mercury is a fictitious material advertised as a key ingredient in nuclear weapons, high explosives, and missile guidance systems. It has been associated with hoax attempts to sell the material.)
 - (S//NF) Detainee received a monthly to semi-annual stipend from Muhammad Shah. Shah was an assistant to al-Qaida facilitator Sulayman al-Jazairi in Pakistan in 2003.⁵² Shah and detainee were captured together in Pakistan in June 2003.⁵³ Shah also had ties to al-Qaida facilitator Jafar al-Jazairi, aka (Omar Chabani).⁵⁴
 - (S//NF) In early 2003, Shah and his associate Jawid traveled to Dubai, United Arab Emirates (AE, UAE) to facilitate their travel into the US. In the UAE, detainee sent Shah and Jawid more than \$2,000 US. Detainee remarked Shah was a friend of Khalid Deek, assessed to be Jordanian Millennium Plot co-conspirator Khalil Deek.⁵⁵ Like detainee, Deek was an associate of Abu Khabab al-Masri.⁵⁶
- (S//NF) Detainee received basic and advanced militant training in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and participated in attack planning against US forces.⁵⁷
 - (S//NF) Detainee stated he attended an IED training course with al-Qaida explosives expert Abu Mushin al-Masri in a house in Peshawar in November 2002. The training group discussed attacking US forces in Afghanistan and the Bagram Air Base including poisoning food destined for the base.⁵⁸
 - (S//NF) Detainee stated he trained at the Khaldan Training Camp commanded by Ali Muhammad Abdul Aziz Al Fakhri, aka (Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi), ISN US9LY-000212DP.⁵⁹

⁵⁰ 001452 notes 01-Oct-2004

⁵¹ TD-314/56212-03

⁵² TD-314/54872-03

⁵³ 001452 FM40 21-APR-2005

⁵⁴ TD-314/56437-03

⁵⁵ TD-314/56437-03

⁵⁶ >TD-314/15278-03

⁵⁷ IIR 6 034 0007 05, TD-314/45079-03

⁵⁸ TD-314/45291-03, TD-314/45285-03

⁵⁹ 001452 SIR 12-NOV-2004

JTF-GTMO-CDR

SUBJECT: Detainee Assessment Brief ICO Guantanamo Detainee, ISN PK9AG-001452DP (S)

- (C//REL TO USA, GCTF) Detainee acknowledged he trained at the al-Qaida-sponsored Jalozai Training Camp for GIA members in Pakistan.⁶⁰
- (S//NF) Detainee reported he and AG-705 attended training at the Sada Training Camp for one month circa 1986, and then fought on the front lines.⁶¹

c. (U//FOUO) Detainee's Conduct: Detainee is assessed as a **MEDIUM** threat from a detention perspective. His overall behavior has been mostly compliant and sometimes hostile to the guard force and staff. Detainee currently has 19 Reports of Disciplinary Infraction listed in DIMS with the most recent occurring on 12 June 2008, when he was found in possession of contraband. He has five Reports of Disciplinary Infraction for assault with the most recent occurring on 9 January 2007, when he threw a mixture of urine and feces on the guard force. Other incidents for which he has been disciplined include inciting and participating in mass disturbances, failure to follow guard instructions and camp rules, inappropriate use of bodily fluids, damage to government property, assaults, and possession of food and non-weapon type contraband. In 2007, detainee had a total of ten Reports of Disciplinary Infraction and three so far in 2008.

8. (U) Detainee Intelligence Value Assessment:

a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be of **HIGH** intelligence value. Detainee's most recent interrogation session occurred on 12 June 2008.

b. (S//NF) Placement and Access: Detainee traveled to Afghanistan and Pakistan with several prominent extremists, and possibly met UBL during a stay at his safe house in SA. Detainee is a veteran of the Soviet Afghan War in Afghanistan and a former member of the GIA. Detainee worked for the Taliban Foreign Ministry and Intelligence Ministry, and participated in hostilities against the Northern Alliance, and later, US and Coalition forces. Detainee trained at terrorist training camps operated by EIJ and al-Qaida. Detainee was affiliated with HIG during the Afghan Civil War, and may have recent associations with HIG militia leaders and fighters who are still active in anti-Coalition militia activity in Afghanistan. Detainee possibly led a Pakistan-based terrorist cell involved in a series of 2002 attacks on Protestant churches in Punjab and Islamabad, and the Sheraton Hotel in Karachi. Detainee has extensive connections with several extremist groups, including al-Qaida, EIJ, GIA, HIG, LIFG, Haqqani Network, and the Khalifa group.

c. (S//NF) Intelligence Assessment: Detainee has a history of affiliation with extremist organizations since his childhood. Because of his extensive past access to al-Qaida, HIG, Haqqani Network, LIFG, GIA, and Taliban organizations and leaders, detainee likely has knowledge of anti-Coalition militia leaders, personnel, organization, operations, and support

⁶⁰ IIR 6 034 0007 05

⁶¹ 001452 FM40 02-NOV-2004, 001452 FM40 04-NOV-2004

JTF-GTMO-CDR

SUBJECT: Detainee Assessment Brief ICO Guantanamo Detainee, ISN PK9AG-001452DP (S)

networks that may still be of value to US and Coalition forces operating in Afghanistan. Detainee likely has valuable information about other JTF-GTMO detainees who trained at terrorist training camps in Afghanistan and Pakistan or who fought against US and Coalition forces. Detainee possibly has knowledge about a terrorist cell involved in the 2002 church and hotel bombings in Pakistan, including other terrorist personnel involved, safe havens used by the cell, links to terrorist support networks such as al-Qaida, and plans for other attacks. Detainee may have additional knowledge about plans by al-Qaida and other terrorist groups to acquire or transfer nuclear materials or other WMD, including personnel involved and potential suppliers.

d. (S//NF) Areas of Potential Exploitation:

- Al-Qaida leadership, members, operations, support, and finances
- Extremist groups, including the Khalifa group, Al-Takfir wa al-Hijra, and Jamaat Muslimeen
- Global Jihad Support Network leadership, members, activities, funding, international support and associates, and recruiting network within Afghanistan and Pakistan
- Muslim Brotherhood (links to extremist elements in NAE and Central Asia)
- Qari Said: association between Khalid Bin Walid Training Camp and GIA
- Jamiat Islamiyah (personnel and links to al-Qaida and other extremists)
- Taliban Intelligence Ministry and Foreign Ministry
- Terrorist facilitation networks: personnel, facilities, equipment, finances
- Terrorists and foreign fighters in Afghanistan, including funding of foreign fighters
- Terrorist biographical and psychological information
- Suspected terrorists in the Peshawar area
- Means of communication between extremists operating in Afghanistan and Pakistan

9. (S) EC Status: Detainee's enemy combatant status was reassessed on 30 November 2004, and he remains an enemy combatant.



D. M. THOMAS, JR
Rear Admiral, US Navy
Commanding

* Definitions for intelligence terms used in the assessment can be found in the Joint Military Intelligence College October 2001 guide *Intelligence Warning Terminology*.