AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE CIA TORTURE PROGRAMME

CIA TORTURE UNREDACTED

SAM RAPHAEL
CROFTON BLACK
RUTH BLAKELEY
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‘SCHOLARS OF COUNTER-TERRORISM HAVE LONG ARGUED THAT TORTURE REPRESENTS AN IMMORAL AND DEEPLY INEFFECTIVE MEANS OF RESPONDING TO NON-STATE VIOLENCE. THIS STRIKING REPORT CONTRIBUTES RESONANTLY TO THAT INSIGHT, AND WILL PROVE OF VERY HIGH VALUE TO ALL WHO ARE INTERESTED IN APPROPRIATELY MORAL AND SUCCESSFUL RESPONSES TO TERRORISM.’

PROFESSOR RICHARD ENGLISH, AUTHOR OF TERRORISM: HOW TO RESPOND


MARGARET L. SATTERTHWAITE, CO-DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND GLOBAL JUSTICE, NYU SCHOOL OF LAW
‘OVER A NUMBER OF YEARS, THE AUTHORS’ METICULOUS RESEARCH HAS PROVIDED AN INVALUABLE TOOL FOR THE UN’S EFFORTS TO UNCOVER THE SCALE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY THAT WAS ORCHESTRATED BY THE BUSH-ERA CIA, AS WELL AS ITS COLLABORATORS SUCH AS THE UK. SHAMEFULLY, SUCCESSIVE US ADMINISTRATIONS HAVE FAILED TO PROSECUTE THE PERPETRATORS, OR ANY OF THE SENIOR ADMINISTRATIONS OFFICIALS WHO ORDERED THESE CRIMES, SHIELDING BEHIND THE “SUPERIOR ORDERS” DEFENCE THAT WAS REJECTED AT NUREMBURG AND IS EXPRESSLY FORBIDDEN UNDER THE UN CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE. IN THE FACE OF THIS AFFRONTE TO THE VALUES OF CIVILISED NATIONS, WE ALL OWE A DEBT OF GRATITUDE TO RAPHAEL, BLACK AND BLAKELEY FOR THEIR INDEFATIGABLE COMMITMENT TO THE TRUTH.’

BEN EMMERSON QC, FORMER UN SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON COUNTER-TERRORISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS
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When I first visited Guantánamo Bay in 2004, the nearly 800 prisoners held there were mostly nameless. It took years for the government to release a list of its captives – a prerequisite to establishing whether or not they should be held at all. Many, it turned out, were there on the basis of malicious, false or inaccurate information, had been handed over by bounty hunters, or had been imprisoned because they wore a certain type of Casio watch. These were the people the Bush administration called ‘the worst of the worst’.

Information about its prisoners had to be prised out of the US military’s unwilling bureaucracy. But already at that time there were rumours of an even more secretive programme, run in parallel by the Central Intelligence Agency outside the Pentagon’s chain of command. Occasional press stories spoke of people abducted in the middle of the night, manhandled onto planes and never heard of again. Leaks from US government officials began to tell a tale of secret detention locations, in Asia or Europe or elsewhere. Painstakingly, journalists, NGOs and lawyers began to compile lists of the disappeared – the organisation I founded, Reprieve, contributed to one of them in 2009.

Accounts of grave abuses committed in the so-called ‘black sites’ began to surface. One man had been waterboarded – drowned to the point of convulsions, vomiting and unconsciousness – 183 times in one month. Others had been placed for hours in boxes so small they had to crouch, or deprived of sleep for weeks at a time. One had been killed – through a combination of neglect, ill treatment and avoidable hypothermia. This wasn't ‘enhanced interrogation'. This was torture.

We knew that some of these men had ended up in Guantánamo – where they were held apart, in a separate unit, and prevented from communicating their experiences to the outside world. Others had been transferred to other countries and released, sometimes after years of torture and isolation. But we often didn’t know where they'd been held – and so were unable effectively to investigate what had happened to them or to seek meaningful redress on their behalf.

A comprehensive picture of the illegal system into which these men disappeared – albeit one apparently derived entirely from CIA documents without the participation or inclusion of any former prisoners – is contained in the full report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, published in 2014. But it is unlikely any of us will ever get to read it. The report, a mammoth exercise, is likely
to remain classified for decades. Instead, what we have is a partial summary, heavily redacted at the behest of the CIA – the very agency whose abuses the report investigates.

CIA Torture Unredacted is a ground-breaking study of the CIA’s detention programme. A pioneering combination of sophisticated analysis techniques and detailed open-source research, it unveils crucial data which the CIA tried to hide in its censorship of the torture report. This data paints an unprecedented picture of the inside details of the black site programme.

Why does this matter? While the US has, at least partially, given an account of its missteps in the early years of the ‘War on Terror’, other heavily-complicit countries still maintain the facade that they were not involved. Three European countries which held prisoners for the CIA still refuse to admit to the facts – facts which CIA Torture Unredacted lays out in forensic detail. The UK, despite a recent damning report by its Intelligence and Security Committee, still has not convened a proper judge-led inquiry into its own – considerable – role in what happened. Theresa May’s apology for the rendition of our clients Abdul Hakim Belhadj and Fatima Boudchar was wrung out of an unwilling government only after many years of fighting in the courts. This is simply unacceptable.

It is a truism that if we fail to understand the lessons of history we are doomed to repeat our failures. But we cannot learn from history unless we know what it is. CIA Torture Unredacted is an essential guide to the history of one of the most profound errors in recent memory – the decision, when threatened, to abandon centuries of due process around imprisonment and prohibitions around torture. It is, at times, uncomfortable reading. But only through comprehensive investigation of how western democracies came to endorse barbarism in the name of protecting freedom can we hope to ensure that this is not repeated.

Clive Stafford Smith, founder, Reprieve

www.reprieve.org.uk
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

It has not been easy to investigate the CIA’s torture programme. State officials from numerous countries, to the highest levels, have denied public access to much of the important documentary evidence relating to the programme; have denied the scope, significance and human impact of the programme; and have even denied its very existence. The victims of CIA torture often do not know where they were held, or who was responsible for their abuse. The outsourcing of key aspects of the programme to private companies has meant the dispersal of evidence, as has its global scope and operation over many years. Our data has often been fragmentary, held at disparate locations across the world, and challenging to access. Likewise, undertaking our analysis has presented significant methodological and resourcing challenges. We are a small team, operating with a small budget.

More than ever, therefore, it is true to say that we would not have been able to do this alone. Our work would not have been possible without being able to build on the investigations and findings of a number of lawyers, activists, parliamentarians, journalists and others who have, over the years since 9/11, sought to expose the abuses at the heart of the ‘War on Terror’. We hope to have given due credit throughout the report – in particular in the endnotes – and remain indebted to those who have worked before us and alongside us to expose the torture programme.

We would like to say our particular thanks to the following people and organisations, who gave us access to material, advice and support throughout our work: Singeli Agnew; Dibyesh Anand; Nicolas Bennett-Jones; Christina Cowger, Allyson Caison, Catherine Read and all members of NCCIT; Helen Darbishire, Lydia Medland and the team at Access Info Europe; Helen Duffy; Hélène Flautre and the European Parliament’s LIBE committee; John Flint; Katie Gallagher; Anand Gopal; Julia Hall; Qassim Hamad; Leah Henderson; Andy Hindmoor; Jonathan Horowitz; Adam Krzykowski; Jason Leopold; Dick Marty and the PACE inquiry team; Vic Parsons; Laura Pitter; Alka Pradhan; Nikki Reisch; Payenda Sargand; Meg Satterthwaite; Graham Smith; Clive Stafford Smith, Cori Crider and the team at Reprieve; Matias Vallés; Sebastian Walker; Jennifer Watson; Steven Watt, Dror Ladin and the team at ACLU; Vincent Wood.

Steve Kostas, who kindly passed on to us a significant body of material he collected, and helped us to make sense of this, has been a crucial colleague throughout our efforts.
Jac St John has worked tirelessly to ensure the integrity of our data, findings and presentation, to create our online document library, and to support us in numerous other ways. We owe him a lot.

Claire Mason from Flushleft, our designer, has brilliantly transformed our intractable mass of material into its current form. This was no small task and we are grateful to her for her perseverance, sensitivity, and eye for detail.

Between them, the University of Westminster, The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, the University of Sheffield, and the University of Kent have funded much of our time, and also provided logistical support at important moments along the way. Thanks also to our students and colleagues, discussions with whom have been key in helping us to formulate the scope and shape of the project.

Lisa Magarrell, Manager of the National Security and Human Rights Project at Open Society Foundations, provided us funding to complete the investigation and produce the report. We could not have finished it without this support, and we are very thankful for it.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

CIA Torture Unredacted presents the findings from a four-year joint investigation by The Rendition Project and The Bureau of Investigative Journalism into the use of rendition, secret detention and torture by the CIA and its partners in the ‘War on Terror’. Between 2001 and 2009, the CIA established a global network of secret prisons (‘black sites’) for the purpose of detaining terrorism suspects, in secret and indefinitely, and interrogating them through the use of torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment. The abuses which took place were severe, sustained, and in clear violation of domestic and international law. The perpetrators have never been held to account.

This report, and The Rendition Project’s website (www.therenditionproject.org.uk), provide the most detailed public account to date of the CIA torture programme. We move significantly beyond the findings of past investigations, including those published in heavily-redacted form by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) in December 2014. In the course of our work, we have:

→ Revealed key material which was redacted from the SSCI Torture Report;
→ Unlocked the locational data from the thousands of CIA cables referenced by the Torture Report, allowing us to build a picture of where the torture of individual prisoners took place;
→ Constructed datasets to enable cross-source analysis of detention times, locations and movements;
→ Collated and published thousands of records relating to CIA rendition operations, including company invoices, pilot logs, landing records and aircraft communications data;
→ Brought together multiple first-hand accounts of torture from former CIA prisoners; and
→ Compiled and indexed hundreds of declassified US Government documents, including many released after 2014.
Our analysis has enabled us to build an unprecedented picture of the programme from the ground up. We are publishing here:

- A detailed profile of the prisoners held within the torture programme, including their nationalities; capture locations and dates; detention locations, dates and treatment; and fate and whereabouts afterwards;
- The identity of those prisoners held in the black sites in Thailand, Poland, Romania, Lithuania, Morocco, and Guantánamo Bay;
- A detailed reconstruction of the shifting geography of secret detention operations in Afghanistan;
- A granular account of the complex network of companies which provided aircraft to the CIA for rendition operations;
- Extensive documentary evidence relating to over 60 rendition circuits by these aircraft, which involved over 120 individual renditions;
- A detailed overview of complicity by a number of key states, including the United Kingdom and those which hosted the black sites.

CIA Torture Unredacted stands as a comprehensive public account of one of the most disturbing elements of the 'War on Terror': a global programme of systematic disappearance and torture, carried out by the world’s most powerful liberal democratic states. In the face of continued obstruction and denial by the governments involved, which refuse to allow for a full accounting of the crimes which took place, we hope that this report will stand as a central reference point for all those who still seek redress and reparations for the victims of CIA torture, as well as some measure of the truth for us all.
When I was suspended to the ceiling there were 20 or more elements at play but before I get into that let me stop. when you read the list of EIT (here are more stuff which were never mentioned in the list) for example you would find prolonged standing or even suspension and it misleads to think that the US Govt agents were using one torture method at a time. Now back to suspension, I wasn’t just being suspended to the ceiling, I was naked, starved, dehydrated, cold, hooded, verbally threatened, in pain from the beating and waterdrowning as my head smashed by hitting against the wall for Dozen and Dozen of Times my ears were exploding from the Blasting harsh music (which is still stuck in my head) Sleep deprived for weeks, I was shaking and trembling my legs barely supported my weight as my hands were pulled even higher above my head after I complained that the handcuffs were so tight as if cutting through my wrists, then my legs start to Swallow as a result of long Suspension, I start screaming and the Doctor came with a tape measure, wrapped it around my leg and told to my utmost shock the Doctor told the Interrogator NO that wasn’t enough and my leg should get more Swollen!!
ABBREVIATIONS

The following abbreviations are used throughout the report, including in the endnotes:

AFTN Aeronautical Fixed Telecommunication Network
ARB Administrative Review Board (DoD)
CAA Civilinės Aviacijos Administracija (Lithuania)
CIA Central Intelligence Agency
CNSD Committee on National Security and Defence (Lithuania)
CSC Computer Sciences Corporation
CSRT Combatant Status Review Board (DoD)
CTC Counterterrorism Center (CIA)
DCI Director of Central Intelligence (CIA)
DDO Deputy Director of Operations (CIA)
DoD Department of Defense
DoJ Department of Justice
DoS Department of State (DoS)
ECtHR European Court of Human Rights
FAA Federal Aviation Administration
FCO Foreign and Commonwealth Office (United Kingdom)
FOIA Freedom of Information Act
GID General Intelligence Directorate (Jordan)
ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross
ISC Intelligence and Security Committee (United Kingdom)
ISI Inter-Services Intelligence (Pakistan)
JTF-GTMO Joint Taskforce Guantánamo (DoD)
MI5 Security Service (United Kingdom)
MI6 Secret Intelligence Service (United Kingdom)
MoN Memorandum of Notification
NSC National Security Council
OIG Office of Inspector General (CIA)
In addition, we use the term 'Committee Study' throughout to refer to the redacted executive summary of the SSCI’s Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency’s Detention and Interrogation Program.
INTRODUCTION
INTRODUCTION

CIA Torture Unredacted presents the findings from a four-year joint investigation by The Rendition Project and The Bureau of Investigative Journalism into the use of rendition, secret detention and torture by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and its partners in the ‘War on Terror’. We have focused our efforts on understanding the evolution, scope and human impact of the CIA’s Rendition, Detention and Interrogation (RDI) programme, which operated between 2001 and 2009. During this time, the CIA established a global network of secret prisons (so-called ‘black sites’) for the purposes of detaining and interrogating terrorism suspects – in secret, indefinitely, and under the most extreme conditions. As a result, scores of men were captured, at locations around the world, and disappeared into the programme for weeks, months or years on end, whereupon they were subjected to sustained torture and other forms of cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment.

This report, and The Rendition Project’s website (www.therenditionproject.org.uk), provide, without doubt, the most detailed public account to date of CIA torture. We move significantly beyond the findings of past investigations, shedding new light on the inner workings of the programme and tracking in detail the operation of the CIA’s black sites, the use of private aircraft to transfer prisoners secretly between these sites, and the fate and whereabouts of those subjected to secret detention, rendition and torture. In particular, we have filled in many of the gaps in public understanding which still exist after the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) decided to withhold its full Committee Study into the programme, and – alongside the CIA and the White House – to heavily redact the Study’s Executive Summary before its publication in December 2014.

As we document throughout the report, the abuses at the heart of the programme were severe, and were in clear violation of international and domestic law. Although the CIA played the lead role, officials and personnel from a number of other states – including other powerful liberal democracies such as the United Kingdom – were deeply implicated in the abuses which took place, as were a number of private companies. Prisoners were held in complete darkness for months on end, chained to bars in the ceiling and forced to soil themselves. Continual loud music, combined with extended sleep deprivation, dietary manipulation and stress positioning were deployed to reduce men to a completely dependent state. Interrogations involved being
severely beaten, and repeatedly slammed against walls. Some prisoners were placed, for hours at a time, in boxes so small they had to crouch. Others were subjected to water torture which induced vomiting, hypothermia and unconsciousness. Men were raped, mutilated, and threatened with guns, drills and being buried alive. They were strapped to chairs and to tables. They were hung upside down and beaten. They were chained to the floor in ways making it impossible to stand or sit. They were deliberately, systematically dehumanised in an attempt by interrogators to exert complete control.

Although these accounts are harrowing, we discuss them in detail throughout the report. We do this because it is important to be clear about the severity and systematic nature of the abuse which lay at the heart of the programme. This is especially true given the lengths to which state officials have gone to deny the impact of, or even the existence of, CIA torture, including through the use of euphemistic language. This was not a programme of ‘enhanced interrogation’; this was torture.

Throughout our investigation, our work has focused on four particular elements of the torture programme. First, we have examined the evolution of the CIA’s network of ‘black sites’: secret prisons built and run by the CIA directly, for the express purpose of holding terror suspects outside the law and interrogating them under torture. We have worked to confirm the location of each of these sites, their position within the overall torture programme, their specific operating periods, and the knowledge and involvement of host countries in their operation. We have also identified, to a far greater level than any other public investigation, the names of those held and tortured within each black site, the dates of their detention, and the treatment to which they were subjected.

Second, we have investigated the CIA’s rendition programme, which ran alongside the detention programme and which was used to transfer prisoners into and out of secret detention, and between detention facilities. We have tracked CIA aircraft as they crossed the globe, and have uncovered the network of private companies which undertook these rendition operations. Our account of the rendition programme is unparalleled, derived from our analysis of thousands of billing records from within the programme and thousands of flight records pertaining to CIA aircraft. We have been able to map both the network itself, as well as more than 60 individual rendition operations. Each of these operations transferred prisoners in secret, in violation of international law, for the purposes of secret detention and torture by the CIA and its partners in the ‘War on Terror’.

Third, we have established the most detailed picture to date of the CIA’s secret prisoners. At least 119 men were detained by the CIA as part of its torture programme, and we have tracked their whereabouts during and after their time in CIA custody. This has included building a picture of the nationalities, capture locations and capture dates of each prisoner, as well as the dates that they were transferred into and out of CIA custody, the duration of their detention, and their fate and whereabouts afterwards. We have also documented, to the greatest degree possible, the location(s) and time frame(s) of each instance of secret detention, along with the conditions and treatment to which each prisoner was subjected.
Last, we have investigated the role played by the United Kingdom, and in particular the
British intelligence services, in providing support for the programme. It is now clear that Britain’s
role was central: supplying locational intelligence for capture operations; passing questions and
intelligence for use in interrogations under torture; planning, financing and facilitating rendition
operations; and acting as a key logistical hub for numerous rendition operations transferring
prisoners for torture.

This is not the first time we have published our findings from this investigation. We have
previously outlined the ways in which we tracked CIA rendition aircraft to understand more fully
the use of secret detention in Europe.¹ We have provided expert testimony to the European Court
of Human Rights (ECtHR), which found that the involvement of European states in the torture
programme led to multiple violations of the European Convention on Human Rights.² We have
assisted citizen-led efforts at accountability for CIA torture.³ We have published the most detailed
public account of British involvement in torture in the ‘War on Terror’,⁴ and have helped to guide
parliamentary, commissioner and police investigations in relation to this.⁵

CIA Torture Unredacted moves beyond our previous publications, however, and provides an
overview of our investigation as a whole. We present here our key findings in one place, along
with an account of our data and the methods we have used for our analysis. These findings have
been made possible through the collection and analysis of thousands of records relating to CIA
torture, including flight records, corporate invoices and billing records, declassified CIA docu-
ments, court records and prisoner testimonies. We have also developed novel techniques to
‘unredact’ – both literally and metaphorically – the heavily-redacted executive summary of the
SSCI’s ‘Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency’s Detention and Interrogation Program’
(hereafter, the Committee Study).⁶ Through a detailed analysis of the text and the redactions
within the Committee Study, including through pioneering a technique to unlock the locational
data from the thousands of CIA cables referenced by the Study, and through a systematic trian-
gulation of this data with the other records at our disposal, we are able to significantly advance
our understanding of how the torture programme evolved.

This has not been easy. The torture programme was a highly secret endeavour, with the CIA
and its partners going out of their way to hide the existence of a secret prison network dedicated
to the indefinite detention and torture of terror suspects. It has taken years of investigation, by
journalists, lawyers, parliamentarians and human rights investigators, for the broad contours of
the programme to be revealed. Our report builds upon these previous efforts, and we remain
indebted to each of them.

The report has two substantive chapters, followed by two appendices. In Chapter 1 we
explain how we sourced and analysed our data, including through ‘unredacting’ the Committee
Study, through the construction of a number of unique and powerful databases (versions of
which we are publishing alongside this report), and through the systematic triangulation of our
data. We also provide a summary of our key findings, which relate to the black sites, the rendi-
tion programme, the fate and whereabouts of the prisoners, and the multifaceted nature of
British involvement.
In Chapter 2 we provide an account of the overall evolution of the torture programme, from its inception immediately after the attacks of 11 September 2001 until its closure in January 2009. Our focus here is on tracking the shifting network of black sites, secret detentions and rendition operations, so as to situate the detention and torture of individual prisoners within a broader, programmatic context.

Our extensive appendices outline our current assessment of what happened to each of the CIA’s prisoners (Appendix 1), and of the rendition operations which moved them into, out of, and between the secret prisons (Appendix 2). Focus here is on the marshalling of all available evidence to provide an account of what happened to each prisoner, where they were held, how they were moved, and by whom.

Our core findings are based upon the correlation of independent facts which mutually reinforce each other through a process of multiple triangulation. Although some of our specific findings may be provisional, given the incomplete data from which they are derived, our overall account of the spatial architecture and evolution of CIA torture is supported by such a rich set of data that it would be impossible to plausibly sustain any other conclusions than those we derive here. Given the continued obfuscation and denial from many state authorities, this point is important to make. Indeed, as the ECtHR has found – based in part on the presentation of our findings before the Court – the continued refusal by state authorities to release the full information in their possession should not be seen as an insurmountable obstacle to establishing proof in the context of CIA torture. Rather, the Court found, ‘proof may follow from the coexistence of sufficiently strong, clear and concordant inferences or of similar unrefuted presumptions of fact.’

In this light, it is simply not possible to deny what we have now established as indisputably and factually true about the CIA torture programme, including in relation to the host countries of the black sites, their operational periods, the changing number of prisoners held in the programme over time and who was held in each black site, and the aircraft, companies and countries involved in dozens of individual, specific rendition operations.

Overall, we hope that this report will stand as a central reference point for all those who still believe that the systematic human rights abuses at the heart of the programme, which translate to many stories of individual human suffering, demand a full accounting of the facts of CIA torture. We firmly believe that it is access to these facts which will ultimately drive further attempts to achieve justice and accountability for the abuses committed, as well as any further successes in this regard. We also believe that such an accounting of the past is important for assisting those who continue to challenge the involvement of states (including liberal democracies) in systematic human rights abuses in the name of countering terrorism and defending freedom.

**ACCOMPANYING RESOURCES**

CIA Torture Unredacted does not just provide the most detailed public account to date of the CIA torture programme. It also provides comprehensive open access to our underlying data, including
our unique datasets and the hundreds of primary documents with which we have worked. Where individual documents are referenced in the text of the report, access is provided through the hyperlinked endnotes in each chapter and appendix. In addition, The Rendition Project website (www.therenditionproject.org.uk) provides access to the following:

- an online, fully-indexed document archive, where users can search and browse hundreds of CIA and other documents;
- a prisoner search page, where users can search for and filter prisoners by name, capture location, detention locations, and other indicators;
- a rendition circuit search page, where users can search for rendition operations by country involved, aircraft and prisoner;
- a version of our Prisoner Database, allowing users to filter and search to conduct independent data analysis;
- a version of our Cable Database, allowing users to identify the location from which individual cables were sent and their dates;
- a version of our Flights Database, with visualisations and data filter functions.

As well as these online resources, we include throughout this report full-page images – themselves hyperlinked to the underlying documents – which provide illustrative examples of the records to which we have access, providing an easy way to understand the type and extent of data which underpin our findings.

**PRISONER NAMING CONVENTION**

Those held by the CIA have, in many cases, been known by multiple names. This has been either on account of aliases adopted by the individuals concerned, or because others (e.g., the US government) have made their own determination in this regard. Transliteration from (in most cases) Arabic has also often provided numerous spellings for names, in particular for common nomenclature such as Sheikh (Shaykh), Khalid (Khaled), and Mohammed (Mohamed, Muhammad, and so on).

Throughout our work we have adopted one form, and one spelling, for the name of each of the CIA’s prisoners, relying where possible on the spelling most often found in NGO and legal texts. Where the Committee Study (based on CIA naming conventions), or other key organisations (such as the Department of Defense), use names for individuals which are significantly different, we note this in the prisoner profile in Appendix 1 – although we do not provide a full listing of all aliases which have been associated with each prisoner.

In most cases, the names adopted by us conform closely or identically with the names adopted in the Committee Study. Important exceptions include those listed in this table.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Rendition Project name</th>
<th>Committee Study name and number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abdul Rabbani</td>
<td>Abd al-Rahim Ghulam Rabbani (#23)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ahmed Rabbani</td>
<td>Ghulam Rabbani, aka Abu Badr (#25)</td>
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<td>Ali al-Hajj al-Sharqawi</td>
<td>Riyadh the Facilitator (#93)</td>
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<td>Gouled Dourad</td>
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<td>Khaled al-Maqtari</td>
<td>Firas al-Yemeni (#96)</td>
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<td>Khalid al-Sharif</td>
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<td>Salah Nasir Salim Ali (#75)</td>
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<td>Saleh Di’iki</td>
<td>Abu Abdallah al-Zulaytini (#94)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walid bin Attash</td>
<td>Khallad bin Attash (#56)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When we first mention specific prisoners, we follow their name with their Committee Study number – e.g., Abu Zubaydah (#1), Abu Faraj al-Libi (#114) – to enable easy cross-referencing with other sections of the report. A full list of the CIA’s 119 prisoners, as indexed by the Committee Study and later amended after our initial investigation found anomalies in the data provided, is provided after this introduction.

NOTES ON THE TEXT

We use UK English spellings throughout (e.g., programme), unless we are citing US documents or institutions.

Where we have ‘unredacted’ parts of the Committee Study to determine the hidden text, we represent such text through the use of this typographic format. Where we have been able to ascertain only the number of digits underlying the redaction of a number, but not the values themselves, we have represented these as follows: $\times$ for single-digit numbers; $\times\times$ for double-digit numbers.

Many of our references are to individual CIA cables, which in many cases have been extracted from the Committee Study. Here, we have often been able to unredact the locational data for a particular cable, or the date of a cable (either exactly or within a narrow range), or both. We discuss this in detail in Chapter 1, but note here that, where this has been possible, our cable references include the unredacted portions in this typographic format.

Some of the prisoner testimonies we reproduce were recorded in imperfect conditions. We have occasionally edited the transcripts to ensure maximum clarity, although we have been careful to retain the original meaning throughout. Source material can always be accessed through the endnotes.
To maximise readability of the text we have used endnotes, rather than footnotes, throughout. In the electronic version of the report these are dynamic, and so allow easy movement between the text and the corresponding endnotes. All endnotes are hyperlinked to full versions of the documents, which are held on The Rendition Project website.

Endnotes


6. SSCI, Committee Study, 9 December 2014 (redacted).

7. See, for example: ECtHR, Judgment: Al Nashiri v. Romania, 31 May 2018, para 488.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>CIA Detainees</th>
<th>Date of Custody</th>
<th>Days in CIA Custody</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Abu Zubaydah</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>1,610</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>Zarkariya</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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**Key**

- **Bold Text:** Detainees in bold text were subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.
- **Italic Text:** Detainees in italics have not been previously acknowledged by the CIA to the SSCI.

**Source Information**

CIA Fax to SSCI Committee Staff, entitled, “15 June Request for Excel Spreadsheet,” June 17, 2009. DTS #22009-3359.

CIA detainee charts provided to the Committee on April 27, 2007. Document in Committee Records entitled, “Briefing Charts provided to committee members from CIA Director Michael Hayden at the closed Hearing on April 12, 2007, concerning EITs used with CIA detainees, and a list of techniques.” DTS #2007-1594.

CIA operational cables and other records produced for the Committee’s Study of the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program.
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**KEY**

**BOLD TEXT:** Detainees in bold text were subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.

**ITALICS TEXT:** Detainees in italics have not been previously acknowledged by the CIA or the SSCI.

# Detainee number on main detainee spreadsheet, based on date of CIA custody. Number is based on a designation made by the SSCI, not the CIA.

**SOURCE INFORMATION**

CIA Fax to SSCI Committee Staff, entitled, "15 June Request for Excel Spreadsheet," June 17, 2009. DTS #2009-2529.

CIA detainee charts provided to the Committee on April 27, 2007. Document in Committee Records entitled, “Briefing Charts provided to committee members from CIA Director Michael Hayden at the closed hearing on April 12, 2007, concerning ERTs used with CIA detainees, and a list of techniques.” DTS #2007-1994.

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**Sources:** CIA Fax to SSCI Committee Staff, entitled, “15 June Request for Excel Spreadsheet,” June 17, 2009 (DTS #2009-252); CIA detainee charts provided to the Committee on April 27, 2007; document in Committee records entitled, “Briefing Charts provided to committee Members from CIA Director Michael Hayden at the closed Hearing on April 12, 2007, concerning EITs used with CIA detainees, and a list of techniques” (DTS #2007-1594, hearing transcript at DTS# 2007-3158); and CIA operational cables and other records produced for the Committee’s Study of the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program.

**Gul Rahman, listed as detainee 24, was the subject of a notification to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence following his death at DETENTION SITE COBALT; however, he has not appeared on lists of CIA detainees provided to Committee.**
CHAPTER 1

UNREDACTING CIA TORTURE
CHAPTER 1: UNREDACTING CIA TORTURE

Much has been written about the CIA torture programme, and its broad contours are now well understood. Referred to by the CIA as the Rendition, Detention and Interrogation (RDI) programme, it ran from September 2001 until January 2009, and formed a central plank of the Bush administration’s ‘War on Terror’. It was global in scope, and shocking in its depravity, representing one of the most profoundly disturbing episodes of recent US and allied foreign policy. The programme resulted in multiple violations of domestic and international law, encompassing a global network of kidnap operations, indefinite secret detention at numerous locations, and the systematic use of brutal interrogation techniques which clearly amounted to torture.

As part of the programme, scores of terror suspects were swept up by the CIA in the months and years after 9/11, with capture operations taking place across Europe, Africa, the Caucasus, the Middle East, and Central, South and Southeast Asia. Foreign security forces often played a role in the capture, either jointly with the CIA or acting on the basis of US and allied intelligence. Prisoners were held for days or weeks in foreign custody, and were often interrogated under torture. CIA officials were present during many of these interrogations. For example, Majid al-Maghrebi (#91) was held in Pakistani custody for several weeks before his transfer to a CIA prison in Afghanistan. Throughout this period, he was interrogated and tortured repeatedly, including many times via electric shocks until he lost consciousness, as well as beatings (including with a leather whip) and the use of stress positions and positional torture (including tying him to a frame and ‘stretching’ him). He could hear the screams of others being tortured at the facility, as well as their pleas for mercy: ‘I can still hear the voice of one of the guys in my head asking them to stop, saying blood was coming out of his mouth.’ Likewise, Mohamed Bashmilah (#89) was tortured repeatedly while in Jordanian custody:

Soon after seeing my mother and wife, some guards came and took me from my cell to a large hall in the same building, known as the Yard, where several guards were waiting in a circle holding canes. The guards surrounded me and commanded me to run around in circles. When I became too fatigued to run any further they beat me with their canes. When I could no longer withstand the pain of being beaten by the canes I collapsed into the middle of the circle. The guards in the Yard tried to demean
me by ordering me to imitate animals. They forced me to imitate a donkey’s bray and the antics of dogs. After torturing me in the Yard the guards then took me to another room and suspended me upside down, from the ceiling.²

After this period of initial detention, prisoners were transferred to CIA custody, either formally or otherwise. At this stage, most were rendered – transferred between states outside of the law – to secret detention at one of a number of facilities around the globe. Some of these facilities were themselves secret; others were acknowledged to exist but yet held some prisoners ‘off the books’. A number were owned and run by another foreign security service – in particular, those in Afghanistan, Egypt, Jordan and Morocco – while others were operated by the US Department of Defense (DoD) in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The CIA itself built and operated at least ten of its own secret prisons. Four of these so-called ‘black sites’ were located in Afghanistan, with others in Thailand, Poland, Romania, Lithuania and within the grounds of the US naval base at Guantánamo Bay. At least two others, one in Morocco and a second site in Lithuania, were built but never used. Agreements were also reached with two further countries to establish black sites on their territory, although these plans were not enacted.³

CIA detentions and interrogations also took place at a number of informal ‘safe houses’ and ad hoc locations. Khaled el-Masri (#97), for example, was held by the CIA for 23 days in January 2004, in a hotel room in Skopje, Macedonia, before being rendered to an Afghan-run prison in Kabul.⁴ Both CIA records and prisoner testimony make clear that there was an evolving network of secret detention sites in Afghanistan and, as we detail in Chapter 2, the CIA made extensive use of Afghan-run facilities and safe houses to hold detainees before, during and after their time in the official black sites.

The black sites and other prisons did not exist in isolation from one another. They formed, rather, a network of secret detention facilities which operated across four continents, with individual sites operating for varying periods within the overall programme. Rendition aircraft – civilian aircraft operated by or on behalf of the CIA – flew hundreds of flights to connect the sites, and were used to transfer prisoners, interrogators and other US officials between prisons. These flights were undertaken in secret, and where they carried CIA prisoners they entailed multiple violations of international law. This was the case, not least, given the treatment to which they were subjected. Prisoners were drugged, shackled, hooded and strapped to stretchers by rendition teams dressed entirely in black and communicating only in sign language. Some were placed in coffins during the flight; others were beaten repeatedly during their transfer. This procedure was designed, in the words of one memo, to create ‘significant apprehension in the [detainee] because of the enormity and suddenness of the change in the environment, the uncertainty about what will happen next, and the potential dread [they] might have of US custody.’⁵

After riding in the car with these guards for about twenty or twenty-five minutes, we arrived at an airport, where I was assaulted and experienced very humiliating, painful and terrifying treatment. I was pulled roughly out of the car. I was lifted off the ground
and my blindfold was ripped off. I saw about five black-clad individuals whose faces were concealed by balaclavas. They tore off all of my clothing. One shoved a finger into my rectum. They photographed me naked. Then they put a diaper on me and... plugged my ears with cotton, placed headphones and a hood over my head, and securely taped the hood. They chained my hands, waist, and feet. I was blind, deaf, and could barely walk. I was in severe pain and felt deeply humiliated and weak...

After experiencing this terrible treatment, I half-walked and was half-carried onto a waiting plane by people holding me on both sides. I was forced to lie on my back on the floor, and then was strapped down around my legs and waist... The position they put me in was very painful. I could not shift my position as I could barely move because of the straps. I have a back injury from before my detention, and I asked to be allowed to change positions to alleviate the pain but the guards did nothing. I even tried using English, pleading ‘Help me, help me please!’ but no one did anything.⁶

Mohammed al-Asad (#92)

Some men were rendered multiple times. For example, the CIA’s first formal prisoner, Abu Zubaydah (#1), was rendered at least seven times during his four-and-a-half years of secret CIA detention: from Pakistan to Thailand, then to Poland, Guantánamo Bay, Morocco, Lithuania, Afghanistan and finally to US military detention at Guantánamo Bay (where he remains).

Prisoners were held secretly within the programme for months or years on end, always incommunicado (without access to legal representation or other contact with the outside world). All were held in continuous solitary confinement, under conditions designed explicitly to dehumanise and exert control, and which in themselves clearly amounted to cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment.

Conditions at some of the sites were dungeon-like, with prisoners held in either complete darkness or constant light, and subjected to continual loud noise, harsh temperatures and a number of ‘conditioning techniques’ designed, in the words of one CIA memo, to reduce them ‘to a baseline, dependent state.’ These required ‘little to no physical interaction between the detainee and the interrogator,’ and were important ‘to demonstrate to the [prisoner] that he has no control over basic human needs.’⁷ Such techniques, which were applied throughout an individual’s detention, and were separate from the interrogations under torture, included sustained nudity, sleep deprivation through vertical shackling, diapering, and dietary manipulation.

Many were also subjected to multiple and sustained forms of torture, either during interrogation sessions or as part of a generalised regime of detention. This torture was brutal. Men were subjected, variously, to drowning to the point of unconsciousness, repeated beatings, the use of ice baths and hoses to induce hypothermia, sleep deprivation for more than a week at a time, painful stress positions for months at a time, prolonged confinement in extremely small boxes, and sexual assault by forced feeding through the rectum. Others were subjected to mock execution, electro-torture, genital mutilation, mock burials, rape, and stress positions so severe that, in one case, observers were concerned that the prisoner’s arms would dislocate from his
6. Subject was led to the small box and was shut in at 1349 hours. The small box was moved back to its original location by the security team several minutes later. At 1412 hours subject could be heard sobbing, which continued for some time. At 1424 hours, subject was heard mumuring a prayer, making an appeal to God. (Note: interestingly subject was heard using the word "rabbi" as opposed to the word "Allah". Generally speaking the word rabbi is typically but not exclusively used by Christians in the Arab world. It is also used by Moslems in some cases. End of note.) During the prayer subject was heard saying that he had nothing and asking God to help him remember anything else.

Subject was removed from the small box at 1745 hours by the security team, and seated in the corner, hooded, until the next session began.

7. At 1756 hours, the security team and interrogators entered the room. The small box was again moved out of the way, and the water table wheeled in. Subject's hood was removed, and he was helped to his feet. When asked if he was ok, subject replied that he was cold. The water table support collar was placed around his neck and head.

He was told to get on to the water table. He was led to the water table, and climbed on to it slowly, trembling and shaking. His breathing became visibly more rapid. He frantically pleaded with interrogators while they were strapping him on to the board, saying he had given everything he knew.

Cable from the Thai Black Site, August 2002, describing the eighth continuous day of Abu Zubaydah's torture.
The psychological impact of extended secret detention in isolation from human contact, sensory deprivation, stress positioning and interrogation under torture, was extreme. Many detainees became suicidal, and used blankets, toothbrushes and other objects to harm themselves. Others rammed their heads against their cell walls in an attempt to lose consciousness. Men experienced severe hallucinations and paranoia, and many have continued to suffer significant post-traumatic stress.

"I became so hopeless and helpless that I decided to end my life. I stockpiled painkillers given to me by medics over the weeks of my detention to ease the pain in my right hand, and I attempted to swallow them and overdose. However, before I was able to swallow them, guards entered my cell and stopped me.... I still suffer the excruciating physical and mental effects of my time in the Darkness and the interrogators’ abusive treatment of me. My whole body still aches, my upper and lower back especially. I regularly suffer crippling flashbacks and nightmares. They’re a constant reminder of that place and the terrible things that were done to me there."¹⁰

Suleiman Abdullah (#48)

THE COMMITTEE STUDY

Many new details of the CIA’s torture programme emerged in December 2014, with the partial publication of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) ‘Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency’s Detention and Interrogation Program’ (hereafter, the Committee Study). The SSCI is tasked with ‘oversee[ing] and mak[ing] continuing studies of the intelligence activities and programs of the United States Government’, and in this context completed a three-year review of the torture programme between March 2009 and December 2012. The Study represents a mammoth effort, and is without doubt the most comprehensive review of CIA torture ever likely to be conducted. The full report, which remains classified, has over 6,700 pages and 38,000 footnotes, and is drawn from extensive and unprecedented access to classified CIA records. More than six million pages of material were reviewed, including ‘cable traffic, reports, memoranda, intelligence products, records of interviews conducted of CIA personnel by the CIA’s Office of the Inspector General and other CIA entities, as well as internal email and other communications.'¹¹ Over three volumes, the Study covers the history of the programme from its inception to its termination, along with a review of each of those known to have been held by the CIA. It describes the agreements in place with foreign governments for the operation of the secret prisons, as well as the ways in which the CIA misrepresented the effectiveness of its use of torture to gather intelligence."¹²
The Committee Study provided new insights into the scope, scale and nature of the programme. For the first time, an official list of CIA detainees was published, with 119 names provided in an appendix to the report. Many of these prisoners had never before been identified by investigators. There were new details of the treatment to which these men were subjected, with ‘overwhelming and incontrovertible’ evidence of the use of torture, as well as ‘conditions of confinement and the use of authorized and unauthorized interrogation and conditioning techniques [that] were cruel, inhuman, and degrading.’

CIA records cited by the Study showed that torture was used immediately after the arrival of prisoners at a site, rather than as part of a measured escalation of interrogation methods (as the CIA had claimed). The Study also concluded that black site staff and interrogators were poorly trained, and subjected prisoners to improvised torture methods without authorisation. Meanwhile, the development and deployment of the authorised torture techniques was described as being largely the work of two contract psychologists, named elsewhere as James Mitchell and Bruce Jessen, who had no experience as interrogators but who made millions of dollars via their contract with the CIA.

Despite the global press interest and political reaction which accompanied the release of the Study, the published summary provides only a partial account of the use of secret detention, rendition and torture by the CIA and its allies in the ‘War on Terror’. This is so in a number of ways. The overall scope of the report is limited: there is no discussion of the rendition branch of the programme, and the aircraft and companies which took part in this are not mentioned at all. Individuals being transferred by the CIA to foreign governments or the US military were explicitly excluded from the Committee’s investigation, as was an accounting of the fate and whereabouts of these men and the involvement by the CIA in their interrogation. These are significant omissions, given that many detainees were moved into and out of formal CIA custody throughout their time in secret detention, and given that the CIA continued to have access to detainees held in foreign and US military custody.

The Committee Study, as published, also provides little or no information on most of the CIA’s prisoners. Chapters within the Study provide detailed analysis of the cable traffic relating to a small number of interrogations under torture: Abu Zubaydah (#1) between 4-23 August 2002; Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri (#26) between 5 December 2002 – 27 January 2003; Ramzi bin al-Shibh (#41) between 11-28 February 2003; and Khaled Sheikh Mohammed (#45) between 6-24 March 2003. While there is an excruciating level of detail in these case studies, they neither account for these detainees’ entire period of secret CIA detention, nor encompass the vast majority of those held within the programme. More than 50 of the 119 prisoners are not discussed at all in the Study, remaining simply names on a list, while a further 20 are mentioned only once or twice in passing. With the exception of the four men above, the executive summary refers to most of the prisoners in a haphazard, inconsistent and fragmentary fashion, with information about each prisoner often buried at multiple locations in the report, and often only in the footnotes.

Despite the fact that the programme operated within the context of significant international cooperation, the Committee Study also fails to address in any detail the role played by other
governments, and by partner intelligence and security agencies. This absence is perhaps most glaring in the case of those countries which hosted the CIA’s black sites, but is also significant in cases where other countries provided material and intelligence support for capture and rendition operations, or for interrogations under torture. In this sense, no case was more significant than UK support for the programme, and the absence of all mention of British involvement in the Committee Study is striking: 18

Perhaps most significantly, some of the most important information in the Committee Study is hidden from public view, either through the use of pseudonyms in place of real names or through the redaction of text (where particular words are blacked out, [REDACTED]). Without exception, the names and locations of each black site, the countries that hosted (or negotiated the hosting of) these sites, and the names of CIA personnel working at the sites are hidden behind pseudonyms. Even at the point where the classified Study was presented to the full Committee, the names of those countries which hosted black sites had been replaced with a letter, so that they were referred to throughout as ‘Country A’, ‘Country B’, and so on. Likewise, each black site was given a colour, and described as ‘DETENTION SITE BLACK’, ‘DETENTION SITE BLUE’, and so on. During the subsequent declassification process to prepare the Study for public consumption, the CIA and White House added another level of opacity, replacing some specific dates with more general time frames, redacting specific locations, and redacting all pseudonyms for black site hosts (thus, ‘Country A’ has become ‘Country A’). In addition, the locational data for each of the hundreds of cables from CIA stations, which are cited throughout the report, were redacted to conceal where the abuses took place.

There are thousands of redactions, and numerous pseudonyms, scattered throughout the report, relating to the geographic locations of CIA detention and torture, the identities of the torturers, the dates of particular renditions and detentions, and the active involvement of other countries. In essence, the declassification process was designed to ensure that the abuses described at some length in the report can be tied to neither specific individuals, specific times, nor specific jurisdictions. This has significant implications for a full understanding of the programme, and for attempts to achieve some measure of justice for the abuses which took place.

MOVING BEYOND THE COMMITTEE STUDY

Launched in December 2014, our investigation aims to address many of the Committee Study’s limitations, and to fill in many of the remaining gaps in the public understanding of how the CIA torture programme operated. This effort, which has taken years of investigative research to collate, analyse and triangulate a huge amount of data relating to CIA torture, has enabled us to build a picture of the programme from the ground up. By tracking each individual prisoner as they were rendered between secret detention sites; tracking the use of each facility over time (including location, layout, conditions of confinement, and operational dates); tracking the CIA aircraft involved in the torture programme as they travelled the globe; and tracking the companies
enhanced techniques commensurate with [KSM’s] level of resistance, until he indicates initial cooperation.” On March 1, 2003, the day of KSM’s arrival at DETENTION SITE BLUE, the on-site medical officer described the use of the waterboard on KSM as inevitable:

"[T]he team here apparently looks to use the water board in two different contexts. One is as a tool of regression and control in which it is used up front and aggressively. The second is to vet information on an as needed basis. Given the various pressures from home vs what is happening on the ground, I think the team’s expectation is that [KSM] will [be] getting treatment somewhere in between. I don’t think they believe that it will be possible to entirely avoid the water board given the high and immediate threat to US and allied interests. It is an interesting dynamic because they are well aware of the toll it will take on the team vs. the detainee. The requirements coming from home are really unbelievable in terms of breadth and detail.”

Meanwhile, OMS completed draft guidelines on the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques, specifically addressing the waterboard interrogation technique. These guidelines were sent to the medical personnel at the detention site. The guidelines included a warning that the risk of the waterboard was “directly related to number of exposures and may well accelerate as exposures increase,” that concerns about cumulative effects would emerge after three to five days, and that there should be an upper limit on the total number of waterboard exposures, “perhaps 20 in a week.” CIA records indicate that, as of the day of KSM’s arrival at DETENTION SITE BLUE, the interrogation team had not reviewed the draft OMS guidelines.

KSM arrived at DETENTION SITE BLUE at approximately 6:00 PM local time on March 1, 2003, and was immediately stripped and placed in the standing sleep deprivation position. At 6:38 PM, after the medical and psychological personnel who had traveled with KSM from DETENTION SITE COBALT cleared KSM for the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques, the detention site requested CIA Headquarters’ approval to begin the interrogation process. The detention site received the approvals at 7:18 PM, at which point the interrogators began using the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques on KSM.

Between March 1, 2003, and March 9, 2003, contractors SWIGERT and DUNBAR, and a CIA interrogator, used the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques against KSM, including nudity, standing sleep deprivation, the attention

430 10064 (030904Z MAR 03); DIRECTOR 10024 (04/4442Z MAR 03). The initial approval was for
SWIGERT and CIA interrogator
2003. DIRECTOR 10054 (04/4442Z MAR 03). The authorization was extended to DUNBAR on March 1, 2003, at 3:51:09 AM.
451 Email from: [REDACTED]; to: cc: subject: Technique; date: March 1, 2003, at 3:51:09 AM.
452 Email from: [REDACTED]; to: cc: subject: Re: Technique; date: March 1, 2003, at 3:22:45 PM.
453 10711
454 10705
455 DIRECTOR 10711
456
and countries involved in enabling the programme to operate, we can present a far richer picture of how CIA rendition, secret detention and torture played out on the ground.

Our data comes from a number of key sources. First, we have brought together the findings of previous investigations by a number of journalists, lawyers, NGOs and parliamentary bodies, especially where these have significantly advanced the factual narrative in relation to CIA torture. We have also collated first-hand accounts from former CIA prisoners, some of which have been published as witness statements in court cases in the United States and elsewhere; others of which have been gathered by international organisations, human rights investigators or journalists. We bring together this testimony for the first time, providing multiple, harrowing accounts of the torture endured.

Then, they took me to a room and hung me by my hand to an iron shackle where my toes hardly touched the ground. They removed the mask away from my face and left me hanging from one hand, naked, thirsty, and hungry. I regained my breath after they removed the mask but soon enough I began feeling tired from being hung, hungry, and thirsty. All my weight was hung from the iron shackle until my hand was about to be cut off and the blood was going down to my feet. All my body parts were shaking because of cut off blood circulation and my pulled and beaten body began hurting all over and my head, nose and mouth started bleeding. Although I was not able to see anything due to the darkness, I was able to smell and taste the blood that was falling down my throat.

Ahmed Rabbani (#25)

We have also made use of hundreds of formerly-classified US Government documents, most of which have been declassified in response to Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) litigation or other lawsuits. Significant tranches of documents include those relating to US military detentions of former CIA prisoners at Guantánamo Bay, including the transcripts from the Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs) and the Administrative Review Boards (ARBs), and the Joint Task Force Guantánamo (JTF-GTMO) Detainee Assessments, all of which are hosted by The New York Times. They also include material released to the American Civil Liberties Union through FOIA litigation and through discovery in legal proceedings; and material released to investigative journalist Jason Leopold following the publication of the Committee Study.

In addition we have comprehensively deconstructed the Committee Study, extracting each of the thousands of pieces of data scattered throughout its pages and connecting each where possible to particular individuals, locations and dates. We have also been able to 'unredact', in a literal sense, many of the Study's redactions. This is due to our identification of a number of important – if apparently unremarkable – features of the report's formatting and typography. Armed with this knowledge, it becomes possible to propose likely values underlying specific redactions, especially where these clearly hide the name of a calendar month, a particular date, or a particular location. Where our proposed underlying text has strong confirmation from an independent source, and where there is an exact overlay with the redaction, there is a very strong indication that we have identified the correct value.
UNREDACTING THE COMMITTEE STUDY: FORMATTING AND TYPOGRAPHICAL CHARACTERISTICS

Identifying the following characteristics of the Committee Study text has been crucial to our process of unredacting:

- the report is written in Times New Roman, at 12pt (with footnotes in 10pt);
- the report is ‘flushed left’ (aligned along the left margin), meaning that there are equal spaces between each word (unlike with justified text);
- Times New Roman is a proportional font, meaning that the width of each character is variable (so ‘w’ is wider than ‘j’);
- Despite Times New Roman being proportional, its figures are monospaced (so ‘1’ has the same width as ‘8’). This means that, where a redaction clearly hides just figures (e.g., the date), we cannot identify the value, but we can identify the number of figures (single or double digit). It also means that, where it is clear that a redaction hides both figures and letters, and we know the number of figures, we can identify the length of the accompanying word (this is useful for unredacting cable references – see below);
- the report uses a standardised date format: ‘month date, year’ (e.g., ‘February 23, 2004’);
- redactions are applied to individual words or sentence fragments, with the redaction always coterminous with the word(s). There are no large block redactions applied to whole paragraphs.

Lastly, we have collated large amounts of data relating to the companies and aircraft involved in the torture programme. This includes contracting and billing documentation passed between companies, registration and leasing documentation for particular aircraft, and flight data. ‘Flight data’ is our term for information that provides geolocational data on specific aircraft at specific times. In many cases, this data was sourced initially through the work of other investigators, and we are indebted to a number of organisations and individuals for agreeing to share their findings with us. Our own investigation has also secured the release of significant tranches of data. Overall, these come from a large number of sources, including Eurocontrol (a pan-European, intergovernmental air traffic management organisation), the US Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), a number of national civil aviation, border guard and airport authorities across Europe, the findings of parliamentary investigations at a national level, hotel records, eyewitness accounts, and documentation secured from within the CIA torture program.

Collecting this data was only the first step. Our ability to generate significant new findings in relation to the CIA torture programme has come as a result of building datasets which allow analysis along multiple vectors, as well as subsequent triangulation between these datasets. We discuss these next.
CIA FLIGHTS DATABASE

Our CIA Flights Database is the world’s largest and most comprehensive public database relating to aircraft associated with the CIA torture programme. Compiled over a number of years, and first released in May 2013, our database incorporates flight data from a number of authoritative sources. This enables us to track the movements of individual aircraft between airports on particular dates. It is the collation of this data into one database, and the subsequent analysis, which has enabled us to generate significant new findings in relation to the rendition of CIA detainees. This is particularly true given that each individual dataset within the database contains only partial records of an aircraft’s movement, and it is only by linking individual flights into ‘flight circuits’ (a series of discrete flights – from A to B, from B to C, and so on – which connect together to form an overall global trip) that it has been possible to track rendition aircraft as they transited from airport to airport. Each record in the database represents one flight by a specific aircraft between two airports. Aircraft are identified in the data by their registration numbers (often referred to as their tail numbers), and circuits are built by ordering records by this number, and then by date, to establish a chronological account of each aircraft’s movements.

Collecting this data, and matching across hundreds of individual flight records to produce meaningful flight circuits, has been time-consuming and challenging. This is true not least because of the sheer number of different sources in the database, as well as the different formats which the raw data has taken. These include exchanges of messages or digital data between a number of different actors around the world on the Aeronautical Fixed Telecommunication Network (AFTN) or the Société Internationale de Télécommunications Aéronautiques (SITA) Network; extracts from air traffic management systems used by air traffic authorities (each with varying fields); lists or tables generated specifically for the purpose of answering FOIA requests; take-off and landing records generated by individual airports; itineraries listed in corporate invoices; pilot logs; hotel records; and service provision invoices by companies operating at particular airports. This data – which cumulatively consists of tens of thousands of individual data points – has had to be converted to a standardised format to enable cross-dataset analysis to take place.

Formed in this way, the database contains over 15,000 records, relating to over 11,000 flights. A version of our CIA Flights Database can be accessed on The Rendition Project website (www.therenditionproject.org.uk), which allows users to search flight records for themselves. Around 200 aircraft are listed in the database. Not all of these aircraft were involved in the torture programme, although all of them have been suggested as such in the past. As a further caveat, even where certain aircraft clearly undertook rendition operations (transferring prisoners between facilities), not all flights by these aircraft are rendition flights. Many rendition planes were private charter aircraft, and the CIA was one of a number of clients. Even where a flight took place by or on behalf of the CIA, this could have been for a number of operational reasons, to do with both the torture programme (e.g. ferrying staff and supplies between black sites) and other intelligence activities.
**February 2005 invoice from Palanga Airport, Lithuania (EYPA), for charges due for aircraft N787WH, having flown from Bucharest, Romania (LRBS) (Circuit 55)**

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Flight Number</th>
<th>Aircraft Type</th>
<th>Fuel, LT</th>
<th>VAT, EUR</th>
<th>VAT Rate</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N787WH</td>
<td>N787WH</td>
<td>57.2</td>
<td>147.4</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Identifying rendition operations from within this data thus requires triangulation with other data sources, specifically those which establish the movements of prisoners into, out of, and between secret detention facilities.\(^3\) These are collated in our CIA Prisoner Database.

## CIA PRISONER DATABASE

Our CIA Prisoner Database provides a summary of our analysis of the 119 CIA prisoners named in the Committee Study, and sets out what is currently known about their nationalities; where and when each prisoner was captured; the duration of pre-CIA custody (before they were transferred to the CIA’s secret prison network); the duration of CIA detention; where they were held; and what happened to each prisoner after their time in CIA detention. We have established this information through a careful reading of prisoner testimony, declassified documents, and other forms of reporting. Our deconstruction of the Committee Study, including an analysis of its redactions, has proved especially fruitful here, as has our analysis of the CIA cables which underpin the Study’s work (see below). A version of the CIA Prisoner Database is available on The Rendition Project website, and can be filtered and ordered to allow for independent analysis of the data.

We have been able to establish a range of dates within which we know each prisoner was transferred into and out of CIA custody. This has been important for tracking the fate and whereabouts of individuals, and was made possible through a detailed analysis of the information provided in the Committee Study triangulated with information gleaned from other sources. Of particular importance has been our analysis of Appendix 2 to the Study. This provides an official list of CIA detainees, ordered chronologically according to their entry date into the programme, along with the date of custody and the number of days each spent in CIA detention. However, key information in this list, including dates and periods of detention, are partially redacted, meaning that it is not possible to easily determine these without our techniques for unredacting.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>CIA Detainees</th>
<th>Date of Custody</th>
<th>Days in CIA Custody</th>
<th>Source Information</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Abu Zubaydah</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>1,617</td>
<td>CIA Fax to SSCI Committee Staff, entitled, “Factsheet: Request for Executive Summary,” June 17, 2009. OfS #2009-2529.</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>Zarkaqa</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>CIA detainees claims provided to the Committee on April 27, 2007. Document in Committee Records entitled, &quot;Briefing Charts provided to Committee members from CIA, Director Michael Hayden at the closed Hearing on April 12, 2007, concerning EFTs used with CIA detainees, and a list of techniques.&quot; OfS #2009-1994.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Jamil al-Moqrani, aka Jamal</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>CIA operatives cables and other records produced for the Committee’s Study of the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Adbar al-Hawari, aka Abu Sufiyan</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>37</td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Hassan Muhammad Abu Bakr Qa’id</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>52</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>Bidja Ahmad Najjar, aka Najjar</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>70</td>
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<td>Ayah Marjodi Ali Sa'id</td>
<td>2002</td>
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<td>Bashir al-Malik Al-Maswadah</td>
<td>2002</td>
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<td>Haji Arif Ahmad al-Abdoura</td>
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<td>Matia Umar al-Mohsin</td>
<td>2002</td>
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<td>Suhaib Awad</td>
<td>2002</td>
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<td>Umair Farooq, aka Abu al-Farouk al-Kuwari</td>
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<td>Abd al-Salam al-Hilabi</td>
<td>2002</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Korai, aka Azael Sar Jiam</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Abbar Zadarya, aka Zecharia Zeiraq</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Rafiq bin Bashir bin Hadi al-Hamdi</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Yusuf Nasir Ahmed al-Bani</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Laci al-Arabi al-Ghadir</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Dr. Hikmat Naj Shokat</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Yaqub al-Malikhi oto Abu Taib</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Abd al-Rahim Gudam Rabbani</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Col Rahman</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Ghulam Rabbani oto Abu Badr</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Abd al-Rahim al-Nashir</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>1,399</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Haji Ghurdi</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Nizar Ali</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Junaid Gil</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Wajid bin Ali oto Muhammad</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Isid</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>Qari Mobarik Ul Rahman</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>Shah Wali Khan</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>Haymadullah Haqqani</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>Bishir al-Rawil</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**KEY**
- **Bold Text:** Detainees in bold text were subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques.
- **Italic Text:** Detainees in italics have not been previously acknowledged by the CIA to the SCI.
- **Bold Text:** Number on main detainee spreadsheet based on data of CIA custody.
- **If data is not available, it is noted as: No data.

**Note on Reduction:** The last digit of days in CIA custody is redacted.
ANALYSIS OF APPENDIX 2: REVEALING THE IN/OUT DATES FOR CIA PRISONERS

The following characteristics of Appendix 2 have allowed us to unredact the entry and exit dates for each prisoner:

- The text in the appendix is Times New Roman, 8pt.
- The month and date of custody is redacted, although the year is not.
- Given the principles already outlined (relating to the proportional characteristics of the font used, the monospaced figures and the standardised date formats) it is possible to suggest values underlying each redaction. These will be in a range, given that ‘April 10, 2004’ is the same length as ‘April 30, 2004’ and all values in between, although different from ‘April 3, 2004’ and also different from all other possible month values.
- These ranges can be further narrowed given the fact that each prisoner appears on the table in the order in which they entered CIA custody. Thus, the earliest in-date for prisoner #3 can be no earlier than the earliest in-date for prisoner #2, while the latest in-date can be no later than prisoner #4.
- The number of days in CIA detention have the final digit redacted. For example, Abu Zubaydah was held by the CIA for 1,591 days. This provides a range (1590-1599 days).
- The exit dates are therefore also a range, derived from the entry range and the custody range. For example, a prisoner brought into the programme ‘February 23, 2003’, and held for 620 days, would have left the programme at some point between 22 October 2004 (10 February 2003 + 620 days) and 18 November 2004 (28 February 2003 + 629 days).

Other data, such as prisoner testimony, flight records, or individual CIA cables (see below), can be used to further narrow these date ranges, often to a specific day. In turn, this has a knock-on effect with other dates for that prisoner, and with the dates for surrounding prisoners (given the chronological relationship between individuals on the list). At the time of writing, we have been able to establish the dates of entry into the CIA prison network to an accuracy of a week or less for 70 of the 119 prisoners, and to between a week and a month for a further 46. In fact, our initial investigation into this data brought to light inaccuracies in the original Appendix of the Committee Study, and the SSCI published a corrected version as a result of our work.32
Our analysis of redactions in the Committee Study has enabled us to identify the location from which many of the CIA station cables were sent. Cable traffic between CIA Headquarters and individual stations form the primary evidential material in the Committee Study, with thousands of individual references throughout. Importantly, it is the cables from the stations back to Headquarters which provide the detailed accounts of prisoner transfers, detentions and torture, and identifying the location of these provides a crucial window into the programme as a whole.

Cable references in the Committee Study have three parts. First, there is the locational data, which we call the ‘originator ID’, identifying the site from where the cable was sent. Cables from the US mainland have this identifier shown (e.g., HEADQUARTERS, WASHINGTON, ALEC), but those of all cables from field stations are redacted. Second, there is what we call the ‘cable ID’. This is a unique identifier for each cable, and tends to be 4-6 figures in length. In this case, cable IDs from the US are all redacted, whereas those of cables from field stations are not. Third, cables have a date-time stamp, in the format ‘(ddhhmmZ MTH yy)’. ‘Z’ here stands for ‘Zulu time’ (Greenwich Mean Time, GMT). For example, a cable with date-time stamp (040952Z SEP 04) would have been sent at 09:52 GMT on 4 September 2004. Most cable references in the Committee Study have their date-time stamp unredacted, although some are redacted in part or in full.

Understanding the format of these cables is important. Each cable is used in the Study to support particular factual claims, and collecting this data enables us to identify which cable(s) refer to which event. For example, cable ‘[*redacted*] 3240 (231839Z SEP 04)’ documents the rape of Majid Khan (#58) on 23 September 2004, where his “lunch tray”, consisting of hummus, pasta with sauce, nuts and raisins, was “pureed” and rectally infused. Other cables document the severe psychological toll exacted on Khan over the following nine months, through his sustained secret detention and torture.

### CIA CABLES DOCUMENTING MAJID KHAN’S DETERIORATING MENTAL HEALTH

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Originator ID</th>
<th>Date-Time Stamp</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3694</td>
<td>301800Z NOV 04</td>
<td>attempts to cut his wrists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3724</td>
<td>031723Z DEC 04</td>
<td>attempts to chew into arm at inner elbow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3835</td>
<td>260659Z DEC 04</td>
<td>attempts to cut vein in top of his foot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4242</td>
<td>191550Z MAR 05</td>
<td>attempts to cut his wrists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4250</td>
<td>221213Z MAR 05</td>
<td>attempts to cut his wrists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4614</td>
<td>071358Z JUN 05</td>
<td>attempts to cut skin at elbow with filed toothbrush</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Crucially, the redacted originator IDs are of different lengths, depending on the field stations from which they came. Thus, all cables from the black site referred to in the Study as DETENTION SITE GREEN have originator IDs of the same length as each other, and this length is different to the IDs of cables from DETENTION SITE BLUE. With this observation as a starting point, we have measured the length of redacted originator IDs for each of the hundreds of cables referenced in the Study. This has enabled us to build our CIA Cable Database. Here, each record relates to one reference of one cable in the Committee Study, and has a number of fields: the length of the redacted originator ID; the (unredacted) cable ID; the (mainly unredacted) date-time stamp; the location of the cable reference in the Study; and the content which the cable supports as a footnote.

Once this dataset was built, we could order chronologically all cables with the same length of originator ID. When this happens, the cable IDs are also ordered sequentially, confirming the coherence of each cable series. Using this approach, we have built a number of cable series, and connected these to particular locations (through triangulation with other data concerning the location of where particular events took place).\textsuperscript{24}

Thus, for example, we have a series of cables relating to DETENTION SITE GREEN, beginning with cable 10005 (sent 23:16 on 9 April 2002) and ending with cable 11357 (sent 12:42 on 2 December 2002). Likewise, our DETENTION SITE BLUE series begins with cable 10006 (sent 09:02 on 7 December 2002) and ends with cable 12825 (sent on 13 September 2003).

In turn, in those cases where individual cables have their date-time stamp redacted, their location in a particular cable series allows us to propose minimum and maximum date-times.

**CABLE ANALYSIS: UNREDACTING THE DATE-TIME STAMPS**

- DETENTION SITE BLUE 10985 (242351Z MAR 03)
- DETENTION SITE BLUE 10990
- DETENTION SITE BLUE 10999 (260835Z MAR 03)

Cable 10990 was clearly sent by officials at DETENTION SITE BLUE at some point between 23:51 on 24 March 2003 and 08:35 on 26 March 2003. This is an important observation, given that the cable documented the request by the black site officials to Headquarters to torture Abu Yasir al-Jaza'iri (#47). This both confirms al-Jaza'iri's presence in DETENTION SITE BLUE during March 2003, and suggests the time that he was transferred to the site (given that torture requests tended to be sent immediately prior to, or immediately after, a prisoner's arrival at a black site).\textsuperscript{25}

In this way, our series allow us to provide locational data for particular events and detainees. For example, all of the cables referenced above in relation to Majid Khan fit into the Afghanistan series, suggesting that he was held in the country during this abuse. Indeed, an analysis of all
Cables referring to Khan reveal that those sent between 5 March – 24 May 2003 fit into the Pakistan series, and those sent from 27 May 2003 to 7 June 2005 fit into the Afghanistan series, suggesting the locations of his detentions, the date on which he was captured by Pakistani forces, and the later date on which he was transferred to CIA custody.

Likewise, as another example, our analysis of CIA cables relating to Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri provides a far more detailed account of his time in CIA custody than that published in the Committee Study.

**CABLE ANALYSIS AND AL-NASHIRI’S LOCATIONS**

The following specific cables are the first and last in each series which document al-Nashiri’s presence at particular black sites, thus confirming the dates and locations during his period of secret CIA detention. Possible values for the redacted dates in the first two cables can be suggested according to their place in the relevant cable series, as well as through triangulation with flight data and other documents (see below).

- Afghanistan 29768 (\_\_\_ NOV 02)
- DETENTION SITE GREEN 11293 (\_\_\_ NOV 02)
- DETENTION SITE GREEN 11357 (021242Z DEC 02)
- DETENTION SITE BLUE 10030 (111541Z DEC 02)
- DETENTION SITE BLUE 11701 (191640Z MAY 03)
- Morocco 1756 (190800Z SEP 03)
- Guantánamo 1091 (031835Z NOV 03)
- Guantánamo 1630 (271440Z MAR 04)
- DETENTION SITE BLACK 1202 (231644Z MAR 04)
- DETENTION SITE BLACK 3051 (301235Z SEP 05)
- DETENTION SITE VIOLET 3910 (241852Z JAN 06)
- DETENTION SITE BROWN 1029 (291750Z JUN 06)
- DETENTION SITE BROWN 1242 (050744Z SEP 06)

This analysis is powerful, especially when other findings confirm the locations of the black sites (see below). This allows us to independently confirm that al-Nashiri was held at black sites in Afghanistan, Thailand, Poland, Morocco, Guantánamo Bay, Romania, Lithuania and Afghanistan again, as well as identify the dates on which he was in each country.
Our analysis of the cables in the Committee Study has been powerful, and we reference individual cables throughout this report to provide evidence of the location and time of events. We have also published a version of our CIA Cable Database on The Rendition Project website, and this can be used to identify exactly where each cable is referenced in the Committee Study.

TRIANGULATION

Our account of the torture programme has been built up through multiple triangulation of a range of sources. For example, analysis of the redactions in the Committee Study can often reveal the date of an individual's transfer to CIA custody, while the CIA Cable Database can reveal the location to which he was first brought. This can be matched with flight data, which might confirm a flight into the black site location by a known CIA rendition aircraft on the date in question. Billing documentation can confirm that the flight was undertaken pursuant to the overall contract with the CIA, and provide confirmation of where the prisoner was before transfer to CIA custody. With the entry date for that prisoner confirmed, the range of possible exit dates is narrowed (as are the entry date ranges for other prisoners, given the chronological relationship between individuals' entry into the programme). This can then often be matched with witness testimony by the prisoner, or information in declassified documents, which independently confirms a particular exit date. Again, flight data on that date may include a flight by a known CIA rendition aircraft, leaving from a known black site location, suggesting that this was the individual's final detention location while in CIA custody.

The power of this method of triangulation is best illustrated in the context of specific case studies, and we include discussion of two of these at the end of this chapter to show the detailed cross-analysis which underpins our findings. The rest of the chapter outlines some of our broader findings in relation to CIA black sites, rendition operations and secret detentions.

LOCATING THE BLACK SITES

Although the Committee Study disguises the location of the CIA's black sites through the use of pseudonyms, our investigation provides robust evidential confirmation of the countries which hosted these facilities, as well as their periods of operation.
### CIA BLACK SITE LOCATIONS AND OPERATIONAL PERIODS (FROM/TO)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DETENTION SITE</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>From</th>
<th>To</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GREEN</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>March 2002</td>
<td>December 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COBALT</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>September 2002</td>
<td>April 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BLUE</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>December 2002</td>
<td>September 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRAY</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>January 2003</td>
<td>December 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BLACK</td>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>September 2003</td>
<td>November 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INDIGO</td>
<td>Guantánamo Bay</td>
<td>September 2003</td>
<td>April 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAROON</td>
<td>Guantánamo Bay</td>
<td>September 2003</td>
<td>April 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ORANGE</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>April 2004</td>
<td>September 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIOLET</td>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>February 2005</td>
<td>March 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BROWN</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>March 2006</td>
<td>March 2008</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These findings are made possible through the triangulation of all our datasets, but in particular by reading the Committee Study alongside an analysis of our CIA Flights Database. For example, the Study makes multiple references to specific renditions to and from DETENTION SITE BLUE, each of which can be matched with corresponding flights into and out of the Szymany airport in north-eastern Poland. This is significant, given that previous investigations, as well as the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), have found that this airport serviced a CIA black site outside the village of Stare Kiejkuty, in the lakes region of north-eastern Poland.36

The Committee Study makes passing reference to Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri and Abu Zubaydah's rendition from DETENTION SITE GREEN to DETENTION SITE BLUE in December 2002, and this will have taken place on or before the torture of al-Nashiri at DETENTION SITE BLUE, which the Study notes began on 5 December.37 This stated transfer is matched with the flight by aircraft N63MU from Bangkok, Thailand to Szymany, landing on 5 December (Circuit 15). Likewise, the Study's documentation of Ramzi bin al-Shibh's rendition from foreign custody to DETENTION SITE BLUE, between 1-9 February 2003,38 matches with a flight by aircraft N379P from Rabat, Morocco to Szymany on 8 February (Circuit 17). Lastly, Khaled Sheikh Mohammed's rendition from DETENTION SITE COBALT to DETENTION SITE BLUE in March 2003, at some point on or
after 6 March and by the time of his torture on 8 March at the latest, matches with a flight by aircraft N379P from Kabul, Afghanistan to Szymany on 7 March (Circuit 19).

Although this is just one form of triangulation possible from our data, these matches alone provide powerful confirmation of the location of DETENTION SITE BLUE. And, in turn, they help to confirm the location of other sites: DETENTION SITE GREEN as a CIA black site in Thailand; DETENTION SITE COBALT as a CIA black site in Afghanistan; and Morocco as a site of secret detention by a foreign government on behalf of the CIA.

The locations of the CIA black sites and facilities run by foreign governments have long been suggested by investigators, often on the back of excellent reporting by a number of journalists. Our findings, derived independently from our analysis of the Committee Study and other declassified documents, prisoner testimony and flight data, puts this matter beyond any doubt. We are clear that these are now established as factually true; a matter in which, in the context of black sites in Poland, Romania and Lithuania, the ECtHR agrees. With detailed reference to our findings and submissions, the Court's two separate rulings in May 2018 concerning Romania and Lithuania stated that, in both cases, 'the applicant's allegations [regarding the location of his secret detention are] sufficiently convincing and, having regard to the above evidence from various sources corroborating his version, finds it established beyond reasonable doubt' that the black site existed in the country.

HOST COUNTRY COMPLICITY

It is clear that the countries hosting CIA black sites were both aware of the rendition operations and secret detentions taking place on their soil, and were active participants in the programme. The Committee Study confirms that 'the political leaders of host countries were generally informed of [the sites'] existence,' with the CIA paying millions of dollars in cash to foreign government officials, and local CIA stations providing 'wish lists' of financial assistance to partner agencies. The Thai site, for example, was run 'with the foreign host government's knowledge and approval,' although local officials acquiesced to its continued operation through 2002 only after continued lobbying by the CIA Station Chief. Likewise, Moroccan officials were involved in surveying potential locations for a black site during 2003, and agreed on two separate occasions to hold CIA prisoners in their own facilities while the site was under construction. Although the CIA facility was never made operational, and Morocco ultimately rescinded its support for the programme, it is clear that elements of the political leadership in the country were aware of the cooperation, and provided approval of the construction of the black site.

Investigations into the black sites in Poland, Romania and Lithuania have uncovered much of the detail relating to host government involvement, and, given the effort to which these governments have gone to deny their knowledge and culpability, it is worth describing this in some detail. Having spoken with 'multiple well-placed sources in the governments and intelligence services of several countries, including the United States, Poland and Romania,' the Council of
Europe’s early investigation into secret detention and rendition in Europe concluded that ‘the key arrangements for CIA clandestine operations in Europe were secured on a bilateral level.’ Such agreements existed with respect to individual capture operations, and also for more enduring forms of cooperation, including infrastructure, material support and operational security. In countries where black sites operated, the CIA ‘brokered “operating agreements”… to hold its high-value detainees in secret detention facilities.’ Under these agreements, host governments ‘agreed to provide the premises in which these facilities were established, the highest degrees of physical security and secrecy, and steadfast guarantees of non-interference.’

Although the ECtHR did not have sight of any bilateral agreement between the CIA and Polish authorities, it found it ‘inconceivable that the rendition aircraft could have crossed Polish airspace, landed at and departed from a Polish airport and that the CIA could have occupied the premises in Poland without some kind of pre-existing arrangement.’ The Committee Study also recounts how Polish officials became uneasy about the detention site in early 2003, refusing to accept a transfer flight in March until ‘the US ambassador intervened with [Poland’s] political leadership.’

The CIA appears to have chosen Romania to host a black site given, at least in part, the close existing intelligence and security relationship afforded as part of the broader ‘War on Terror’. Several high-level Romanian government officials knew about and authorised the secret detention operations, including President Ion Iliescu, President Traian Băsescu, Presidential Advisor on National Security Ioan Talpeș, Minister of National Defence Ioan Pașcu and the Head of Directorate for Military Intelligence Sergiu Medar. Such high-level knowledge was not shared widely, with information kept from the heads of the civilian intelligence services.

The CIA entered into an agreement with the Romanian authorities to host a black site in mid-October 2002. By January 2003 the local CIA station had been asked to consider ways to demonstrate to the Romanian government ‘that we deeply appreciate the cooperation and support’ for the black site, and in April 2003 the station provided an 8 million dollar suggestion. By May 2003 Headquarters had provided millions more than suggested, and by the fall of 2003 it had received its first five prisoners.

Accounts of these agreements have been confirmed by some of the high-level Romanian officials involved. Speaking in 2015, former President Ion Iliescu admitted that ‘our US allies asked us for a site’ towards the end of 2002, and that he had approved this in principle as ‘a gesture of courtesy ahead of our accession to NATO.’ The details were taken care of by Ioan Talpeș, who has confirmed this independently. According to Talpeș, he had discussions with the CIA from 2003 regarding ‘a more intense cooperation’ where the CIA could carry out its own activities in certain locations, and told Iliescu in 2003 and 2004 that the CIA was operating in Romania. This involved the detention of individuals in ‘one or two locations in Romania.’ Specifically, Talpeș has admitted to having given permission to lease a government building to the CIA, and that this building was in Bucharest. He was aware of the risks inherent in such an arrangement, and ‘explicitly told the CIA representatives that Romania did not want to know anything about the activities on these premises.’
The leasing of this building to the CIA has been confirmed by ‘Witness Z’, in testimony to the Romanian prosecutor (in the context of the government’s criminal investigation). This official has acknowledged that the CIA ‘asked the Romanian authorities to offer some locations, on Romanian territory, to be used for actions of combating international terrorist threats’, and that one location was offered: an office building in Bucharest. Furthermore, ‘we insisted, and it was agreed, that in all those locations the Romanian State should have no participation and all activities were to be undertaken exclusively by the American partners under their exclusive responsibility’.58

It appears that the desire for non-interference in CIA operations was mutual, although Romanian officials were key in providing security. The Council of Europe found that ‘the manner of protection requested by the CIA was for Romanian military intelligence officers on the ground to create an area or “zone” in which the CIA’s physical security and secrecy would be impenetrably protected, even from perceived intrusion by their counterparts in the Romanian services’.59

Although Romanian officials have all denied knowledge of the activities taking place at the secret detention site, the Committee Study makes clear that, at some point after 11 September 2004, Romanian officials were briefed by the US Ambassador and the local CIA Station Chief regarding the programme. The use of torture by the CIA was clearly described in the presentation, which sought to bolster support for the programme amongst Romanian officials.60

Although the Romanian government has always denied the existence of a secret prison on its territory, and has claimed that allegations are without merit,61 the ECHR ruled that it had been established beyond reasonable doubt that Romania both ‘knew of the nature and purpose of the CIA’s activities on its territory’, and also ‘cooperated in the preparation and execution’ of the rendition and detention program.62

In Lithuania, meanwhile, the CIA obtained the approval of the political leadership before constructing the black sites. One Lithuanian official was described as ‘shocked’, but nevertheless approved the plan. The CIA offered $1m+ to its partners to ‘show appreciation’ for their support, with money transferred through the development of ‘complex mechanisms’ (presumably to hide the payment).63 Indeed, the Lithuanian Parliament’s Committee on National Security and Defence (CNSD) found that the State Security Department (SSD) accounting of funds used to implement the project was ‘inappropriate’.64 Lithuanian officials also explicitly approved the plan to construct the final black site, after an initial ‘holding cell’ was deemed insufficient to hold multiple detainees, and asked for updates as works progressed.65

Although the Committee Study redacts the names and posts of those in Lithuania who knew and approved of the site, other investigations have shone light on this. President Rolandas Paksas testified to the CNSD that the CIA had requested permission in 2003 to bring detainees into the country, and SSD Director General Mečys Laurinkus confirmed that he had informed Paksas about this possibility. Although the President denied permission for the use of Lithuanian territory, it appears that he was not asked about the expanded site (Project No. 2), which eventually held prisoners. However, SSD officials at the highest level, including Laurinkus, SSD Director General Arvydas Pocius and SSD Deputy Director General Dainius Dabašinskas had knowledge of the construction of the black site. In turn, Pocius has testified that President Valdas Adamkus
OUT-TELEGRAM

Date: 8 November 2002

SUBJECT: Individuals Travelling to Gambia

THIS INFORMATION HAS BEEN COMMUNICATED TO THE RECIPIENT GOVERNMENT IN CONFIDENCE AND SHALL NOT BE RELEASED WITHOUT THE AGREEMENT OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT.

1. Further to [redacted] dated 1 November and our telephone conversation today.

2. We are able to confirm that the three individuals associated with the prominent spiritual cleric Omar OTHMAN@ Abu QATADA who were arrested at Gatwick on 1 November have today boarded Sierra National Airlines Flight L 054 to Banjul, Gambia. The flight was due to depart from the UK at 1230 but the departure was delayed until 1310.

3. The three individuals checked-in at the airport using the following variations of their names:

   JAMIL ABDUL LATIF IVLAN (28/5/62)
   BISHIR QALID (23/12/67)
   ABDALLAH GHAZI (18/9/62)

4. Regards.
was ‘adequately informed of the project’, while Dabašinskas was clear that the project ‘had been blessed by the top officials of the State’.66

SSD involvement on the ground was extensive. From 2002 onwards, the SSD led the way in adapting the initial ‘holding cell’ (so-called Project No. 1), ‘taking account of the requests and conditions’ set out by the CIA. From 2004, the SSD worked with the CIA to buy and equip the facility eventually used as a black site (Project No. 2). SSD had ‘unrestricted access to all the premises of the facility’, and in theory accompanied CIA officials at all times. However, in practice the SSD did not control the movements of the CIA, did not monitor activities, and did not have full awareness of operations at the site.67 The CNSD found that ‘the layout of the building, its enclosed nature and protection of the perimeter as well as the sporadic presence of the SSD staff in the premises allowed for actions to be taken by officers of the partners without being monitored by the SSD, and also allowed them to use the infrastructure at their discretion.68

**BRITISH COMPLICITY**

As we have described at some length elsewhere, our research has enabled us to establish beyond reasonable doubt that Britain was deeply and directly involved in post-9/11 prisoner abuse, including as part of the CIA’s torture programme. This is true despite a consistent narrative emanating from government officials that Britain neither uses, condones nor facilitates torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment and punishment. Such denials are untenable. We have argued that it is possible to identify a peculiarly British approach to torture in the ‘War on Terror’, which is particularly well-suited to sustaining this narrative of denial. As part of this, UK officials have had to operate within a set of constraints – a rhetorical, legal and policy ‘scaffold’ that has enabled them to demonstrate at least procedural adherence to human rights norms and legal commitments. On the ground, the UK intelligence and security agencies have been guided by a very particular approach, driven by two fundamental principles: avoiding the formal legal custody of prisoners; and the avoiding direct involvement in the abuse of prisoners. However, participation in detention, rendition and interrogation operations formally operated by partners, regardless of whether or not abuse was known to be taking place (or where it was common sense to assume that abuse would take place), was deemed legitimate by British intelligence and security officials. Adhering to these principles ensured that the UK could remain full counterterrorism partners of the US and other allies, while at the same time insulating itself from allegations of abuse.69

Our analysis of the evidentiary material now in the public domain suggests that the UK has been implicated in abuse on a number of levels. First, British intelligence and security agencies worked hand-in-glove with counterterrorism partners, including the CIA, to identify and apprehend suspects and disappear them into secret detention where torture was endemic. The British role in this context was either to supply the intelligence needed for the apprehension, or to take part in capture operations as formal secondary partners, ensuring that they were not directly responsible for prisoners. In the case of Bisher al-Rawi (#35) and Jamil el-Banna (#36), for
example, the passing of UK intelligence to the CIA regarding the men’s whereabouts was central to their capture, rendition to Afghanistan, and secret CIA detention before transfer to US military custody. Crucially, documents show that both men had been detained in the UK in early November 2002, several days before their disappearance, with MI5 providing to the CIA details of the men’s detention and their travel plans to The Gambia.70

British involvement was widespread. The UK Parliament’s Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) found that, in at least three cases, British intelligence paid, or offered to pay, for rendition operations, all of which they found ‘amounts to simple outsourcing of action which they knew they were not allowed to undertake themselves.’71 In at least 28 other cases, these agencies ‘suggested, helped to plan, or agreed to, a rendition operation proposed by others,’ while in 22 cases they ‘enabled renditions to go ahead by providing intelligence (for example, on the location of the individual).’72 Although ministerial approval was granted in a number of these cases, this was not always sought. And regardless, many of these renditions were to countries where the risk of torture or other mistreatment was significant.73

Although none of the official inquiries into Britain’s role in abuses have published full details of specific cases, documents obtained by Human Rights Watch from a government building in Tripoli in September 2011, in the immediate aftermath of the fall of the Gaddafi regime, provide compelling evidence of British involvement in a number of these operations.74 In one such operation, Sami al-Saadi and his family, including his four children, were rendered from Hong Kong to Libya in March 2004. One memo from the CIA to its Libyan counterpart, dated 23 March 2004, was clear that they were ‘aware that your service had been cooperating with the British to effect [al-Saadi’s] removal to Tripoli’, and offered to step in to ‘render [him] and his family into your custody.’75

Once in Libya, al-Saadi was detained for six years, during which time he was subjected to beatings with ropes and sticks, as well as electric shocks to the neck, chest and arms.76

In a similar operation, Abdel Hakim Belhadj (also known as Abu Abdullah al-Sadiq) was rendered with his wife, Fatima Boudchar (who was pregnant at the time), from Malaysia to Libya (Circuit 40). MI6 were aware of their initial detention in Malaysia, and took an active role in organising their rendition back to Libya.77 This involved passing the intelligence to the CIA, which subsequently took the lead.78 That Britain played a key role in the operation was confirmed by a memo from Mark Allen, then Director of Counterterrorism at MI6. Sent to his counterpart in Libya, Musa Kusa, the memo explicitly congratulates Kusa on the ‘safe arrival’ of Belhadj and discusses securing direct British access to the detainee’s interrogations: ‘Most importantly, I congratulate you on the safe arrival of Abu Abd Allah Sadiq [Belhadj]. This was the least we could do for you and for Libya to demonstrate the remarkable relationship we have built over the years. I am so glad. I was grateful to you for helping the officer we sent out last week. Abu ‘Abd Allah’s information on the situation in this country is of urgent importance to us. Amusingly, we got a request from the Americans to channel requests for information from Abu ‘Abd Allah through the Americans. I have no intention of doing any such thing. The intelligence on Abu ‘Abd Allah was British. I know I did not pay for the air cargo. But I feel I have the right to deal with you direct on this and am very grateful for the help you are giving us.’79
Once suspects were in secret detention, British intelligence and security agencies were, in many cases, intimately involved in the torture that took place, either by participating in the interrogations, by providing the intelligence that formed the basis of the torture, or by receiving intelligence gained through torture. The ISC found that, in at least 232 cases, UK officials supplied questions or intelligence to partners after they knew, or suspected, that mistreatment of the detainees in question was taking place. Binyam Mohamed (#95), for example, was tortured in Moroccan detention on the basis of intelligence and questions supplied by British agencies. In a further 198 cases, British intelligence received information from partners when it was known, or suspected, that such intelligence came from interrogations under torture. The agencies clearly knew of the existence of CIA black sites, with internal memos referencing "‘black’ facilities’ and 'other centres where the chances of complaint from allied representatives are slight.’ Regardless, intelligence and questions continued to be passed to the CIA, including in the case of Khaled Sheikh Mohammed during his detention and torture at the Polish site, and Abu Zubaydah during his detention and torture in Thailand. In the latter case, British police have, in March 2019, opened an investigation into possible violations of UK law as a result of this cooperation.

The role played by the UK in the CIA torture programme is also highlighted by the degree to which British territory was used by CIA aircraft as refuelling stops while undertaking rendition operations. Collation and analysis of flight data associated with CIA rendition aircraft, and the correlation of this with data concerning prisoner transfers, has allowed us to establish that UK involvement in the rendition programme was much more extensive than previously thought. British territory was central to the rendition of at least 28 prisoners between secret prisons, some of whom were subjected to torture. These include the two prisoners acknowledged to have passed through Diego Garcia in 2002, who we have established as likely being Mohammed Saad Iqbal Madni (January 2002) and Umar Faruq (#14, September 2002). Likewise, mainland UK was used to facilitate the rendition of so-called ‘high value detainees’ to secret detention in Poland, including Abu Zubaydah, Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, Ramzi bin al-Shibh and Khaled Sheikh Mohammed, all of whom were tortured at the site. Others were taken to CIA black sites in Afghanistan, Romania and Lithuania. Still more were rendered to proxy detention in Egypt, Jordan or Morocco on aircraft that used UK territory as a staging post.
## RENDITION OPERATIONS USING UK TERRITORY FOR REFUELLING

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Destination 1</th>
<th>Destination 2</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Circuit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jamil Qasim Saeed Mohammed</td>
<td>Pakistan to Jordan</td>
<td>October 2001</td>
<td>Circuit 1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohamed el-Zery, Ahmed Agiza</td>
<td>Sweden to Egypt</td>
<td>December 2001</td>
<td>Circuit 2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohammed Saad Iqbal Madni</td>
<td>Indonesia to Egypt</td>
<td>January 2002</td>
<td>Circuit 3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ali al-Hajj al-Sharqawi (#93)</td>
<td>Pakistan to Jordan</td>
<td>February 2002</td>
<td>Circuit 4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Umar Faruq (#14)</td>
<td>Indonesia to Egypt</td>
<td>September 2002</td>
<td>Circuit 9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacha Wazir (#38)</td>
<td>UAE to Morocco</td>
<td>October 2002</td>
<td>Circuit 11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri (#26)</td>
<td>UAE to Afghanistan</td>
<td>November 2002</td>
<td>Circuit 13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abu Zubaydah (#1), Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri (#26)</td>
<td>Thailand to Poland</td>
<td>December 2002</td>
<td>Circuit 15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramzi bin al-Shibh (#41), Ibn Sheikh al-Libi (#42)</td>
<td>Morocco to Poland, Egypt to Afghanistan</td>
<td>February 2003</td>
<td>Circuit 17</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khaled Sheikh Mohammed (#45)</td>
<td>Afghanistan to Poland</td>
<td>March 2003</td>
<td>Circuit 19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zubair (#62)</td>
<td>Thailand to Afghanistan</td>
<td>June 2003</td>
<td>Circuit 24</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hiwa Rashul (#64), Saifullah Paracha</td>
<td>Iraq to Afghanistan, Thailand to Afghanistan</td>
<td>July 2003</td>
<td>Circuit 25</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asadallah (#43)</td>
<td>Afghanistan to Egypt</td>
<td>July 2003</td>
<td>Circuit 26</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Destination</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Circuit</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samr al-Barq (#67), Ammar al-Baluchi (#55)</td>
<td>Afghanistan to Poland</td>
<td>July 2003</td>
<td>Circuit 27</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanad al-Kazimi (#74)</td>
<td>UAE to Afghanistan</td>
<td>August 2003</td>
<td>Circuit 29</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salah Qaru (#75)</td>
<td>Jordan to Afghanistan</td>
<td>September 2003</td>
<td>Circuit 30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laid Saidi (#57)</td>
<td>Afghanistan to Tunisia</td>
<td>June 2004</td>
<td>Circuit 46</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Janat Gul (#110)</td>
<td>Afghanistan to Romania</td>
<td>July 2004</td>
<td>Circuit 48</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muhammad Ibrahim (#99)</td>
<td>Romania to Jordan or Afghanistan</td>
<td>October 2004</td>
<td>Circuit 52</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abu Faraj al-Libi (#114), Abu Munthir al-Magrebi (#115)</td>
<td>Afghanistan to Romania, Tunisia to Romania</td>
<td>May 2005</td>
<td>Circuit 57</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khaled Sheikh Mohammed (#45), Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri (#26)</td>
<td>Romania to Lithuania</td>
<td>October 2005</td>
<td>Circuit 58</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**THE CIA RENDITION NETWORK**

There were two branches to the rendition component of the CIA torture programme. The first comprised aircraft that were owned by the CIA via a shifting array of shell companies. The Agency is thought to have had at least 26 aircraft in its direct service, with at least 10 purchased since 2001. Registered owners of these aircraft existed only on paper as a front for the CIA. They were occasionally dissolved, with the aircraft ‘sold’ to other shell companies and often reregistered with new tail numbers to cover their tracks. Meanwhile, the aircraft themselves were operated by a set of real companies, responsible for maintenance, providing hangers and arranging the logistical details for particular operations. Many of these operating companies, such as Aero Contractors, Pegasus Technologies and Tepper Aviation, have long existed as an air arm of the CIA.

Although past investigations have suggested that many of these aircraft and companies were involved in rendition operations, we are less clear that this is the case. Indeed, we have been able to confirm the clear involvement of just two CIA-owned aircraft in rendition operations. Both were operated by Aero Contractors: a Gulfstream V jet with registration number N379P.
(later reregistered as N8068V, and then again as N44982), and a Boeing 737 with registration number N313P (later reregistered as N4476S). They were essentially government assets, with one declassified file referring to the latter as an ‘Agency aircraft’. While engaging in rendition operations, N379P was owned on paper by Premier Executive Transport Services, and N313P was owned by Stevens Express Leasing. Both were shell companies, and the pilots and crew flying the two aircraft operated under cover, using passports with false names.

These two aircraft – N379P and N313P – account for the majority of rendition operations we have identified, especially during the first years of the CIA torture programme. Between September 2001 and March 2004, over 80% of the operations (68 out of 82) took place on board one of these two aircraft, involving at least 48 different prisoners.

A second branch of rendition aircraft, which operated alongside (and to some extent later than) those aircraft owned by CIA shell companies, comprised a number of aircraft run by commercial on-demand charter aircraft operators. In these cases, the US government was just one client, and the companies provided the planes, pilots, crew and all other logistical requirements (so-called ‘wet leasing’). Documents secured from within this contracting network, including quotes, invoices, billing reconciliations, subcontracts and subcontract task order modifications, have enabled us to build an intricate picture of this outsourced element of the torture programme.

The documents identify two successive prime contractors, DynCorp Systems and Solutions, LLC (DynCorp) and Computer Sciences Corporation (CSC), which were operating under a ‘prime contract’ with the CIA. These companies undertook to organise flight operations on behalf of the US government, and subcontracted this task to two brokering companies: Capital Aviation and SportsFlight Air (SFA). In turn, these brokers contracted with more than a dozen aircraft operating companies to secure the services of particular aircraft and the logistics required to mount global, multiday trips. Operating companies included FirstFlight Management, Airborne, Richmor Aviation, Prime Jet, Premier Aircraft Management, Kookaburra Air, International Group, Clay Lacy Aviation, Victory Aviation, Aircastle, Jet Alliance, Colt, US Aviation and Integrity Jet Charter.

The CIA’s use of these operating companies expanded over time. In June 2002, DynCorp entered into a contract with Capital Aviation designated as LT050602, while SportsFlight entered into a contingent agreement with Richmor Aviation to provide one plane, registered N85VM, for services as required by DynCorp. Richmor was to supply the aircraft ‘as required’, with a guarantee of 250 hours’ work over the duration of the initial contract. Richmor was responsible for maintaining the aircraft, paying for fuel and the salaries of the pilots and crew. In return, it would be paid $5,000 per hour for flying to and from Washington, and $4,900 per hour for all other flight times. If extra crew were needed, they would be charged at $800 per person per day.

Both these initial contracts were for a six-month term. At the end of this term, the government indicated that it wished to diversify its range of aircraft operators, with the result that the initial relationship between DynCorp, Capital and SFA continued on an ad hoc but non-exclusive basis, while other operating companies and aircraft became involved as necessary. In 2003, DynCorp was taken over by CSC, and in 2004 CSC formalised the pre-existing pattern of business with a new contract, S1007312, stipulated to run from August 2004 to July 2005. This new contract
SINGLE ENTITY AIRCRAFT CHARTER AGREEMENT NO: LT050602

Name of Charterer: DynCorp Systems & Solutions, LLC
Principal Office: 6101 Stevenson Avenue
                 Alexandria, Virginia 22304
Tel: (703) 461-2171
Fax: (703) 461-2405

The following with addendum constitutes the charter contract:

Charter Contract

Capital Aviation, Inc. as Aircraft Supplier for DynCorp Systems & Solutions, LLC

Aircraft Operator: Richmor Aviation, Inc.
Aircraft: Gulfstream IV
Crew: As approved
Configuration: 10 passenger seats
Registration: N85VM
Date: April 23, 2002 – October 31, 2002
Schedule: As required with a guaranteed payment of 250 hours during contract period April 23, 2002 to October 31, 2002 and an option for an additional 50 hours. Additional options shall be exercised on a month to month basis. These 50 hour lease options will begin at the completion of the 6 month base period or after the initial 250 hours have been flown, whichever occurs first.
Charter Price: As outlined in Appendix "A"

Backup aircraft Gulfstream IV, N917W, operated by North American Air Charter, Inc. will be substituted at the same rate in the event N85VM is unavailable for any reason.

The charter price is based on performing the flights during the agreed period of time only, and the flights are subject to obtaining the necessary traffic rights/governmental approvals/overflight permits. Aircraft operator agrees that the flights are subject to be operated under a letter of public convenience.

Capital Aviation, Inc. will not be held responsible for any delay caused by strikes, civil strife, weather, acts of God, or unforeseen mechanical delays.

Aircraft operator will maintain liability insurance in the amount of $200,000,000 USD and will operate the aircraft in accordance with FAR 91 and all applicable Federal, State, and Local ordinances as defined by the U.S. Department of Transportation and the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration and under the provisions dictated under the letter of Public Convenience as provided.

CAI INITIALS: [Signature]

Charterer Initials: [Signature]
was between CSC and SFA (dba Capital), although in June 2005 SFA was removed from the paperwork and the contract was reassigned simply to Capital, while CSC executed a new contract with SFA in August 2005 to run through to July 2006. The new contract was designated S1008117. Under the terms of these two contracts, S1007312 and S1008117, SFA and Capital offered specific numbered task orders to operating companies to carry out specific trips. Invoices for missions carried out under these contracts continued to bear the original contract designation of LT050602, however, demonstrating that they related to a single overarching pattern of business.

Analysis of documents relating to these business relationships, including the tracing of these contract numbers through the paperwork, has been crucial to enabling us to identify over 60 aircraft operating under the same prime contract with the CIA. Triangulation with other data allows us to confirm that 16 of these aircraft were involved in specific rendition operations. Individual operations by these aircraft can be traced back, using invoicing and contractual reference numbers, to the network and thereby to the government, lending further weight to connections we assert. Full details of our findings in this regard can be found in Appendix 2.

### RENDITION AIRCRAFT OPERATING PURSUANT TO THE CIA’S CONTRACT WITH DYNCORP/CSC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Registration</th>
<th>Aircraft Type</th>
<th>Prisoners Rendered</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N85VM</td>
<td>Gulfstream IV</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N63MU</td>
<td>Gulfstream IV</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N1HC</td>
<td>Gulfstream V</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N308AB</td>
<td>Gulfstream IV</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N248AB</td>
<td>Gulfstream IV</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N968CE</td>
<td>Boeing 733</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N733MA</td>
<td>Boeing 738</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N740EH</td>
<td>Boeing 738</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N787WH</td>
<td>Boeing 737</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N17ND</td>
<td>Gulfstream III</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N740JA</td>
<td>Gulfstream IV</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CIA rendition aircraft flew as civilian planes, rather than military or government, thus allowing them the freedom to navigate airspace and airport landings without formal permission from the states involved.\textsuperscript{97} Importantly, however, while on rendition operations individual aircraft would often invoke their connection to the US government in order to expedite their landings at particular airports. For example, the Gulfstream IV jet with registration N85VM often carried ‘letters of public convenience’, on paper issued with Department of State letterheads, declaring that it was ‘operating under contract with the US government… as Global Support to US Embassies worldwide.’\textsuperscript{98} These letters of convenience appear to have always been signed by ‘Terry A. Hogan’, although variations in the signature at the bottom of each letter suggest that they were actually signed by more than one person.\textsuperscript{99}

Other companies involved in facilitating rendition operations (carried out by both branches) include ‘trip planners’, such as Jeppesen Dataplan, Baseops, and Universal Weather and Aviation (UWA). These companies were responsible for ensuring that the required flight plans were filed, overflight and landing authorisations received and hotel reservations booked.

Analysis of our flight data has enabled us to identify hundreds of circuits by CIA-owned or CIA-contracted aircraft which involved landings at one or more black site locations during their period of operation, at locations hosting US military detention facilities, or in countries known to have received or provided prisoners rendered by the CIA. These circuits are prima facie suspicious. Further traces in the data can alert us to the existence of the particular footprint of rendition operations. These traces are varied, and include landings at unusual times of the day, landings at identifiable ‘rest and relaxation’ points after leaving a black site location, and landings as part of a documented contract which also encompasses proven rendition operations.

‘Special status’ designations in pre-flight and in-flight communications between aircraft and air traffic authorities were often used during rendition operations to ensure the prioritisation of particular flights above others. These included the designation of flights as ‘STS/STATE’, indicating that a flight is ‘specifically required by the State Authorities, e.g., military or civil registered
aircraft used in military, customs and police services,’ and ‘STS/ATFMEXEMPT’, which indicates that flights are ‘specifically authorised by the relevant national authority to be exempted from flow regulations.’ In addition, false flight plans were often filed to disguise the landings at black site locations. These can be identified where flight plans list one destination, but where ground records confirm the actual landing at an airport (often in a different country) near to a black site.

FILING FALSE FLIGHT PLANS: CASE STUDY

On 18 February 2005, the trip planning company Baseops filed a flight plan for a Boeing 737 with registration number N787WH. This notified the relevant air traffic authorities that the aircraft was due to fly between Bucharest, Romania and Gothenburg, Sweden. However, documents at our disposal, including data from the Lithuanian Civil Aviation Administration and airport documents from Palanga, confirm that the aircraft did not fly to Sweden, but instead landed in Palanga, Lithuania. This is important, given that it connects two black site locations, Romania and Lithuania, at a key moment in the torture programme’s evolution: the exact time that the Lithuanian site was opened and received its first prisoners.

In addition, billing documents, including a ‘subcontract task order modification’ between SFA and CSC, situate this flight within the context of the renditions programme, and explain the submission of false flight plans by Baseops.

Landings at black site locations were clearly facilitated by the host governments. In the case of the European black sites, the ECtHR has found that the authorities ‘knowingly assisted’ in disguising CIA rendition aircraft, and that the use of false flight plans ‘required active cooperation on the part of the host countries through which the planes travelled. In addition to granting the CIA rendition aircraft overflight permissions, the national authorities navigated the planes through the country’s airspace to undeclared destinations in contravention of international aviation regulations and issued false landing permits.

In Poland, there was clearly a special procedure for the landing of CIA rendition flights at Szymany. The airport manager has given a detailed description of this procedure, which has been confirmed by a range of airport employees, civil servants, security guards, and Border Guard and military intelligence officials.

...regarding the flights, we termed them special flights, as none of the procedures followed in the case of other aircraft, such as civil aircraft, were complied with.

As to the landings, we were under the impression that they involved changeover of intelligence personnel. The airport manager received information concerning these flights directly from Border Guard Headquarters, and the army was informed about the landings at the same time. Two staff from the army unit at Lipowiec were on duty at the Szymany airport at the time. Events unfolded as follows. Border Guard Headquarters telephoned me about the planned landing and at the same
time, I received the same information from one of the staff on duty at the airport... normal practice was for the Border Guard and the Customs Service to be informed of civil aircraft landings. When these particular aircraft landed, however, the Customs Service was not informed, at the request of the Border Guard, who said they would make all the arrangements themselves. Prior to the landings two high-ranking Border Guard officers would always appear, a captain or someone of higher rank.... After they landed, these aircraft generally parked at the end of the runway, so that the airport workers could not really see what was going on. The Border Guard would always drive up to the aircraft and return a few minutes later. Vehicles bearing the Kiejkuty army unit’s registration would then drive up to the aircraft. It was not possible to tell if anyone did or did not leave the aircraft and enter these vehicles, as this could not be observed from the airport office which is located about halfway along the runway. An ambulance was in attendance at one of these landings, but nobody knew why that was there either. The ambulance travelled behind the vehicles with tinted windows... It was not possible for anyone to see what was happening around the aircraft because the aircraft always parked in such a way that the entrance doors faced towards the wood, so nothing could be seen. No airport workers drove up to the aircraft, only the Border Guard. It was not even possible to see what was happening from the top of the control tower.107

Ms M.P., director, Szymany Airport

In the context of Romania, several witness statements given to the prosecutor during the criminal inquiry made clear that special procedures existed. For example, ‘Witness Z’ claimed that ‘from about 2003 onwards several contacts [relating to CIA flights] had taken place’ and ‘resulted in concrete agreements that made possible the operation of the special American flights on Romanian territory, in different conditions than those provided for by international customs. It should be understood that those flights had a special character and they were not under an obligation to obey the usual rules imposed on civil flights.’108 Other witnesses have testified to night-time landings announced as ‘special flights’, with staff asked not to approach the planes.109

Similar provisions were established during rendition flights landing in Lithuania. Planes were not subject to normal customs or border guard control. State Border Guard Service (SBGS) officers were prevented from carrying out inspections, and classified letters were sent to the SBGS on at least two occasions enabling SSD and CIA officials free rein at the airports.110

Although none of the witnesses admitted to seeing prisoners embark or disembark these flights, the ECtHR has ultimately found it ‘implausible that the transportation of prisoners on land from the planes to the CIA detention site could, for all practical purposes, have been effected without at least the minimum assistance of the host country’s authorities, if only to secure the area near and around the landed planes and provide the conditions for the secret and safe transfer of passengers.’111

Our investigation has also uncovered a further diversionary technique deployed by CIA
aircraft undertaking rendition operations: the use of two aircraft to link two prison sites, meeting for a 'cargo switch' on the runway of a third country. Thus, one aircraft would fly from black site destination A to a third-country runway, where it would meet a second aircraft which had not visited anywhere suspicious. Both aircraft would be on the ground together for less than an hour, while prisoners were transferred between the aircraft, before the first aircraft left for home and the second aircraft flew its cargo to black site destination B. As a result, flight records document no single flight linking the black sites, making it more difficult to identify potential rendition operations.

THE ‘CARGO SWITCH’: CASE STUDY

Our flight data shows that two known rendition aircraft – N308AB and N787WH – met on the ground in Tirana, Albania, between 22:38 and 23:35 on 5 October 2005. While Albania is not known to have hosted a black site, and individually the flight circuits do not appear particularly suspicious, N308AB had just come from Bucharest, while N787WH flew onward to Vilnius. The black site locations in Romania and Lithuania were thereby connected.

Furthermore, flight data shows that the first aircraft, N308AB, was operated by Prime Jet, known for its involvement in other rendition operations. One email set out the itinerary for the aircraft, specifying the flight from Romania to Albania, where it was to 'drop all PAX [passengers]'\(^\text{112}\). A 'preliminary requirements' document from CSC situates the operation within the overall contract, and stated that two passengers were to be picked up in Romania, and also confirmed that all passengers were to be dropped in Albania. Customs help was to be denied.\(^\text{113}\)

Further billing documents for this circuit include invoices from SFA to CSC,\(^\text{114}\) and 'subcontract task order modifications' between SFA and CSC.\(^\text{115}\)

Data also shows that the second aircraft, N787WH, was operated by Victory Aviation, with Baseops International filing the flight plans, including false plans to disguise the landing in Lithuania.\(^\text{116}\) The true flight, from Albania to Lithuania on 6 October 2005, was in fact confirmed by records seen by a Lithuanian Parliament investigation, which noted that the landing was 'unscheduled', and that customs officials 'were prevented from inspecting the aircraft.' According to one customs officer 'civil aviation officers prevented the SBGS officer from approaching the aircraft.... A car drove away from the aircraft and left the territory of the airport border control point. Upon contacting the civil aviation officers, it was explained that the heads of the SBGS had been informed of the landing... The letter from the SSD marked as 'CLASSIFIED'... was received by the SBGS on 7 October 2005, i.e., post factum.'\(^\text{117}\) Data from the Lithuanian Civil Aviation Administration,\(^\text{118}\) and airport documents from Vilnius,\(^\text{119}\) also confirm the landing.

Analysis of flight data and subsidiary contracting paperwork can suggest the existence of particular rendition operations. However, it is the triangulation of this data with other information – locations and known operating periods of black sites, and known dates and locations of capture
here is a copy of the preliminary requirements.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>A/C Home Base</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10/03</td>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>1840Z - 5 Oct 2005</td>
<td>LZIB / Slovakia</td>
<td>RON UTC+1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>2100Z - 5 Oct 2005</td>
<td>LRCK / Romania</td>
<td>PU 2 PAX UTC+2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>2300Z - 5 Oct 2005</td>
<td>LATI / Albania</td>
<td>Drop All PAX UTC+2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TBD</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>TECH/RON</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Crew: Must have 3 pilots, NO Flight Attendants.
At least a G-IV performance with 10 PAX capability.
No customs help
File Flight Plan from East Coast to RON/LZIB
Have crew make hotel arrangements for all PAX they are carrying

Cannot TECH/RON in these locations unless asked for:
Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Morocco, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Romania, Uzbekistan, or the UK, England, Wales, Scotland, and Crown Colonies/Territories unless specifically asked for by me or the on board mission coordinator.
or transfer operations involving particular prisoners – which allows us to make clear statements of fact regarding individual rendition operations by the aircraft involved.

With this in mind, our investigation has confirmed 62 separate rendition operations by CIA aircraft, involving over 120 individual renditions. The evidence to support our claims is outlined in Appendix 2, where we have provided detailed profiles for each of the 62 circuits. These profiles lay out the flight data we have accumulated, and the ways in which we have been able to match it with individual prisoner movements. Although we are not able to paint a complete picture of CIA rendition, this is without doubt the fullest account to date of the rendition of prisoners between black sites and foreign government detention facilities by the CIA. It also provides the clearest picture to date of the regular involvement of other countries, playing – wittingly or otherwise – a key logistical role in the programme by facilitating the refuelling of aircraft as they made their way to and from the rendition operations.

**COUNTRIES PLAYING A KEY LOGISTICAL ROLE IN THE RENDITION NETWORK**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>No. Circuit</th>
<th>Circuits (see Appendix 2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>1, 2, 3, 4, 9, 11, 13, 15, 17, 19, 24, 25, 26, 27, 29, 30, 46, 48, 52, 57, 58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(incl. Diego Garcia)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1, 5, 7, 8, 14, 16, 18, 20, 21, 22, 23, 27, 30, 33, 36, 57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1, 7, 9, 22, 23, 29, 32, 34, 56, 60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>4, 7, 11, 13, 15, 28, 29, 33, 49, 50, 52, 61, 62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5, 6, 14, 16, 17, 19, 20, 23, 26, 27, 29, 31, 56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>6, 8, 9, 10, 13, 18, 28, 35, 37, 38, 40, 41, 45, 47, 51, 58, 62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>17, 37, 38, 40, 45, 46, 47, 48, 53, 57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>19, 20, 26, 31, 32, 36, 38, 45, 48, 50, 51, 52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>35, 37, 39, 40, 44, 46, 47, 49, 55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>45, 53, 54, 57, 58, 59, 60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>46, 48, 49, 54, 55, 58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Of the more than 120 individual renditions we have identified, 20 were transfers to foreign custody, either of those who were never held by the CIA or of those who were later moved into the black site programme. 35 renditions were transfers into CIA custody, generally from foreign custody in the location where they had been captured, or to which they had been previously rendered. A further 42 renditions were transfers between CIA black sites, with prisoners shuttled between secret prisons as they opened and closed. 20 renditions were of prisoners being moved out of CIA custody, either for release or continued detention in foreign or US military custody. Our data also includes the rendition of four prisoners to US military custody by CIA aircraft, even though those men were never held by the CIA.

**TRACKING CIA PRISONERS**

We have compiled a list of more than 200 individuals reported to have been captured, rendered or detained by the CIA. 119 of these prisoners are confirmed officially in the Committee Study as having been held in formal CIA custody in one or more of its black sites. However, this figure is highly likely to be an undercount, given poor recordkeeping by the CIA, especially at the Dark Prison in Afghanistan (referred to in the Committee Study as DETENTION SITE COBALT). It is also necessarily incomplete, given that the CIA was clearly deeply involved in the rendition, secret detention and torture of many prisoners who did not come formally under its authority.

In some cases, CIA prisoners have testified to being held in black sites alongside others who appear not to be listed in the Committee Study. In other cases, prisoners were held in facilities in Afghanistan or Pakistan which were run by the local intelligence services but where the CIA clearly had access. For example, four Guantánamo Bay detainees, transferred from Bagram in May 2003, were captured in Iran in late 2001 or early 2002 and transferred to Afghan custody in early 2002. Testimony by one of these men, Wesam al-Deemawi, places all four men in the same facility during 2002, where the guards were Afghan but the interrogators were American. None of these men appear on the list of formal CIA prisoners, although others held at the same facilities in 2002 did later come within the CIA programme. Reporting collated by NGOs has identified a further 19 individuals as being detained in Pakistan or Afghanistan with some form of CIA involvement, none of whom seem to appear in the Committee Study. Whether that is due to poor recordkeeping, or the fact that these men never came under formal custody of the CIA, is unknown.

The 119 men listed in the Committee Study do not include those rendered by the CIA directly to US military custody in Afghanistan, or directly to foreign government custody. These numbers are not insignificant: we have identified five men rendered by the CIA directly to US military custody at Bagram Airbase, and compiled reports of more than 50 men rendered by the CIA to foreign custody (again, where the CIA continued to have access for interrogations). This includes at least 14 men rendered to Jordan, nine to Libya, eight to Egypt, eight to Syria and seven to Morocco. This number is a lower-end figure, and the true number of renditions to foreign
custody will undoubtedly be higher. For example, it is now clear that British intelligence were actively involved in, or had contemporaneous knowledge of, up to 76 rendition operations.\textsuperscript{126} Indeed, as early as January 2002 at least one partner service, reported to be Egypt, had received at least 29 prisoners.\textsuperscript{127}

Other reports have suggested that up to a dozen prisoners were rendered by the CIA out of Iraq in the months after the US invasion and occupation,\textsuperscript{128} and the Department of Justice (DoJ) authorised at least some of these on an individual basis, writing that such men were not ‘protected persons’ under the Geneva Conventions.\textsuperscript{129} It is also clear that the CIA held ‘ghost detainees’ in DoD-run facilities in Iraq. One inquiry into detention operations in the country, for example, found that ‘various detention facilities... routinely held persons brought to them by Other Government Agencies (OGAs) [i.e., the CIA] without accounting for them, knowing their identities or even the reason for their detention.’\textsuperscript{130} Some of these were former CIA prisoners.

Hiwa Rashul (\#64), for example, was rendered from DoD control to the CIA in Afghanistan in July 2003 (\textbf{Circuit 25}), before the DoJ ruled that he was in fact a ‘protected person’ under the Conventions. He was rendered back to Iraq in October 2003 (\textbf{Circuit 32}), but at this point was kept away from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), with one classified military order directing guards to keep Rashul ‘segregated and isolated from the remainder of the detainee population. Under no circumstances will his presence be made known to the detainee population... Only military personnel and debriefers will have access to the detainee... Knowledge of the presence of this detainee will be strictly limited on a need-to-know basis.’\textsuperscript{131} Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld later acknowledged that he had authorised the secret detention of Rashul: ‘We were asked [by the CIA] to not immediately register the individual. And we did that... The decision was made that it would be appropriate not to for a period. And he wasn’t lost in the system. They’ve known where he was, and that he was there in Iraq, for this period of time.’\textsuperscript{132}

With regards to the 119 men who are documented as coming under formal CIA custody within the torture programme, our investigation has established the clearest picture yet of their nationalities, capture locations, detention periods and locations, and fate and whereabouts after their time in CIA custody.

Our investigation has established the nationalities of 78 of the 119 formal CIA detainees, which included 18 Yemenis, 8 Libyans, 9 Afghans, 6 Pakistanis, 5 Algerians and 5 Iraqis. Others came from Egypt, Ethiopia, Jordan, Palestine, Kuwait, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Syria, Tanzania, and Tunisia. Although most of the capture operations we know about took place in Pakistan, at least 18 different countries across the world were involved, including those in Africa (Djibouti, Egypt, The Gambia, Mauritania, Somalia, Tanzania, Tunisia, South Africa), Europe (Macedonia, Georgia, Turkey), the Middle East (Iran, Iraq, Jordan, UAE), Central/South Asia (Afghanistan, Pakistan) and Southeast Asia (Indonesia, Thailand).

Most prisoners were held by foreign governments before their formal transfer into CIA custody, although – as we have discussed – the CIA often had access to the men during this period. In 23 cases, prisoners were held for between a week and a month, and in 16 cases between a month and a year. Three men – Ibn Sheikh al-Libi (\#42), Binyam Mohamed (\#95) and Ali al-Hajj
al-Sharqawi (#93) – were held for more than a year before formal transfer to the CIA.

Once in CIA custody, just ten of the 119 prisoners were held for less than a month, with a further 30 held for 30-99 days. The majority, 79, were held for more than three months, with 47 being held for more than a year. 24 were held for two years or more, while 13 were held for more than three years. Almost all men – 104 – appear to have been held exclusively in Afghanistan, with only a small number held in other black sites. Overall, 102 prisoners were in CIA black sites in Afghanistan between September 2002 and May 2004, and 42 after that time (of course, some were held in the country across both periods). At least 19 prisoners were held in Afghan-run facilities or informal ‘safe houses’ in the country, although it appears that only one – Khaled el-Masri (#97) – was held exclusively outside of the official black sites. Of those held outside Afghanistan, we have identified two detainees held in Thailand, eight in Poland, five in Guantánamo Bay, twelve in Romania, four in Lithuania, five in Morocco and two in Jordan. These figures only relate to the period of official CIA custody, and do not include detention locations before or after this time. Further details of those held at each site are provided in Chapter 2.

After their time in CIA secret detention, and with the exception of Gul Rahman (#24), who was killed while in a black site in Afghanistan, prisoners were released or transferred to either foreign government or US military custody. We have established that 38 prisoners were transferred to US military custody at Bagram Airbase, and it appears that these were often in groups. Thus, six men were moved in October 2002, six men in December 2002, five in November 2003, and 18 in May 2004. This last transfer came as the CIA moved to downsize the programme, after the ICRC had sent notice of its awareness of the use of secret detention in Afghanistan.

22 of those transferred to Bagram were later moved to Guantánamo Bay, on board four separate military aircraft and alongside other (non-CIA) prisoners who were being transferred to the island base. The first of these transfers took place on 28 October 2002, and included six Yemeni prisoners who had been captured together in Karachi in September 2002 and held for around one month by the CIA in Afghanistan. The second transfer took place on 7 February 2003, and included Jamil el-Banna and Bisher al-Rawi, who had been captured in December 2002 after a tip-off from British intelligence. The third transfer took place on 9 May 2003, and included two of the first CIA prisoners, captured in Georgia in April 2002: Zakariya (#2) and Abbar al-Hawari (#4). The final transfer took place on 19 September 2004, and included eight former CIA prisoners, all of whom had been transferred to US military custody at Bagram in May 2004. Among this group were Hassan bin Attash (#10), the two Rabbani brothers, and Binyam Mohamed (#95). Nine of those transferred to Guantánamo Bay remain there, as of May 2019, while the others were released at various points between 2007-2017.

Of the other 16 men sent to Bagram, four escaped in July 2005: Hassan Abu Bakr Qa’id (#5), Umar Faruq (#14), Muhammad al-Qahtani (#60) and Abdullah Ashami (#71). A further nine were ultimately released, including Ghairat Bahir (#37), Muhammad al-Bakri (#39) and Suleiman Abdullah (#48), although in some cases (such as Lutfi al-Gharisi, #20) this was more than a decade after leaving CIA custody. We have yet to establish the fate and whereabouts of three of those sent to Bagram.
A further 16 so-called ‘High-Value Detainees’ were transferred directly to Guantánamo Bay from CIA custody, including 14 in one go in September 2006. This group included the CIA’s first (and longest-held) prisoner, Abu Zubaydah (#1), as well as the five men since charged with involvement in the 11 September attacks: Khaled Sheikh Mohammed (#45), Ramzi bin al-Shibh (#41), Mustafa al-Hawsawi (#46), Ammar al-Baluchi (#55) and Walid bin Attash (#56). Others include Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri (#26), Majid Khan (#58), Zubair (#62), Lillie (#72), Hambali (#73), Gouled Dourad (#102), Ahmed Ghailani (#111) and Abu Faraj al-Libi (#114). All remained detained at Guantánamo Bay as of May 2019, except for Ghailani (who is detained in a US federal prison).

22 men were rendered to foreign custody for continued detention, and were often held for years before eventual release. This included six men rendered to Libya, four to Yemen, three to Jordan and two to Egypt. We have also established that at least 13 prisoners were released directly from the programme, or after a very short period of post-CIA detention, while two were moved to US military custody in Iraq: Hiwa Rashul (#64) and Abu Ja’far al-Iraqi (#117). We have been unable to ascertain the fate and whereabouts of 27 individuals after their time in the CIA programme.

Appendix 1 contains detailed profiles of each of these men, providing the most comprehensive public account to date of the identity, fate and whereabouts of the CIA’s secret prisoners. Our CIA Prisoner Database, available on The Rendition Project website (www.therenditionproject.org.uk) can also be used to analyse our data regarding these men.
CASE STUDIES

THE SECRET DETENTION OF ABD AL-RAHIM AL-NASHIRI, 2002

According to the Committee Study, Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri ‘was captured in the United Arab Emirates in mid-October 2002. He provided information while in the custody of a foreign government... and was then rendered by the CIA to DETENTION SITE COBALT in Country [redacted] on November [redacted], 2002, where he was held for [redacted] days before being transferred to DETENTION SITE GREEN on November [redacted] 2002. At DETENTION SITE GREEN, al-Nashiri was interrogated using the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques, including being subjected to the waterboard at least three times. In December 2002, when DETENTION SITE GREEN was closed, al-Nashiri and Abu Zubaydah were rendered to DETENTION SITE BLUE.’

The first redaction here is one letter (the pseudonym representing the host country of the black site DETENTION SITE COBALT); the second redaction is a double-digit figure; the third is clearly a word for a number (e.g., ‘two’); the last is another double-digit figure. An analysis of the redactions, alongside triangulation with a number of other sources, allows us to confirm the location of the sites involved:

- billing documents confirm a flight by rendition aircraft N85VM from Dubai to Afghanistan at some point 8-12 November 2002;\(^{135}\)
- a CIA cable from DETENTION SITE COBALT, which is dated no later than 18 November 2002, documents al-Nashiri’s rendition to the site;\(^ {136}\)
- the word ‘five’ gives the exact fit with the third redaction in the above passage;
- another declassified CIA document establishes that al-Nashiri was rendered to the same site as Abu Zubaydah on 15 November 2002;\(^{137}\)
- flight data indicates that known rendition aircraft N379P was in Uzbekistan/ Afghanistan on 13 November 2002 and in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia on 16 November 2002, suggesting that it undertook a rendition operation between Afghanistan and Southeast Asia (Circuit 14);
- a declassified CIA document confirms that his torture at the new site continued until 4 December 2002;\(^{138}\)
- Billing documents confirm a flight by rendition aircraft N63MU from Bangkok, Thailand to Szymany, Poland, 4-5 December 2002;\(^ {139}\)
- Although the aircraft filed a flight plan to Vienna, Austria, landing records at Szymany confirm the landing of N63MU at Szymany. The owner of the aircraft’s registered company has also admitted that it landed at Szymany.\(^ {140}\)
- CIA records cited by the Committee Study make it clear that al-Nashiri was tortured at DETENTION SITE BLUE from 5-8 December 2002.\(^ {141}\)
**Invoice from Capital Aviation to DynCorp, pursuant to contract LT050602, for rendition operation between black sites in Thailand and Poland (Circuit 15)**

**Capital Aviation, Inc.**

**SINGLE ENTITY AIRCRAFT CHARTER AGREEMENT NO. LT050602**

**Please Remit To:**
Capital Aviation, Inc.  
12110 Sunset Hills Road  
Suite 450  
Reston, VA 20190

**DynCorp Systems & Solutions, LLC**  
6101 Strutton Avenue  
Alexandria, Virginia 22312

**SUBCONTRACT:**  
K2-S-5008

**INVOICE DATE:**  
January 7, 2003

**INVOICE NUMBER:**  
LT050602-1203

**AIRCRAFT:**  
**Gulfstream IV - N634MC**

---

**Hours Remaining On Contract Following Trip #23:**  
84.2 hrs.

**TRIP NO. 24:**  
December 3rd through 6th, 2002

- Washington, Dulles (IAD) - Anchorage (ANC)
- Anchorage (ANC) - Osaka (RJBB)
- Osaka (RJBB) - Bangkok (VTBD)
- Bangkok (VTBD) - Moshad Ab (OMDM)
- Moshad Ab (OMDM) - Szczyno (EPSY)
- Szczyno (EPSY) - Warsaw (EPWA)
- Warsaw (EPWA) - London (ECCW)
- London (ECCW) - Washington, Dulles (IAD)

**Total Flight Time:**  
51.1 hrs.

**Hours Remaining on Contract:**  
31.9 hrs.

---

**Trip No. 24 Additional Costs:**

- Position of Aircraft:  
  6,000.00
- Additional Crew Labor & Holiday Premium:  
  2 crew members @ 6 days @ $300.00 per day:  
  9,600.00
- Crew Airfare Logistics and Additional Mission Services (Client-directed):  
  11,200.47
- Crew Expenses:  
  6 RON’s @ $167.00 (JTR Anchorage, AK) @ 2 Crew members:  
  1,444.00
  1 RON @ $536.00 (JTR London, UK) @ 4 Crew members:  
  2,144.00
- Initial Handling fees:  
  19,760.00
- Landing Fees:  
  3,676.00
- Catering:  
  2,221.76

**BALANCE DUE UPON RECEIPT:**  
$54,773.83
On the basis of this evidence, it is possible to confirm that DETENTION SITE COBALT was in Afghanistan, DETENTION SITE GREEN was in Thailand and DETENTION SITE BLUE was in Poland (each of these locations are further confirmed multiple times by undertaking the same process of triangulation in other cases).

It is also possible to confirm that al-Nashiri was:

- held in Emirati custody until 10 November 2002;
- rendered to Afghanistan on board known rendition aircraft N85VM on 10 November;
- held at DETENTION SITE COBALT (which prisoners referred to as the Dark Prison) from 10-15 November 2002 (where his wrists were tied to a bar in the ceiling, and he was kept naked in a painful position with his feet just touching the floor);\textsuperscript{142}
- rendered from Afghanistan to Thailand on 15 November 2002, likely on board known rendition aircraft N379P;
- held in Thailand (DETENTION SITE GREEN) alongside Abu Zubaydah until 4 December 2002 (where he was kept naked and shackled, subjected to the waterboard, and threatened with sodomy, and with the arrest and rape of his family);\textsuperscript{143}
- rendered to Poland on 4-5 December 2002, alongside Abu Zubaydah and on board known rendition aircraft N63MU;
- held in Poland (DETENTION SITE BLUE) from 5 December 2002 (where he was subjected to sustained torture, including extreme stress positions, mock execution and threats with a power drill).\textsuperscript{144}

### The Secret Detention of Khaled Sheikh Mohammed, 2005-2006

The Committee Study states that Khaled Sheikh Mohammed ‘was transferred [from DETENTION SITE BLACK] to DETENTION SITE \textcolor{red}{VIOLET} on October \textcolor{red}{5}, 2005, to DETENTION SITE BROWN on March \textcolor{red}{26}, 2006, and to US military detention at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, on September 5, 2006.’\textsuperscript{145}

The first redaction here is the pseudonym for the black site (a word, in capital letters); the second redaction is the name of a month; the third redaction is a single-digit figure; the last is a double-digit figure. An analysis of the redactions, alongside triangulation with a number of other sources, allows us to confirm the location of the sites involved:

- the only black site pseudonym which fits the first redaction is ‘VIOLET’;
- the only month name which fits the second redaction is ‘October’;
Mohammed's transfer from DETENTION SITE BLACK to DETENTION SITE VIOLET was 1-9 October 2005 (a redaction of a single digit for the date);

Eurocontrol flight data shows a flight by rendition aircraft N308AB from Bucharest, Romania to Tirana, Albania, on 5 October 2005. The aircraft filed a false flight plan to disguise its landing in Bucharest, and was on the ground at Tirana from 22:38 to 01:08.

Billing documents confirm the flight between Romania and Albania, with two passengers to be picked up in Romania and all to be dropped in Albania. Customs help was to be denied;¹⁴⁶

Flight data from Eurocontrol, the FAA and the Icelandic aviation authority (ISAVIA) also log a second known rendition aircraft, N787WH, flying from Reykjavik, Iceland and landing in Tirana on 5 October 2005.¹⁴⁷ It was on the ground until 23:35, meaning that both aircraft were together for around an hour;

Eurocontrol and ATC data document a flight by N787WH from Tirana to Tallinn, Estonia,¹⁴⁸ although data from the Lithuanian Civil Aviation Administration and airport documents confirm that the aircraft in fact landed at Vilnius, Lithuania;¹⁴⁹

An investigation by the Lithuanian Parliament confirmed that N787WH landed at Vilnius on 6 October 2005, that the flight was 'unscheduled', and that customs officials 'were prevented from inspecting the aircraft.' According to one customs officer 'civil aviation officers prevented the SBGS officer from approaching the aircraft.... A car drove away from the aircraft and left the territory of the airport border control point. Upon contacting the civil aviation officers, it was explained that the heads of the SBGS had been informed of the landing... The letter from the SSD marked as 'CLASSIFIED'... was received by the SBGS on 7 October 2005, i.e., post factum.'¹⁵⁰

CIA cables from DETENTION SITE VIOLET document Mohammed's presence at the site in December 2005;¹⁵¹

The Committee Study confirms that DETENTION SITE VIOLET was closed in March 2006, with all remaining detainees transferred to DETENTION SITE BROWN.¹⁵² The only month name which fits this redaction is 'March';

Mohammed's transfer to DETENTION SITE BROWN took place 10-31 March 2006 (double digit redaction);

Eurocontrol flight data shows a flight by rendition aircraft N733MA from Porto, Portugal to Helsinki, Finland on 25 March 2006, although the Lithuanian Parliament investigation confirmed that it in fact landed in Palanga, Lithuania, and that no customs inspections were carried out, pursuant to a request from the SSD;¹⁵³
Witnesses in the Lithuanian prosecutor’s investigation confirmed the loading of a number of coffin-sized boxes onto an aircraft on 25 March 2006;\textsuperscript{154}

Eurocontrol and ATC data further confirms that N733MA landed in Cairo, Egypt, and was on the ground from 02:19 to 03:45 on 26 March 2006;\textsuperscript{155}

Eurocontrol data also logs rendition aircraft N740EH on the ground at Cairo until 02:45 on 26 March 2006, meaning that both aircraft were together for around half an hour;

this data then tracks N740EH flying from Cairo to Kabul, Afghanistan.

On the basis of this evidence, it is possible to confirm that DETENTION SITE BLACK was in Romania, DETENTION SITE VIOLET was in Lithuania and DETENTION SITE BROWN was in Afghanistan (each of these locations are further confirmed multiple times by undertaking the same process of triangulation in other cases).

It is also possible to confirm that Mohammed was:

- Held in Romania until 5 October 2005;
- rendered from Romania to Lithuania on board two rendition aircraft (N308AB and N787WH) which met in Albania, likely alongside al-Nashiri, on 5-6 October 2005;
- held in Lithuania, alongside al-Nashiri, Abu Zubaydah, Mustafa al-Hawsawi (#46) and maybe others, until 25 March 2006;
- rendered from Lithuania to Afghanistan, on board two rendition aircraft (N733MA and N740EH) which met in Cairo, alongside the other detainees held in Lithuania, on 25-26 March 2006;
- held in Afghanistan until 5 September 2006, at which point he was rendered for a final time to DoD custody at Guantánamo Bay (where he remains).
Endnotes

5. CIA, Background Paper on CIA's Combined Use of Interrogation Techniques, sent as fax to Dan Levin, DoJ (OLC), 30 December 2004 (redacted), p. 2.
7. CIA, Background Paper on CIA's Combined Use of Interrogation Techniques, sent as fax to Dan Levin, DoJ (OLC), 30 December 2004 (redacted), pp. 4-5.
8. CIA (OIG), Special Review: Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities (September 2001 - October 2003), 2003-7123-IG, 7 May 2004 (redacted), p. 44.
14. SSCI, Committee Study, 9 December 2014 (redacted), foreword, p. 4.
15. Ibid., p. 9.
16. Ibid., pp. 40-45, 67-72, 78-80, 84-93.
17. As an example, the Study’s extensive discussion of Abu Zubaydah’s torture during August 2002 is to be considered in light of the fact that he was held in secret by the CIA for more than four and a years, in at least seven different countries. Little detail of his remaining time in the programme is provided in the Study.
18. Indeed, it is now clear that from 2009 onwards, UK government officials made regular representation to the SSCI to ensure that mentions of the UK were redacted from the report. See, for example: Rowena Mason, UK Ministers Met Senate Committee During Torture Inquiry, Papers Reveal, The Guardian, 12 December 2014; FCO, Letter to Reprieve: Freedom of Information Act 2000 Request Ref: 0672-14, 1 August 2014.
23. See, for example: 2015 Torture FOIA, American Civil Liberties Union.
24. See, for example: Leopold CIA Interrogation Documents.
25. Other investigations which have tracked aircraft associated with the torture program include those undertaken by teams at the Council of
Much of this came through our work at (or in partnership with) Reprieve. See, for example, Reprieve and Access Info Europe, Rendition on Record, 15 December 2011; FCO, Freedom of Information Response, 0630-13, 25 October 2013. Our collaboration with the European Parliament’s LIBE committee in 2012-13 was also key to a significant body of disclosures.


For more on data from these communication systems, in the context of CIA rendition, see: Center for Human Rights and Global Justice, Data String Analysis Submitted as Evidence of Polish Involvement in US Extraordinary Rendition and Secret Detention Program, 9 March 2010; PACE, Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, Secret Detentions and Illegal Transfers of Detainees Involving Council of Europe Member States: Second Report, 11 June 2007, p. 36.

In many cases, individual flights are recorded by more than one data source.

There are various reasons why an aircraft may have been included in a data-gathering exercise, but the fact of inclusion is not in itself indicative that a plane was involved.


SSCI, Committee Study, 9 December 2014 (redacted), p. 115.

Of course, our database does not include every cable from every field station; just those referenced by the Committee Study. So while the series are coherent, they are incomplete.

Indeed, through triangulation with flight data we have established that he was on board the rendition flight from Afghanistan to Poland on 25 March 2003.

See, for example: Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, Secret Detentions and Illegal Transfers of Detainees Involving Council of Europe Member States: Second Report, 11 June 2007, pp. 36-40; ECtHR, Judgment: Abu Zubaydah v. Poland, 24 July 2014, para 419.

SSCI, Committee Study, 9 December 2014 (redacted), p. 67.

Ibid., pp. 75-76.

Ibid., pp. 83-84.


SSCI, Committee Study, 9 December 2014 (redacted), findings and conclusions, pp. 7, 16-17.


Ibid., pp. 139-142.


SSCI, Committee Study, 9 December 2014 (redacted), p. 74.


Ibid., para 211-216.

SSCI, Committee Study, 9 December 2014 (redacted), p. 97.

Ibid., p. 97.


Torture in Romania: Former Head-of-State Iliescu Admits Existence of CIA Prison, Spiegel Online, 22 April 2015; Former Romania President Admits Allowing CIA Site, Al Jazeera, 27 April 2015.


89. In some cases these fictitious identities have been penetrated. See, for example, Suspected Kidnappers Identified, Spiegel Online, 21 September 2006.

90. In other words, some prisoners were rendered more than once by Aero Contractors aircraft.

91. The prime contract is referred to throughout the documentation, although the text of this remains classified.


95. DynCorp International, A Brief History of DynCorp International.


107. Ibid., para 288.


110. CNSD, Findings of the Investigation Concerning the Alleged Transportation and Confinement of Persons Detained by the Central Intelligence Agency, 22 December 2009; ECtHR, Judgment: Abu Zubaydah v. Lithuania, 31 May 2018, para 304-349. For details of how this worked in practice, see Circuit 54 and Circuit 59.


112. [Redacted], N308AB Itinerary, 29 September 2005.


114. SFA, Invoice to CSC, LTS050602-10046, 12 October 2005; SFA, Invoice to CSC, LTS050602-10038, 12 October 2005.


For previous investigations which have generated lists of those held or rendered by the CIA, see, for example: Center for Human Rights and Global Justice, Fate and Whereabouts Unknown: Detainees in the ‘War on Terror’, 17 December 2005; Amnesty International, Off the Record: US Responsibility for Enforced Disappearances in the ‘War on Terror’, 7 June 2007; Disappearing Act: Rendition by the Numbers, Mother Jones, 3 March 2008; Open Society Justice Initiative, Globalizing Torture: CIA Secret Detention and Extraordinary Rendition, 5 February 2013.


The other men were Hussein Salem Muhammed Almerfedi, Walid Muhammad Shahir al-Qadasi and Aminullah Baryalai Tukhi. See Open Society Justice Initiative, Globalizing Torture: CIA Secret Detention and Extraordinary Rendition, 5 February 2013, pp. 31-32, 38, 51-52, 58, citing documents on file with Human Rights Watch. Although al-Deemawi thought they were held in the Dark Prison, this was likely to have been an Afghan-run facility (given that the Dark Prison was not operational until September 2002).

Al-Najjar, Qa'id, al-Bihani, al-Hami.


This does not include the rendition of at least seven of the CIA’s own detainees to Morocco during their time in CIA custody.


One of these men, reportedly Ibn Sheikh al-Libi, was rendered from Bagram to Egypt inside a closed coffin, under the nose of British intelligence. Ibid., pp. 32, 85. This report hides the destination of these renditions behind a codeword, CUPAR, and the identity of coffin-bound prisoner behind the codeword CUCKOO. For reporting linking CUPAR with Egypt and CUCKOO with Ibn Sheikh, see Ian Cobain and Clara Usiskin, Exclusive: UK Spy Agencies Knew Source of False Iraq War Intelligence Was Tortured, Middle East Eye, 6 November 2018.


DoJ, Status of [redacted], 23 June 2004 (redacted); DoJ, Status of [redacted], 23 June 2004 (redacted).


These figures exclude pre-CIA detention in other countries or post-CIA detention in US military custody or elsewhere.

SSCI, Committee Study, 9 December 2014 (redacted), pp. 66-67.


CIA, Afghanistan, cable 29768, 11-18 November 2002.

DoJ (OPR), Investigation into the Office of Legal Counsel's Memoranda Concerning Issues Relating to the Central Intelligence Agency's Use of 'Enhanced Interrogation Techniques' on Suspected Terrorists, 29 July 2009, p. 85.

CIA (OIG), Special Review: Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities (September 2001 - October 2003), 2003-7123-IG, 7 May 2004 (redacted), pp. 35-36.


Vilnius Airport, Invoice to Victory Air Transport, 6 October 2005; Vilnius Airport, Ground Handling Form, 6 October 2005.
Clues to Secret CIA Flights, Chicago Tribune, 6 February 2007.


143. Ibid., p. 17; SSCI, Committee Study, 9 December 2014 (redacted), p. 67.

144. SSCI, Committee Study, 9 December 2014 (redacted), pp. 67-72.

145. Ibid., p. 96.


147. See, for example: ISAVIA, Letter to Access Info Europe, 2 March 2012.


153. CNSD, Findings of the Investigation Concerning the Alleged Transportation and Confinement of Persons Detained by the Central Intelligence Agency, 22 December 2009, pp. 4-5.


CHAPTER 2

THE EVOLUTION OF CIA TORTURE
The CIA torture programme, running from 2001 until 2008, was highly dynamic and did not exist in isolation. Rather, it took place within the context of a large-scale and long-running covert intelligence programme, global in scope and interconnected with both US military capture and detention operations and the activities of foreign liaison partners. Building a picture of the historical evolution of the programme, from its inception immediately after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 until its closure in January 2009, has been central to our work to understand how secret detention, rendition and torture played out on the ground. An analysis of data relating to the programme – such as flight records by aircraft suspected of involvement – which does not take account of how the programme itself developed, is likely to result in findings which have little basis in the reality of CIA torture. Indeed, the spatial architecture of the torture programme emerged rather haphazardly in the months and years after 9/11, and remained dynamic throughout its existence. Individual black sites were often closed at very short notice as their existence was threatened with exposure. Prisoners were moved between locations as a result of these closures, and of overcrowding at particular sites, rather than necessarily as a result of assessments of where best to interrogate those considered to be terror suspects. This chapter tells the story of how the black site network evolved during the entire period of the programme’s operation, based on the analysis of all the data at our disposal. Although much still remains unknown, what follows is the fullest account to date of how the torture programme evolved on the ground, and of where and when the CIA’s prisoners were rendered, secretly detained, and tortured.

THE FIRST MONTHS: ESTABLISHING THE PROGRAMME

Presidential authorisation for CIA capture and detention operations in the ‘War on Terror’ began almost immediately after the attacks of 11 September 2001. Less than a week later, on 17 September 2001, President Bush signed a 14-page covert action Memorandum of Notification (MoN) for the National Security Council, authorising the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), George Tenet, to ‘undertake operations designed to capture and detain persons who pose a continuing, serious threat of violence or death to US persons and interests or who are planning
terrorist activities.’

By then, discussions within the CIA had already begun: on request from the chief of the CIA’s Counterterrorism Center (CTC), CIA stations across Africa were asked to consider appropriate locations for detention facilities, and discussions over the following weeks centred on four countries in Africa and one in Southeast Asia. Authority for managing and overseeing the programme was quickly delegated by Tenet to James Pavitt, Deputy Director of Operations (DDO), and Cofer Black, Director of CTC. On the back of discussions by lawyers at the National Security Council, Tenet established an approval process for each proposed capture and detention operation. Accordingly, in each case ‘the reasons for the determination that the individual targeted meets the criteria’ laid down by the MoN were to be set out in writing, for approval or otherwise by the Principals Committee of the National Security Council. In cases where time did not permit such prior approval, Pavitt was to have authority to approve all ‘hostile capture and detention operations’, whereas Black was authorised to approve ‘consented capture and detention operations’.

By November 2001 the CIA had paused its search for appropriate locations for black sites, given the myriad problems that were foreseen in running its own facilities. Senior officials worried about the need for ‘intensive negotiation’ with host governments, the ‘uncontrollable risks’ to facility security posed by having a foreign country involved, the likelihood of exposure as a result of the lengthy detention of suspects – which already the CIA was suggesting might be years in some cases – and the adverse media and public reaction which would result from this. Given the ways in which the programme eventually unravelled, this list was prescient. The CIA’s preference at this point was to establish and fund a short-term facility while contracting out actual operations to other US Government agencies, commercial companies, and foreign governments. Simultaneously, the CIA sought to persuade the Department of Defense (DoD) to host a long-term facility for detention, ideally at the US Naval Base at Guantánamo Bay.

Although the 17 September MoN made no mention of interrogation – ‘enhanced’ or otherwise – by November the CIA was considering possible legal arguments which could be deployed to defend the use of torture. Discussion of the ‘necessity defence’ – a legal principle which might exonerate those who commit a crime, if they could demonstrate that such action prevented a greater harm than would adherence to the law – allowed one draft memo, ‘Hostile Interrogations: Legal Considerations for CIA Officers’, to suggest that ‘if we follow the Israeli example, CIA could argue that torture was necessary to prevent imminent, significant, physical harm to persons, where there is no other available means to prevent the harm.’ Moreover, and regardless of US legal commitments under international law, other states ‘may be very unwilling to call the US to task for torture when it resulted in saving thousands of lives.’ Another memo, sent in February 2002, continued the theme, this time in the context of the possible application of the Geneva Conventions to CIA detainees: ‘In short, if a detainee were granted POW status, and therefore is covered by the Geneva convention, there are few alternatives to simply asking questions... the optic becomes how legally defensible is a particular act that probably violations the convention, but ultimately saves lives.’
In short, if a detainee were granted POW status, and therefore is covered by the Geneva convention, there are few alternatives to simply asking questions.
While discussions continued throughout 2001 and early 2002 of how and where to operate detention facilities, and the legal consequences for the proposed use of torture, CIA capture operations on the ground were proceeding apace. Starting in October 2001, the CIA worked with partner governments across the globe to identify, locate and arrest suspects, and render them to the custody of foreign governments across the Middle East and North Africa. Prisoners were then detained in secret, tortured and interrogated – often in the presence of CIA officials.\(^{10}\) By this time, Tenet’s procedure for case-by-case approval by the NSC Principals had been overridden by Pavitt, who issued a ‘blanket approval’ within DDO for determining those individuals who ‘pose the requisite “continuing serious threat of violence or death to US persons and interests or who are planning terrorist activities”,’ and for undertaking subsequent capture and detention operations.\(^ {11}\) Operations needed to be recorded in cable traffic, but not preapproved by Headquarters.\(^ {12} \)

Our analysis of flight data and other information has enabled us to identify specific rendition operations which transferred at least ten prisoners to foreign custody in Egypt, Morocco and Jordan in 2001 and 2002,\(^ {13} \) although there were undoubtedly others subjected to a similar fate. Investigations by the UK Parliament’s Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC), for example, have found that at least 29 renditions were undertaken to one particular country, reported to have been Egypt, by January 2002. One MI6 officer witnessed the rendition of a prisoner from Bagram: ‘About half an hour later [redacted] was sitting with one of the team outside the hanger when a pick up jeep with a six-foot, sealed box on the back drove past. It was [redacted] on the way to the waiting plane.’ It has been further reported that Ibn Sheikh al-Libi (#42) was in the ‘coffin’.\(^ {14} \)

## RENDITIONS TO FOREIGN CUSTODY, 2001–2002

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Country of Origin</th>
<th>Destination</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Circuit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jamil Qasim Saeed Mohammed</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>October 2001</td>
<td>Circuit 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohamed el-Zery, Ahmed Agiza</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>December 2001</td>
<td>Circuit 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohammed Saad Iqbal Madni</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>January 2002</td>
<td>Circuit 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(via Diego Garcia)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ali al-Hajj al-Sharqawi (#93)</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>February 2002</td>
<td>Circuit 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abou Elkassim Britel</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>May 2002</td>
<td>Circuit 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Binyam Mohamed (#95)</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>July 2002</td>
<td>Circuit 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Umar Faruq (#14)</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>September 2002</td>
<td>Circuit 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(via Diego Garcia)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As one example, Mohammed Saad Iqbal Madni was detained by Indonesian officials in Jakarta in January 2002, on request from the CIA, and passed to CIA and Egyptian personnel at the airport. There he was beaten severely by Egyptian intelligence, stripped naked and bundled onto the plane. During the flight he was bleeding from his nose, mouth and ears, and was unable to move because shackles wound tightly around his body. Rendered to Egypt, he was detained for over three months in an underground cell ‘like a grave’, hung from the ceiling, and repeatedly tortured with electric shocks and beatings. Although the torture was undertaken by Egyptian officials, CIA personnel were in the room during at least some of the sessions, and passed questions in silence to the torturers.

CIA access was also granted to Ali al-Hajj al-Sharqawi (#93) while he was detained in Jordan, having been rendered by the CIA from Pakistan in February 2002. During his two years in Jordanian custody, al-Sharqawi says he was tortured continuously: ‘They beat me in a way that does not know any limits. They threatened me with electricity, with snakes and dogs. They say we'll make you see death.’ Likewise, Binyam Mohamed (#95) has testified that his torture in Morocco clearly took place on the back on British questioning and intelligence, and that at least one US agent was involved in his interrogation.

We still do not have the full picture of renditions to foreign custody. Binyam Mohamed reported being rendered to Morocco alongside two other prisoners, whom we have yet to identify. Mamdouh Habib was reported to have been rendered from Pakistan to Egypt in November 2001, while Mohamedou Ould Slahi was rendered from Mauritania to Jordan in the same month. We do not have flight records to allow us to confirm either of these operations. Research by the Open Society Justice Initiative and Open the Government has identified a further list of individuals reported to have been rendered by the CIA, although at present we have been unable to verify these through flight data matches. We do know, however, that such operations continued to be a key part of the programme, even as the CIA’s own facilities were established. These included both renditions to foreign custody for the purposes of interrogation, where the prisoner has little or no connection with the country concerned, and renditions to the country from which the prisoner had originally come. In March 2004, for example, British intelligence arranged for the rendition of Libyans Abdel Hakim Belhadj and Fatima Boudchar from Thailand to custody in Tripoli, with the CIA supplying the aircraft and rendition crew (Circuit 40).
CABLE FROM THE THAI BLACK SITE, APRIL 2002, DESCRIBING THE CELL IN WHICH ABU ZUBAYDAH WAS HELD
While the CIA became increasingly involved in renditions to foreign custody, it appears to have been the anticipation of capturing its first so-called ‘High Value Detainee’, Abu Zubaydah (#1), which finally tipped the balance in favour of the CIA establishing its own detention facilities. One March 2002 PowerPoint presentation, ‘Options for Incarcerating Abu Zubaydah’, listed pros and cons of a number of possibilities. Guantánamo Bay was described as having a ‘high degree of physical security’ although the ‘viability of maintaining secrecy of Abu Zubaydah’s presence’ was an issue, as was risking ‘possible loss of control to US military and/or FBI’ and the ‘possible impact on prisoners if AZ’s presence becomes known’. According to reporting at the time, CIA officials were clear that ‘it’s imperative to keep him isolated from other detainees as part of psychological warfare, and even more aggressive tools may be used.’ US military custody in Afghanistan was also highlighted as problematic, given issues around ‘maintaining secrecy’ and ‘poor area security’. Rendition to an existing partner country (likely Morocco) was discounted, given the poor results of recent interrogations by the liaison partners and the desire to participate directly in his interrogation.

Ultimately, the CIA decided to keep Abu Zubaydah away from the US military and other prisoners, and to establish its own facility in a partner country. Thailand was the chosen location. Although there would be ‘diplomatic/policy decisions’ required with this option, and ultimately it was ‘not a USG-controlled facility’, the benefits included ‘no issues of possible US court jurisdiction’. After authorisation from President Bush on 29 March 2002, the local CIA station obtained approval from Thai officials, and Abu Zubaydah was rendered to Thailand from Pakistan on 31 March 2002. The CIA had taken formal custody of its first detainee.

The precise location of the Thai site is unclear. It has been reported as being at least an hour’s drive from Bangkok, although others have suggested locations in the provinces of Udon Thani or Chiang Mai, both of which are much further away. It has also been reported as being located in a small, disused warehouse on an active airbase, and it appears as though this was within, or adjacent to, a city. Ali Soufan, an FBI agent who was present at the site and initially interviewed Abu Zubaydah there as well as in a nearby hospital, gives a sparse description: it was a ‘very primitive location’ which had a ‘safe house’ and a ‘makeshift hospital room.’ Soufan reached the facility on a small plane after arriving in the host country. Other reporting has confirmed that the facility was makeshift, with one senior CIA official acknowledging that ‘it was just a chicken coop we remodelled.’ Despite its initial primitive state, the site was transformed over the next couple of weeks into ‘an actual cell... monitored by hidden cameras and microphones’. A fuller picture of the conditions of confinement at the site emerges from CIA cables sent during April 2002, after Abu Zubaydah had been moved back to the facility following a period in a local hospital. The cell was described as ‘white with no natural lighting or windows, but with four halogen lights pointed into the cell. An air conditioner was also in the room. A white curtain separated the interrogation room from the cell. The interrogation cell had three padlocks.’ Security personnel wore ‘all black uniforms, including boots, gloves, balaclavas, and goggles to
keep Abu Zubaydah from identifying the officers, as well as to prevent Abu Zubaydah from seeing the security guards as individuals who he may attempt to establish a relationship or dialogue with. The officers used ‘hand signals when they were with Abu Zubaydah and used hand-cuffs and leg shackles to maintain control. In addition, either loud rock music was played or noise generators were used to enhance Abu Zubaydah’s “sense of hopelessness”.

These modifications – which included ‘the sanding of the holding cell bars to reduce AZ’s ability to stimulate his sensorium via rubbing of the bars’ – were designed, according to the interrogation team, specifically ‘to create an atmosphere that enhances the strategic interrogation process of AZ. The deliberate manipulation of the environment is intended to cause psychological disorientation, and... an increased sense of learned helplessness’.

The black site had no permanent staff, with temporary duty officers taking up the position of Chief of Base as well as security, medical and communications personnel. Interrogations of Abu Zubaydah, and later Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri (#26), were led by the two contracted psychologists/interrogators, James Mitchell and Bruce Jessen, who the CIA had employed to develop and oversee the ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’.

Abu Zubaydah was interrogated during April and May 2002, and then placed in isolation for 47 days (from 18 June to 4 August) while the interrogation team departed Bangkok, Thailand ‘for a break and to attend to personal matters’. Cables from the site during this time log his condition during this phase, which was designed ‘to induce doubt and uncertainty about subject’s disposition. Disrupting the routine to which subject is accustomed and limiting his contact with people will maximise psychological pressure’.

It was during this time that CIA Headquarters, working from the contract psychologists’ untested theories on interrogation, developed its set of ‘novel interrogation methods’ for use on Abu Zubaydah, ostensibly based on techniques deployed by the US military’s SERE (Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape) school. These discussions took place within the context of the February 2002 Executive Order by President Bush, which had determined that the Geneva Conventions did not apply to al-Qaeda detainees, that ‘Prisoner of War’ status did not apply to al-Qaeda or Taliban detainees, and that Common Article 3 (which outlaws inhumane treatment of prisoners) also did not apply to either.

Almost immediately after Abu Zubaydah’s capture, some within the CIA were pushing for an interrogation strategy which should, as one cable put it, ‘be designed to facilitate... psychological dependence. Although Zubaydah’s medical condition will likely require continued attention from a medical physician in the near term, these medical evaluations will need to be controlled in a fashion that the dependence with the primary interrogator is not diluted.

As a result of these discussions, a list of twelve ‘potential physical and psychological pressures’ was drafted by the CIA for use against Abu Zubaydah: attention grasp; walling; facial hold; facial slap; cramped confinement; wall standing; stress positions; sleep deprivation; water board; use of diapers; insects; and mock burial.

Although most of these techniques were eventually used against a number of detainees, they were initially developed in the light of what was known about Abu Zubaydah personally.
Thus, the diaper would 'leverage his concerns' over being clean and his particular sensitivity 'to situations that reflect a loss of status or are potentially humiliating.' Likewise, the suggested use of insects was designed to play on Abu Zubaydah's personal fears, to 'increase his sense of dread.' The use of the 'mock burial', although ultimately not passed to the Department of Justice (DoJ) for authorisation, envisaged the prisoner being 'placed in a cramped confinement box that resembles a coffin. The box has hidden air holes to prevent suffocation. The individual is moved to a prepared site where he hears digging. The site has a prepared hole, dug in such a way that the box can be lowered into the ground and shovels of dirt thrown in on top of it... This procedure would be used as part of a threat and rescue scenario where the “burial” is interrupted and the subject is rescued by a concerned party. The rescuers then use the subject's fear of being returned to the people trying to bury him as a means of pressuring the subject for information.'

In attempting to get the legal green light from the DoJ for these techniques, Mitchell and Jessen were asked to 'comment on the short and long term psychological effects of the water board and mock burial,' and when doing so were asked to 'keep in mind the statutory definition that the technique must not cause severe mental pain or suffering.' This might prove difficult, the cable implied, given that both techniques 'are no longer being used [in SERE training] because they are extremely effective.'

CIA personnel at the Thai site were also involved in these discussions, up to and including outlining their plan for dealing with Abu Zubaydah's possible death under torture: 'If subject develops a serious medical condition which may involve a host of conditions including a heart attack or another catastrophic type of condition, all efforts will be made to ensure that proper medical care will be provided to subject. In the event subject dies we need to be prepared to act accordingly keeping in mind the liaison equities involving our hosts. If subject dies, we plan on seeking [redacted] assistance for the cremation of subject.'

As the Chief of Base wrote in one cable: 'We are a nation of laws and we do not wish to parse words. A bottom line in considering the new measures proposed for use at [redacted] is that subject is being held in solitary confinement, against his will, without legal representation... [We] will make every effort to ensure that subject is not permanently physically or mentally harmed but we should not say at the outset of this process that there is no risk.'

Given the severity of torture proposed for Abu Zubaydah, site personnel were also keen to 'get reasonable assurances that subject will remain in isolation.' Such assurances were received from Headquarters, where there was 'a fairly unanimous sentiment... that AZ will never be placed in a situation where he has any significant contact with others and/or has the opportunity to be released.... All major players are in concurrence that AZ should remain incommunicado for the remainder of his life.' Given this risk, and the fact that the proposed methods ‘include certain activities that normally would appear to be prohibited' under the torture convention, the Attorney General was asked to ‘grant a formal declination of prosecution, in advance, for any employees of the United States, as well as any other personnel acting on behalf of the United States, who may employ methods in the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah that otherwise might subject those individuals to prosecution.'
By 18 July 2002, officials at the site were constructing the two confinement boxes, as well as the ‘wallow’ wall, so that ‘it can be quickly pieced together and placed inside subject’s cell.’ In the following days, Mitchell and Jessen were conducting ‘a walk-through rehearsal with security staff… which choreographed moving Abu Zubaydah in and out of the large and small confinement boxes, as well as use of the water board.’ 

By 24 July 2002 the Attorney General was approving the use of the so-called ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’ proposed by the CIA (supported by Mitchell and Jessen), and the DoJ’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) circulated its classified legal opinion on 1 August. From this point on, CIA torture was firmly on the table, and interrogators led by Mitchell and Jessen quickly began to apply these techniques to Abu Zubaydah.

Cables describing Abu Zubaydah’s torture at the black site in Thailand during August 2002 provide excruciating detail of near-24/7 abuse to which he was subjected, as well as the clear physical and psychological effects it had on him. We have reproduced some of these cables in full here, to illustrate the ways in which black site personnel and interrogators recorded the daily use of severe torture on those held within the programme. These sessions were videotaped, with 12 tapes recording 83 separate applications of the waterboard. The use of the waterboard in practice deviated from the authorised technique: rather than applying small amounts of water in a controlled manner, interrogators ‘continuously applied large volumes of water.’ This resulted in vomiting and ‘involuntary spasms of the torso and extremities’, as well as ‘hysterical pleas’ from the prisoner. At one point, he needed medical resuscitation after becoming ‘completely unresponsive, with bubbles rising through his open, full mouth.’ When not being interrogated, he was left strapped to the waterboard with a cloth over his face, placed in a stress position, or locked in confinement boxes. Overall, Abu Zubaydah spent a total of more than 11 days in a coffin-sized box, and 29 hours in a box which measured just 75cm x 75cm x 55cm.

He then dragged me to another very tiny squared box. With the help of the guards he shoved me inside the box. It was so painful. As soon as they locked me up inside the box I tried my best to sit up, but in vain, for the box was too short. I tried to take a curled position but to no vain, for it was too tight. It was a serious problem. I spent long countless hours inside. I felt I was going to explode from bending my legs and my back…

When they pulled me outside it took me a long time before I was able to stand on my feet. They were shoving me thinking that I was deliberately refusing to stand up… They restrained me to a metal bed that had many belts in every direction… I suddenly felt water being poured. It shocked me because it was very cold. But the water didn’t stop…. They kept pouring water and concentrating on my nose and my mouth until I really felt I was drowning and my chest was just about to explode from the lack of oxygen. Indeed that was the first time and the first day that I felt I was going to die from drowning… All I know or remember is that I started vomiting water but also rice and string beans.
Date: 20020804

TO: 

FROM: 

SUBJECT: EYES ONLY - DETAILS RE INITIAL CYCLE OF INTERROGATIONS OF 

TOR: 041559Z AUG 02

G-S-C-H-Y 041559Z AUG 02

CITE: 

TO: 

FOR: 

SUBJECT: EYES ONLY - DETAILS RE INITIAL CYCLE OF INTERROGATIONS OF 
04 AUGUST 02 OF ABU ZUBAYDAR

REF: 

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: -- PLEASE ENSURE THAT SUBSTANTIVE PORTIONS OF INFORMATION BELOW ARE SHARED WITH FBI HQS

ABU ZUBAYDAR'S TORTURE IN THE THAI BLACK SITE - DAY 1

1. AT 1150 HOURS SECURITY PERSONNEL WENT INTO THE CELL AND SHACKLED AND HOODED SUBJECT AND REMOVED SUBJECT'S TOMEL. WHEN THIS WAS ACCOMPLISHED IC SERE PSYCHOLOGIST (ICSP) ENTERED THE CELL. IC SERE PSYCHOLOGIST PLACED A ROLLED TOMEL BEHIND SUBJECT'S NECK AND BACKED SUBJECT UP TO THE CELL WALL. THE IC SERE PSYCHOLOGIST REMOVED SUBJECT'S HOOD. PER REF B GUIDANCE, PROVIDE DETAILED AND VERIFIABLE INFORMATION ON OPERATIONS PLANNED AGAINST THE U.S., TO INCLUDE NAMES, PHONES NUMBERS, EMAIL ADDRESSES, WEAPONS CACHES, AND SAPIENTES OF ANYONE SUPPORTING TERRORIST OPERATIONS IN THE U.S. IN AN EFFORT TO DETERMINE SUBJECT'S COMPLETE COMPREHENSION OF THE SITUATION, IC SERE PSYCHOLOGIST HAD SUBJECT REPEAT THE KIND OF INFORMATION HE EXPECTED SUBJECT TO PROVIDE. SUBJECT ARTICULATED THAT HE NEEDED TO PROVIDE INFORMATION ON/ABOUT OPERATIONS AND PERSONS INVOLVED IN THESE OPERATIONS.

4. SUBJECT APPEARED APPREHENSIVE. SUBJECT SAID HE HAD ALREADY PROVIDED THE REQUIRED INFORMATION AND DENIED HAVING ADDITIONAL INFORMATION. SUBJECT RECEIVED INSULT SLAP AND FACE GRAB AT EACH POINT THAT HE DENIED HAVING ADDITIONAL INFORMATION. AS HIS DENIALS WERE EXPECTED, SUBJECT WAS AGAIN HOODED WHILE SECURITY OFFICERS STOOD THE BOX UPRIGHT AND SECURED IT TO THE CELL BARS. SUBJECT WAS BACKED INTO THE BOX AND PROVIDED THE CONTAINER FOR HIS WASTE, WATER, AND TOILET PAPER. SUBJECT'S HOOD REMOVED AND HE WAS TOLD THIS WAS HIS NEW HOME UNTIL HE WAS PREPARED TO PROVIDE DETAILED AND VERIFIABLE INFORMATION ON OPERATIONS PLANNED AGAINST THE U.S. THIS VERBAL DEMAND SVERS AS A BRIDGE TO THE NEXT SESSION OF INTERROGATION AND IS WHAT SUBJECT IS LEFT TO THINK ABOUT DURING HIS CONFINEMENT. SUBJECT
WAS THEN SHUT INTO THE LARGE CONFINEMENT BOX. THE FIRST SESSION LASTED APPROXIMATELY TEN MINUTES.

5. AT 1230 HOURS [_____] TEAM MEMBERS ASSISTED ICSP IN PUTTING UP THE "WALLING" WALL IN SUBJECT'S CELL. DURING THE PERIOD FROM 1200 HOURS UNTIL THE BEGINNING OF THE NEXT INTERROGATION SESSION AT 1645 HOURS SUBJECT APPEARED TO ADAPT TO HIS TIME IN THE CONFINEMENT BOX. DURING THE FIRST HOUR IN THE BOX SUBJECT SHOWED SIGNS OF DISTRESS BUT APPEARED TO ADAPT TO THIS ENVIRONMENT AFTER 4 HOURS. SUBJECT ALTERNATELY SPENT HIS TIME IN THE BOX SITTING AND STANDING.

6. AT 1630 HOURS [_____] TEAM REGROUPED TO PREPARE FOR THE SECOND INTERROGATION SESSION.


7. ICSP IMMEDIATELY TRANSITIONED SUBJECT INTO THE INTERROGATION PROCESS BY DEMANDING INFORMATION ON OPERATIONS PLANNED AGAINST THE U.S. AND DETAILS ABOUT THE NETWORK IN THE U.S. THAT WOULD SUPPORT THESE OPERATIONS. SUBJECT ATTEMPTED TO APPEAR SINCERE IN HIS RESPONSES. HE FEIGNED HELPLESSNESS AND A GENERALLY PATHETIC POSTURE. SUBJECT WAS TOLD TO COMPOSE HIMSELF AND BEHAVE IN A MORE DIGNIFIED MANNER. ON THIS OCCASIONS WHEN SUBJECT AGAIN ATTEMPTED TO DENY KNOWLEDGE OF ANY ADDITIONAL INFORMATION THEN WHAT HE HAS PREVIOUSLY PROVIDED HE RECEIVED AN INSULT SLAP AND WAS PUSHED UP AGAINST THE "WALLING" WALL. SUBJECT WAS TOLD WE KNOW HE HAS MORE INFORMATION AND THAT HE ONLY HAS A FEW MINUTES AVAILABLE TO HIM BEFORE HIS SITUATION WOULD GET WORSE AND THAT HE WOULD FIND HIMSELF IN THE SMALL CONFINEMENT BOX. AT THE SAME TIME THAT ICSP WAS DELIVERING HIS VERY FIRM AND POINTED MESSAGE THAT THINGS WOULD CONTINUE TO GET WORSE FOR SUBJECT, THE LATTER WAS TOLD THAT AT ANY TIME SUBJECT COULD STOP THE SITUATION FROM GETTING WORSE BY PROVIDING THE REQUIRED INFORMATION. WHEN ICSP DETERMINED THAT SUBJECT DID NOT INTEND TO BE FORTHCOMING WITH ANY INFORMATION HE (ICSP) SIGNALIZED THE GUARDS BACK IN AND SUBJECT WAS PUT INTO THE SMALL CONFINEMENT BOX. THE SESSION ENDED AT 1750 HOURS. [_____] TEAM MEMBERS ASSESSED THAT SUBJECT DID NOT BEHAVE IN A TRUTHFUL MANNER DURING THIS SESSION.
6. SUBJECT REMAINED IN THE SMALL FOR ONE HOUR AND TEN MINUTES. SUBJECT SOUNDED MORE DISTRESSED AND DID NOT APPEAR TO ADAPT AS WELL TO HIS TIME IN THE SMALLER BOX. GUARDS AND BOTH ICS's ENTERED THE CELL AT 1609 HOURS. SUBJECT SCOTCED OUT OF THE BOX ON HIS HINDQUARTERS. HE WAS BROUGHT TO THE STANDING POSITION BY THE ICS AND SECURITY GUARD. A ROLLED TOWEL WAS AGAIN PLACED BEHIND SUBJECT's NECK AND HE WAS BACKED UP AGAINST THE 'WALLING' WALL. GUARDS DEPARTED THE CELL AND THE TWO ICS's BEGAN TO DOUBLE TEAM SUBJECT WITH RAPID FIRE QUESTIONS ON WHAT SUBJECT KNEW ABOUT OPERATIONS IN THE U.S. SUBJECT CONTINUED TO DENY ANY ADDITIONAL KNOWLEDGE. ICS's TOLD SUBJECT THEIR JOB WAS TO OBTAIN INFORMATION AND THAT IF SUBJECT DID NOT COOPERATE HE WAS ONLY GOING TO BRING MORE MISERY ONTO HIMSELF. AT 1815 HOURS SUBJECT WAS HOODED AND THE WATER BOARD WAS BROUGHT INTO THE CELL. AT 1820 HOURS THE WATER BOARD TECHNIQUE WAS APPLIED FOR THE FIRST TIME. THROUGHOUT THE PROCESS SUBJECT WAS ASKED AND GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY TO RESPOND TO ICS's QUESTIONS ABOUT THREATS TO THE U.S. SUBJECT COUGHED AND VOMITED IN SMALL AMOUNTS BUT CONTINUED TO MAINTAIN HIS POSITION THAT HE DID NOT HAVE ANY ADDITIONAL INFORMATION OTHER THAN WHAT HE HAD ALREADY PROVIDED TO FBI.[ ] [ ] [ ] ICS's CAME OUT TO CONSULT WITH TEAM MEMBERS AT 1829, 1915, AND 2001 HOURS BETWEEN SESSIONS OF THE WATER BOARD. SUBJECT'S LAST SESSION ON THE WATER BOARD WAS BETWEEN 2050 AND 2053 HOURS. AT 2054 HOURS SUBJECT WAS MOVED INTO THE SMALL CONFINEMENT BOX. AT 2130 HOURS SUBJECT WAS MOVED FROM THE SMALL CONFINEMENT BOX TO THE LARGE CONFINEMENT BOX.

9. CURRENT STATUS: SUBJECT HAS NOT PROVIDED ANY NEW THREAT OR ELABORATED ON ANY OLD THREAT INFORMATION.

MEDICAL ASSESSMENT IS THAT SUBJECT REMAINS STABLE AND THAT HIS PHYSIOLOGIC CONDITION IS CLOSE TO NORMAL GIVEN HIS PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES.


12. CLARIFICATION RE SMALL CONFINEMENT BOX: [SUPERSEDES THE ORIGINAL] PARAMETERS LIMITING THE USE OF THE SMALL CONFINEMENT BOX TO THREE TIMES. AS SUCH WE PLAN TO USE THE SMALL CONFINEMENT BOX AS OFTEN AS
NECESSARY, NOT TO EXCEED THE 2 HOUR LIMIT AT ANY ONE SESSION. UNLESS OTHERWISE ADVISED, WILL PRESUME THAT OUR UNDERSTANDING IS CORRECT AND WILL PROCEED AS SUCH. REGARDS.

END OF MESSAGE
2. [HOS APPROVAL AND PER] CONCURRENCE. 5
AUGUST 2002 INTERROGATION CYCLE COMMENCED AT 1012 HOURS.

TEAM DISCUSSED STRATEGY FOR THE FIRST
SESSION OF THE DAY. MEDICAL STAFF PROVIDED GUIDANCE ABOUT WHAT IC
SERE PSYCHOLOGISTS AND [ ] TEAM MEMBERS SHOULD BE LOOKING FOR TO
HELP ASSESS ABU ZUBAYDHAH (SUBJECT)'S GENERAL CONDITION IN THE COURSE
OF INTERROGATIONS. IC SERE PSYCHOLOGISTS WILL BE REFERRED TO AS
"INTERROGATORS" FOR THE PURPOSE OF THIS CABLE.

3. SUBJECT SPENT THE PREVIOUS EVENING IN THE LARGE CONFINEMENT
BOX. SUBJECT HAS ADAPTED TO THE LARGE BOX BUT
NONETHLESS, MEDICAL TEAM ON SITE REPORTED THAT OVER THE COURSE OF
THE NIGHT SUBJECT HAD A TOTAL OF ABOUT 10-20 MINUTES SLEEP. AT 1012
HOURS SECURITY TEAM AND INTERROGATORS ENTERED THE CELL AND SUBJECT
WAS TOLD TO STAND AND FACE THE DOOR. SUBJECT WAS LED TO THE
"NAILING" WALL AT WHICH TIME A ROLLED TOWEL WAS PLACED BEHIND
SUBJECT'S NECK. SUBJECT WAS ASKED WHAT HE REMEMBERED ABOUT
RATIONS IN THE U.S. FOLLOWING HIS TIME IN THE LARGE CONFINEMENT
BOX. WHEN SUBJECT DID NOT RESPOND HE WAS ASKED WHAT IT WAS THAT HE
WAS SUPPOSED TO REMEMBER.

8.58 - 105
4. AT 1233 HOURS THE GUARDS AND INTERROGATORS ENTERED THE CELL AND SUBJECT CAME OUT OF THE SMALL CONFINEMENT BOX AND WAS BROUGHT TO THE WALL. SUBJECT APPEARED TO SHOW SIGNS OF DISTRESS IN THE SMALL BOX AFTER A PERIOD OF ONE HOUR. THE WATER BOARD WAS PARTIALLY IN SUBJECT'S VIEW WHEN HE WAS BROUGHT TO THE "WALLING" WALL THIS SESSION. THE INITIAL SIGHT OF THE WATER BOARD PROVOKED AN OBVIOUS NEGATIVE REACTION IN SUBJECT.

SUBJECT WAS TOLD THAT HE MIGHT BE ABLE TO DO A BETTER JOB ON THE WATER BOARD THEN AT THE WALL. AT 1254 HOURS THE WATER BOARD WAS BROUGHT INTO THE CELL, WHILE LYING ON THE WATER BOARD AND WITHOUT ANY APPLICATION OF WATER.

5. INTERROGATORS RETURNED TO THE CELL AT 1320 HOURS AND TRANSITIONED INTO A MODE OF QUESTIONING ON THE "REAL OPERATION PLANNED AGAINST THE U.S." THE WATER BOARD TREATMENT BEGAN AT 1323 HOURS. AT 1329 HOURS INTERROGATORS LEFT THE CELL AND TOLD SUBJECT TO THINK ABOUT WHAT INFORMATION SUBJECT HAD NOT TOLD HIS EARLIER INTERROGATORS. SUBJECT REMAINED ON THE WATER BOARD.

6. AT 1408 HOURS INTERROGATORS RETURNED TO THE CELL AND BEGAN THE WATER BOARD TECHNIQUE WITHOUT ASKING ANY QUESTIONS. SUBJECT SHED AND SPIT UP WATER BUT HE DID NOT PROVIDE ANY INFORMATION. AT 1410 HRS SUBJECT WAS TAKEN OFF THE WATER BOARD AND HANDCUFFED TO A WHITE PLASTIC PATIO CHAIR; WHICH IN THE PAST HAS CAUSED HIM GREAT DISCOMFORT. A COLLECTIVE DECISION WAS MADE TO RANDOMIZE THE ENTIRE RANGE OF TECHNIQUES TO APPLY AGAINST SUBJECT IN ORDER TO DISLOCATE.
HIS EXPECTATIONS, RATHER THAN TO ATTEMPT TO CHANGE THE LINE OF
QUESTIONING, WHICH FROM THE BEGINNING, WAS NARROWLY FOCUSED AND
SOLELY DESIGNED TO ESTABLISH WHAT SUBJECT KNOWS ABOUT OPERATIONS IN
U.S. PER HQS GUIDANCE.

7. AT 1447 HOURS SECURITY TEAM AND INTERROGATOR ENTERED THE
CELL. SUBJECT WAS BROUGHT TO THE WALL, A ROLLED TOWEL WAS PLACED
BEHIND SUBJECT'S NECK AND AN ATTENTION GRAB WAS PERFORMED.

8. AT 1611 HOURS SECURITY TEAM WENT INTO THE CELL, REMOVED
SUBJECT FROM THE SMALL BOX, HOODED HIM AND THEN PLACED HIM AT THE
"WALLING IN" WALL. AN INTERROGATOR ENTERED THE ROOM AND WITHOUT
SPEAKING FORCEFULLY WAILED SUBJECT INTERMITTENTLY FOR 1 MINUTE. AT
1616 HOURS SUBJECT WHILE STILL HOODED WAS PUT IN A STRESS POSITION.
SUBJECT WAS SHACKLED ON THE FLOOR WITH LEGS EXTENDED AND ARMS OVER HIS
HEAD. SUBJECT'S HANDS WERE SHACKLED AND HIS LEGS WERE ANCHORED TO
THE BARS OF THE CELL. SUBJECT HAD GREAT DIFFICULTY WITH THIS
POSITION AND AT 1700 HOURS SUBJECT WAS MOVED BACK INTO THE SMALL
CONFINEMENT BOX. AT NO TIME IN THIS PROCESS DID SUBJECT VOLUNTEER
INFORMATION. AT 1823 HOURS SUBJECT WAS MOVED FROM THE SMALL BOX TO
THE LARGE CONFINEMENT BOX.

9. AT 2005 HOURS SUBJECT WAS REMOVED FROM THE LARGE CONFINEMENT
BOX. HE WAS HOODED AND IMMEDIATELY PROCEEDED TO THE WATER BOARD.
SUBJECT'S HOOD WAS REMOVED AND INTERROGATORS WAITED FOR SUBJECT TO
VOLUNTEER INFORMATION.

IN THE COURSE OF THIS ROUND ON THE WATER BOARD SUBJECT
VOMITED, AFTER WHICH SUBJECT WAS MOVED FROM THE WATER BOARD AND PLACE
IN A STRESS POSITION ON THE FLOOR. AT 2119 HOURS SUBJECT WAS SEATED
ON THE FLOOR WITH LEGS EXTENDED AND ARMS OVER HIS HEAD.
INTERROGATORS CONTINUED QUESTIONING SUBJECT. AT 2125 HOURS SUBJECT
WAS THEN MOVED INTO THE SMALL BOX.

10. AT 2205 HOURS SUBJECT WAS REMOVED FROM THE SMALL BOX AND
WAS MOVED INTO THE WALL. SUBJECT WAS GIVEN A BRIDGE AS HE WAS PUT
INTO THE LARGE CONFINEMENT BOX. THE ESSENCE OF THE BRIDGE WAS THAT
THERE WAS SOMETHING HE DID NOT WANT US TO KNOW AND THAT
WHEN WE OPENED THE DOOR NEXT TIME, SUBJECT IS GOING TO TELL US WHAT
THAT WAS. SUBJECT WAS PUT IN THE LARGE BOX AT 2207 HOURS.

11. CURRENT STATUS: SUBJECT HAS NOT PROVIDED ANY NEW THREAT
INFORMATION OR ELABORATED ON ANY OLD THREAT INFORMATION.
TEAM ASSESSES THAT, SINCE THE LAST REPORTING PERIOD, THERE HAS BEEN A
NOTICEABLE SHIFT IN SUBJECT'S BEHAVIOR. SUBJECT HAS BECOME MORE
PLENTIFUL AND HIS PREVIOUS PERSISTENT PROTESTATIONS HAVE BECOME
SILENT. DENIALS. BASED ON THE LAST SESSION, HOWEVER, THERE STILL
APPEARS TO BE AREAS THAT SUBJECT IS WITHHOLDING INFORMATION ON -- WE
HAVE NOT PINPOINTED WHAT THOSE AREAS ARE. SUBJECT'S MEDICAL
CONDITION IS STABLE.
12. PLANS: SUBJECT WILL REMAIN IN THE LARGE CONFINEMENT BOX WITH HIS SLEEP DISRUPTED THROUGHOUT THE NIGHT UNTIL INTERROGATIONS Resume Morning of 6 August 02. THIS IS TO ALLOW SUBJECT A CHANCE TO SUME ENSURE AND FLUIDS IN ORDER TO FACILITATE THE INTERROGATION PROCESS.

13. REQUEST FOR CLARIFICATION: CONSISTENT WITH THE TWO HOUR TIME LIMIT ON THE SMALL CONFINEMENT BOX, UNLESS OTHERWISE ADVISED WE WILL PRESUME THAT SUBJECT CANNOT SPEND MORE THAN 18 HOURS IN THE LARGE CONFINEMENT BOX AT ONE TIME.

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

DAY 2
SUBJECT: EYES ONLY - DETAILS RE 06 AUGUST 02 CYCLE OF INTERROGATIONS OF ABU SUBAYDHAH

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: PLEASE ENSURE THAT SUBSTANTIVE PORTIONS OF INFORMATION BELOW ARE SHARED WITH FRI HOS MARKED ATTENTION:

2. DAY THREE OF THE ENHANCED INTERROGATION PHASE COMMENCED AT 1042 HOURS. ABU SUBAYDHAH (SUBJECT) SPENT THE PREVIOUS EVENING IN THE LARGE CONFINEMENT BOX. PER THE CURRENT INTERROGATION STRATEGY SUBJECT'S SLEEP CONTINUES TO BE DISRUPTED THROUGHOUT THE NIGHT. AT 1942 HOURS THE GUARDS AND IC SERE PSYCHOLOGISTS (INTERROGATORS) ENTERED THE CELL AND SUBJECT WAS TAKEN OUT OF THE LARGE BOX. AS DISCUSSED DURING THE 0900 HOURS STAFF MEETING, TEAM MEMBERS IN CONSULTATION WITH THE MEDICAL STAFF CRAFTED A SCENARIO IN WHICH SUBJECT COULD CLEAN HIS EXPOSED WOUND WITHOUT DISRUPTING THE INTERROGATION PROCESS. PRIOR TO AS PREVIOUSLY REPORTED, SUBJECT'S BANDAGE CAME COMPLETELY OFF WITHIN THE FIRST 4 HOURS OF THE ENHANCED PHASE OF INTERROGATION. THE GUARDS SWAPPED OUT SUBJECT'S WRIST Shackles, FOR A CLEAN PAIR, SINCE THEY OCCASIONALLY COME INTO CONTACT WITH THE EXPOSED WOUND. SUBJECT WAS BROUGHT TO THE "WALLING" WALL.
A ROLLED TOWEL WAS PLACED BEHIND SUBJECT’S NECK. WHEN ASKED WHAT WAS THE ONE THING SUBJECT DID NOT WANT US TO KNOW, SUBJECT DENIED HE WAS WITHHOLDING ANY INFORMATION. SUBJECT RECEIVED AN INSULT SLAP. SUBJECT WAS "WALLED" WHEN HE DENIED HAVING ANY INFORMATION TO STOP OPERATIONS AGAINST THE U.S.

3. THE INTERROGATORS DEMANDED THAT SUBJECT CLEAN HIS WOUND AS THEY HAD NO INTEREST IN GETTING ANY EXUDATE FROM HIS WOUND OR ANY OTHER OF HIS BODILY FUNCTIONS ON OR NEAR THEM. SUBJECT WAS PROVIDED 6 GAUGE PADS SOAKED IN BETADINE SOLUTION AND WAS TOLD IN A FIRM AND PERFUNCTORY MANNER THAT HE ONLY HAD A FEW MINUTES TO TAKE CARE OF HIMSELF. SUBJECT WAS TOLD THE PEOPLE WHO WERE FORMERLY TAKING CARE OF HIM HAD LEFT THE PREMISES AND THAT SUBJECT WAS TO GET THE JOB DONE AND NOT WASTE THE INTERROGATORS TIME. IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THIS BRIEF INTERLUDE, SUBJECT WAS WALLED WITH THE QUESTION, "WHAT IS IT THAT YOU DO NOT WANT US TO KNOW?” SUBJECT CONTINUED TO DENY THAT HE HAD ANY INFORMATION. AT 1110 HOURS THE INTERROGATOR WALKED SUBJECT INTO THE LARGE CONFINEMENT BOX AND PERFORMED AN ATTENTION GRAB. SUBJECT WAS BRIDGED INTO THE BOX WITH THE FOLLOWING PHRASE: WHAT INFORMATION DID SUBJECT HAVE AT THE TIME OF HIS ARREST WHICH WOULD STOP OPERATIONS.

4. AT 1130 HOURS SUBJECT WAS TAKEN OUT OF THE LARGE CONFINEMENT BOX AND HOODED. HE WAS BROUGHT TO THE "WALLING" WALL AND IN AN EFFORT TO CONTINUE TO DISENCHANT HIS EXPECTATIONS SUBJECT WAS LEFT STANDING HOODED IN THE PRESENCE OF THE GUARDS UNTIL 1209 HOURS. AT THAT TIME THE SECURITY TEAM MOVED SUBJECT BACK TO THE LARGE BOX, REMOVED THE HOOD, POINTED TO HIS WASTE BUCKET AND PLACED HIM BACK IN THE BOX. THE SECURITY TEAM HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED WITH THIS MOTION IN AN ATTEMPT TO GET SUBJECT TO RELIEVE HIS BLADDER.

5. AT 1246 HOURS THE INTERROGATORS BROUGHT THE WATER BOARD INTO THE CELL. THE LARGE BOX WAS OPENED AND SUBJECT WAS HOODED. SUBJECT'S HOOD WAS REMOVED AND SUBJECT MOVED ONTO THE WATER BOARD WHERE HE BEGAN CRYING AS HE WAS TOLD THAT HE HAD NOTHING TO STOP OPERATIONS AGAINST THE U.S. SUBJECT WAS TOLD THAT HE COULD STOP THE PROCESS AT ANY TIME. SUBJECT CONTINUED WITH HIS APPEAL THAT HE HAD TOLD THE TRUTH AND THAT HE WAS TELLING THE TRUTH IN AN EFFORT TO SAVE HIMSELF AND HIS BROTHERS. AT 1226 HOURS SUBJECT WAS PUT BACK IN THE LARGE CONFINEMENT BOX.

6. AT 1629 HOURS, THE TEAM ENTERED THE CELL AND OPENED THE BOX. THE INTERROGATOR GAVE THE SAME BRIDGE WHICH SUBJECT WAS LEFT WITH WHEN HE WAS PUT IN THE BOX REGARDING OPERATIONS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES AND WHAT INFORMATION HE HELD BACK FROM THE PREVIOUS INTERROGATORS. SUBJECT HAD NO RESPONSE, AND WAS LED FROM THE BOX TO THE WATER BOARD AND AGAIN ASKED THE BRIDGE. SUBJECT STARTED CRYING AND CLAIMED HE HAD GIVEN US EVERYTHING. SUBJECT WAS INFORMED HE NEEDED TO START GIVING NEW INFORMATION IN ORDER TO STOP THE WATER TREATMENT; HE WAS WARNED NOT TO MANUFACTURE INFORMATION.
TOP-SECRET

8. CURRENT STATUS: AFTER THREE DAYS OF THE AGGRESSIVE INTERROGATION PHASE, SUBJECT HAS FAILED TO PROVIDE ANY NEW INFORMATION REGARDING IMMEDIATE THREATS OR ATTACKS AGAINST THE US. AT THE RISK OF STATING THE OBVIOUS, THERE ARE POTENTIALLY TWO REASONS FOR HIS FAILURE TO PROVIDE SUCH INFORMATION: (A) SUBJECT KNOWINGLY POSSESSES ACTIONABLE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION AND CONTINUES TO CONCEAL THIS INFORMATION DESPITE THE SIGNIFICANT ESCALATION OF THE INTERROGATION PROCESS OR (B) SUBJECT HAS NO SIGNIFICANT ADDITIONAL INFORMATION DIRECTLY RELATED TO THREATS/ATTACKS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES, BEYOND THAT WHICH HE HAS ALREADY PROVIDED, BUT MAY BE WITHHOLDING INFORMATION RELATED TO PAST OPERATIONS AND/OR ACTIVITIES NOT YET UNDERSORE THAT IN THE OPINION OF TEAM MEMBERS IT IS PREMATURE IN THIS NEW INTERROGATION PHASE TO ADEQUATELY DISCERN WHICH RATIONALE (ITEM A OR B) IS THE CORRECT REASON FOR THE LACK OF NEW INFORMATION.

SUBJECT'S MEDICAL CONDITION IS STILL STABLE GIVEN THE PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES.

9. PLANS: SUBJECT WILL REMAIN IN THE LARGE CONFINEMENT BOX WITH HIS SLEEP DISRUPTED THROUGHOUT THE NIGHT UNTIL INTERROGATIONS RESUME MORNING OF AUGUST 02. THIS IS TO ALLOW SUBJECT A CHANCE TO CONSUME ENOUGH AND FLUIDS IN ORDER TO FACILITATE THE INTERROGATION PROCESS.

TOP-SECRET
SUBJECT: EYES ONLY - DETAILS RE 07 AUGUST 2002 CYCLE OF INTERROGATIONS OF ABU SUBAYDAH

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: NONE.


USING THE ROLLED TOWEL/NECK SUPPORT, THE INTERROGATOR INTERMITTENTLY WALLOWED SUBJECT AND TURNED SUBJECT'S HEAD TOWARD THE WATER BOARD, TELLING SUBJECT THAT HIS (THE INTERROGATOR'S) JOB IS TO EITHER PUT SUBJECT ON THE WATER BOARD OR GET INFORMATION FROM SUBJECT TO STOP OPERATIONS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES.
Day 4

SECRET

AT 1000 HOURS, SUBJECT WAS PUT IN THE SMALL CONFINEMENT BOX.

WHILE IN THE SMALL CONFINEMENT BOX, SUBJECT WAS HEARD RECITING A LITANY OF PRAYERS IN ARABIC. SUBJECT MURMURED FREQUENTLY TO HIMSELF AND MAY HAVE POSSIBLY BEEN CRYING AT TIMES.


INTERROGATOR BRIEFLY "WALLED" SUBJECT AND USED AN INSULT SLAP AS SUBJECT APPEARED SOMewhat DEFICIENT. THE NECK COLLAR FOR THE WATER BOARD WAS THEN PLACED AROUND SUBJECT'S NECK AND THE INTERROGATOR MOTIONED FOR THE SECURITY TEAM TO ROLL IN THE WATER BOARD. SUBJECT WAS MOVED TO AN ADJACENT WALL (TO ALLOW SECURITY TEAM TO ROLL IN BOARD).

AND THEN MOVED TO THE WATER BOARD AT 1123 HOURS. AS THE STRAPS WERE PUT IN PLACE, SUBJECT SAID HE WANTED TO STOP THIS (His TREATMENT). THE INTERROGATOR TOLD HIM HE COULD STOP IT AT ANY TIME BY PROVIDING THE INFORMATION SOUGHT, EVEN STARTING WITH JUST ONE PIECE OF THE OPERATION(S). SUBJECT WAS ALSO WARNED NOT TO MAKE UP AN ANSWER. SUBJECT BEGAN TO WHIMPER AND WAS VISIBLE TREMBLING; HE CONTINUED TO DENY HE HAD ANY MORE INFO TO GIVE.

HOURS, THE INTERROGATORS INITIATED THE WATER TREATMENT, WHICH CONTINUED ON AND OFF FOR THE NEXT FEW MINUTES, INTERSPERSED WITH QUESTIONING.

4. THE INTERROGATORS RETURNED TO THE CELL AT 1157 HRS AND NOTED THAT SUBJECT'S DISTRESS LEVEL INCREASED THE MOMENT THE TEAM ENTERED.
THE CELL, A SIGN THAT THE CONDITIONING STRATEGY WAS WORKING. TO DISRUPT SUBJECT’S EXPECTATIONS, INTERROGATORS IMMEDIATELY BEGAN TO A PPLY THE WATER TREATMENT. THE INTERROGATORS AGAIN EXITED THE CELL, AND LEFT SUBJECT ON THE TABLE (TO VARY ROUTINE). AGAIN WITH HIS EYES COVERED. THIS ALLOWED ONE OF THE MEDICAL TEAM MEMBERS, DRESSED UP AS A GUARD, TO INSPECT SUBJECT’S LEG WOUND UP CLOSE WITHOUT SUBJECT’S KNOWLEDGE GIVEN THAT WE HAD PASSED THE 72 HOUR MARK SINCE LAST DRESSING CHANGE. THE MEDICAL OFFICER THEN LEFT THE CELL TO BRIEF THE TEAM ON STATUS OF SUBJECT’S WOUND, AND THE TEAM DEVISED A STRATEGY ON HOW BEST TO ACCOMPLISH A DRESSING CHANGE WITHOUT NEGATIVELY IMPACTING THE INTERROGATION STRATEGY. AT 1230 HOURS, THE INTERROGATION TEAM REENTERED THE CELL, AND COVERED SUBJECT’S ENTIRE FACE WITH THE CLOTH, BUT DID NOT APPLY THE TREATMENT. SUBJECT BEGAN MURMURING, SOMETIMES IN ARABIC. THE INTERROGATOR WARNED SUBJECT NOT TO ACT CRAZY LIKE HE DID WHEN THE PAKISTANIS HAD HIM IN CUSTODY (1994). SUBJECT SAID IN ARABIC THAT HE NEEDED OXYGEN (WHEN THE WATER TREATMENT IS APPLIED) AND THEN REPEATED IT IN ENGLISH. SUBJECT CLAIMED THAT HE WAS NOT CRAZY. SUBJECT WAS UNSTRAPPED FROM THE WATER BOARD AND TOLD TO SIT UP.

THEN, AS PLANNED WITH THE MEDICAL TEAM MEMBERS, THE INTERROGATOR MADE A REMARK ABOUT THE STATE OF SUBJECT’S WOUND AND REMINDED HIM THAT HE HAD BEEN WARNED NOT TO TEAR OFF THE ORIGINAL BANDAGE THAT HAD BEEN APPLIED WHEN THE AGGRESSIVE INTERROGATION PHASE BEGAN. SUBJECT AS PUT IN THE LARGE BOX AT 1237 HOURS WITH THE DOOR OPEN. THE INTERROGATORS LEFT THE CELL, AND THE SECURITY TEAM, INCLUDING THE MEDICAL OFFICER STILL DRESSED UP AS A SECURITY TEAM MEMBER, BROUGHT SUBJECT BETADINE AND BANDAGES FOR SUBJECT TO APPLY TO HIS WOUND. ONE INTERROGATOR RETURNED TO INDICATE TO THE SECURITY TEAM TO REMOVE SUBJECT’S HANDCUFFS LONG ENOUGH TO APPLY THE DRESSING. SUBJECT APPLIED THE DRESSING CHANGE, AND AT 1246 HOURS, SECURITY TEAM REATTACHED THE HANDCUFFS AND LOCKED SUBJECT IN THE LARGE BOX, ALONG WITH HIS WASTE BUCKET, AND BOTTLES OF WATER AND ENSURE.

5. IN ORDER TO DISRUPT THE CYCLE OF PLACING SUBJECT IN THE LARGE BOX OVERNIGHT, AS HAD BEEN DONE THE PREVIOUS TWO EVENINGS, THE TEAM CHANGED THE TIMING BY LEAVING SUBJECT IN THE LARGE BOX FOR SEVERAL HOURS DURING THE AFTERNOON, AND AGAIN RESUMED INTERROGATIONS AT 2131 HOURS. RESULTS OF THE 2131 HOURS SESSION WILL BE REPORTED SEPARATELY.
SUBJECT: EYES ONLY - DETAILS OF 8 AUGUST 2002 CYCLE OF INTERROGATIONS OF ABU ZUBAYDAH

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: PLEASE SEE 8 AUGUST 2002________ TO BE SENT SEPARATELY, FOR ADDITIONAL COMMENTS REGARDING OUTCOME AND ASSESSMENT OF THE BELOW INTERROGATION SESSIONS.

2. DAY FIVE OF THE AGGRESSIVE INTERROGATION PHASE COMMENCED AT 1031 HOURS LOCAL TIME. ([ABU ZUBAYDAH]) (SUBJECT) SPENT THE PREVIOUS EVENING IN THE LARGE CONFINEMENT BOX. PER THE CURRENT INTERROGATION STRATEGY SUBJECT'S SLEEP CONTINUES TO BE DISRUPTED THROUGHOUT THE NIGHT. THE SECURITY TEAM NOTED THAT SUBJECT MANAGED TO OCCASIONALLY NAP, THOUGH NO LONGER THAN 20 MINUTES AT A TIME.

SUBJECT WAS WALLOWED WHEN HE BEGAN TO DENY ANY KNOWLEDGE OF CURRENT/FUTURE OGS

INTERROGATORS TOLD SUBJECT HE WAS STALLING, AND SIGNALED FOR THE SECURITY TEAM TO ROLL IN THE WATER BOARD (AT 1045 HOURS). SUBJECT WAS TAKEN TO AN ADJACENT WALL AS THE SECURITY TEAM BROUGHT IN THE WATER BOARD.

4. SUBJECT WAS TOLD TO SIT DOWN ON THE WATER BOARD. SUBJECT WAS RELUCTANT TO LIE BACK AND BEGAN TO PLEAD THAT HE HAD NOTHING NEW TO GIVE. THE INTERROGATORS CUT HIM OFF AND TOLD HIM TO LIE DOWN. THE TEAM SAW A NOTICEABLE CHANGE IN SUBJECT'S BREATHING PATTERN WHEN IT BECAME MORE RAPID AS HE WAS STRAPPED ONTO THE BOARD. SUBJECT BEGAN TO CRY AND AGAIN PLEADED HIS DENIALS. SUBJECT WAS TOLD THAT DESPITE THE INTERROGATORS' EFFORTS TO GIVE HIM IDEAS OF THE KIND OF INFORMATION WE WANTED, HE CONTINUED TO DENY.

AT 1053 HOURS, THE FIRST OF TWO WATER TREATMENTS WAS APPLIED. THE BOARD WAS IMMEDIATELY ELEVATED IN ORDER TO CLEAR SUBJECT'S AIR PASSAGE. DURING THIS AND THE SECOND WATER TREATMENT, SUBJECT RAISED HIS VOICE IN ADAMANT DENIALS, AND INTERRUPTED INTERROGATORS WITH THESE DENIALS EVEN AS MORE WATER WAS APPLIED. SUBJECT WAS REMINDED THAT HE HAD THE CHOICE TO STOP THIS TREATMENT AT ANY TIME BY PROVIDING THE INFORMATION WE SOUGHT, THAT HE SHOULD NOT WASTE OUR TIME WITH DENIALS, AND THAT HE BETTER NOT TELL ANY LIES. SUBJECT CONTINUED TO CRY.
5. AT 1057 HOURS, SUBJECT WAS UNSTRAPPED AND TOLD TO SIT UP.

SUBJECT WAS TOLD TO GET OFF THE BOARD, AND TOLD TO SIT ON THE FLOOR IN FRONT OF THE SMALL BOX. SUBJECT WAS THEN INSTRUCTED TO GET INTO THE SMALL BOX, WHICH HE DID AT 1059 HOURS.

6. AS NOTED IN THE 8 AUGUST 1637 BETWEEN 1100 AND 1637 HOURS, SUBJECT WAS MOVED IN AND OUT OF THE LARGE AND SMALL BOXES, MADE TO STAND AGAINST THE WALL, OR SIT IN A STRESS POSITION. IN LIGHT OF SUBJECT’S RESPONSE TO THE MORNING SESSION, AND IN ORDER TO MITIGATE THE PRESSURES ON SUBJECT TO PREVENT SEVERE AND PROLONGED MENTAL HARM, THE TEAM DECIDED FOR THE AFTERNOON SESSION (1637-1657 HRS) TO PLACE SUBJECT ON THE WATER BOARD BUT NOT APPLY ANY WATER.

MORE SPECIFICALLY:

AT 1637 HOURS, SUBJECT WAS TAKEN OUT OF THE LARGE BOX BY THE SECURITY TEAM AND IMMEDIATELY PLACED ON THE WATER BOARD. SUBJECT EXHIBITED HEAVY BREATHING AS HE WAS STRAPPED DOWN ON THE BOARD, AND REPEATEDLY DENIED KNOWING ANY INFORMATION, CLAIMING: “I TRY, I TRY.”

SUBJECT CONTINUED WITH THE SAME LEVEL OF DENIALS REGARDING KNOWLEDGE OF FUTURE THREATS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES, WHILE MANIFESTING THE SAME DEGREE OF DESPAIR AND HELPLESSNESS AS DISPLAYED DURING THE MORNING SESSION.

SUBJECT WAS RESTRAPPED TO THE WATER BOARD. SUBJECT ADMITTED THAT HE COULD TELL US ANYTHING WE WANTED TO KNOW ABOUT ALL THE PREVIOUS OPERATIONS, BUT STILL MAINTAINED THAT HE DID NOT HAVE ANY INFORMATION REGARDING CURRENT THREATS/OPERATIONS PLANNED. SUBJECT FURTHER STATED THAT HE TRAINED OPERATIVES, THAT HE HAD GIVEN $50,000 TO BIN LADIN, AND THAT HE HAD $100,000 READY FOR OPERATIONS AGAINST ISRAEL AT THE TIME OF HIS ARREST, BUT HE DID NOT KNOW ANY NEW INFORMATION. SUBJECT SAID THAT ANYTHING HE KNEW, HE WOULD TELL US.
SUBJECT WAS THEN TOLD TO GET INTO THE SMALL BOX, WHICH HE DID AT 1657 HOURS.

7. SUBJECT STAYED IN THE SMALL BOX FOR TWO HOURS AND WAS THEN TRANSITIONED BACK TO THE LARGE BOX. IN ORDER TO KEEP WITHIN THE GUIDELINES OF NOT EXCEEDING 18 TOTAL HOURS WITHIN A 24 HOUR PERIOD, THE PLAN IS FOR THE SECURITY TEAM TO BRING SUBJECT OUT OF THE LARGE BOX AT 2317 HOURS (THE END OF THE 24 HOUR PERIOD), AND SIT HIM ON THE FLOOR HOODED UNTIL APPROXIMATELY 0200 HOURS. AT THAT TIME, THE SECURITY TEAM WILL PLACE BOTTLES OF WATER AND ENSURE IN THE LARGE BOX, AND PLACE SUBJECT BACK IN THE LARGE BOX UNTIL THE NEXT INTERROGATION SESSIONS COMMENCE.

8. PLEASE SEE THE ______ FOR 8 AUGUST, TO BE SENT SEPARATELY, FOR ADDITIONAL ______ TEAM ASSESSMENT OF SUBJECT'S BEHAVIOR DURING TODAY'S SESSIONS.

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET
Cable traffic describing the torture of Abu Zubaydah was clear that practice at the site may not be in full compliance with the legal authorisations from the DoJ, with Jose Rodriguez, Director of CTC, emailing midway through to ‘strongly urge that any speculative language as to the legality of given activities or, more precisely, judgment calls as their legality vis-à-vis operational guidelines… be refrained from in written traffic (email or cable traffic). Such language is not helpful.’ Nonetheless, despite the devastating effects of the torture on Abu Zubaydah, and its likely violation of the approved guidelines, the interrogators were urging that ‘the aggressive phase at [DETENTION SITE GREEN] should be used as a template for future interrogation of high value captives.’

Officials did not have to wait long. Abu Zubaydah was joined by a second detainee, Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, who was rendered to the site on 15 November 2002 (Circuit 14). While in Thailand, al-Nashiri was kept naked and shackled, and was ‘threatened with sodomy, and with the arrest and rape of his family.’ By this point, Gina Haspel (now Director of the CIA) was in post as Chief of Base for the Thai site, and oversaw al-Nashiri’s torture. CIA records document his torture at this site, including the use of the waterboard on multiple occasions from 27 November. Authorisation for this was granted for use immediately upon his arrival, and was conducted by Mitchell and Jessen, who had ‘successfully used these measures against Abu Zubaydah.’ Cables recently released document al-Nashiri’s torture in some detail, including the use of confinement boxes and the waterboard over a number of days.

By 1 December 2002, the cables relating to al-Nashiri’s torture had taken on an absurd theatricality. One noted that interrogators and linguists ‘strode, catlike, into the well-lit confines of the cell at 0902hrs. [Redacted] deftly removed the subject’s black hood with a swipe, paused, and in a deep measured voice said that subject… should reveal what subject had done to vex his guards to the point of rage.’

Guidance from Headquarters, issued in December 2002, instructed the black sites to ‘fully document in advance any decisions to employ any enhanced techniques’, in order to evidence ‘good faith’ that there was no specific intent to cause ‘severe physical or mental pain or suffering’ (i.e., torture) during these sessions. Furthermore, the guidance continued, ‘the critical need for such documentation is reinforced by the concern that a detainee may suffer a heart attack, for example, and die in the course of his detention. The documentation serves a number of functions, not the least of which is to protect the officers on our interrogation teams.’ Ultimately, the videotapes of the torture of Abu Zubaydah and al-Nashiri were destroyed, with one CIA email making clear that ‘the heat from destroying is nothing compared to what it would be if the tapes ever got into public domain… out of context, they would make us look terrible; it would be devastating to us.’

Meanwhile, during 2002, the CIA’s detention operations in Afghanistan were gaining momentum, with the use of Afghan-run facilities over the summer complemented by the opening of the dungeon-like ‘Dark Prison’ in or near Kabul in September, and a consequent expansion of secret prisoner numbers.
The Thai black site was the only CIA prison to be established during the spring and summer of 2002, and Abu Zubaydah was the only prisoner held within an official CIA facility during these months. Nevertheless, it was soon after Abu Zubaydah’s capture that the CIA determined that it would open a ‘specialised detention facility’, totally under CIA control, in Afghanistan. Planning began in April 2002 and $200,000 of costs were approved in June.68

While this new site was under construction, the CIA took custody of at least five prisoners captured outside Afghanistan and rendered them to Afghan-run facilities to which ‘the CIA had unlimited access.’69 Three men, Zakariya (#2), Jamal Eldin Boudraa (#3) and Abbar al-Hawari (#4), were captured by Georgian security forces on 28 April 2002, held in a warehouse for four days, before being driven to another location, examined, then taken to an airport and put on a plane (Circuit 6).

The Americans didn’t capture me. The Mafia captured me. They sold me to the Americans. When I was first captured, a car came around and people inside were talking Russian and Georgian. I also heard a little Chechnya. We were delivered to another group who spoke perfect Russian. They sold us to the dogs. The Americans came two days later with a brief case full of money. They took us to a forest, then a private plane to Kabul, Afghanistan... There was four of us. Myself, my friend Abdal Haq [Boudraa], a Yemeni guy name Zackria [Zakariya], and a Chechnya driver, who was killed.70

Abbar al-Hawari (#4)

Two further men, Hassan Abu Bakr Qa’id (#5) (better known as Abu Yahya al-Libi) and Ridha Ahmad al-Najjar (#6), were captured alongside a number of others in Karachi, Pakistan, on 22 May 2002.71 Both men were held and interrogated in a Pakistani facility, which sent reports from the interrogations to the CIA.72 They were then flown to Afghanistan on 6 June 2002, and held at a site referred to by the guards as ‘Intelligence 2’. Al-Najjar reports being held in an underground cell with a window high up at street level, and believes it was in Kabul.73 Qa’id was likely held at the same site (which he referred to as ‘Rissat 2’).74

CIA records document the formal custody of just six men before September 2002: Abu Zubaydah plus the five held in proxy facilities in Afghanistan. However, the CIA were clearly involved in the detention and torture of others at Afghan-run sites during the summer of 2002, including those held at ‘Rissat 2’. For example, Rafiq al-Hami (#18) and Tawfiq al-Bihani (#19) were both captured in Iran on 29 January 2002 and transferred to Afghan custody in mid-March.75 As al-Hami has testified: ‘I was in an Afghan prison but the interrogation was done by Americans. I was there for about a one-year period, transferring from one place to another.’76 According to al-Bihani, while in the first Afghan prison they were hidden from Red Cross representatives until one of their fellow prisoners informed them of their existence.
I was handcuffed behind and they put a hood on my head so that I could not see anything. When I entered the interrogation room, the American guards pushed me down to the ground in a very savage manner. They started to cut my clothing with scissors. They undressed me completely and I was nude. They made me sit on a chair and it was very cold. I was also afraid and terrorized because the guards were aiming their weapons towards me. The interrogator put his personal gun on my forehead threatening to kill me.\textsuperscript{77}

Tawfiq al-Bihani (#19)

Al-Bihani says that he was held at this site for around 10 weeks, and then moved to a second site where he was held in solitary confinement for over five months. This appears to have been ‘Rissat 2’, given that Qa’id has said that he was held there alongside al-Bihani in June 2002.\textsuperscript{78}

Al-Najjar reports being tortured at the Afghan-run site throughout August and September 2002,\textsuperscript{79} and CIA records document that this involved CIA personnel directly. One cable, dated 16 July 2002, was sent to the CIA station in Afghanistan, suggesting utilizing ‘Najjar’s fear for the well-being of his family to our benefit’; using ‘vague threats’ to create a ‘mind virus’ that would cause him to believe that his situation would continue to get worse; manipulating his environment using a hood, restraints, and music; and employing sleep deprivation through the use of round-the-clock interrogations.\textsuperscript{80}

By 26 July 2002, CIA officers in Afghanistan were proposing ‘breaking Najjar’ through the use of isolation, ‘sound disorientation techniques’, ‘sense of time deprivation’, limited light, cold temperatures, and sleep deprivation.\textsuperscript{81} This is also likely to have been the facility where the CIA applied a ‘pressure point technique’ in July 2002, as reported to the CIA’s Office of Inspector General (OIG). With both his hands on the prisoner’s neck, the officer repeatedly ‘manipulated his fingers to restrict the detainee’s carotid artery’, and then ‘watched his eyes to the point that the detainee would pass out; then [redacted] shook the detainee to wake him.’\textsuperscript{82}

THE DARK PRISON OPENS

The ‘specialised CIA detention facility’ in Afghanistan, authorised in June 2002, officially opened in August 2002,\textsuperscript{83} although it did not receive its first prisoners until September.\textsuperscript{84} By this point, the site manager described it as ‘not complete [but] functional.’\textsuperscript{85} Prisoners who passed through it have commonly referred to it as the ‘Dark Prison’, while the Committee Study gave it the pseudonym DETENTION SITE COBALT. It has also been referred to as the ‘Salt Pit’ in some reports, although prior confusion has meant that that name has also been applied to ‘Rissat 2’, an Afghan-run facility in Kabul which held detainees on behalf of the CIA throughout 2002-2004.\textsuperscript{86} The Dark Prison was also seemingly in or near Kabul, not far from the airport. All the rendition operations we have identified as transferring prisoners to and from the site landed in Kabul, and the prisoners themselves often speak of a 15-20 minute journey by road after landing.\textsuperscript{87} Some CIA staff
working there in 2002 were referring to it as Afghan facility, and reports suggest that it was housed within the grounds of an Afghan intelligence base.

The prison consisted of 20 cells, described as 'stand-alone concrete boxes' with a metal ring attached low to the wall to which prisoners were shackled. Four of the cells were designed specifically for sleep deprivation, with bars high up between two walls to which prisoners could be secured. Although cells had windows, these were blacked out with two coats of black paint and heavy curtains. Each cell had speakers. Overall, the prison had been established with isolation of the detainee being the primary goal. Each detainee's interaction with the outside world was intended to be limited to brief contact with the guards and more extensive contact with his CIA interrogators. This allows CIA personnel to control almost all aspects of the detainees’ existence.

According to the prison's site manager, this control was exercised through maximising the isolation and disorientation of prisoners, which was achieved through both continual darkness, 'so the detainees would not know the passage of time', and continual loud music, 'to prevent communications among the prisoners so they are given the sense that they exist in isolation.' These conditions were extreme, and 'WOW-ed' a delegation from the Federal Bureau of Prisons who arrived in November 2002 to assess practices, provide training and make recommendations. Reports from the delegation make clear that they had 'never been in a facility where individuals are so sensory deprived, i.e., constant white noise, no talking, everyone in the dark, with the guards wearing a light on their head when they collected and escorted a detainee to an interrogation cell, detainees constantly being shackled to the wall or floor, and the starkness of each cell (concrete and bars).’ There is, the delegation reported, ‘nothing like this in the Federal Bureau of Prisons.’

Prisoners were initially shackled with one hand to the wall in a seated position; sometimes after the passage of some weeks ('if the prisoner is older, or otherwise non-threatening') this might be reassessed. Prisoners were fed just once a day. They were held naked or clothed in diapers. There was no drainage in the cells, and there were 'buckets for human waste'. Presumably as a result of the lack of sanitary provision, guards at the site complained of smells; the CIA's solution was to provide them with surgical masks. Officials from the CIA Renditions Group, visiting the site in December 2002, concluded that the facility's "baseline conditions" involved so much deprivation that any further deprivation would have limited impact on the interrogations.

Instead, guards provided comforts as incentive to cooperate, such as lights, blankets, or a mat to sleep on. The site also had a cell referred to as the ‘luxury suite’, containing a rocking chair and ‘foamies’ for prisoners’ ears to block out the noise.

Temperature at the site was a contentious issue. ‘In warm weather, keeping prisoners up (i.e., awake) was general SOP [Standard Operating Procedure],’ the site manager noted, but ‘now [i.e. December 2002] nothing can be taken away, on account of the temperature. There are a variety of things that have been modified as a result of the temperature... For example, we do not chain the detainees by both hands because they could not pull their clothes over their bodies. For the same reason, there is no standing up at night. These softening conditions are getting in the way, and we need to be concerned about them. There is no central heating. There are now about 15 heaters in the cell area, spaced out... There is no insulation.'
Regarding medical care, the site manager noted that ‘the doc tries to get out to the facility at least every two weeks, and as needed.’ Guidelines stated that prisoners with ‘significant health problems’ should not be rendered to the site. In November 2002, however, it was reported that ‘approximately a fourth of the prisoners have one or more significant pre-existing medical problems upon arrival.’

In addition to the concrete cells, the site had a second ‘section’ where ‘prisoners were interrogated and guards congregated.’ This consisted of three interrogation rooms, a staff room, a guardroom and a ‘conditioning room’, which was used for water dousing and which had a waterboard. This layout has been independently confirmed by several prisoners who were held there. Mohammed Al-Shoroeiya, for example, has described the facility as comprising several different types of rooms used for interrogation and torture: ‘One was a group of rooms where he was interrogated. Another set of rooms were freezing cold and were used to submerge the prisoners in icy water while lying on plastic sheeting on the ground. A third set of rooms he called the “torture rooms,” where they used specific instruments. One of these instruments was a wood plank that they used to abuse him with water.’

The Dark Prison soon became the heart of the CIA’s black site network. It functioned as ‘a detention, debriefing and interrogation facility for high and medium value detainees,’ a holding facility for assessing the potential ‘value’ of prisoners before deciding their final disposition, and as a transit point for detainees going to Thailand, Poland and Romania. Its 20 cells were at full capacity by mid-October 2002, as the programme’s pace increased. The site held almost everyone taken into CIA custody by that time, with the exception of Abu Zubaydah (still in Thailand) and Hassan bin Attash (#10), who had been held at the Dark Prison for 2-3 days in mid-September 2002 then rendered to proxy detention in Jordan (Circuit 9).

**DETAINEES IN THE DARK PRISON, OCTOBER 2002**

| Zakariya (#2) | Jamal Boudraa (#3) | Abbar al-Hawari (#4) |
| Hassan Abu Bakr Qa’id (#5) | Ridha al-Najjar (#6) | Ayub Marshid Salih (#7) |
| Abd al-Salam al-Hilah (#15) | Asat Sar Jan (#16) | Zakaria Zeineddin (#17) |
| Rafiq al-Hami (#18) | Tawfiq al-Bihani (#19) | Lutfi al-Gharisi (#20) |
| Hikmat Shaukat (#21) | Yaqub al-Baluchi (#22) |
Throughout its period of operation, the Dark Prison held more than half of all CIA prisoners. Internal records document 64 prisoners at the site, although the Committee Study’s scathing assessment of the site’s management suggests this is just a lower-end estimate: ‘The CIA maintained such poor records of its detainees in [Afghanistan] during this period that the CIA remains unable to determine the number and identity of the individuals it detained. The full details of the CIA interrogations there remain largely unknown, as DETENTION SITE COBALT was later found to have not reported multiple uses of sleep deprivation, required standing, loud music, sensory deprivation, extended isolation, reduced quantity and quality of food, nudity, and “rough treatment”.’

Some prisoners, such as Ramzi bin al-Shibh (#41), Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, and Khaled Sheikh Mohammed (#45), were held there for just the first few days of their time in CIA custody, before being rendered to sites outside of Afghanistan. Even in such cases, detainees report being tortured at the site. Al-Nashiri says his wrists were tied to a bar in the ceiling, and he was kept naked in a painful position with his feet just touching the floor. Mohammed was subjected to sustained torture during his time at the site, including facial and abdominal slaps, the facial grab, stress positions, standing sleep deprivation (with his hands at or above head level), nudity, water dousing and rectal rehydration.

Others were held at the Dark Prison for months on end, and there are extensive, multiple prisoner accounts which confirm the conditions of confinement and torture to which they were subjected. For the first few months, there were no interrogation guidelines provided to staff at the site. Officers were ‘left to their own devices in working with detainees’, and developed their own ‘standard operating procedures’ – including ‘the use of darkness, sleep deprivation, solitary confinement, and noise... [as well as] standing sleep deprivation, nakedness and cold showers.’ Much of this was based on the ‘model’ provided by Headquarters in July 2002, in relation to the treatment of al-Najjar in the Afghan-run site. Techniques were also developed haphazardly in response to the facts on the ground. The decision to use darkness, for example, ‘was arrived at simply (as an almost necessary expedient), since there was only one light switch for all lights in the cell areas.... Faced with the choice to keep them on all the time or off all the time, [the site manager] chose the latter.’

From the outset, I was held in complete darkness and isolation and kept in leg shackles twenty-four hours a day. I was given very little water and fed only once every one or two days. My toilet was a very small bucket, which was difficult to use, especially in the continuous darkness. Despite the extreme cold, I was not provided with adequate clothing or blankets. Strange music and loud man-made sounds were played around the clock, which – in addition to the constant screams of the other prisoners around me – made sleeping extremely difficult and very disturbed. When I did manage to fall asleep I often had nightmares.

Bisher al-Rawi (#35)

The procedures in situ at the Dark Prison were further developed during November 2002, as the result of both the Bureau of Prisons visit and the fact that Bruce Jessen travelled to the site to
lead on interrogations under torture.\textsuperscript{120} This included the torture of Gul Rahman (#24), who died in custody on 20 November 2002 after being subjected to several days of sleep deprivation, water dousing and so-called ‘hard takedowns’. Eventually, Rahman had his hands and feet shackled together with a short chain, and was then shackled to the ring on the floor of his cell. As the OIG found, the position ‘forced Rahman, who was naked below the waist, to sit on a cold concrete floor and prevented him from standing up’. He was found dead the next morning.\textsuperscript{121}

Overall, 38 prisoners entered the CIA programme in 2002. They included Abu Zubaydah and al-Nashiri (both held in Thailand); the three captured in Georgia, who had been held in Afghan proxy facilities since the summer of 2002; a group of seven captured in Pakistan who came under CIA control on 14-15 September; and Jamil el-Banna (#36) and Bisher al-Rawi (#35), captured in The Gambia after a tip-off from British intelligence. Between 14-16 prisoners left the programme during the same period, the majority of whom were transferred to Bagram.

\section*{FROM THAILAND TO POLAND}

Throughout 2002, as the scale of detention operations in Afghanistan ratcheted up, the ongoing utility of the black site in Thailand was becoming increasingly uncertain. Over the course of the year, local officials responsible for supporting the site were replaced by ‘different officials whom the CIA believed were not supportive’. Calls for the site to be closed gathered pace, and it survived only as a result of ‘continued lobbying’ by the CIA’s Station Chief.\textsuperscript{122} However, word of the prison had already leaked out. By April, numerous local officials, as well as an unidentified media organisation, knew of Abu Zubaydah’s presence in the country. By November, The New York Times was aware. Pressured by the CIA, neither outlet published the story, but the media’s knowledge resulted in the decision to close the facility.\textsuperscript{123}

On 4 December, Abu Zubaydah and al-Nashiri were flown to a new site, in northern Poland (\textbf{Circuit 15}). Both Mitchell and Jessen accompanied them, in order to ‘ensure continuity to the interrogation/debriefing process.’\textsuperscript{124} From this point until March 2006, the black site programme was bifurcated. Prisoners of perceived ‘high value’ were moved between a group of smaller sites in Poland, Romania, Guantánamo Bay, Lithuania and Morocco (this last an overflow site maintained by the Moroccan government, not run by the CIA). Others were kept in Afghanistan, initially in the Dark Prison and a number of Afghan-run or informal facilities, and latterly in two modern facilities (referred to by the Committee Study as DETENTION SITE ORANGE and DETENTION SITE BROWN).

The Polish site consisted of two buildings within a military intelligence training base, located in the woods outside the village of Stare Kiejkuty in the lakes region of north-eastern Poland. It has been reported that the CIA paid at least $300,000 for improvements at the site, including the installation of security cameras and the conversion of the two buildings. One of these was a two-storey villa, the other a shed. Both were used to detain prisoners, and there was also a gym for detainees to use a treadmill or exercise bike if they proved cooperative.\textsuperscript{125} Polish officials
provided perimeter security for the site, as well as operational security during prisoner transfers to and from the airport at Szymany (13 miles from the site). They could visit the staff canteen, although they had no access to the prisoners.\textsuperscript{126}

The facility was initially intended to hold a maximum of two high-value detainees, but a lack of detention facilities elsewhere led to the construction of five cells. Three of these were purpose-built ‘holding units’, and it may be that the other two were cages supplied by a local contractor.\textsuperscript{127} By April 2003 these cells were full,\textsuperscript{128} and overall a total of eight prisoners were held in the site at various points.\textsuperscript{129}

### DETAINES HELD IN POLAND (FROM/TO)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Detainee</th>
<th>From</th>
<th>To</th>
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<tr>
<td>Abu Zubaydah (#1)</td>
<td>December 2002</td>
<td>September 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Circuit 15)</td>
<td>(Circuit 31)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Circuit 15)</td>
<td>(Circuit 23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramzi bin al-Shibh (#41)</td>
<td>February 2003</td>
<td>June 2003</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Circuit 17)</td>
<td>(Circuit 23)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Khaled Sheikh Mohammed (#45)</td>
<td>March 2003</td>
<td>September 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Circuit 19)</td>
<td>(Circuit 31)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Circuit 20)</td>
<td>(Circuit 31)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Walid bin Attash (#56)</td>
<td>June 2003</td>
<td>September 2003</td>
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<td>(Circuit 23)</td>
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Not all eight prisoners were held at the site at the same time, as al-Nashiri and bin al-Shibh were rendered to Morocco on the same day as bin Attash was brought from Afghanistan (\textit{Circuit 23}). Nevertheless, officers were concerned that it had become overcrowded.\textsuperscript{130} There were also
ongoing tensions with the Polish authorities, who were clearly aware of the activities taking place on Polish soil. Local officials proposed a written Memorandum of Understanding with the CIA, delineating relative roles and responsibilities, which the CIA refused to sign. In turn, the Polish authorities refused to approve the transfer of Khaled Sheikh Mohammed to the site in March, a decision that was only overturned after diplomatic intervention by the US ambassador. Ultimately, a multi-million dollar payment by the CIA to its Polish counterparts appears to have smoothed relations, and the political leadership in the country from that point ‘was now flexible with regard to the number of CIA detainees at the facility and when the facility would eventually be closed.’

The Polish site was run by a Chief of Base who ‘oversaw interrogations and debriefings, released cables and reports, and communicated daily with the local Station and Headquarters.’ There were half a dozen or so security personnel at the facility, and these were responsible for monitoring detainees and the site perimeter, maintaining detainee records, and preparing three meals daily for the detainees ‘which generally consisted of beans, rice, cheese sandwiches, vitamins, fruit, water, and Ensure nutritional supplement.’ One CIA review of its black sites, conducted in early 2003, concluded that prisoners in Poland ‘received bi-weekly medical evaluations, brushed their teeth once a day, washed their hands prior to each meal, and could bathe once a week. Amenities such as solid food, clothing (sweatshirts, sweatpants, and slippers), reading materials, prayer rugs, and Korans were available depending on the detainee’s degree of cooperation with interrogators.’

Although the conditions of confinement appear to have been a slight improvement on the dungeon-like conditions in Afghanistan, torture at the site was routine. The Chief of Base participated in the torture of al-Nashiri during December 2002 and January 2003, alongside an untrained and unqualified interrogator referred to in the Committee Study as CIA OFFICER 2 (about whom there were significant concerns, given his temper and ‘security issues’). Al-Nashiri was subjected to sustained torture during four discrete periods in December and January, which involved being placed in a standing stress position for days, followed by a mock execution with a hand gun and the use of a cordless power drill. According to the OIG investigation into these incidents, as the officer racked the handgun and pointed the barrel at al-Nashiri’s temple, al-Nashiri began to cry. Later, when the power drill was revved, ‘al-Nashiri stood naked and hooded; he flinched and shook, but did not cry.’ He was placed in stress positions so extreme that a medical officer had to intervene due to concerns that his shoulders would dislocate.

Later interrogation plans for al-Nashiri, drafted by Bruce Jessen, prompted concerns to be expressed at Headquarters. One cable, drafted by the CIA’s chief of interrogations to the Polish site, made clear that ‘we have serious reservations with the continued used of enhanced techniques with Nashiri (subject) and its long term impact on him. Subject has been held for three months in very difficult conditions, both physically and mentally…. Continued enhanced methods may push subject over the edge psychologically.’ On the same day, the CIA’s chief of interrogations announced his early retirement, given his severe concerns over the torture programme: ‘This morning I informed the front office of CTC that I will no longer be associated in any way with the interrogation program due to serious reservation I have about the current state of affairs.'
Instead, I will be retiring shortly. This is a train wreck (sic) waiting to happen and I intend to get the hell off the train before it happens.¹⁴¹

The death of Gul Rahman in the Dark Prison in November 2002, and the use of unauthorised techniques against al-Nashiri in Poland, prompted the CIA Director to issue the first set of high-level guidelines for interrogations and conditions of confinement in the black sites. These made a clear distinction between ‘standard techniques’ – which included the use of isolation, white noise or loud music, reduced caloric intake, and sleep deprivation and the use of diapers for up to 72 hours – and ‘enhanced techniques’, most (but not all) of which had been approved by the DoJ. However, in making such a clear distinction between the two sets of techniques, and mandating greater oversight of the use of ‘enhanced techniques’, the guidelines in fact protected the considerable autonomy which had developed at each black site. Interrogators were able to employ ‘standard techniques’ without prior authorisation, as this was only required ‘when feasible’. Sleep deprivation was now defined as a standard technique, as long as detainees were permitted a small amount of sleep every three days. Medical and psychological staff did not need to be present, as long as they were ‘readily available for consultation and travel to the interrogation site’.¹⁴²

The guidelines do not appear to have had significant effect on practice at the Polish site, where detainees continued to be subjected to sustained torture throughout 2003. Walid bin Attash (#56) was hung, naked, from a ring in the ceiling of his cell for a month after his arrival in June 2003, needing to defecate into an unchanged diaper. He was subjected to water dousing, threats of sexual assault (rectal rehydration), and 110 hours of sleep deprivation.¹⁴³ Likewise, Ramzi bin al-Shibh was subjected to ‘sleep deprivation, nudity, dietary manipulation, facial holds, attention grasps, abdominal slaps, facial slaps and walling.’ His torture began immediately upon arrival at the Polish site, alongside ‘sensory dislocation’ which included ‘shaving [his] head and face, exposing him to loud noise in a white room with white lights, keeping him unclothed and subjected to uncomfortably cool temperatures, and shackling him hand and foot with arms outstretched over his head.’¹⁴⁴

CIA records also document the extreme treatment of Khaled Sheikh Mohammed, who was rendered to Poland on 7 March 2003 (Circuit 19). He was tortured immediately upon his arrival, and ultimately subjected to 15 separate waterboarding sessions throughout March, with at least 183 applications of water. As a result, Mohammed ingested so much water that his ‘abdomen was somewhat distended and he expressed water when the abdomen was pressed.’ One medical officer present suggested that ‘we are basically doing a series of near drownings.’¹⁴⁵

```
I was kept for one month in the cell in a standing position with my hands cuffed and shackled above my head and my feet cuffed and shackled to a point in the floor. Of course during this month I fell asleep on some occasions while still being held in this position. This resulted in all my weight being applied to the handcuffs around my wrists resulting in open and bleeding wounds....

For the interrogation I was taken to a separate room.... If I was perceived not to be
```
This morning I informed the front office of CTC that I will no longer be associated in any way with the interrogation program due to serious reservations I have about the current state of affairs. Instead, I will be retiring shortly. This is a Trainwreck waiting to happen and I intend to get the hell off the train before it happens.
cooperating I would be put against a wall and punched and slapped in the body, head and face. A thick flexible collar would also be placed around my neck so that it could then be held at the two ends by a guard who would use it to slam me repeatedly against the wall. The beatings were combined with the use of cold water, which was poured over me using a hosepipe.¹⁴⁶

Khaled Sheikh Mohammed

THE RESHUFFLE

The Poland facility was closed in September 2003, as had been agreed with the Polish authorities.¹⁴⁷ This provided the occasion for a major reshuffle of the CIA’s perceived high-value detainees, which appears to have taken place on board one rendition aircraft: between 20-25 September 2003, N313P completed a global circuit which included stopovers in Afghanistan, Poland, Romania, Morocco and Guantánamo Bay. One CIA official, speaking off the record, labelled this circuit as a ‘five-card straight revealing the program to outsiders: five stops, five secret facilities, all documented’ (Circuit 31).¹⁴⁸

The Romanian black site had been negotiated with the Romanian government during 2002 and 2003. By January 2003 the local CIA station had been asked to consider ways to demonstrate to the Romanian government ‘that we deeply appreciate the cooperation and support’ for the black site,¹⁴⁹ and in April 2003 the station provided an ‘$8 million “wish list”.¹⁵⁰ By May 2003 Headquarters had provided significantly more funds than suggested, and by the fall of 2003 the site had received its first five prisoners.¹⁵¹ We have established that these were five of the six men held in Poland at its point of closure: Khaled Sheikh Mohammed, Abu Yasir al-Jaza’iri (#47), Walid bin Attash, Samr al-Barq (#67) and Ammar al-Baluchi (#55).

The sixth prisoner in Poland, Abu Zubaydah, stayed on the aircraft as it continued to Morocco, and then onto the two new black sites which were opening at the US Naval Station at Guantánamo Bay.

GUANTÁNAMO BAY

While the Romanian site was to remain a central hub for high-value prisoners until November 2005 (see below), the Guantánamo sites were less successful. Abu Zubaydah and Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri arrived there in September 2003 (Circuit 31), and were joined by Mustafa al-Hawsawi (#46) and Ibn Sheikh al-Libi (#42) in November 2003 (Circuit 33). A fifth prisoner, Ramzi bin al-Shibh (#41), was rendered to the island in December 2003 (Circuit 34).¹⁵²
**DETAINEES HELD IN GUANTÁNAMO BAY (FROM/TO)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Date In</th>
<th>Date Out</th>
<th>Circuit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abu Zubaydah (#1)</td>
<td>September 2003</td>
<td>April 2004</td>
<td>Circuit 42 or Circuit 43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri (#26)</td>
<td>September 2003</td>
<td>April 2004</td>
<td>Circuit 42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mustafa al-Hawsawi (#46)</td>
<td>November 2003</td>
<td>April 2004</td>
<td>Circuit 42 or Circuit 43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ibn Sheikh al-Libi (#42)</td>
<td>November 2003</td>
<td>April 2004</td>
<td>Circuit 42 or Circuit 43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramzi bin al-Shibh (#41)</td>
<td>December 2003</td>
<td>April 2004</td>
<td>Circuit 42 or Circuit 43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Little is known about the sites themselves or their relationship to one another, although it has been reported that they comprised a new facility, entirely separate from the DoD prison on the base. These five prisoners were held here until spring 2004. CIA lawyers became increasingly worried about the possible consequences of the upcoming ruling of the US Supreme Court in the case of Rasul v. Bush, which looked likely to grant habeas corpus rights to DoD prisoners at Guantánamo. The concern was that this ruling might apply to the CIA’s own prisoners as well, making them both visible and eligible for legal representation if they remained on the base. Ultimately, the DoJ recommended that the CIA move four of the prisoners off the island pending the Supreme Court judgement (Ibn Sheikh al-Libi had earlier been held under DoD authority and declared to the ICRC, and so was thought able to remain at Guantánamo Bay). In the event, the CIA transferred all five prisoners out of the Guantánamo facilities to Romania and Morocco, with two rendition operations on 12 and 13 April 2004. The first was on board the aircraft N85VM, which flew to Romania and then Morocco (Circuit 42). The second was on board the aircraft N368CE, flying direct to Morocco (Circuit 43).

**AFGHANISTAN FROM 2003**

As high-value prisoners were flown out of Afghanistan into Poland, and onwards to Romania and Guantánamo, the general prison population in Afghanistan continued to expand. Some were flown in from far afield. After a lengthy period in Egyptian custody (during which he fabricated information linking Saddam Hussein to al-Qaeda that proved critical in the Bush administration’s
Email from Scott Muller, CIA General Counsel, concerning secret prisoners at Guantánamo Bay.

SECRET//NOFORN

Date: 200402

TO: James L. Pavitt

FROM: Scott W. Muller

CC: George J. Tenet@DCI; John E. McLaughlin@DCl; John H. Mossman@DCl

SUBJECT: CIA Detainees at GITMO.

----------------------------------------------- BODY -----------------------------------------------

In light of the Supreme Court's acceptance of a case presenting the question of whether GITMO is US territory, we asked DOJ for its advice on whether the CIA detainees should remain at GITMO or be moved out pending the Supreme Court decision. We also raised the issue with NSC and White House Counsel. Pat Philbin (OLC) called this afternoon and advised that, as agreed in an earlier conversation with White House counsel and others, the Solicitor General had been consulted. Philbin reported that DOJ (including specifically the Solicitor General) recommended that CIA move the detainees (except al-Libi) out of GITMO at this time.

SECRET//NOFORN

EMAIL FROM SCOTT MULLER, CIA GENERAL COUNSEL, CONCERNING SECRET PRISONERS AT GUANTÁNAMO BAY
public relations push around the Iraq war) Ibn Sheikh al-Libi was brought into Afghanistan in February 2003 (Circuit 17). Tanzanian national Suleiman Abdullah (#48) was flown in from Djibouti in March (Circuit 21). Several men captured in Pakistan were also transferred into Afghanistan, including Libyan anti-Gaddafi fighters Khaled al-Sharif (#51) and Mohammed al-Shoroeiya (#52), Asadallah (#43) (the son of the imprisoned Egyptian ‘blind sheikh’ Omar Abd al-Rahman), and Mustafa al-Hawsawi.

Although the DDO had, in December 2001, issued blanket approval to the field for capture and detention operations, it appears that by April 2003 there was some nervousness about the resultant scope of the programme. A further guidance note was issued to the field, clarifying that the requisite standards for capture and detention under the MoN meant that ‘there must be an articulable basis on which to conclude that the actions of a specific person whom we propose to capture and/or detain pose a “continuing serious threat” of violence or death to US persons or interests or that the person is planning a terrorist activity.’ In practice, this meant that ‘we [must] possess reliable intelligence that identifies the reasons we conclude that the person poses the requisite threat.’ Although the guidance acknowledged that the capture and detention authorities under the MoN were ‘unprecedented’, it took the time to make clear that, ‘even so, the authority is not without limits. For example, we are not permitted to detain someone merely upon a suspicion that he or she has valuable information about terrorists or planned acts of terrorism… Similarly, the mere membership in a particular group, or the mere existence of a particular familial tie, does not necessarily connote that the threshold of “continuing, serious threat” has been satisfied.’

These concerns were valid. The majority of detainees were held in Afghanistan, yet CIA officers in the field conducted no written assessment of whether or not each of these men met the criteria laid down in the MoN. Indeed, contemporaneous recordkeeping in the country was so poor that the CIA has never been able to provide a full picture of who it detained there. Nonetheless, we have identified that the numbers detained in the programme increased throughout 2003, topping 40 in August 2003 and staying at or above this level until May 2004. The high point in prisoner population at the black sites came in October 2003, when 55-57 men were being held. During this period, a handful of prisoners were held in sites outside of Afghanistan, but probably no more than ten at any one time. By May 2003 there were six held outside Afghanistan (five in Poland, one in Jordan), and by October 2003 this number had risen to nine (five in Romania, one Morocco, two in Guantánamo Bay, one in Jordan). By February 2004 there were ten held outside Afghanistan (five in Romania and five in Guantánamo Bay), and these numbers stayed level throughout the spring of 2004.

Although conditions improved a little after the death of Gul Rahman in November 2002, the Dark Prison continued to exist as little more than a dungeon, with unauthorised torture of prisoners routine throughout 2003. Detainees at the site were subjected to water dousing, where they were ‘held down, naked, on a tarp on the floor, with the tarp pulled up around them to form a makeshift tub, while cold or refrigerated water was poured on them.’ Others were subjected to ‘group torture’, and to ‘rectal rehydration’ without evidence of medical necessity, whereby
large tubes were used to pump pureed food through the anus. In the case of Mustafa al-Hawsaw, the ‘rectal exams’ were conducted with such force that they left him with ‘chronic haemorrhoids, an anal fissure and symptomatic rectal prolapse.’\textsuperscript{160} Sanad al-Kazimi (#74), meanwhile, reported being ‘subjected to severe physical and psychological torture’ during 2003 and 2004, including by being ‘suspended with his arms above his head for extended periods of time and beaten with electric cables.’\textsuperscript{161}

Waterboarding was clearly used at the site, despite CIA denials that this took place in Afghanistan. The Committee Study makes reference to a photo from the site which shows ‘the waterboard device... surrounded by buckets, with a bottle of unknown pink solution (filled two thirds of the way to the top) and a watering can resting on the wooden beams of the waterboard.’\textsuperscript{162} Multiple prisoner testimony also suggests the use of the waterboard at the site. For example, Mohammed al-Shoroeiya told Human Rights Watch that he was repeatedly strapped to a board made of wood that could spin him around while he was wearing a hood that covered his nose and mouth. They would then pour buckets of extremely cold water over his nose and mouth to the point that he felt that he was going to suffocate: ‘They wouldn't stop until they got some kind of answer from me.’\textsuperscript{163} Likewise, Mustafa al-Hawsaw has testified that he was strapped to the board, which was ‘a rotating table made of wood with a bed of shiny metal.’ According to his account, ‘his head was tilted in the down position’ and ‘several bottles of water were poured on his chest so that the water ran into his face and nose and he thought he was drowning. He said he was put on the table many times during that interrogation period, with multiple bottles of water each time.’\textsuperscript{164} The OIG investigated these allegations, interviewing a number of CIA officials who were present at the site. Although some upheld official denials that the waterboard was ever used, and claimed that it was ‘located in the back of the conditioning room collecting dust and used by the analysts to sit on or lean on during water dousing,’ one official did admit to its use on either al-Hawsaw or Khaled Sheikh Mohammed during March 2003, and claimed that ‘several personnel witnessed this usage.’\textsuperscript{165}

From at least May 2003 onwards, the prison population in Afghanistan exceeded the capacity of the Dark Prison, with around 30-50 held in the country at any one time from June 2003 – May 2004. Although poor record-keeping makes it hard to be certain, it appears that the population of the Dark Prison never exceeded capacity,\textsuperscript{166} suggesting that 10-30 men were held at other sites in the country during this time.

The Committee Study has only acknowledged the existence of one other CIA-run black site in Afghanistan before April 2004: DETENTION SITE GRAY, which held eight prisoners between January and December 2003.\textsuperscript{167} Very little is known about this facility. Another solution to the overcrowding problem was to use Afghan facilities for prisoners deemed not sufficiently important for the Agency’s own sites. In these cases there was no independent reason for Afghan forces to detain these individuals, who were held solely at the behest of the CIA.\textsuperscript{168} At least four prisoners were farmed out to Afghan sites in this way, including Hamid Aich (#49) and Mohamed Dinshah (#59). As the Dark Prison’s manager wrote: ‘They [Afghan officials] also happen to have 3 or 4 rooms where they can lock up people discretely (sic). I give them a few hundred bucks a
month and they use the rooms for whoever I bring over – no questions asked. It is very useful for housing guys that shouldn’t be in [the Dark Prison] for one reason or another but still need to be kept isolated and held in secret detention.\footnote{169}

At least two of the CIA’s prisoners, Laid Saidi (#57) and Majid Khan (#58), were held at a ‘safehouse’ in Afghanistan during May 2003, where they were subjected to ‘ice baths’.\footnote{169} Declassified notes from Khan’s lawyer in Guantánamo Bay, made public in June 2015, make clear that this was a form of waterboarding: ‘Shackled and hooded, they placed Khan feet-first into the freezing water and ice. They lowered his entire body into the water and held him down, face-up in the water. An interrogator forced Khan’s head under the water until he thought he would drown. The interrogator would pull Khan’s head out of the water to demand answers to questions, and then force his head back under the water, repeatedly. Water and ice were also poured from a bucket onto Khan’s mouth and nose when his head was not submerged.’\footnote{171}

In Saidi’s case, detention at this site appears to have been for a relatively short period of time (around five days).\footnote{172} Likewise, Hassan Ghul (#98), although only in Afghanistan for two days in January 2004, was moved from the Dark Prison to a ‘[redacted] facility for portions of his interrogations’.\footnote{173} However, throughout 2003 and 2004 prisoners also continued to be held for more extended periods of time in the Afghan facility known by some as ‘Rissat 2’. It appears that Majid Khan was here from May 2003, and Laid Saidi from early June 2003. Abdul Rabbani (#23) and Ahmed Rabbani (#25) were also moved from the Dark Prison to this facility at about this time. All four men were held at the site for around a year (although Khan also spent some of this time in the Dark Prison). They were joined in January 2004 by Khaled el-Masri (#97), who had been rendered from Macedonia and who was held at the site until May 2004.

The prisoners describe the site as having Afghan guards, although the CIA clearly had full access to, and control of, the prisoners. There were two rows of six underground cells, each with a small opening in the door.\footnote{174} El-Masri has said that prisoners at the site ‘slept on the floor, wore diapers and were given tainted water that made them vomit’.\footnote{175}

\begin{quote}
Here another era of torture, humiliation and abuse began. The place is underground; a room in the basement that does not see the sun, foul smells and breathing air is below normal. It is an old room like animals’ bin, the walls are cracked and dirty, the food is inhumane, and the treatment is cruel with beating, nudity, and threats by the Afghans once when the Americans are absent and once by the Americans…. [T]his place is not better than the grave yard of the living (the darkness prison). I do not want to go in length describing it and the torture we received in it; yet, it is enough for you to know that we were under two managements; American and Afghani and each one practiced whatever they chose from the types of torture. It is enough to tell you that all the prisoners and I had a hunger strike nine times or more demanding the Americans to take us back to the darkness prison because it was easier and better than this prison….’\footnote{176}

\end{quote}

Ahmed Rabbani (#25)
Despite the death of Gul Rahman and the investigation that resulted from it, CIA Headquarters remained ill-informed about events in Afghanistan. In autumn 2003, personnel in Afghanistan provided a list of 44 detainees held there at that point, prompting Headquarters to observe that they had not previously been aware of all these names. The Afghanistan station then carried out ‘an exhaustive search of all available records in an attempt to develop a clearer understanding of the [CIA] detainees’. The search resulted in an ‘unsettling discovery’ that: ‘We are holding a number of detainees about whom we know very little. The majority of [CIA] detainees in [Afghanistan] have not been debriefed for months and, in some cases, for over a year. Many of them appear to us to have no further intelligence value for [the CIA] and should more properly be turned over to the [US military], to [Afghan] authorities or to third countries for further investigation and possibly prosecution. In a few cases, there does not appear to be enough evidence to continue incarceration, and, if this is in fact the case, the detainees should be released.’

This ‘unsettling discovery’ was followed by another blow: in January 2004 the International Committee of the Red Cross informed US authorities of their discovery that CIA prisoners in Afghanistan were being held ‘incommunicado for extensive periods of time, subjected to unacceptable conditions of internment, to ill treatment and torture, while deprived of any possible recourse.’ The letter, which included a ‘fairly complete list’ of CIA prisoners, ‘prompted CIA Headquarters to conclude that it was necessary to reduce the number of detainees in CIA custody’.

As a result, the CIA released eight detainees between January-August 2004, and transferred another seven to foreign custody around the same time. In May 2004, 18 prisoners were transferred to US military custody in Bagram. According to one of the men, Binyam Mohamed, ‘we were transferred to Bagram Air Base by helicopter, tied like hens going for slaughter.’ Eight of these prisoners were sent onwards to Guantánamo Bay in September 2004, while ten remained at Bagram.

It was also at this time that the CIA closed down the Dark Prison and moved its remaining occupants to a new site in Afghanistan, which the Committee Study refers to as DETENTION SITE ORANGE. This facility was billed as a ‘quantum leap forward’ in relation to the Dark Prison, given its ‘heating/air conditioning, conventional plumbing, appropriate lighting, shower, and laundry facilities.’ Nevertheless, it remained the case that ‘detainees undergoing interrogation were kept in smaller cells, with waste buckets rather than toilet facilities.’ An OIG audit of the CIA’s black sites between July 2005 and February 2006, which included DETENTION SITE ORANGE, found that prisoners were ‘held in solitary confinement in climate-controlled, lighted, above-ground, window-less cells... that are equipped with a mattress, a sink and toilet.’ The facility had an exercise room, and detainees were provided access to books, movies, and games.

This new site opened in April 2004, and the first prisoners arrived in an en-masse transfer from the Dark Prison on 24 April 2004. At least nine men were moved at this point. They were medically examined, subjected to the standard rendition procedure, then moved in several vehicles to a large plane with benches along each side. The flight lasted for several hours, although it seems likely that the plane was circling to disorientate the prisoners. The men were then transferred to helicopters and flown to another location, then driven to the facility. They were
held in the new black site for anywhere from four months to nearly two-and-a-half years, and were later joined by others (either transferred from other facilities, or newly-captured).

### DETAINES HELD AT DETENTION SITE ORANGE, APRIL 2004 – SEPTEMBER 2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>ID</th>
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<th>ID</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ramzi bin al-Shibh</td>
<td>#41</td>
<td>Abu Yasir al-Jaza'iri</td>
<td>#47</td>
<td>Sayed Habib</td>
<td>#50</td>
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<tr>
<td>Khalid al-Sharif</td>
<td>#51</td>
<td>Mohammed al-Shoroeiya</td>
<td>#52</td>
<td>Laid Saidi</td>
<td>#57</td>
</tr>
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<td>Majid Khan</td>
<td>#58</td>
<td>Salah Qaru</td>
<td>#75</td>
<td>Mohamed Bashmilah</td>
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<td>Mohammed al-Asad</td>
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<td>Khaled al-Maqtari</td>
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<td>Abd al-Bari al-Filistini</td>
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<td>#107</td>
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<tr>
<td>Marwan al-Jabour</td>
<td>#108</td>
<td>Qattal al-Uzbeki</td>
<td>#109</td>
<td>Abu Faraj al-Libi</td>
<td>#114</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although in some ways the site was an improvement on the Dark Prison, DETENTION SITE ORANGE remained the location of severe mistreatment for those held there. Mohammed al-Shoroeiya and Khalid al-Sharif say they were chained to the wall of their cells throughout, and that there was constant noise at the facility, including loud music and sounds played through speakers in the cells. Some of the sounds, such as that of an electric shock, were used to wake the detainees up. Khaled al-Maqtari has said that the temperature was controlled, through heating and air conditioning, but that these were used as reward and punishment rather than to keep the cells at a comfortable temperature.

By this time, some of the detainees who had been held for extended periods of time had begun to display evidence of profound psychological trauma. Acts of self-harm became more common, including slashing wrists, banging heads against the wall, and refusing food. The response from prison staff was brutal. Mohamed Bashmilah reports that: ‘The guards untied my hands and sat me in a chair and strapped my arms to the arms of the chair. They then used a chain to connect the shackles on my feet to a metal ring in the floor. I saw blue cans on the table that contained what looked like pink coloured liquid. There were also tubes like those used for IVs and a metal IV pole. After I was strapped to the chair and chained to the floor they shoved a tube up into my nose and I began screaming because of the pain. I resisted because I was beginning to choke and the guards held my head back. In this way they forced the tube all the way into my stomach.’

So anyway, my worst day in [DETENTION SITE ORANGE] was December 31, 04. They had to send some kind of report that day... First they put so much food in me, through my rectum, that I didn't have any option but to dump it out... They nose fed...
me, but this time I threw up by putting my finger in my throat. So now that was the big problem for them. So now they decided to feed me again, but this time they put me on one chair, hands cuffed behind, and taped me and my whole body with duct tape... then they overdosed me forcefully by injection. So I passed out until they sent reports but since then I was in so much pain, I get up in pain and go back to sleep, then get up, then back to sleep. So I broke my strike the next day, but still they kept me in the cold, freezing cell for another week or so to teach me a lesson.  

Majid Khan (#58)

After its rapid growth in 2003, and the upheavals which followed this – the swift exit from the undisclosed Guantánamo sites, the wholesale transfer from the Dark Prison to DETENTION SITE ORANGE and the shedding of prisoners prompted by the ICRC’s intervention – the programme’s volume levelled off. In late June 2004 there were 34 prisoners spread between Afghanistan, Romania and the re-established temporary holding unit in Morocco. This number had dropped to 29 by the end of December. After the switch from the Dark Prison only eight prisoners entered the programme in the rest of 2004.  

Most of these are known to have been captured in Pakistan.

The following year, only four prisoners entered the programme, two of whom were probably held in Afghanistan.

MOROCCO

Morocco played a key role in the secret detention and torture of CIA detainees from mid-2002 until February 2005. At least six prisoners – Abou Elkassim Britel, Binyam Mohamed, Pacha Wazir (#38), Ramzi bin al-Shibh, Saleh Di’iki (#94) and Mustafa al-Madaghi – were rendered by the CIA to Morocco and held in Moroccan custody. The CIA was granted access to all these prisoners, and participated in their interrogation (often under torture), although it is clear that Morocco retained ultimate authority over these men. Some of these prisoners were later rendered to CIA custody at other black sites.

Glenn Carle, a CIA officer who interrogated Pacha Wazir while he was in Moroccan custody, has described the facility as located in the countryside, and clearly run by local officials. Moroccan personnel were in charge of Wazir’s detention, and were also present during interrogations. Al-Madaghi thought that the facility was on or near to a military base, given that he could hear military training exercises outside. His cell was below ground level but had a small window. Arabic poetry was written all over the walls. He could hear the shouts and screams of other prisoners. Likewise, according to Di’iki, his cell was made of stone, and had a window and a mattress. On the wall were written the names of many people who eventually ended up at Guantánamo Bay, including one of the CIA’s key prisoners: ‘For the one who is going to read this, I am Ramzi bin al-Shibh and for anyone who can read these lines, I ask him to please inform my family in Yemen.
that I believe that on this date I will be transferred to Guantánamo tomorrow." This was likely to
have been written in February 2003, several months before Di’iki found himself in the same cell.

Torture was routine at the site. Abou Elkassim Britel has testified that, during his repeated
interrogations: ‘I was handcuffed, blindfolded, and severely beaten on all parts of my body. I was
threatened with worse torture, including having my genitals cut off and “bottle torture” (a torture
technique whereby a bottle is forced into the victim’s anus).’ Binyam Mohamed’s account of
his detention in Morocco tells a similar story. He was held initially in ‘a series of houses which
were dug down, almost underground. There were six rooms per house, and at least five houses
in a group, with more further away. Three of the rooms were for prisoners, one for interrogation,
one for the guards and one empty.’ Binyam was tortured on numerous occasions during his
time in the prison:

They came in and cuffed my hands behind my back. Then three men came in with
black ski masks that only showed their eyes...one stood on each of my shoulders
and the third punched me in the stomach. The first punch...turned everything inside
me upside down. I felt I was going to vomit. I was meant to stand, but I was in so
much pain I’d fall to my knees. They’d pull me back up and hit me again. They’d kick
me in the thighs as I got up. They just beat me up that night...I collapsed and they
left. I stayed on the ground for a long time before I lapsed into unconsciousness.
My legs were dead. I could not move. I’d vomited and pissed on myself.

Detainee accounts of the layout of the prison, and the abuse to which they were subjected,
matches with what is known about the Témara facility, 15km south of Rabat on the Moroccan
coast. This centre is run by the National Surveillance Directorate (DST), and is reported to have
received prisoners from a number of foreign authorities, including Pakistan, Syria and the US.

**DETAINEES HELD IN MOROCCO**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abu Zubaydah (#1)</th>
<th>Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri (#26)</th>
<th>Pacha Wazir (#38)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ramzi bin al-Shibh (#41)</td>
<td>Ibn Sheikh al-Libi (#42)</td>
<td>Mustafa al-Hawsawi (#46)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saleh Di’iki (#94)</td>
<td>Binyam Mohamed (#95)</td>
<td>Abou Elkassim Britel</td>
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<td>Mustafa al-Madaghi</td>
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In addition to Moroccan detention on behalf of the CIA, discussions regarding the construction
of the CIA’s own black site in Morocco began in January 2003. By April 2003, CIA Headquarters
had instructed the local station to ‘think big’ about how it could support Moroccan intelligence.
services, and by May local officials had surveyed potential sites. In June 2003 the CIA station in Morocco had proposed a multimillion-dollar subsidy package, designed to compensate its allies for support for the secret detention programme.202

While arrangements were being made for the CIA’s own facility in Morocco, the CIA reached two separate agreements with its Moroccan counterparts. The first, struck in May 2003, involved a ‘temporary patch’ to enable the CIA to hold al-Nashiri and bin al-Shibh in a Moroccan facility while the black site was being built. This was clearly a short-term agreement, with the CIA promising to conclude its detention activities in the country by July 2003. In the event, both men were rendered from Poland on 6 June 2003 (Circuit 23), and held in Morocco for several months before eventually being rendered to the CIA sites at Guantánamo Bay. Al-Nashiri was transferred in September 2003 (Circuit 31), with bin al-Shibh following in December 2003 (Circuit 34), by which point there were no CIA detainees left in the country.203

The second agreement, reached in January 2004, referred to the five CIA detainees being held at Guantánamo Bay. Moroccan officials agreed to this arrangement for ‘a limited period of time’, and the detainees were transferred to the facility in April 2004 (Circuit 42 and Circuit 43).204 Shortly thereafter, the CIA’s detainees were reporting that they could hear the torture of other detainees at the site. Tensions began to rise between the two countries as the CIA reported these allegations to its Moroccan counterparts. In August 2004 the CIA was asked to remove all its prisoners from the country, and further reporting of allegations in October 2004 led to a significant deterioration in intelligence cooperation. By January 2005, Moroccan intelligence was insisting that the political leadership needed to be briefed on the ‘more permanent and unilateral CIA detention facility’ under construction, but in February 2005 all remaining CIA detainees were transferred out of the country. Despite the fact that the political leadership ultimately approved the construction of the facility, by February 2006 it was being decommissioned, and was described as an ‘aborted’ project.205

ROMANIA

The black site in Romania held at least 12 prisoners between September 2003 and November 2005. A number of locations have been suggested for the facility. The Council of Europe investigation focused on a secure area on the Black Sea coast which encompassed ‘several current and former military installations, including all those facilities named in the Access Agreement of 2005, which have been used by the United States under a “special regime of access” since late 2001.’ In particular, the report drew attention to the dual military-civil Mihail Kogalniceanu airport at Constanţa, which played a key role in the broader ‘War on Terror’.206

While the Council of Europe team felt unable to pinpoint the exact location of the black site in 2007, by December 2011 investigative journalists working for Associated Press and the German ARD news programme Panorama revealed that they had spoken to ‘former US intelligence officials familiar with the location and inner working of the prison.’ According to these reports, the
INVOICE FROM RICHTHOR AVIATION TO SPORTSFLIGHT AIR, FOR RENDITION OPERATION BETWEEN BLACK SITES IN GUANTÁNAMO BAY, ROMANIA AND MOROCCO (CIRCUIT 42)
The site was located in the basement of a building in northern Bucharest used by the National Registry Office for Classified Information (ORNIS) to store sensitive EU and NATO files. The basement was ‘one of the most secure rooms in all of Romania,’ with detainees flown to Bucharest’s airport, loaded into vans, then driven to the building. The site was just a 15 minute drive from the airport. Once there, they would be taken down a side road, and through a rear gate that led into the compound. They would then be taken underground, where six prefabricated cells had been built, on springs in order to keep detainees off-balance and disorientated.\footnote{The internal layout of the site has also been reported by The New York Times, which described ‘a renovated building on a busy street in Bucharest’ built to house half a dozen prisoners in isolated cells.} The internal layout of the site has also been reported by The New York Times, which described ‘a renovated building on a busy street in Bucharest’ built to house half a dozen prisoners in isolated cells.\footnote{The internal layout of the site has also been reported by The New York Times, which described ‘a renovated building on a busy street in Bucharest’ built to house half a dozen prisoners in isolated cells.}

One of the men held at the site, Khaled Sheikh Mohammed, has described how ‘they kept our clothes on, but our feet shackled. The rooms were about four feet wide by nine feet long. The walls were ceramic, there was a hook in the ceiling and two hooks on the floor, and there was a drain in the floor. From time to time I would hear other detainees screaming.’\footnote{Although the exact location of the facility has not been independently confirmed, the fact that a building was leased to the CIA in Bucharest has been, by both Ioan Talpeş (former Presidential Advisor on National Security) and ‘Witness Z’.}

According to the Committee Study, the first detainees arrived in Romania in September 2003, and this included a batch of five prisoners.\footnote{According to the Committee Study, the first detainees arrived in Romania in September 2003, and this included a batch of five prisoners.} We have established the identities of these five men, plus at least seven others held there before it was closed.

### DETAINES HELD IN ROMANIA (FROM/TO)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
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<td>October 2005</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>(Circuit 58)</td>
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<td>(max)</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
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<td>Muhammad Ibrahim (99)</td>
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<td>Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri (26)</td>
<td>April 2004 (Circuit 42)</td>
<td>October 2005 (Circuit 52)</td>
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<td>Ramzi bin al-Shibh (41)</td>
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<td>Abu Faraj al-Libi (114)</td>
<td>May 2005 (Circuit 57)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abu Munthir al-Magrebi (115)</td>
<td>May 2005 (Circuit 57)</td>
<td>November 2005 (max)</td>
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Hambali and Lillie may also have been detained at the site, although the evidence for this is not conclusive.

Detainees who arrived in Romania shortly after their capture were often subjected to sustained torture. In January 2004, for example, Hassan Ghul was rendered to the site and immediately ‘shaved and barbered, stripped, and placed in the standing position against the wall’ with ‘his hands above his head.’ He was then subjected to one session of 59 hours’ sleep deprivation, whereupon he experienced hallucinations, followed by further deprivation and other techniques, alongside further hallucinations. Cables also describe the use of sleep deprivation on Muhammad Ibrahim for three days straight, from 27-30 January 2004, exceeding the 48 hours authorised by CIA Headquarters at the beginning of this period.

Once in Romania, Janat Gul (#110) was subjected to extensive, customised application of “enhanced interrogation techniques”. CIA cables from the Romanian site document that Gul was tortured from 3-10 August 2004 and again from 21-25 August 2004, and that this included continuous sleep deprivation, facial holds, attention grasps, facial slaps, stress positions, and walling, until he experienced auditory and visual hallucinations. Gul became hugely disoriented, and could see ‘his wife and children in the mirror and heard their voices in the white noise.’ After continued torture, Gul ‘asked to die, or just be killed’. This torture took place throughout August 2004, and included a 47-hour session of standing sleep deprivation, after which he was returned to his cell, allowed to remove his diaper, given a towel and a meal, and permitted to sleep.

Abu Faraj al-Libi was also tortured on arrival in Romania, and throughout June 2005, with...
two key periods: from 28 May until 2 June, and then again from 17-28 June. This treatment continued even after he complained of loss of hearing (he was eventually fitted with a hearing aid after his transfer to US military custody at Guantánamo Bay).

Some of the detainees who had been held by the CIA for longer before transfer to Romania also appear to have been interrogated at the site. Although the sustained use of interrogation under torture appears not to have been used against these prisoners while in Romania, mistreatment clearly continued. Walid bin Attash has testified that he was placed in a standing stress position for several days while at the site, and forced to defecate into a diaper. Likewise, Ramzi bin al-Shibh has testified that he was ‘restrained on a bed, unable to move, for one month, February 2005 and subjected to cold air-conditioning during this period.’ Referring to the prison as his ‘eighth place of detention’, he has also testified that he was forcibly but partially shaved in order to humiliate him.

CIA cables from the site document severe psychological problems experienced by the detainees as a result of their torture and prolonged isolation, including depression, anxiety and insomnia. In at least one case this led to a hunger strike. This was quashed in May 2004, when Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri was subjected to rectal feeding, with Ensure infused while he was ‘in a forward-facing position (Trendlenberg) with head lower than torso.

By the time that Abu Faraj al-Libi and Abu Munthir al-Magrebi (#115) were transferred to Romania in May 2005 (Circuit 57), the site’s own manager considered the prison to be dysfunctional. He was troubled by the ‘natural and progressive effects of long-term solitary confinement on detainees,’ and was exasperated by the personnel deployed there, many of whom were ‘basically incompetent’. The quality of debriefers and security officers being sent to the site was degenerating, while the information coming out of it was ‘mediocre or, I dare say, useless’.

The Romanian site operated until November 2005. In the days before its closure, the CIA had learned that The Washington Post knew of the prison’s existence. While seeking to prevent the paper from publishing the details, it also proposed moving the prisoners into DoD custody. When the Pentagon refused, the National Security Council directed the CIA to prepare other options. At least two prisoners – Khaled Sheikh Mohammed and al-Nashiri – were rendered to the Lithuanian black site on 5 October 2005, although it is unclear if this took place before or after the CIA had learned of the newspaper’s story.

The Washington Post published its story on 2 November 2005. This caused significant tension with allies. US representatives to the European Union worried that public knowledge of the programme would cause ‘considerable ramifications’ for relations with the European Union, and bilateral counterterrorism relations with European allies were clearly impacted as a result. From this point onwards, at least one government refused to provide information that could lead to US custody and interrogation of terror suspects, whether by the CIA or the DoD.

Although The Washington Post story withheld the names of the ‘Eastern European democracies’ which hosted black sites, Human Rights Watch followed up quickly to identify Poland and Romania. As a result, the Romanian authorities demanded the closure of the black site within xx hours, and the CIA ‘transferred the remaining three prisoners out of the facility shortly thereafter.’
We have identified the rendition circuit which completed this transfer, with all prisoners moved to Afghanistan (via a plane switch in Jordan) (Circuit 59).

The CIA now had only two active prison sites: one in Lithuania, the other in Afghanistan. At this point the programme held 27, with Abu Ja’far al-Iraqi (#117) added later in November once he had been transferred to Afghanistan from DoD custody in Iraq.

LITHUANIA

Discussions with Lithuanian officials regarding the construction of a black site started in 2002, and the Lithuanian intelligence service (SSD) began implementing what became known as Project No. 1. This involved equipping a facility 'suitable for holding detainees... taking account of the requests and conditions' set out by the CIA. The site was on Z. Sierakauskos gatvė, according to subsequent government disclosures. According to the Committee Study, this had been completed by mid-2003, although by that time it was considered too small given the requirement to hold multiple prisoners at once. It appears that Project No. 1 was never used as a detention site.

The construction of a new, expanded facility was approved by Lithuanian officials, with awareness at the highest political levels and coordination by top-level officials in the SSD. The implementation of Project No. 2 began in 2004 with the purchase of a former horse riding school located in the village of Antaviliai, on the edge of woodland 15 miles from Vilnius. Journalists obtained real estate records showing that the site had been sold by a local family in March 2004 to a Panamanian company, Elite LLC. Locals have testified to significant construction activity during the summer of 2004, with the excavation of large amounts of earth and the conversion of existing buildings into a secure facility, with security cameras, fencing and no windows. Accounts exist of multiple shipping containers arriving by road throughout this time, carrying raw building materials and also prefabricated components. According to ABC News, citing unnamed Lithuanian and US officials: ‘The riding academy originally consisted of an indoor riding area with a red metallic roof, a stable and a cafe. The CIA built a thick concrete wall inside the riding area. Behind the wall, it built what one Lithuanian source called “a building within a building”. On a series of thick concrete pads, it installed what a source called “prefabricated pods” to house prisoners, each separated from the other by five or six feet. Each pod included a shower, a bed, and a toilet. Separate cells were constructed for interrogations. The CIA converted much of the rest of the building into garage space. Intelligence officers working at the prison were housed next door in the converted stable, raising the roof to add space. Electrical power for both structures was provided by a 2003 Caterpillar autonomous generator. All the electrical outlets in the renovated structure were 110 volts, meaning they were designed for American appliances.

The construction of this building was confirmed by the Lithuanian Parliament’s Committee for National Security and Defence (CNSD), which found that ‘the necessary acquisitions were made for the purposes of implementation of the project, construction works were carried out to equip the facility, with the progress of works ensured by the partners [i.e., the CIA] themselves.'
The building was reconstructed to meet certain security requirements. Although the Committee could not confirm that detainees were actually held in the prison, they were clear that ‘the layout of the building, its enclosed nature and protection of the perimeter’ was designed for such a function. Likewise, a delegation from the Council of Europe’s Committee for the Prevention of Torture completed a site visit in June 2010, and confirmed key aspects of the facility. The final report concluded that, although by that time (over four years since the prison had closed) the site in Antaviliai ‘did not contain anything that was highly suggestive of a context of detention’, it could ‘be adapted for detention purposes with relatively little effort’. Specifically, the delegation noted the existence of two interconnected buildings, one with a brown roof and one with a red roof. The latter building had a layout which ‘resembled a large metal container enclosed within a surrounding external structure. Two parts of this building (a fitness room and a technical area) contained apparatus, machinery and spare parts of US origin as well as instructions and notices written in English.’

According to the Committee Study, the Lithuanian black site received its first prisoners in February 2005. This is confirmed by our investigation, which has identified a rendition circuit connecting Morocco (from where the CIA had removed all its detainees by February 2005), Romania and Lithuania on 18 February 2005 (Circuit 55). This circuit displays the characteristics of a rendition flight, including the filing of false flight plans to disguise the landings at Bucharest (Romania) and Palanga (Lithuania) and the absence of any customs inspection on the ground in Lithuania. The aircraft was recorded as carrying three crew members and five passengers.

Based in part upon the findings of our investigation, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has found it proven that Abu Zubaydah was rendered to Lithuania in February 2005. Our new analysis of CIA cables confirms Abu Zubaydah’s presence at the facility in March 2005, and thus his rendition the month previously. The Committee Study also notes that the site received multiple detainees at that time, suggesting that others were brought on the flight from either Morocco or Romania. They may have included Mustafa al-Hawsawi, who was held in either Morocco or Romania (or both) from April 2004. Our analysis of CIA cables has confirmed that al-Hawsawi was held in Lithuania, with one cable from the site documenting his medical complications after the earlier use of rectal rehydration.

We have also established that at least two detainees, Khaled Sheikh Mohammed and Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, were rendered from Romania to Lithuania on 5 October 2005 on board two separate aircraft which met in Tirana, Albania. This circuit involved the filing of flight plans to disguise the landings in Bucharest and Vilnius, and the prevention of customs and border guards in Lithuania from approaching the plane (Circuit 58). Our analysis of CIA cables confirms that al-Nashiri was in Romania up until at least 30 September 2005, and that he was later held in Lithuania. Likewise, the Committee Study explicitly states that Mohammed was held in Romania and then transferred to DETENTION SITE VIOLET on 8 October 2005. Our analysis of cables confirms his presence in Lithuania during December 2005.
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**LANDING RECORDS FROM VILNIUS AIRPORT, LITHUANIA, 17 FEBRUARY 2005, INCLUDING A LANDING BY N724CL FROM JORDAN (CIRCUIT 54)**
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<tbody>
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<td>Abu Zubaydah (#1)</td>
<td>February 2005 (Circuit 55)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mustafa al-Hawsawi (#46)</td>
<td>February 2005 (Circuit 55)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Khaled Sheikh Mohammed (#45)</td>
<td>October 2005 (Circuit 58)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri</td>
<td>October 2005 (Circuit 58)</td>
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Little is known about the treatment of detainees in Lithuania. Mohammed has stated that the conditions were better, with bigger cells and better food, and a gym. We know that Lithuanian officers refused to admit al-Hawsawi to a local hospital, and as such care for his serious medical issues was delayed. He was ultimately transferred to a third-party country for treatment, which in turn received payment from the CIA. Indeed, an OIG audit of the Romanian and Lithuanian black sites, as well as DETENTION SITE ORANGE in Afghanistan, found that they did not have facilities for dealing with serious mental or physical problems in-house. Guidelines from the CIA’s Office of Medical Services recommended that ‘in situations where a detainee’s medical condition cannot be adequately treated at the detention facility, detention facility staff and local CIA station personnel arrange access to the host country’s health care system.’ However, attempts to obtain support from host country officials had had ‘limited success’, and foreign partners had ‘reneged on previous assurances that they would arrange inpatient treatment or have declined to become involved in providing medical treatment for CIA detainees’. Other issues identified include the ‘unacceptable quality’ of some of the medical facilities offered by partners. As an alternative to relying on host or third-party medical facilities, the CIA built its own hospital in another country between May and December 2005. This facility was not used. The final possibility – to use DoD medical facilities – was also off the table because DoD had refused access.

These problems resulted in the closure of the Lithuanian site in March 2006, and the transfer of the remaining detainees to a new site in Afghanistan, which the Committee Study calls DETENTION SITE BROWN. This took place on a rendition operation using two aircraft: the first rendering the prisoners from Palanga to Cairo; the second taking them onwards to Afghanistan (Circuit 60).

Investigation by the Lithuanian Prosecutor’s Office in 2010, subsequently disclosed during litigation at the ECtHR, offers granular detail of actions carried out by Lithuanian officers in support of the CIA. They had discussed with the CIA the provision of locations to house ‘secret collaborators’. They had been assigned to assist the CIA in locating site for various uses. Regarding
Project No. 2, in Antaviliai, the CIA led the construction works, and no operation file was initiated for the building. Although Lithuanian officials had access to the building, they did not visit all of it, and were ‘not aware of the contents of the operations that were carried out.’ They were under the impression, they told the Prosecutor, that the building was an ‘intelligence support centre’, but that it was used ‘minimally as the partners [i.e. the CIA] were slow to take any decisions’ about it. The CIA ‘changed their plans’, ‘stalled’ and did not ‘fully exploit’ the building. Lithuanian officers assisted in transporting ‘boxes’ to Palanga airport in March 2006: the boxes were ‘of not less than 1 metre length. They were carried by two persons... there were not less than three of them.’ They had also escorted cargo coming from Vilnius International Airport on another occasion. The Prosecutor’s Office concluded that ‘notwithstanding the fact that there is no data... of a precise purpose of the cargo... it might be concluded that “some specific cargo” could have been communication equipment.’

ENDGAME

DoD’s reservations about engaging with the black site programme extended to accepting former black site detainees. The CIA had identified problems with the ultimate disposition of its captives as early as January 2003, when officials drafted a set of ‘lessons for the future’ on the back of initial experience in Thailand. While suggesting that immediate legal issues in relation to host countries mean that ‘particular care needs to be taken with respect to the selection of future interrogation sites,’ this cable was also clear that, ‘as an alternative to indefinite incarceration at temporary locations, [redacted] needs to revisit the issue of establishing and staffing at least one secure and well-designed facility at a location outside the United States, where there is a high degree of confidence in the ability to remain at the location for an open-ended period of time.’

By 2004, officials were highlighting a series of ‘drawbacks of ongoing indefinite detention,’ including the need for regular relocation of detainees, the ‘tiny pool of potential host countries’ that was available to hold them, the ‘high risks’ that these countries ran in offering this assistance, the fact that ‘prolonged detention without legal process increases likelihood of [prisoner] health, psychological problems [and] curtails intel flow’, criticism of the US government if legal processes were delayed or denied, and the likelihood that such a delay would ‘complicate, and possibly reduce the prospects of successful prosecutions of these detainees’.

Six months later, an appraisal of problems facing the detention programme was prepared for CIA Director Porter Goss’s meeting with the National Security Advisor, Condoleezza Rice. This stressed the need to ‘establish a long-term disposition policy for the 12 High-Value Detainees we hold in overseas detention sites’, given in particular the fact that ‘liaison partners who host these sites are deeply concerned by [redacted] press leaks, and they are increasingly skeptical of the [US government’s] commitment to keep secret their cooperation.’ Existing black site hosts were considered likely to eventually ‘ask us to close down our facilities on their territory,’ while ‘few countries are willing to accept the huge risks associated with hosting a CIA detention site,'
so shrinkage of the already small pool of willing candidates could force us to curtail our highly successful interrogation and detention program. As such, the ‘establishment of a clear, publicly announced [detainee] “endgame” – one sanctioned by [the President] and supported by Congress – will reduce our partners’ concerns and rekindle their enthusiasm for helping the US in the War on Terrorism.’

These worries mounted throughout 2005, and were thrown into sharp relief by The Washington Post’s revelations that November. In January 2006, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld conveyed the message that he would not accept any CIA detainees at Guantánamo Bay. CIA officials viewed this prospect with alarm, arguing that the ‘only viable “endgame” for continued US Government custody of these most dangerous terrorists is a transfer to GTMO... absent the availability of GTMO and eventual DoD custody, CIA will necessarily have to begin transferring those detainees no longer producing intelligence to third countries, which may release them, or [the CIA itself may need to] outright release them.’ As Rumsfeld remained intransigent, Porter Goss was advised to take the matter to President Bush, and to ‘stress that absent a decision on the long-term issue (so called “endgame”) we are stymied and the program could collapse of its own weight.’

Starting in February, the CIA gradually began to disperse the prisoners that it was willing to send to foreign custody. Those it kept began to be treated a little more humanely. For example, Khaled Sheikh Mohammed has stated that, towards the end of his time in CIA custody (which would have been in DETENTION SITE BROWN) there was a gym with an opening in the roof, where he could see the sun for the first time. Some prisoners began to be afforded ‘social visits’ with another detainee ‘for approximately one hour in a controlled and monitored setting’, which was seen to have ‘a positive impact on detainees’ behavior and coping skills.’

Marwan al-Jabour (#108), for example, says that from the end of February 2006 he was allowed to meet Abu Yasir al-Jaza’iri, and the two would talk either weekly or monthly until he was transferred out of CIA custody.

DETAINEES IN FINAL BLACK SITES, AFGHANISTAN, MARCH-SEPTEMBER 2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abu Zubaydah</td>
<td>#1</td>
<td>Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri</td>
<td>#26</td>
<td>Ramzi bin al-Shibh</td>
<td>#41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ibn Sheikh al-Libi</td>
<td>#42</td>
<td>Khaled Sheikh Mohammed</td>
<td>#45</td>
<td>Mustafa al-Hawsawi</td>
<td>#46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abu Yaser al-Jaza’iri</td>
<td>#47</td>
<td>Ammar al-Baluchi</td>
<td>#55</td>
<td>Walid bin Attash</td>
<td>#56</td>
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<tr>
<td>Majid Khan</td>
<td>#58</td>
<td>Zubair</td>
<td>#62</td>
<td>Lillie</td>
<td>#72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hambali</td>
<td>#73</td>
<td>Khaled al-Maqtari</td>
<td>#96</td>
<td>Hassan Ghul</td>
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By September 2006, Rumsfeld’s objections were finally overcome, and the CIA and DoD signed a Memorandum of Agreement for delineating duties and responsibilities concerning the CIA prisoners to be transferred to Guantánamo Bay. Although much of the Agreement remains classified, it is clear that former-CIA prisoners were to be held solely under military jurisdiction, including ‘detainees’ registration, movement, release, transfer, continued detention, treatment, interrogation, medical care and trial before military commissions. The speech was the US government’s first acknowledgement of what had by then become an open secret.

After September 2006 the programme was dormant. It was revived sporadically for the detention of the last two CIA prisoners: Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi (#118) (held November 2006 to April 2007) and Muhammad Rahim (#119) (July 2007 to March 2008). After Rahim was sent to Guantánamo the CIA continued to maintain two prison sites, empty but ready to be reactivated. They were managed by a contracting company, Mitchell Jessen Associates (MJA). The company had been set up in 2005 by James Mitchell and Bruce Jessen, the two psychologists who had engineered the blueprint for the interrogation programme. A letter from the CIA’s Director, Leon Panetta, in April 2009, obtained by Vice News, stated that MJA had a contract ‘for services related to the two remaining CIA detention facilities.’ Previously MJA had provided ‘interrogation services, security teams for renditions, facilities, training, and other services.’ By 2009, however, the CIA had informed them that their services would be reduced to providing security teams for the empty facilities, ‘given that the agency would not be engaging in interrogation or operating black sites.’

The contract – due to run until March 2010 – was terminated early, but not before MJA had received more than $81 million for its work with the torture programme. But – Panetta told congressional overseers – the Agency retained the authority to carry out renditions and ‘to detain individuals on a short-term, transitory basis.’
Endnotes


3. President of the United States, Memorandum of Notification (MoN), 17 September 2001, para 4. Although the full MoN remains classified, some relevant sections have been discussed here: CIA, Delegation of Authorities, Memorandum from George Tenet to James Pavitt, 8 October 2001 (redacted), para 2; SSCI, Committee Study, 9 December 2014 (redacted), p. 11; CIA, Sixth Declaration of Marilyn A. Dorn, ACLU et al v. DOD et al, 5 January 2007, pp. 34-40.

4. SSCI, Committee Study, 9 December 2014 (redacted), p. 11.

5. CIA, Delegation of Authorities, Memorandum from George Tenet to James Pavitt, 8 October 2001 (redacted), para 4-6. See, also: CIA, Approval to Capture and Detain Taliban and al-Qa’ida Personnel [Redacted], cable from DIRECTOR, 17 December 2001, 14:10 (redacted), para 3.


7. Ibid., pp. 11-12; CIA (OIG), Special Review: Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities (September 2001 – October 2003), 2003-7123-IG, 7 May 2004 (redacted), para 28.

8. CIA, Hostile Interrogations: Legal Considerations for CIA Officers, draft, 26 November 2001 (redacted), pp. 6, 8.

9. CIA, POWs and Questioning, email, 1 February 2002 (redacted).

10. For some early reporting on these rendition operations to foreign custody, see Rajiv Chandrasekaren and Peter Finn, US Behind Secret Transfer of Terror Suspects, The Washington Post, 11 March 2002.

11. CIA, Approval to Capture and Detain Taliban and al-Qa’ida Personnel [Redacted], cable from DIRECTOR, 17 December 2001, 14:10 (redacted).

12. CIA, Approval to Capture and Detain Taliban and al-Qa’ida Personnel [Redacted], cable from DIRECTOR, 17 December 2001, 14:10 (redacted), para 7; CIA, Guidance on Scope of Capture and Detention Authorities, cable from DIRECTOR, 7 April 2003, 22:16 (redacted), para 7.

13. Some of these men were later rendered by the CIA to Afghanistan, where they were held in either US military custody or at a CIA black site.


19. Ibid., p. 4.


23. CIA, Options for Incarcerating Abu Zubaydah, PowerPoint Presentation, 27 March 2002 (redacted).


25. CIA, Options for Incarcerating Abu Zubaydah, PowerPoint Presentation, 27 March 2002 (redacted); SSCI, Committee Study, 9 December 2014 (redacted), p. 22.

26. It has been reported that Cambodia also offered to help, but that its proposed site was infested with snakes. Adam Goldman, The Hidden History of the CIA’s Prison in Poland, The Washington Post, 23 January 2014.

27. CIA, Options for Incarcerating Abu Zubaydah, PowerPoint Presentation, 27 March 2002 (redacted).


36. CIA, Behavioral Interrogation Team SIT Report, cable 69500, 7 April 2002, 00:09 (redacted).

37. CIA (OIG), Special Review: Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities (September 2001 - October 2003), 2003-7123-IG, 7 May 2004 (redacted), pp. 34-35.

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43. CIA, Description of Physical Pressures, email, 9 July 2002, 10:58 (redacted).

44. Ibid.

45. CIA, HOS Feedback on Status of Enhanced Interrogation Approval, cable, July 2002 (redacted).

46. CIA, DETENTION SITE GREEN, Additional Operational and Security Considerations for the Next Phase of Abu Zubaydah Interrogation, cable 10536, 15 July 2002, 10:06 (redacted).

54. CIA, DETENTION SITE GREEN, Details re Initial
Cycle of Interrogations of 04 August 02 of Abu
Zubaydah, cable, 4 August 2002, 05:59
(reacted); CIA, DETENTION SITE GREEN,
Details re 05 August 02 Cycle of Interrogations
Abu Zubaydah, cable, August 2002
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Details re 06 August 02 Cycle of Interrogations
Abu Zubaydah, cable, 6 August 2002,
15:58 (reacted); CIA, DETENTION SITE GREEN,
Details re 07 August 2002 Cycle of
Interrogations of Abu Zubaydah, cable, August
2002 (reacted); CIA, DETENTION SITE GREEN,
Details of 8 August 2002 Cycle of Interrogations
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Details of 9 August 02 Cycle of Interrogations
Abu Zubaydah, cable, 9 August 2002 (reacted);
CIA, DETENTION SITE GREEN, Details of 11
August 2002 Cycle of Interrogations of Abu
Zubaydah, cable, 12 August 2002, 06:16
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Details of 12 August 2002 Cycle of Interrogations
Abu Zubaydah, cable, 12 August 2002,
14:48 (reacted); CIA, DETENTION SITE GREEN,
Details of 15 August 2002 Cycle of Interrogations
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Detention and Interrogation Activities
(September 2001 - October 2003), 2003-7123-
IG, 7 May 2004 (reacted), pp. 36-37.
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(reacted), pp. 41-44.
57. Abu Zubaydah, Torture Testimony: Thailand,
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58. Jose Rodriguez, Re: [Redacted], email, 12 August
2002 (reacted).
59. CIA, DETENTION SITE GREEN, Status of
Interrogation Phase, cable, 10644, 20 August 2002,
12:35 (reacted).
60. ICRC, Report on the Treatment of Fourteen
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61. Tim Golden, Stephen Engelberg and Daniel
DeFraia, A Prisoner in Gina Haspel’s Black Site,
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Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation
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2003-7123-IG, 7 May 2004 (reacted), p. 36.
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‘Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, cable, circa 11 November
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(reacted), para 8.
67. CIA, email to Dusty Fogg, Short Backgrounder, 10
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account of the decision to destroy the tapes, see
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69. Ibid., p. 49.
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Prison; see: Adam Goldman and Kathy Gannon,
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NBC News, 28 March 2010. For reporting
referring to events in ‘Salt Pit’ which we now
know took place in ‘Rissat 2’; see: Amrit Singh,
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90. CIA, Death Investigation – Gul Rahman, Memo
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Committee Study, 9 December 2014 (redacted),
p. 49; CIA (OIG), Disposition Memorandum:
Alleged Use of Unauthorized Interrogation
Techniques. 2004-7604-IG, 6 December 2006
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91. CIA, Death Investigation – Gul Rahman, Memo
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[Dark Prison Officer], December 2002 (redacted), p. 2.

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December 2002 (redacted), pp. 6-7.

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December 2002 (redacted), p. 15.

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103. CIA, [Redacted] Interview of [Redacted],
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114. Ibid., p. 51.
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131. SSCI, Committee Study, 9 December 2014 (redacted), p. 74. Further reporting has suggested that the CIA paid Polish intelligence $15 million in cash (contained in two large cardboard boxes). See Adam Goldman, The Hidden History of the CIA’s Prison in Poland, The Washington Post, 23 January 2014. Elsewhere, one CIA official admitted during a CIA oral history interview to handing over millions of dollars in $100-dollar bills, contained in a number of boxes. This official did not name the recipient. See SSCI, Committee Study, 9 December 2014 (redacted), p. 140.
136. Ibid., pp. 68-70.
139. SSCI, Committee Study, 9 December 2014 (redacted), pp. 69-70; CIA (OIG), Special Review: Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities (September 2001 - October 2003), 2003-7123-IG, 7 May 2004 (redacted), pp. 41-44.
140. CIA, Concerns Over Revised Interrogation Plan for Nashiri, email, 22 January 2003 (redacted).
141. CIA, Retirement Notice, email, 22 January 2003 (redacted).
144. SSCI, Committee Study, 9 December 2014 (redacted), pp. 77-79.
145. Ibid., pp. 84-86
147. SSCI, Committee Study, 9 December 2014 (redacted), p. 74.
149. SSCI, Committee Study, 9 December 2014 (redacted), p. 97.
152. SSCI, Committee Study, 9 December 2014 (redacted), pp. 140, 143.
154. SSCI, Committee Study, 9 December 2014 (redacted), pp. 140-1.
155. CIA, CIA Detainees at GITMO, email from Scott W. Muller to James L. Pavitt, February 2004 (redacted).
156. CIA, Approval to Capture and Detain Talibann and al-Qa’ida Personnel [Redacted], cable from DIRECTOR, 17 December 2001, 14:10 (redacted).
157. CIA, Guidance on Scope of Capture and Detention Authorities, cable from DIRECTOR, 7 April 2003, 22:16 (redacted).
158. SSCI, Committee Study, 9 December 2014 (redacted), pp. 50-51.
159. Ibid., p. 105.
160. Ibid., p. 100.
162. Ibid., p. 51.
165. Ibid., pp. 17-18.
166. For example, the population fluctuated between 8-20 during the first year of its operation. CIA (OIG), Special Review: Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities (September 2001 - October 2003), 2003-7123-IG, 7 May 2004 (redacted), p. 48.
168. Ibid., p. 17.
169. Ibid., p. 61.
170. Ibid., p. 104.
171. Center for Constitutional Rights, Former CIA Detainee Majid Khan’s Torture Finally Public, 2 June 2015.


178. Ibid.

179. Ibid., p. 119.

180. It appears that at least some of the planning for this transfer took place in March 2004. SSCI, Committee Study, 9 December 2014 (redacted), p. 120.


184. Ibid., pp. 4-5.


187. Ibid., p. 73.


190. DoD (CSRT), Majid Khan, 15 April 2007, p. 29.


192. Ibrahim Jan, Abu Ja’far al-Iraqi.

193. See, for example: Glenn Carle, The Interrogator: An Education, New York: Nation Books, 2011, p. 18. ‘Our liaison partners were running the interrogation because it was occurring on their turf, even though the case, and [Wazir], were ours. It was a matter of sovereignty. Our hosts were willing to help, not do our bidding.’

194. Wazir was transferred to the Dark Prison in Afghanistan in December 2002 (Circuit 16), and Mohammed and Di’iki followed in January 2004 (Circuit 37). Bin al-Shibh was rendered to Poland in February 2003 (Circuit 17).


197. Ibid., pp. 68-69.


200. Ibid., p. 12.


202. SSCI, Committee Study, 9 December 2014 (redacted), pp. 139-140.

203. Ibid., pp. 139-140, 143.

204. The Committee Study states that the site held CIA detainees ‘beginning in April 2004.’ SSCI, Committee Study, 9 December 2014 (redacted), p. 143. Another flight between Guantánamo Bay and Morocco, on 27 March 2004, may therefore have been logistical.

205. SSCI, Committee Study, 9 December 2014 (redacted), pp. 141-142.

206. Council of Europe, Secret Detentions and Illegal Transfers of Detainees Involving Council of


211. SSCI, Committee Study, 9 December 2014 (redacted), pp. 97, 143.


216. See, also: Thomas Hammarberg, Advancing Accountability in Respect of the CIA Black Site in Romania, memo, Council of Europe, CommDH(2012)38, 30 March 2012, p. 15.


229. CIA, DETENTION SITE BLACK, cable 1203, 23 May 2004, 17:09.


231. Ibid., pp. 151-152.


237. SSCI, Committee Study, 9 December 2014 (redacted), p. 98.

238. CNSD, Findings of the Investigation Concerning the Alleged Transportation and Confinement of Persons Detained by the Central Intelligence Agency, 22 December 2009.

239. SSCI, Committee Study, 9 December 2014 (redacted), pp. 95-96.


244. CNSD, Findings of the Investigation Concerning the Alleged Transportation and Confinement of Persons Detained by the Central Intelligence Agency, 22 December 2009, pp. 6-7.

245. Council of Europe, Report to the Lithuanian Government on the Visit to Lithuania Carried Out by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) from 14 to 18 June 2010, 19 May 2011.


247. Ibid., p. 142.

248. This figure does not include prisoners. CNSD, Findings of the Investigation Concerning the Alleged Transportation and Confinement of Persons Detained by the Central Intelligence Agency, 22 December 2009.


250. CIA, DETENTION SITE VIOLET, cable 2166, 7 March 2005, 06:47.


252. CIA, DETENTION SITE VIOLET, cable 3223, date redacted.


255. SSCI, Committee Study, 9 December 2014 (redacted), pp. 95-96.


259. Al-Hawsawi was one of five CIA prisoners transferred to third-party countries for medical care, the others being Janat Gul (#110), Gouled Dourad (#102), Ramzi bin al-Shibh (#41), and Khaled al-Maqtari (#96). SSCI, Committee Study, 9 December 2014 (redacted), pp. 154-155.


261. Ibid.


266. Ibid., p. 150.

267. Ibid., pp. 150-155.

268. Ibid., p. 156.

269. Ibid., pp. 156-7.

270. Ibid., p. 157.


274. DoD and CIA, Memorandum of Agreement Concerning the Detention by DOD of Certain Terrorists at a Facility at Guantánamo Bay Naval Station, 1 September 2006 (redacted), p. 1.

275. White House, President Discusses Creation of Military Commissions to Try Suspected Terrorists, 6 September 2006.

276. Jason Leopold, Here’s the CIA’s Letter to Congress Saying the Agency Was Quitting the Torture Business, Vice News, 5 August 2015. The initials MJA were left unredacted at one point in the disclosed letters, as was the fact that there were two remaining facilities.

CONCLUSION
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CIA Torture Unredacted and its accompanying appendices provide the most comprehensive account of the CIA torture programme to date. This work considerably advances previous findings on the scale and reach of the programme, and overcomes some of the most significant weaknesses of what has been, up until now, the most detailed account of CIA torture: the Executive Summary to the ‘Committee Study of the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program’.

As we have set out here, the redacted version of the Executive Summary provided almost no detail on the majority of the prisoners held. It offered a patchwork account of the programme's overall architecture, withholding crucial details regarding the location and operation of the black sites and other detention facilities. It presented no real insights into the complex arrangements of outsourcing aspects of the programme to private companies in the hope of evading detection. With its reliance on CIA records only, which were incomplete through poor record-keeping practices and wilful destruction by the CIA, the Committee Study provides only a partial account.

The Committee Study's findings, as published, were further diminished by the process of declassification, which severely hampered any real insights into where prisons were hosted and where prisoners were detained. Indeed, as Senator Feinstein indicates in her Foreword to the Committee Study, she opted to agree to non-disclosure of the full report because the process that would be required to negotiate declassification would be too lengthy and ran the risk of none of the findings ever seeing the light of day.1

It is lamentable that it has taken the painstaking work of a group of human rights investigators, litigators, investigative journalists and academics, over many years, to provide a more complete account. But this needs to be understood in context: whereas parliamentary efforts such as that by the Senate Committee in the US and the Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) in the UK can significantly advance public knowledge of this shameful episode, those holding executive power have sought, at all turns, to shut down a full investigation. The Senate Committee's team, led by Daniel Jones, worked against significant resistance from the CIA, the White House, and other agencies – including, it transpired, the CIA's spying on their work. On publication of the Committee Study, and subsequently, key officials have campaigned to suppress the full report, perhaps for ever. A significant protagonist on this front has been Senator Richard Burr, appointed Chair of the SSCI in 2015, who considered the Committee Study to be
‘shoddy’ and ‘excessively critical of the CIA and the administration of President George W. Bush’.² On taking up his new position, he wrote to President Obama to request that all copies of the full Committee Study be returned to the Committee, in an attempt to prevent its release through the Freedom of Information Act. Senator Feinstein was highly critical of Burr’s move, arguing that insisting the US administration relinquish its copies would ‘limit the ability to learn lessons from this sad chapter in America’s history and omit from the record two years of work, including changes made to the Committee’s 2012 report following extensive discussion with the CIA’.³ Her protests made little difference to the Trump administration, and in June 2017 Congressional officials confirmed that the administration had been returning its copies in response to Burr’s request. As The New York Times reported, this has raised the possibility that ‘most of the copies could be locked in Senate vaults indefinitely or even destroyed – and increases the risk that future government officials, unable to read the report, will never learn its lessons.’⁴

Those who would halt further investigation and disclosure are, in part, seeking to prevent legal action against the perpetrators of torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment. There has been very little political will to bring those responsible to justice. In fact, many of those in senior positions in the CIA and Department of Justice (DoJ) continue to hold office following publication of the Committee Study, and some have been elevated by the Trump administration. One example is Gina Haspel. Declassified CIA cables reveal she was directly involved in the torture of Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri while he was held in Thailand, yet, despite considerable opposition, President Trump appointed her as CIA Director in May 2018.⁵ No actions have been taken against Mitchell and Jessen, or the numerous CIA and DoJ officials who colluded in efforts to legitimise torture. Indeed, Mitchell and Jessen received $81 million from the CIA prior to the programme’s termination, and were subsequently offered protection through CIA-funded, multi-year indemnification agreements to protect their company and its employees from legal liability ensuing from the programme.⁶

Many of the same limitations that shaped the Committee Study have also hampered efforts to investigate the UK’s role, despite the fact that it is now clear how deeply implicated UK intelligence agencies were. Indeed, attempts to hold UK authorities to account for their role in the RDI programme have been thwarted at every turn. Successive governments have repeatedly denied any involvement of UK security service or military personnel in torture or CIDT. Even as credible evidence mounted, officials were slow to fully investigate, were reticent about holding anyone to account, and have done very little to offer meaningful redress.

In 2010, the incoming UK Coalition government led by David Cameron finally launched a judge-led inquiry chaired by Peter Gibson, the purpose of which was to examine whether Britain was implicated in the improper treatment of detainees, held by other countries, that may have occurred in the aftermath of 9/11. Yet the Gibson Inquiry was closed down before witnesses were even called, in part because of the considerable constraints placed on the Inquiry by government. Leading human rights organisations and litigators representing victims boycotted the Inquiry because of concerns about transparency, and because they were to be denied the right to question intelligence officials about mistreatment.⁷
Similar constraints were placed on the scope of the subsequent investigation by the UK Parliament’s ISC, which was denied access to key intelligence officers with knowledge of British involvement. This meant that, despite providing the most detailed account to date of UK complicity in this programme, the ISC’s work was unavoidably hamstrung. Indeed, successive UK governments have gone to great lengths to suppress vital evidence, including passing legislation precisely for this purpose. At the time of writing, the current UK government continues to resist repeated calls for a judge-led inquiry, following the damning findings of the ISC. This posture must change, if we are to have true accountability for the violations which took place in the ‘War on Terror’.

The absence of any kind of government effort, both in the US and UK, to hold specific individuals to account for their roles in torture has two implications. First, it emphasises the unwillingness of both states to totally outlaw torture and prevent it from happening in the future. Second, it accelerates the decline of the global governance of human rights. The US and UK pride themselves on their human rights records and play significant roles in holding other states to account, including making the delivery of aid contingent on compliance with international human rights treaties. Yet both states have severely undermined their international reputations, and have contributed to increases in torture and human rights violations by other state and non-state actors, as a direct result of the CIA’s torture programme.

Persistent efforts by litigators, human rights organisations and some dedicated parliamentarians in the US and the UK have attempted to hold executive power to account for torture in the ‘War on Terror’, making it impossible for the US or UK governments to continue to deny how far-reaching the torture programme was, or how devastating its effects. The need to publicise state perpetrated human rights abuses, and to pursue justice against those responsible, is also more urgent than ever. In this light, we hope that CIA Torture Unredacted will play a meaningful role in facilitating efforts to seek redress and reparation for victims. We also hope that it can contribute to holding executive power to account, and to bringing about reform in the security practices of powerful liberal democratic states, including through reinstating the absolute prohibition of torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment at all times and in all circumstances.

Endnotes

1. SSCI, Foreword to the Committee Study, 9 December 2014, p. 3.
5. Andrew Buncombe, Torture of Terror Suspect at CIA Black Site Operated by Current Director Gina Haspel Detailed in Newly Declassified Cables, The Independent, 10 August 2018.
6. SSCI, Findings and Conclusions of the Committee Study, 9 December 2014, p. 11.
APPENDIX 1

THE PRISONERS
APPENDIX 1:
The Prisoners

This appendix provides detailed profiles of the 119 men listed as CIA prisoners in the Committee Study. In each case, we have established where possible the prisoner’s nationality, the date and location of their capture, the location of their initial detention (often by the government in the country of capture), the dates when they were held formally by the CIA, the black site locations during this time, and what happened to them after their time in the torture programme.

By mining the first-hand accounts of individuals held within the programme, alongside declassified US government documents, CIA cables, flight data and a range of other sources, we are able here to build the most comprehensive picture to date of the fate and whereabouts of these 119 men. In some cases, the experiences of an individual have been extensively documented beforehand, and we do not necessarily reproduce every bit of testimony here. However, we do cite to all relevant past investigations and court cases where these have provided such detail, and we provide here enough evidence to support our assertions regarding where and when individuals were held by the CIA, and how they were treated.

As we have discussed in the main body of this report, the CIA undoubtedly held more than these 119 men, and were also clearly involved in the rendition, detention and torture of others held by allied intelligence and security agencies. Appendix 2 provides an account of the rendition of some of these men. However, we restrict our focus in this appendix to the 119 prisoners listed in the Committee Study, given that they have been the primary focus of our investigation.

For the most part, profiles are listed in order that the men formally entered the CIA programme, starting with Abu Zubaydah (#1). However, where two or more prisoners were subjected to essentially similar treatment and movement within the programme, we have combined their profiles to avoid repetition. There are also three sets of prisoners which we treat in larger group profiles, mainly because there is still relatively little known about each. These group profiles come at the end of the appendix, and include seven men transferred to US military custody at Bagram Airbase, ten men released directly from CIA custody, and 20 men whose fate after their time in the torture programme we have been unable to identify.
Abu Zubaydah was captured on 28 March 2002, alongside more than 30 other suspects, in joint US-Pakistani raids on safe houses in Faisalabad, Pakistan. During the course of his arrest, he was seriously injured and flown to a military hospital in Lahore, where he was treated by Pakistani and US doctors. He was the first suspect to be taken into the CIA detention programme. The CIA rejected the idea of passing him to the US military, given that they wished to keep his detention secret from the ICRC. They settled on establishing a secret detention site in Thailand, and by 29 March 2002 President Bush had authorised Abu Zubaydah’s transfer to Thailand. His rendition took place shortly thereafter, and we have established that he entered CIA custody on 31 March 2002.

We have provided a detailed account of Abu Zubaydah’s treatment while in Thailand in Chapter 2, given that the CIA developed many aspects of its overall programme in relation to his detention and interrogation, and do not repeat these details here. Abu Zubaydah was held at the Thai site until December 2002. At that point the site was closed, and he was rendered to the newly-opened Polish black site alongside Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri (#26). Our investigation has confirmed this rendition operation, which took place between 4-5 December 2002 on board the aircraft N63MU (Circuit 15).

Abu Zubaydah was held for over 9 months in Poland, although little is known about his treatment during this time. By July 2003, the two interrogator/psychologists, Mitchell and Jessen, had assessed him as compliant: ‘he completely cooperates with all explicit requests and implicit routines. He proactively provides useful unsolicited and novel information... he strives to please and tries to anticipate demands.’ In September 2003, the Polish site was closed, and all detainees were transferred out. Abu Zubaydah was transferred to the black sites at Guantánamo Bay. This rendition operation took place on 22-23 September 2003 on board the aircraft N313P (Circuit 31).

Abu Zubaydah was held secretly in Guantánamo Bay from September 2003 until April 2004, at which point all five CIA detainees there were rendered to other detention locations. Our investigation has identified two rendition operations which transferred prisoners to Morocco and Romania, on 12 and 13 April 2004. The first was on board the aircraft N85VM, which flew to Romania and then Morocco (Circuit 42). The second was on board the aircraft N368CE, which flew direct to Morocco (Circuit 43).
Some reporting has placed Abu Zubaydah in Morocco from this point, and if correct he could have been on either of these two flights. Subsequently, in March 2005, a cable documents his presence at the Lithuanian black site. It is likely that he was rendered to Lithuania in February 2005, when the Moroccan site closed (Circuit 55).

Little is known about Abu Zubaydah’s treatment in Lithuania. He was held at the site for over a year, until it was closed in March 2006. At that point, all CIA prisoners at the site were transferred to DETENTION SITE BROWN in Afghanistan. Our investigation has identified this rendition operation, which took place on 25-26 March 2006 on board two aircraft, N733MA and N740EH (Circuit 60).

Abu Zubaydah continued to be held in Afghanistan until September 2006. He was then transferred into US military detention in Guantánamo Bay between 4-5 September 2006, as one of the 14 CIA prisoners handed over to the DoD at that time. As of May 2019, he remains detained at Guantánamo Bay.

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**ZAKARIYA (#2)**

- **Nationality:** Yemeni
- **Capture:** Georgia, 28 Apr 2002
- **Captured alongside:** Jamal Boudraa (#3)
- **Pre-CIA detention:** Georgia
- **Entered CIA custody:** 1-2 May 2002
- **Period of CIA custody:** 370-373 days
- **Left CIA custody:** 6-9 May 2003
- **CIA detention locations:** Afghanistan
- **After CIA detention:** Transferred to US military custody at Bagram Airbase, and then Guantánamo Bay. Detained, as of May 2019.

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**ABBAR AL-HAWARI (#4)**

- **Nationality:** Algerian
- **Capture:** Georgia, 28 Apr 2002
- **Captured alongside:** Jamal Boudraa (#3)
- **Pre-CIA detention:** Georgia
- **Entered CIA custody:** 1-2 May 2002
- **Period of CIA custody:** 370-373 days
- **Left CIA custody:** 6-9 May 2003
- **CIA detention locations:** Afghanistan
- **After CIA detention:** Transferred to US military custody at Bagram Airbase, and then Guantánamo Bay. Released to Algeria, 10 November 2008.
Zakariya (also known as Omar al-Rammah) and Abbar al-Hawari (also known as Abu Sufiyan) were two of three men captured in Georgia on 28 April 2002 and handed over to the CIA.11 The third man was Jamal Boudraa (3), who was held for much longer by the CIA before being transferred to his native Algeria.

DoD documents identify Georgian security forces as those involved in the capture operation.12 According to Zakariya, all three were captured by men who drove into the car they were driving in. He fainted, and awoke handcuffed and being beaten in the back of another vehicle. He was then held in a warehouse for four days, before being driven to another location, examined, then taken to an airport and put on a plane to Afghanistan, where he was immediately interrogated by Americans.13 Abbar al-Hawari’s account confirms these sequence of events.14

Our investigation has identified this rendition operation, which took place between 1-2 May 2002 on board the aircraft N63MU (Circuit 6).

Once in Afghanistan, Zakariya and al-Hawari were held by the CIA for over a year. Given that the first formal CIA detention facility in Afghanistan did not open until September 2002, they would have been held in an Afghan-run site for at least the first four months of their custody. We have established that they were held at the Dark Prison during October 2002.15 At some point between 6-9 May 2003, they were transferred to US military control at Bagram Airbase, and then to Guantánamo Bay on 9 May 2003 on board a military aircraft with call-sign RCH594Y.16

Al-Hawari was transferred out of Guantánamo Bay on 10 November 2008, and returned to Algeria.17 As of May 2019, Zakariya remains detained at Guantánamo Bay.
JAMAL BOUDRAA (#3)

**Nationality:** Algerian

**Capture:** Georgia, 28 April 2002

**Captured alongside:** Zakariya (#2), Abbar al-Hawari (#4)

**Pre-CIA detention:** Georgia

**Entered CIA custody:** 1-2 May 2002

**Period of CIA custody:** 630-631 days

**Left CIA custody:** 22 January 2004

**CIA detention locations:** Afghanistan

**After CIA detention:** transferred to Algerian custody. Released, 2010.

Jamal Boudraa (also known as Abdul Haq) is an Algerian national who was one of three men captured in Georgia on 28 April 2002 and handed over to the CIA. He was captured alongside Zakariya (#2) and Abbar al-Hawari (#4), who were both eventually rendered to US military custody at Guantánamo Bay. According to Zakariya, the men were initially held in a warehouse for four days, before being driven to another location, examined, then taken to an airport and put on a plane. Al-Hawari has testified that this flight landed in Kabul, Afghanistan, and our investigation has identified this rendition operation, which took place between 1-2 May 2002 on board the aircraft N63MU (Circuit 6).

Boudraa was held in CIA custody for around 21 months (630-631 days). Given that the first formal CIA detention facility in Afghanistan did not open until September 2002, he will have been held in an Afghan-run site for at least the first four months of his custody (likely alongside Zakariya and al-Hawari). We have established that he was held at the Dark Prison during October 2002. It also appears that he was held at a site in the Panjshir Valley during February 2003, from which he and Hassan Abu Bakr Qa'id (#5) briefly escaped.

Open Society Justice Initiative has reported that Boudraa was transferred to Algeria in January 2004. Our investigation has identified this rendition operation, which took place on 22 January 2004 on board the aircraft N313P (Circuit 37).

Once in Algeria, Boudraa was prosecuted for the crime of membership of a terrorist group active abroad and, in 2005, sentenced to five years of imprisonment. He was released in 2010.
HASSAN ABU BAKR QA’ID (#5)

Nationality: Libyan
Capture: Karachi, Pakistan, 22 May 2002
Captured alongside: Ridha al-Najjar (#6)
Pre-CIA detention: Pakistan
Entered CIA custody: 6 June 2002
Period of CIA custody: 520-529 days
Left CIA custody: 8-17 November 2003
CIA detention locations: Afghanistan

After CIA detention: transferred to US military custody at Bagram Airbase. Escaped, 10 July 2005.

Hassan Abu Bakr Qa’id (also known as Abu Yahya al-Libi) was captured in Karachi, Pakistan, in late May 2002, alongside Ridha al-Najjar (#6) and a number of other individuals. It appears that the raids were conducted by Pakistani forces, although the exact details are redacted from CIA documents. Al-Najjar himself has testified that their capture came on 22 May 2002.

Qa’id and al-Najjar were detained in Pakistan for a number of days. One CIA cable from Pakistan documents that at some point between 5-9 June 2002 both men were rendered to CIA custody at a proxy detention facility in Afghanistan to which the CIA had access and effective control. Al-Najjar has confirmed this date of transfer, giving it as 6 June 2002.

This proxy detention facility has been described by al-Najjar as being underground, with a window at the top of his cell showing street level. His captors referred to the site as ‘Intelligence 2’, and al-Najjar believes it was in Kabul. Qa’id was likely to have also been held at this site, and he has claimed that he was held at a site called ‘Rissat 2’ between June and September 2002.

Al-Najjar was transferred to the Dark Prison in September 2002, and our investigation has established that Qa’id was also held at this site during October 2002. While al-Najjar was then moved between a number of facilities, Qa’id’s location during his time in CIA custody is unknown.

Qa’id was held by the CIA for nearly 18 months, and was transferred out of CIA custody between 8-17 November 2003. He was sent to US military custody at Bagram Airbase, and was one of four men who escaped on 10 July 2005 (the others were also ex-CIA prisoners, Umar Faruq, #14, Muhammad al-Qahtani, #60, and Abdullah Ashami, #71).

The United Nations Security Council added Qa’id to its al-Qaeda Sanctions List in September 2011, on the basis that he was a ‘senior al-Qaeda leader who, as of late 2010, was responsible for the supervision of other senior al-Qaeda officials.’ It has been reported that Qa’id was killed in a US drone strike in Pakistan in June 2012.
RIDHA AL-NAJJAR (#6)

Nationality: Tunisian  
Capture: Karachi, Pakistan, 22 May 2002  
Captured alongside: Hassan Abu Bakr Qa’id (#5)  
Pre-CIA detention: Pakistan  
Entered CIA custody: 6 June 2002  
Period of CIA custody: 700-709 days  
Left CIA custody: 6-15 May 2004  
CIA detention locations: Afghanistan  
After CIA detention: transferred to US military custody at Bagram Airbase, and then Afghan custody. Released, June 2015.

Ridha al-Najjar is a Tunisian national who was captured in Karachi, Pakistan, on 22 May 2002, alongside Hassan Abu Bakr Qa’id (#5) and a number of others.36 Qa’id and al-Najjar were detained in Pakistan for a number of days, during which time the CIA received intelligence reports from al-Najjar’s interrogations.37 One CIA cable from Pakistan then documents that, between 5-9 June 2002, both men were rendered to CIA custody at a proxy detention facility in Afghanistan, to which the CIA had access and effective control.38 Al-Najjar himself has testified that this transfer took place on 6 June 2002,39 and Qa’id has testified that they were held in the facility known as Rissat 2.40

The CIA discussed its interrogation strategy for al-Najjar during June and July, at the same time as debating how to manage Abu Zubaydah’s interrogations. One cable, dated 16 July 2002, was sent to the CIA station in Afghanistan, suggesting possible interrogation techniques to use against al-Najjar, including: utilizing ‘Najjar’s fear for the well-being of his family to our benefit’; using ‘vague threats’ to create a ‘mind virus’ that would cause him to believe that his situation would continue to get worse; manipulating his environment using a hood, restraints, and music; and employing sleep deprivation through the use of round-the-clock interrogations.41 By 26 July 2002, CIA officers in Afghanistan were proposing ‘breaking Najjar’ through the use of isolation, ‘sound disorientation techniques,’ ‘sense of time deprivation,’ limited light, cold temperatures, and sleep deprivation.42

CIA Headquarters authorised the interrogation plan for al-Najjar on 5 August 2002, the day after Abu Zubaydah had become the first prisoner to be subjected to the CIA’s ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’. The authorisation included the use of loud music, worse food, sleep deprivation and hooding.

Al-Najjar was detained in Rissat 2 until September 2002. The guards referred to the site as ‘Intelligence 2’, and he was held in an underground cell with a window high up at street level.43 He was tortured throughout August and September 2002, before being transferred to the Dark Prison between 10-21 September.44 On the last day in the Afghan-run site, an interrogator warned al-Najjar that, if he did not provide the information being sought, ‘wait to see what happens to
you where we take you next. At the next place we will hang you from your anus.\textsuperscript{45}

By 21 September, one CIA cable from the Dark Prison stated that he was now 'clearly a broken man' and 'on the verge of complete breakdown' as a result of isolation. Indeed, al-Najjar was now willing to do whatever his interrogators asked.\textsuperscript{46}

In October 2002, US military personnel were involved in a debriefing of al-Najjar at the site. This was followed by a visit from a US military legal advisor on November 2002, who noted that the site was being run by a junior CIA officer with 'little to no experience with interrogating or handling prisoners.' The advisor reported on al-Najjar specifically, documenting that he was being subjected to 'isolation in total darkness; lowering the quality of his food; keeping him at an uncomfortable temperature (cold); [playing music] 24 hours a day; and keeping him shackled and hooded.' In addition, al-Najjar was described as having been left hanging, with one or both wrists handcuffed to an overhead bar, for 22 hours each day for two consecutive days in order to 'break' his resistance. He was also reported as being forced to wear a diaper, with no access to toilet facilities.\textsuperscript{47} The detention and interrogation of al-Najjar later 'became the model' for others held at the site.\textsuperscript{48}

Al-Najjar's own account confirms his torture at the Dark Prison, including hanging from a bar for days without being able to touch the floor, beatings so severe they resulted in multiple broken bones, various forms of water torture, and being threatened with a make-shift electric chair, a waterboard and a coffin.\textsuperscript{49}

It is unclear how long al-Najjar was held at the Dark Prison, although he thinks it was for 'many months.'\textsuperscript{50} He was then transferred to a site in the Panjshir Valley, where he was held in a cell just 0.8m x 2m, and then to a further location in Kabul where he 'was held in a number of different places inside, on different floors, and was moved underground when other people were in the facility.'\textsuperscript{51} Qai’d has referred to this location as ‘Rissat for Investigations.’\textsuperscript{52}

We have established that al-Najjar was transferred out of CIA custody between 6-15 May 2004, and held at Bagram Airbase for over ten years, where he was given prisoner number 1466.\textsuperscript{53} On 9 December 2014, on the same day as the Committee Study was released, it was reported that al-Najjar had been transferred to Afghan custody, alongside Lutfi al-Gharisi (#20), another Tunisian who had been held in CIA custody before years spent at Bagram.\textsuperscript{54} He was eventually repatriated to Tunisia in June 2015, and released.\textsuperscript{55}
AYUB MARSHID SALIH (#7). . BASHIR AL-MARWALAH (#8)

HA’IL AL-MITHALI (#9). . MUSAB AL-MUDWANI (#11)

SAID SALEH SAID (#12). . SHAWQI AWAD (#13)

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**Nationality:** Yemeni

**Capture:** 11 September 2002, Karachi, Pakistan

**Captured alongside:** Ramzi bin al-Shibh (#41), Hassan bin Attash (#10), Abdul Rabbani (#23)

and Ahmed Rabbani (#25)

**Pre-CIA detention:** Pakistan

**Entered CIA custody:** 14-15 September 2002

**Period of CIA custody:** 31-39 days

**Left CIA custody:** 16-24 October 2002

**CIA detention locations:** Afghanistan

**After CIA detention:** transferred to US military custody at Bagram Airbase, and then Guantánamo Bay. Released, 2016 and 2017 (except Said, who remains detained as of May 2019).

These six Yemeni men were captured together, alongside several other suspects, on 11 September 2002. A series of raids in Karachi by Pakistani ISI officers, rangers and police officers was sparked by the capture the day before of another suspect, Ahmed Rabbani (#25). The men were held in Pakistani detention in Karachi for a number of days, at a site where ‘lots of people were being tortured.’

Our investigation has concluded that this group was transferred to CIA custody along with Hassan bin Attash (#10), who was then separated from the group and transferred onwards to Jordan. Given bin Attash’s own testimony, this transfer date is likely to have been on 14-15 September 2002.

The six men were held in the Dark Prison in Afghanistan for around one month. CIA cables from Afghanistan document the torture, or possible torture, of several of them. Cables refer to the lack of sleep by al-Mithali, and by Salih, in early October 2002. Al-Mithali himself has testified that, while at the site, ‘his testicles were disfigured to the point where they cannot be repaired,’ and that the torture was so bad that he admitted to allegations of involvement with al-Qaeda in order to make it stop. Once in US military custody at Guantánamo Bay, al-Marwalah told CIA debriefers that he was tortured whilst at the Dark Prison, including being forced to ‘stand up for five days straight and answer questions,’ and to ‘strip naked and stand in front of a female interrogator.’ Likewise, Said later told his debriefers that he was ‘mistreated and beaten by Americans while blind-folded and stripped down to his underwear.’
A US federal judge hearing al-Mudwani’s habeas corpus case stated that the prisoner was held at a number of sites before his transfer to Guantánamo Bay, and that his claims of ‘abusive interrogation techniques’ during secret detention were ‘credible.’ Al-Mudwani has testified that, after his time in Pakistan, he was held in an American-run underground prison.

All six men were transferred out of CIA custody between 16-24 October 2002. DoD records show that the men were held at the military detention site at Bagram Airbase, having previously been ‘transferred to a prison facility and held for approximately one month.’ They were transferred to US military custody at Guantánamo Bay on 28 October 2002, on board a military aircraft with call-sign RCH319Y.

Five of the six men have so far been released from Guantánamo Bay: Salih and al-Marvalah were transferred to the UAE on 13 August 2016; Awad to Cape Verde on 4 December 2016; and al-Mithali and al-Mudwani to Oman on 16 January 2017.

In January 2017, the Periodic Review Board (PRB) at Guantánamo Bay determined that Said remained a ‘continuing, significant threat to the security of the United States’. As of May 2019, he remains detained at the site.
HASSAN BIN ATTASH (#10)

**Nationality:** Saudi  
**Capture:** Karachi, Pakistan, 11 September 2002  
**Captured alongside:** Ramzi bin al-Shibh (#41), ‘Karachi 6’ (#7-9, 11-13), Rabbani brothers (#23, #25)  
**Pre-CIA detention:** Pakistan  
**Entered CIA custody:** 14-15 September 2002  
**Period of CIA custody:** 120-129 days (not including 478 days in Jordanian custody)  
**Left CIA custody:** 4-14 May 2004  
**CIA detention locations:** Afghanistan; Jordan; Afghanistan  
**After CIA detention:** transferred to US military custody at Bagram Airbase, and then Guantánamo Bay. Detained, as of May 2019.

At the age of 16, Hassan bin Attash was captured in Karachi, Pakistan, on 11 September 2002, during multiple raids by Pakistani forces on al-Qaeda safe houses in the city. Several other people were captured in these raids, including the so-called ‘Karachi 6’, the Rabbani brothers, and the ‘High-Value Detainee’ Ramzi bin al-Shibh (#41). All were later held in Guantánamo Bay along with bin Attash.

Bin Attash was held in a Karachi prison for 3-4 days, where he was interrogated while blindfolded by a team of about a dozen Pakistani and American officials. During questioning, he was punched in the face and stomach, hit with a stick, and deprived of sleep.

Bin Attash was transferred to CIA custody in Afghanistan between 14-15 September 2002, likely alongside the ‘Karachi 6’. All were detained in the Dark Prison. Here, bin Attash was held in total darkness and continuously blasted with loud music. He was subjected to a cycle of interrogation and positional torture: first he would be taken to an interrogation room where he would have bright lights shone into his eyes (having been kept in total darkness), and be interrogated naked with his wrists chained behind him to a wall. He was also sprayed with cold water during these sessions, which lasted 30-60 minutes. He would then be returned to his cell, and hung by his wrists from a bar above his head with his toes just reaching the floor. This, he says, was like being stretched on a medieval rack, and was ‘so painful that no one put in this position could stand it for even a moment’. He would be left there for 6-8 hours, before being brought back for further interrogation. This cycle went on for the 2-3 days he was held at the site.

Bin Attash was then rendered to Jordan, along with Ramzi bin al-Shibh (who was taken onwards to Morocco). Our investigation has identified this rendition operation, which took place on 17 September 2002 on board the aircraft N379P (Circuit 9).

Bin Attash was detained in the GID (Jordanian intelligence) Headquarters in Wadi Sir, Amman, alongside Ali al-Hajj al-Shaqwawi (#93). He was held for 16 months, and tortured repeatedly, including in the presence of Americans. According to bin Attash’s legal team, citing his testimony:
The Jordanians tortured Hassan mercilessly, slapping and punching him, and making him lie down and stepping on his body and face. They also dragged him through the hallways to prevent him from sleeping. Hassan told counsel that the sleep deprivation was one of his worst tortures, making him almost crazy. The Americans have cruelly called this form of torture the ‘frequent flyer program.’

Hassan suffered other tortures in the Jordanian prison. Sadistically, Hassan’s keepers would lie him on his back, raise his feet above his head, secure his legs on a horizontal bar, and thrash the soles of his feet until they were raw, and afterward force him to stand in a pile of salt half-melted by hot water. Hassan has told counsel that he felt as though he was walking on hot coals, and that eventually he actually tasted salt.74

Another (non-CIA) detainee held in the facility at the same time, Abu Hamza al-Tabuki, has testified that bin Attash was held in cell number 85, on the third floor of the facility, and that ‘the guards didn’t allow [him] to sleep. The guards would look in on him through the small window in his cell door. If they saw that his eyes were closed, they’d wake him up by slapping his face or spraying water on him.’75 According to another of his legal team, bin Attash was hung upside down, beaten on the soles of his feet, and threatened with electric shocks. ‘He says that he told them whatever they wanted to hear. He just wanted it to stop.’76

On 8 January 2004, after 16 months in Jordan, bin Attash was returned to Afghanistan. He has testified that he was taken from the GID Headquarters to the airport where he was met by CIA officers who were dressed in black, and were wearing black masks with forehead flashlights.77 Our investigation has identified this rendition operation, which took place on board the aircraft N313P (Circuit 36).

Once in Afghanistan, bin Attash was detained in the Dark Prison. This has been confirmed by another prisoner, Majid al-Maghrebi (#91), who spoke to him and heard of his ‘horrible torture’ in Jordan.78 While at the site for a second time, bin Attash was subjected to ‘the same tortures as before, including sensory overload and deprivation.’79

Our investigation has established that bin Attash was moved out of CIA custody between 4-14 May 2004, and transferred to US military custody at Bagram Airbase alongside several other detainees also moved out of CIA custody at the same time.

In Bagram, bin Attash continued to suffer physical and psychological abuse, including regular beatings, stress positions and sleep deprivation. He was also threatened with being mauled by dogs, and with electrocution.80 On 19 September 2004, after several months at the site, bin Attash, along with several others moved from the Dark Prison in May 2004, was transferred to US military custody at Guantánamo Bay. This final transfer was on board a military aircraft with call-sign RCH947Y.81 As of May 2019, bin Attash remains detained at Guantánamo Bay.
UMAR FARUQ (#14)

Nationality: Kuwaiti
Capture: Jakarta, Indonesia, early June 2002
Pre-CIA detention: Indonesia; Egypt
Entered CIA custody: 29 September 2002
Period of CIA custody: 410-419 days
Left CIA custody: 13-22 November 2003
CIA detention locations: Afghanistan
After CIA detention: transferred to US military custody at Bagram Airbase. Escaped, 10 July 2005.

According to reporting by The New York Times, Umar Faruq (also known as Abu al-Faruq al-Kuwaiti) was captured in Jakarta, Indonesia, in early June 2002. Our investigation has established that he was transferred into CIA custody between 14-29 September 2002, and it is possible that he was on board the same rendition flight as Abd al-Salam al-Hilah (#15), who had been in Egyptian custody (Circuit 10). If this were the case, it is possible that Faruq was the second prisoner acknowledged by the CIA to have been rendered through Diego Garcia, in September 2002, given that we have identified this flight as transiting from Southeast Asia to North Africa (Circuit 9). This flight, which took place between 13-15 September, is the only flight by a known rendition aircraft from Southeast Asia during this period, lending weight to the suggestion that Faruq was rendered to Egypt. If so, he would have been held in Egyptian custody for two weeks, from 15-29 September, before being rendered to Afghanistan.

Faruq was held by the CIA for over 13 months, and for at least some time in the Dark Prison in Afghanistan. He was transferred out of CIA custody between 13-22 November 2003. It is likely to have been at this point that he was transferred over to DoD control at Bagram Airbase. He was held there until the night of 10-11 July 2005, when he was one of four men who escaped from Bagram (the others were also ex-CIA prisoners, Hassan Abu Bakr Qa'id, #5, Muhammad al-Qahtani, #60, and Abdullah Ashami, #71). It has been reported that he was killed in Iraq on 25 September 2006, by British forces fighting in Basra.
**ABD AL-SALAM AL-HILAH (#15)**

**Nationality:** Yemeni  
**Capture:** Cairo, Egypt, late September 2002  
**Pre-CIA detention:** Egypt  
**Entered CIA custody:** 29 September 2002  
**Period of CIA custody:** 590-599 days  
**Left CIA custody:** 11-20 May 2004  
**CIA detention locations:** Afghanistan  
**After CIA detention:** transferred to US military custody at Bagram Airbase, and then Guantánamo Bay. Detained, as of May 2019.

Abd al-Salam al-Hilah is a Yemeni national who claims to have been captured in Cairo in late September 2002, in a joint operation between Egyptian intelligence and the CIA. DoD documents state his capture was ‘approximately 20 September 2002.’ According to Amnesty International, al-Hilah was subjected to degrading treatment in Egyptian custody for about a week, and then handed over to US officials who flew him to another location. Our investigation has identified this rendition operation, which took place on 29 September 2002 on board the aircraft N379P (Circuit 10).

Al-Hilah was held in the Dark Prison, where he was stripped naked and suspended from the ceiling for prolonged periods. His description of the site matches that from other detainees held at the Dark Prison, and Khaled al-Maqtari (#96) was told that al-Hilah was held at the site in early 2003. Around January 2003, after about three and a half months at the site, al-Hilah was transferred to another location, which he called ‘Malidu’, which was ‘an underground, more modern facility where the conditions were better.’ During this time, he says that he was interrogated by the US for 15 consecutive days.

Around April 2003, after about two and a half months in ‘Malidu’, al-Hilah was transferred to an Afghan-run facility, where he was held for over a year. He was then moved back to Malidu, before being transferred to US military custody at Bagram Airbase. Our investigation has confirmed that he was transferred from CIA custody between 11-20 May 2004. DoD records document his eventual transfer to US military control at Bagram Airbase, and his subsequent transfer to Guantánamo Bay on 19 September 2004. This final transfer was on board a military aircraft with call-sign RCH947Y. As of May 2019, al-Hilah remains detained at Guantánamo Bay.
RAFIQ AL-HAMI (#18)

**Nationality:** Tunisian  
**Capture:** Zahedan, Iran, 29 January 2002  
**Pre-CIA detention:** Iran; Afghanistan  
**Entered CIA custody:** 12-24 October 2002  
**Period of CIA custody:** 50-59 days  
**Left CIA custody:** 10-18 December 2002  
**CIA detention locations:** Afghanistan  
**After CIA detention:** transferred to US military custody at Bagram Airbase, and then Guantánamo Bay. Released to Slovakia, 24 January 2010.

TAWFIQ AL-BIHANI (#19)

**Nationality:** Yemeni  
**Capture:** Zahedan, Iran, 29 January 2002  
**Pre-CIA detention:** Iran; Afghanistan  
**Entered CIA custody:** 12-24 October 2002  
**Period of CIA custody:** 50-59 days  
**Left CIA custody:** 10-18 December 2002  
**CIA detention locations:** Afghanistan  
**After CIA detention:** transferred to US military custody at Bagram Airbase, and then Guantánamo Bay. Detained, as of May 2019.

Rafiq al-Hami and Tawfiq al-Bihani were captured in Iran on 29 January 2002. DoD records relating to al-Bihani state that he remained in Iranian custody at numerous sites in Mashhad and Tehran until mid-March 2002, at which point he was transferred to Afghan custody. This appears to have been part of a transfer of 15 men from Iran to Afghanistan, ten of whom were later transferred to US custody.

The men’s initial time in Afghanistan was in an Afghan-run facility. As al-Hami testified to the Guantánamo Bay Administrative Review Board (ARB), ‘I was in an Afghan prison but the interrogation was done by Americans. I was there for about a one-year period, transferring from one place to another.’ According to al-Bihani, while in the first Afghan prison they were hidden from Red Cross representatives until one of their fellow prisoners informed them of their existence.

*I was handcuffed behind and they put a hood on my head so that I could not see anything. When I entered the interrogation room, the American guards (sic) pushed me down to the ground in a very savage manner. They started to cut my clothing*
with scissors. They undressed me completely and I was nude. They made me sit on a chair and it was very cold. I was also afraid and terrorized because the guards were aiming their weapons towards me. The interrogator put his personal gun on my forehead threatening to kill me.\textsuperscript{39}

Tawfiq al-Bihani

Al-Bihani says that he was held at this site for around ten weeks, and then moved to a second site where he was held in solitary confinement for over five months. According to another CIA prisoner, Hassan Abu Bakr Qa'id (#5), this was a prison known as 'Rissat 2', and Qa'id was held there alongside al-Bihani in June 2002.\textsuperscript{100}

Our investigation has established that both men were transferred into CIA custody between 12-24 October 2002, and held for almost two months in the Dark Prison. CIA cables from that time document the torture of both men, with each subjected to 72 hours of sleep deprivation before their first interrogation session.\textsuperscript{101} This use of ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’ was not authorised by CIA Headquarters.\textsuperscript{102}

This was absolutely the worst prison. It was a very dark prison and there was no light, no bed or a carpet, the floor was semi cement. The restraints on my feet were very tight; they put me into a cell and kept me hanging tied to the wall for almost ten days. The irritating music 24 hours a day was very loud and hard banging on the door. When I used to go for interrogations, I was unable to walk because of the restraints on my legs and tightness on my feet. I would fall down to the ground and scream that I cannot walk. They would pick me up from the ground and I would walk with them while they were hitting me on the way to the interrogation until I would bleed from my feet. When I would fall to the ground, they would drag me while I am on the ground. Then they would bring me back to the cell and sprinkle cold water on me. Sometimes they would put a weapon on my head threatening to kill me using some provocative statements which I cannot mention in this letter.\textsuperscript{103}

Tawfiq al-Bihani

The CIA eventually acknowledged that al-Hami’s detention did not meet the required standards for CIA detention, given that he had no knowledge of imminent threats to US interests, and was not involved in planning or preparing terrorist actions. Likewise, al-Bihani was never suspected of having information on, or a role in, terrorist plotting, but was interrogated simply because he was believed to have been present at a suspected al-Qaeda guesthouse.\textsuperscript{104}

Back in Afghanistan, I would be tortured. I was threatened. I was left out all night in the cold. It was different there. I spent two months with no water, no shoes, in darkness and in the cold. There was darkness and loud music for two months. I was not allowed to pray. I was not allowed to fast during Ramadan.\textsuperscript{105}

Rafiq al-Hami
Despite this determination, the CIA transferred both men to DoD custody at Bagram between 10-18 December 2002.\textsuperscript{106} They were then transferred to US military custody at Guantánamo Bay on 7 February 2003, on board a military aircraft with call-sign RCH191Y.\textsuperscript{107} Al-Hami was held at Guantánamo Bay for a further seven years, and eventually released and transferred to Slovakia on 24 January 2010.\textsuperscript{108} As of May 2019, al-Bihani remains detained at Guantánamo Bay.

**LUTFI AL-GHARISI (#20)**

- **Nationality**: Tunisian
- **Capture**: Peshawar, Pakistan, 24 September 2002
- **Pre-CIA detention**: Pakistan
- **Entered CIA custody**: 12-24 October 2002
- **Period of CIA custody**: 380-389 days
- **Left CIA custody**: 27 October – 17 November 2003
- **CIA detention locations**: Afghanistan
- **After CIA detention**: transferred to US military custody at Bagram Airbase, and then Afghan custody. Released, June 2015.

Lutfi al-Gharisi is a Tunisian man who was captured by US and Pakistani forces in Peshawar, Pakistan, on 24 September 2002.\textsuperscript{109} He was held for several weeks in Pakistan, before being transferred into CIA custody between 12-24 October 2002. Al-Gharisi was detained at the Dark Prison, where he was held for around six months. He has described sustained torture while at this site, including being hung from the ceiling for the first month, repeated beatings to the point of vomiting and fainting, and various forms of water torture. He was also threatened with the use of the electric chair, and the waterboard.\textsuperscript{110} CIA cables from Afghanistan document at least some of this mistreatment at the site, including two 48-hour sessions of sleep deprivation shortly after his arrival.\textsuperscript{111} This treatment was not authorised by CIA Headquarters.\textsuperscript{112}

Around April 2003, al-Gharisi was transferred to another site in Kabul, and then to a prison in the Panjshir Valley. He was held here for a number of months, in a cell measuring 1 x 1.5m, and was visited by some of the officials who had seen him in the Dark Prison.\textsuperscript{113} Al-Gharisi was held in CIA detention for over a year, until some point between 27 October – 17 November 2003. He was then transferred to US military custody at Bagram Airbase, alongside an Afghan detainee (likely Pacha Wazir, #38).\textsuperscript{114} He was held at Bagram for an additional seven years, and was given prisoner number 1209.\textsuperscript{115} He was held alongside another Tunisian who had been in CIA detention, Ridha al-Najjar (#6), and these two men were the final prisoners in Bagram, transferred to Afghan custody on 10 December 2014.\textsuperscript{116} Al-Gharisi was flown back to Tunisia and released in June 2015.\textsuperscript{117}
ABDUL RABBANI (#23)

**Nationality:** Pakistani
**Capture:** 11 September 2002, Karachi, Pakistan
**Captured alongside:** Ramzi bin al-Shibh, Hassan bin Attash, ‘Karachi 6’
**Pre-CIA detention:** Pakistan
**Entered CIA custody:** 1-9 November 2002
**Period of CIA custody:** 550-559 days
**Left CIA custody:** 4-21 May 2004
**CIA detention locations:** Afghanistan

**After CIA detention:** transferred to US military custody at Bagram Airbase, and then Guantánamo Bay. Detained, as of May 2019.

AHMED RABBANI (#25)

**Nationality:** Pakistani
**Capture:** 10 September 2002, Karachi, Pakistan
**Pre-CIA detention:** Pakistan
**Entered CIA custody:** 1-9 November 2002
**Period of CIA custody:** 550-559 days
**Left CIA custody:** 4-21 May 2004
**CIA detention locations:** Afghanistan

**After CIA detention:** transferred to US military custody at Bagram Airbase, and then Guantánamo Bay. Detained, as of May 2019.

Abdul Rabbani (also known as Abd al-Rahim Ghulam Rabbani) and Ahmed Rabbani (also known as Ghulam Rabbani and Abu Badr) are brothers, and Pakistani nationals, who are both currently detained at Guantánamo Bay. Ahmed Rabbani was captured in Karachi by Pakistani ISI forces on 10 September 2002, who believed that he was in fact another suspect, Hassan Ghul (#98). Initial interrogations of Ahmed Rabbani’s driver, who was captured at the same time, revealed the location of further suspects, and led directly to a series of raids on 11 September 2002. Among those captured as a result were Abdul Rabbani, as well as Ramzi bin al-Shibh (#41), Hassan bin Attash (#10), and the so-called ‘Karachi 6’ (#7-9, 11-13).

According to DoD records, after capture the brothers were held in proxy detention in Pakistan for two months, at least part of which time was in Islamabad. This is confirmed by Ahmed Rabbani, who has given a detailed account of their time in Pakistani detention in Karachi and Islamabad, including being beaten with electric cables and threatened with the rape of their family members.
Ever since the moment they captured me they began beating and torturing me... I was surrounded by 12 investigators among whom not even one had a merciful heart...
Some of them were smacking me in the face and in my stomach, some were kicking me, some were beating me with a stick, some were hitting me with an electric wire and some were spitting in my face, some were pulling my hair, some were punching me with an iron fist, some were punching and poking me with their fingers, some were biting me with their teeth, some were poking my body [with] a pen until my entire body was bruised and blood was running from my nose and my mouth.\textsuperscript{121}

Ahmed Rabbani

It also appears that Abdul Rabbani was interrogated by the FBI while in Pakistani custody, and provided information on the whereabouts of Khaled Sheikh Mohammed (#45) and his associates.\textsuperscript{122} Our investigation has established that they were then transferred into CIA custody between 1-9 November 2002. Ahmed Rabbani’s account of the rendition is similar to that from other CIA prisoners, and he has testified that they were held and tortured in the Dark Prison in Afghanistan for the next seven months.\textsuperscript{123}

The second torture journey began when a few Americans who were wearing masks received me and twisted my arms to the back and tied them tightly until they were almost cut off from being so tight. Then they put tape on my mouth and a full mask to cover my head and my face until it was hanging down my neck, they then wrapped the tape around my neck over the mask and closed all opening for air and breathing. Then, they cut my clothes harshly with a knife and gave me [a] few kicks and beatings when I objected [to] not being able to breathe.

I woke up in Afghanistan, in the city of Kabul and in particular at ‘the darkness’ prison... I was received with kicking, beating, pulling left and right, pushing my head and my body against the wall... Some of them would pull me by my testicles and my penis forcefully, some would punch me in the stomach...

They took me to a room and hung me by my hand to an iron shackle where my toes hardly touched the ground. They removed the mask away from my face and left me hanging from one hand, naked, thirsty, and hungry. I regained my breath after they removed the mask but soon enough I began feeling tired from being hung, hungry, and thirsty. All my weight was hung from the iron shackle until my hand was about to be cut off and the blood was going down to my feet.\textsuperscript{124}

Ahmed Rabbani

CIA cables from Afghanistan confirm some of these details, documenting the use of forced standing, attention grasps and cold temperatures without blankets.\textsuperscript{125} The use of these techniques on Ahmed Rabbani had been suggested by Bruce Jessen, just before he left the site and a few days before the death of Gul Rahman.\textsuperscript{126}

DoD records confirm Ahmed Rabbani’s account of their length of detention at the site,
stating simply that they were detained ‘in Kabul’ for seven months, and were then ‘moved to another prison.’ This was around May 2003, and Rabbani refers to this second site as the ‘Afghan intelligence prison in Kabul’ and says they were held there for just short of one year. The site was clearly run by Afghan personnel, although the CIA had unfettered access. At some point between January and May 2004, the Rabbani brothers were held alongside Khaled el-Masri (#97) and Laid Saidi (#57), with whom they exchanged phone numbers.

Both Rabbani brothers were held by the CIA for over 18 months, and were transferred out of CIA control between 4-21 May 2004. DoD records show that they were held at the military detention site at Bagram Airbase, and then transferred to US military custody at Guantánamo Bay on 19 September 2004. This is confirmed by Ahmed Rabbani, who has given a detailed account of his mistreatment in Bagram. This final transfer was on board a military aircraft with call-sign RCH947Y. As of May 2019, both men remain detained at Guantánamo Bay.
GUL RAHMAN (#24)

Nationality: Afghan
Capture: Islamabad, Pakistan, 29 October 2002
Captured alongside: Ghairat Bahir (#37)
Pre-CIA detention: Pakistan
Entered CIA custody: 1-9 November 2002
Period of CIA custody: 11-19 days
CIA detention locations: Afghanistan
After CIA detention: killed in CIA detention, 20 November 2002.

Gul Rahman was captured alongside Ghairat Bahir (#37) and three others in a joint US-Pakistani operation in Islamabad on 29 October 2002. Bahir has said that he was held in Pakistani detention for several weeks,\(^\text{134}\) and it is likely that Rahman spent several days there too. Our investigation has established that Rahman was transferred into CIA custody between 1-9 November 2002, and held at the Dark Prison.

Once at the site, the CIA brought in the contract interrogator Bruce Jessen in order to ‘assess a detainee for the possible use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques.’ Jessen assisted another CIA officer with the torture of Rahman, which included ‘48 hours of sleep deprivation, auditory overload, total darkness, isolation, a cold shower, and rough treatment.’ He was also subjected to nudity, ‘hard takedowns’, facial slaps and dietary manipulation. These techniques had not been authorised by CIA Headquarters. On 19 November 2002, CIA records document that CIA OFFICER 1 ordered that Gul Rahman be shackled to the wall of his cell in a position that required the detainee to rest on the bare concrete floor. Rahman was wearing only a sweatshirt, as CIA OFFICER 1 had ordered that Rahman’s clothing be removed when he had been judged to be uncooperative during an earlier interrogation. The next day, the guards found Gul Rahman’s dead body. An internal CIA review and autopsy assessed that Rahman likely died from hypothermia—in part from having been forced to sit on the bare concrete floor without pants (but also dehydration, lack of food, and immobility due to “short chaining”). CIA OFFICER 1 initial cable to CIA Headquarters on Rahman’s death included a number of misstatements and omissions that were not discovered until internal investigations into Rahman’s death.’

Despite his involvement in the death of Gul Rahman, CIA OFFICER 1 was not sanctioned. CIA records note that, in March 2003, the CIA station in Afghanistan recommended that he ‘receive a “cash award” of $2,500 for his “consistently superior work.”’ CIA OFFICER 1 remained in his position as manager of the detention site until July 2003 and continued to be involved in the interrogations of other CIA detainees. He was formally certified as a CIA interrogator in April 2003 after the practical portion of his training requirement was waived because of his past experience with interrogations at DETENTION SITE COBALT.’ Later, in 2005, a CIA Accountability Board recommended that he receive a 10-day suspension without pay. This does not appear to have been carried out.
Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri is a Saudi national who was captured in Dubai in mid-October 2002, although the precise date, location and details of the capture are unclear. According to al-Nashiri, he was detained and interrogated by Emirati agents for the first month after his capture, before being transferred to Afghanistan. This is confirmed by the Committee Study, which notes that he was rendered to the Dark Prison in Afghanistan on November 2002. Our investigation has identified this rendition operation, which took place on 10 November 2002 on board the aircraft N85VM (Circuit 13). One CIA cable describes al-Nashiri as ‘tearful and distressed’ during his rendition.

Once in Afghanistan, al-Nashiri says his wrists were tied to a bar in the ceiling, and he was kept naked in a painful position with his feet just touching the floor. He was held at the site for five days, and then rendered again to the CIA black site in Thailand on November 2002. One declassified report by the Department of Justice (DoJ) makes clear that al-Nashiri was brought to the Thai site on 15 November, and our investigation has identified this rendition operation, on board the aircraft N379P (Circuit 14).

Al-Nashiri was detained at the Thai black site for nearly three weeks, alongside Abu Zubaydah (#1). He has testified that he was kept naked and shackled, and was ‘threatened with sodomy, and with the arrest and rape of his family.’ CIA records document his torture at this site, including the use of the waterboard.

From the time I was arrested five years ago, they have been torturing me. It happened during interviews. One time they tortured me one way and another time they tortured me in a different way... I was hung for almost a month. You doing your things basically and you were hung upside down and drowning and hitting the wall. There are many scars on my head if I shave my head... I was without clothes. I was sleeping on the floor for about a month....

There was a box half meter by half meter. It was two meters in height. They used to put me inside the box. I was standing in that box for about a week and I couldn't do anything. My feet were swollen. My nails were about to fall off...
The torture continued until 4 December 2002, at which point he was rendered to the newly-opened Polish black site alongside Abu Zubaydah. Our investigation has confirmed this rendition operation, which took place between 4-5 December 2002 on board the aircraft N63MU (Circuit 15).

The Committee Study provides a detailed account of the torture of al-Nashiri while in Poland, including shaving his head, removing his clothing, and placing him in a standing sleep deprivation position with his arms affixed over his head. Interrogators threatened to sexually abuse his mother, raised a pistol to his head, and held a cordless drill to his body.

Al-Nashiri was held in Poland until June 2003, whereupon the CIA placed him and Ramzi bin al-Shibh (#41) 'within an already existing Country [redacted] detention facility.' We have established that this site was in Morocco. This was seen as a 'temporary patch', while discussions continued around the construction of a permanent CIA facility in the country. The rendition of these two prisoners to Morocco in June 2003 has also been reported by Associated Press, and our investigation has confirmed this rendition operation, which took place on 6 June 2003 on board the aircraft N379P (Circuit 23).

Al-Nashiri was held in Morocco for several months, although little is known about his treatment during this time. By December 2003, both bin al-Shibh and al-Nashiri had been transferred out of Country [redacted] to the CIA detention facility at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba. Our cable analysis shows al-Nashiri was still in Morocco on 19 September 2003 and that he was in the black sites at Guantánamo Bay by 3 November 2003. Our investigation has also confirmed the relevant operation which rendered al-Nashiri between the two sites: the only flight by a known rendition aircraft between the two sites during this period was on 23 September 2003, on board the aircraft N313P (Circuit 31).

Al-Nashiri was held in secret in Guantánamo Bay until April 2004, at which point he was rendered, along with all CIA detainees at the site, to other sites. Our investigation has identified two rendition operations which transferred prisoners to Morocco and Romania, on 12 and 13 April 2004. The first was on board the aircraft N85VM, which flew to Romania and then Morocco (Circuit 42). The second was on board the aircraft N368CE, which flew direct to Morocco (Circuit 43).

It is clear that al-Nashiri was rendered to the black site in Romania, and thus would have been on board the first of these flights. CIA cables from the site document his detention and behaviour throughout 2004 and 2005, including depression, anxiety and insomnia. In May 2004, he was subjected to rectal feeding in response to a short-lived hunger strike, with Ensure infused into al-Nashiri ‘in a forward-facing position (Trendelenberg) with head lower than torso.’ The final cable from the Romanian site relating to al-Nashiri is dated 30 September 2005, and shortly thereafter he was rendered to Lithuania alongside Khaled Sheikh Mohammed (#45). Our investigation has identified this rendition operation, which took place on 5-6 October 2005 on board two aircraft, N308AB and N787WH (Circuit 58).

Little is known about al-Nashiri’s treatment in Lithuania, although one CIA cable from the site documents his detention there. He was held at the site for over five months, until it was closed in March 2006. At that point, all CIA prisoners at the site – including Khaled Sheikh...
Mohammed, Mustafa al-Hawsawi (#46) and Abu Zubaydah – were transferred to DETENTION SITE BROWN in Afghanistan, on xx March 2006. Our investigation has identified this rendition operation, which took place on 25-26 March 2006 on board two aircraft, N733MA and N740EH (Circuit 60).

CIA cables from DETENTION SITE BROWN document al-Nashiri’s presence at the site throughout summer 2006. He was then transferred into US military detention in Guantánamo Bay between 4-5 September 2006, as one of the 14 CIA prisoners handed over to the DoD at that time. As of May 2019, al-Nashiri remains detained at Guantánamo Bay.
WAFTI BIN ALI (#30)

**Nationality:** Tunisian  
**Capture:** Pakistan  
**Pre-CIA detention:** Pakistan  
**Entered CIA custody:** 13 November 2002  
**Period of CIA custody:** 80-86 days  
**Left CIA custody:** 1-7 February 2003  
**CIA detention locations:** Afghanistan  
**After CIA detention:** transferred to US military custody at Bagram Airbase, and then Guantánamo Bay. Released to Kazakhstan, December 2014.

Wafti bin Ali (also known as Lotfi bin Ali and Abdullah) is a Tunisian who was captured in Pakistan by government forces. Our investigation has established that he was transferred into CIA custody on 13 November 2002, and held by the CIA for nearly three months. He was held in Afghanistan, and Hassan Abu Bakr Qa’id (#5) has stated that he was subjected to ‘severe torture’ at the Dark Prison.

Bin Ali was transferred out of CIA custody between 1-7 February 2003, and passed to US military custody at Bagram. He was then transferred to US military custody at Guantánamo Bay on 7 February 2003, on board a military aircraft with call-sign RCH191Y. He was finally released from Guantánamo Bay on 30 December 2014, and flown to Kazakhstan.
**SHAH WALI KHAN (#33)**

- **Nationality:** Afghan
- **Capture:** Kandahar, Afghanistan, 15 November 2002
- **Pre-CIA detention:** Afghanistan (US military custody)
- **Entered CIA custody:** 13 November 2002
- **Period of CIA custody:** 20-29 days
- **Left CIA custody:** 3-12 December 2002
- **CIA detention locations:** Afghanistan
- **After CIA detention:** transferred to US military custody at Bagram and then Guantánamo Bay. Released to Afghanistan, 20 December 2014.

Shah Wali Khan is the brother of another CIA prisoner, Nazar Ali (#28). Although DoD records document that he was captured by US Special Forces on 15 November 2002, Khan himself is certain that it took place in Kandahar on the sixth of Ramadan, which that year was 11 November. According to Khan, the ‘Afghanis captured me on my motorcycle at the bazaar. They took my money and motorcycle, and turned me over to the Americans.’

At that point, he was taken to Mullah Omar’s house where, ‘for one night, they interrogated me. They put a sack on my head. I stood there until morning. It was Ramadan and I hadn’t any water to drink.’

The next morning, Khan was taken to Kandahar airport, where he spent a second night, this time alongside his brother, Nazar Ali. They were then both flown on the same aircraft to Kabul and taken to the Dark Prison. Khan was held at the site for 3-4 weeks, alongside his brother: ‘they tied our hands and left us hanging like this for one month. They put us in a small box.’ During this time, he heard Ali being tortured. ‘He was screaming. I said, “What is going on? Is everything okay? Is everything okay?” I could hear him say that he was in pain.’

There was a high steel bar, and they had tied my hand to it. The first day they took us there, they told me, ‘today we will let you rest. You are tired from the flight’... We couldn't tell if it was day or night. It looked like a dark night. It was a small room like a washroom... We couldn't stretch our legs or lay down... Another day they brought me and hanged me upside down. Then my legs, hands and face swelled. For nine days they gave me no water and no food... I stood like this, on the tips of my toes.

After his time in CIA custody, Khan was transferred to US military custody at Bagram Airbase. This took place in December 2002, and he was held there for several weeks. He was then transferred to US military custody at Guantánamo Bay on 7 February 2003, on board a military aircraft with call-sign RCH191Y, and held until 20 December 2014. At this point, he was released to Afghanistan.
Bisher Al-Rawi (#35)

Nationality: Iraqi
Capture: 8 November 2002, Banjul Airport, The Gambia
Pre-CIA detention: The Gambia
Entered CIA custody: 9 December 2002
Period of CIA custody: 1-9 days
Left CIA custody: 10 December 2002 – 18 December 2002
CIA detention locations: Afghanistan
After CIA detention: transferred to US military custody at Bagram Airbase, and then Guantánamo Bay. Released to United Kingdom, 30 March 2007.

Jamil El-Banna (#36)

Nationality: Jordanian-Palestinian
Capture: 8 November 2002, Banjul Airport, The Gambia
Pre-CIA detention: The Gambia
Entered CIA custody: 9 December 2002
Period of CIA custody: 1-9 days
Left CIA custody: 10 December 2002 – 18 December 2002
CIA detention locations: Afghanistan
After CIA detention: transferred to US military custody at Bagram Airbase, and then Guantánamo Bay. Released to United Kingdom, 19 December 2007.

Bisher al-Rawi and Jamil el-Banna travelled together from the United Kingdom to The Gambia in November 2002, where they were arrested by Gambian authorities. They were detained and interrogated by US agents in the country, before being rendered to the Dark Prison in Afghanistan and then Bagram and Guantánamo Bay. Jamil el-Banna (also known as Abu Anas) is a Jordanian-Palestinian with refugee status in the UK. Bisher al-Rawi is an Iraqi national who had been living in the UK since 1984. Al-Rawi had worked with the British intelligence services during the 1990s, and was the main channel of communication between MI5 and the Muslim cleric Abu Qatada until his arrest in October 2002.177

On 1 November 2002, al-Rawi, el-Banna and their colleague Abdullah El Janoudi travelled together to Gatwick Airport on a business trip to The Gambia. The three men were arrested at the airport and detained under the Terrorism Act 2000 for four days. The ostensible reason for their arrest was the discovery of a ‘suspect electronic device’ in al-Rawi’s luggage,178 and MI5 notified the CIA on the same day, stating that al-Rawi was an ‘Islamic extremist’ and that the police had recovered ‘some form of home-made electronic device.’179 The device turned out to be a battery charger, and the men were released.180 However, MI5 continued to monitor their
movements, and requested the CIA to pass their travel plans to the Gambian intelligence service in order to ‘cover these individuals whilst they are in Gambia.’

On 8 November, the day the three men attempted to travel to The Gambia for a second time, MI5 sent another telegram to the CIA. This one provided the exact flight details, including the flight number and delayed take-off time, and the names and dates of birth under which the three men were travelling. Significantly, unlike the previous telegrams, this one did not include the caveat that the intelligence provided was ‘for research and analysis purposes only and may not be used as the basis for overt, covert or executive action.’

On arrival in Banjul, all three men were arrested by Gambian agents, along with al-Rawi’s brother Wahab and another colleague Omar Omeri, who had come to meet them at the airport. The five men were initially taken to the Gambian National Intelligence Agency (GNIA) Headquarters, and questioned by Gambian officials. The next morning, two Americans arrived and interrogated them. After two days, there were transferred to another location controlled by Americans. Omeri was released relatively quickly, while el-Janoudi was kept for 26 days and Wahab al-Rawi for 27 days.

On 8 December 2002, al-Rawi and el-Banna were driven to the airport at Banjul, prepared for rendition according to the standard CIA practice, and flown to Afghanistan. Our investigation has confirmed this rendition operation, which took place on board the aircraft N379P (Circuit 16).

On arrival in Afghanistan, al-Rawi and el-Banna were thrown into a vehicle and driven to the Dark Prison. There, they were subjected to similar conditions and torture as other detainees at the site, with continuous darkness, shackling, and loud music and noise.

*From the outset, I was held in complete darkness and isolation and kept in leg shackles twenty-four hours a day. I was given very little water and fed only once every one or two days. My toilet was a very small bucket, which was difficult to use, especially in the continuous darkness. Despite the extreme cold, I was not provided with adequate clothing or blankets. Strange music and loud man-made sounds were played around the clock, which – in addition to the constant screams of the other prisoners around me – made sleeping extremely difficult and very disturbed. When I did manage to fall asleep I often had nightmares.*

Bisher al-Rawi

At some point between 10-18 December 2002, the two men were transferred by military helicopter to Bagram Airbase, where they were forced to stand for hours, kicked and dragged along the floor, deprived of access to a toilet or shower or clean clothes, and held for prolonged periods in isolation.

On 7 February 2003, al-Rawi and el-Banna were rendered from Afghanistan to Guantánamo Bay, on board a military aircraft with call sign RCH191Y. Al-Rawi was held in Guantánamo until 30 March 2007, and el-Banna was released on 19 December 2007. Both were returned to the United Kingdom.
**GHAIRAT BAHIR (#37)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Nationality:</strong></th>
<th>Afghan</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Capture:</strong></td>
<td>Islamabad, Pakistan, 29 October 2002</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Captured alongside:</strong></td>
<td>Gul Rahman (#24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pre-CIA detention:</strong></td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Entered CIA custody:</strong></td>
<td>10-12 December 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Period of CIA custody:</strong></td>
<td>510-519 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Left CIA custody:</strong></td>
<td>3-14 May 2004</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>CIA detention locations:</strong></td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>After CIA detention:</strong></td>
<td>transferred to US military custody at Bagram Airbase. Released, May 2008.</td>
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</table>

Ghairat Bahir is an Afghan national who was captured alongside Gul Rahman (#24) and three others in a joint US-Pakistani operation in Islamabad on 29 October 2002. In an interview given to The Mail on Sunday, Bahir says that he was ‘cuffed, shackled, made to wear blacked-out goggles, headphones and a hood.’ He was then held somewhere near Islamabad for several weeks before being ‘stripped, shackled, internally searched and flown to Afghanistan.’ Our investigation has established that he was transferred into CIA custody between 10-12 December 2002, and held for around 16-17 months.

According to Bahir, speaking to Associated Press, during this time he was ‘left naked, sleeping on the barren concrete.’ He would be tied to a chair and sat upon, and hung from the ceiling, naked, for hours on end. He was given a bucket for a toilet, and the guards concealed their identity with masks and carried torches. His description of the site matches the Dark Prison in Kabul, and CIA cables from Afghanistan in December 2002 also document his torture. In an interview with The Mail on Sunday he also referred to being held at a jail in Afghanistan controlled by the Northern Alliance.

Bahir was transferred out of CIA custody and moved to Bagram Airbase between 3-14 May 2004. While in Bagram, Bahir was held in a cell measuring 1m x 2m, shackled, wearing goggles, and with no toilet. He was forced to soil himself, and interrogated most days. After two months of solitary confinement, he was moved to one of the standard cells at Bagram, which held 16-18 prisoners who he says had been rendered from Thailand, Dubai, Karachi and Somalia. Given which other former CIA prisoners were being held at Bagram at that time, it is possible that Bahir was held alongside Suleiman Abdullah (#48), Pacha Wazir (#38) and Muhammad al-Bakri (#39). Bahir was eventually released on 29 May 2008.
PACHA WAZIR (#38)

**Nationality:** Afghan  
**Capture:** United Arab Emirates, late September 2002  
**Pre-CIA detention:** UAE; Morocco  
**Entered CIA custody:** 12 December 2002  
**Period of CIA custody:** 330-339 days  
**Left CIA custody:** 7-16 November 2003  
**CIA detention locations:** Afghanistan  
**After CIA detention:** transferred to US military custody at Bagram Airbase. Released, February 2010.

Pacha Wazir (also known as Haji Wazir) is an Afghan who was captured in the United Arab Emirates in the last week of September 2002, ‘bundled into a vehicle’, and taken to an Emirati facility for interrogation. After several days in proxy detention, he was rendered to Morocco. We have identified this rendition operation, which took place between 7-8 October 2002 on board the aircraft N63MU (Circuit 11). Once in Morocco, Wazir was interrogated by CIA officer Glenn Carle, who has described the episode at some length in his published account. Although it quickly became clear that Wazir was not the high-level al-Qaeda operative which he was thought to be by Headquarters, he was eventually rendered to the Dark Prison in Afghanistan.

> I was shackled and taken to an airstrip in the middle of the night. When we landed I didn't know where I was because I was blindfolded and when my eyes were opened it was a dark room with no light... I was kept in a dark room for six months. Loudspeakers were installed in the room and they used to talk to me through those.

Our investigation has identified the rendition operation which transferred Wazir from Morocco to Afghanistan, on 12 December 2002 on board the aircraft N379P (Circuit 16). Wazir was held in CIA detention in Afghanistan for almost a year, first at the Dark Prison and then at a site in the Panjshir valley ‘where I was kept in a cell where I couldn't stand up and my hands were chained to the walls.’ He was then transferred to US military control at Bagram between 7-16 November 2003, and was given prisoner number 1207. Wazir was released in February 2010.
MUHAMMAD AL-BAKRI (#39)

**Nationality:** Yemeni  
**Capture:** Bangkok, 28 December 2002  
**Pre-CIA detention:** Thailand  
**Entered CIA custody:** 1-9 January 2003  
**Period of CIA custody:** 490-499 days  
**Left CIA custody:** 5-22 May 2004  
**CIA detention locations:** Afghanistan  
**After CIA detention:** transferred to US military custody at Bagram Airbase. Released, September 2014.

Muhammad al-Bakri is a Yemeni national who was captured in Bangkok on 28 December 2002 as he headed to the airport to return to Yemen. Our investigation has established that he was then transferred into CIA custody between 1-9 January 2003, and held for around 16 months. His exact whereabouts during this time are unknown. According to court papers filed on his behalf, while in CIA detention al-Bakri was subjected to serious abuse, resulting in injuries to his knees and back. According to Hasan Abu Bakr Qa’id (#5), who was held alongside him in Bagram, al-Bakri was held in the Dark Prison, a site in the Panjshir Valley, and another Afghan facility.

Al-Bakri was transferred out of CIA custody between 5-22 May 2004. At this point, he was transferred to DoD custody at Bagram Airbase, where he was given prisoner number 1464. He was held at Bagram for over ten years until his release in September 2014.
Ramzi bin al-Shibh (also known as Abu Ubeidah al-Hadrami) is a Yemeni national who was captured by Pakistani authorities in Karachi on 11 September 2002. He was captured together with Hassan bin Attash (#10) and several other CIA detainees, all of whom were held in Pakistan for 3-4 days. According to bin Attash, bin al-Shibh was with him as he was transferred to the Dark Prison in Afghanistan and held for 2-3 days before being rendered onwards to Jordan.

Bin al-Shibh's own testimony confirms these details, as he says he was shackled in a standing stress position for 2-3 days while in Afghanistan, his second place of detention. The Committee Study notes that bin al-Shibh was rendered to a foreign government on 17 September 2002. Although some sources have placed bin al-Shibh in Jordanian custody alongside bin Attash, our investigation has established that he was almost certainly rendered to Morocco, and we have identified the relevant rendition operation. This took place on 17 September 2002, on board the aircraft N379P (Circuit 9).

While in Morocco, bin al-Shibh was interrogated on multiple occasions, although it is unclear whether those sessions involved torture. At least some of the interrogations were recorded, with the existence of the recordings disclosed by the CIA to a US court in 2007. He was then rendered into CIA detention at the Polish black site on 8 February 2003. Our investigation has identified this rendition operation, which took place on 8 February 2003 on board the aircraft N379P (Circuit 17).

Bin al-Shibh has testified that he was kept naked and shackled to the ceiling for seven days in Poland, and deprived of solid food for 3-4 weeks. He was also ‘splashed with cold water from a hose’ during interrogations. The Committee Study has provided a detailed account of the torture of bin al-Shibh at the site, including a plan to use near-constant interrogations, sensory deprivation, liquid diet, attention grasp, walling, facial hold, facial slap, abdominal slap, cramped confinement, wall standing, stress positions, sleep deprivation beyond 72 hours, and the waterboard. He was also threatened with the use of rectal rehydration. Bin al-Shibh was tortured for ‘behaviour adjustment’ purposes, including as punishment for perceived disrespect, such as
failing to address an interrogator as ‘sir’. At one point, officers noted that he was cowering in the
corner of his cell after a bulb had blown, and proceeded to use darkness as an interrogation
technique, subjecting bin al-Shibh to sleep deprivation standing, shackled feet and hands, with
hands over his head, naked, in total darkness. Bin al-Shibh was held in Poland until [redacted] 2003, whereupon the CIA placed him and Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri (#26) 'within an already existing Country [redacted] detention facility.' We have established that this site was in Morocco. This was seen as a ‘temporary patch’, while discussions continued around the construction of a permanent CIA facility in the country. The rendition of these two prisoners to Morocco in June 2003 has also been reported by Associated Press, and our investigation has confirmed this rendition operation, which took place on 6 June 2003 on board the aircraft N379P (Circuit 23).

Bin al-Shibh was held in Morocco for several months, although little is known about his
treatment during this time. CIA detainees were held in Morocco until (redacted) 2003, by which
point both bin al-Shibh and al-Nashiri had been ‘transferred out of Country [redacted] to the CIA
detention facility at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba.’ Given that our cable analysis has established that
al-Nashiri was rendered from Morocco in September 2003, it is likely that al-Shibh was held there
until December. Our investigation has identified this rendition operation, which took place on 3
December 2003 on board the aircraft N379P (Circuit 34).

Bin al-Shibh was held in secret in Guantánamo Bay from December 2003 until April 2004,
at which point all CIA detainees at the site were rendered to other sites. Our investigation has
identified two rendition operations which transferred prisoners to Morocco and Romania, on 12
and 13 April 2004. The first was on board the aircraft N85VM, which flew to Romania and then
Morocco (Circuit 42). The second was on board the aircraft N368CE, which flew direct to Morocco
(Circuit 43).

Bin al-Shibh could have been on either of these two flights, given that it is clear that he was
rendered back to Morocco at this point, where he was reported to have attempted to ‘influence’ a Country [redacted] officer. He was held in Morocco until October 2004, and then transferred
to the Romanian black site. CIA cables from the site confirm that he was there by 2 October
2004, and report his psychological assessment (likely to have taken place upon his arrival at the
site). Our investigation has identified this rendition operation, which took place on 1 October
2004 on board the aircraft N227SV (Circuit 51).

Once in Romania, bin al-Shibh has testified that he was ‘restrained on a bed, unable to move,
for one month, February 2005 and subjected to cold air-conditioning during this period.’ Referring
to the prison as his ‘eighth place of detention’, he has also testified that he was forcibly but
partially shaved in order to humiliate him. CIA cables from the site document his detention
throughout 2004 and 2005, when he was experiencing severe psychological problems as a result
of his torture and prolonged isolation.

Given that he was still at the site in late 2005, he would have been transferred on board one
of the flights out of the country in October and November 2005, to either Lithuania or Afghanistan
(Circuit 58 and Circuit 59). There is some evidence that he was rendered direct to Afghanistan,
given that another detainee, Khaled al-Maqtari (#96), was handed a blanket by one of his guards in 2006 on which was written: ‘To Cuba, to Morocco, to Romania and to this place – Abu Ubeidah al-Hadrami.’ Al-Maqtari was at that time held in DETENTION SITE ORANGE in Afghanistan. Bin al-Shibh was certainly held in Afghanistan (in DETENTION SITE ORANGE or DETENTION SITE BROWN) from at least March 2006, as the CIA had closed its secret prisons in all other countries by then.

Al-Maqtari recounts how he was transferred in early August 2006 to a medical facility for treatment for persistent stomach pain and bleeding. He was flown alongside another detainee on two flights; the first about five to six hours long and the second about eight hours long. This second prisoner is likely to have been Ramzi bin al-Shibh, given that he was also transferred to the same third country as al-Maqtari for medical care.

Bin al-Shibh was transferred into US military detention in Guantánamo Bay between 4-5 September 2006, as one of the 14 CIA prisoners handed over to the DoD at that time. As of May 2019, bin al-Shibh remains detained at Guantánamo Bay.
IBN SHEIKH AL-LIBI (#42)

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Nationality: Libyan</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capture: Pakistan, 11 November 2001</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pre-CIA detention: Pakistan; Afghanistan (US military custody); Egypt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entered CIA custody: 9 February 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Period of CIA custody: 1160 days</td>
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<tr>
<td>Left CIA custody: 14 April 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIA detention locations: Afghanistan; Guantánamo Bay; Morocco; Jordan; Afghanistan</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Ibn Sheikh al-Libi (also known as Ali Aziz al-Fakhiri) was a Libyan national who was captured in Pakistan on 11 November 2001, and transferred to US military custody in Afghanistan, where his detention was declared to the ICRC. CIA cables cited by a 2006 SSCI study on intelligence relating to Iraq’s WMD programme reveal that Ibn Sheikh told CIA debriefers in January 2004 that he was detained by the US in early 2002, and threatened with rendition to a foreign country. When this rendition came, in January 2002, it appears that he was placed in a sealed coffin and loaded onto a truck. One MI6 officer, who was present at Bagram Airbase, described ‘sitting with one of the team outside the hangar when a pick up jeep with a six-foot, sealed box on the back drove past. It was [redacted] on his way to the waiting plane.’ It has since been reported that this detainee was Ibn Sheikh, and this confirms testimony from another CIA prisoner, Hassan Abu Bakr Qa’id (#5).231

While detained in US custody, and also after his rendition to a foreign government (which was almost certainly Egypt), Ibn Sheikh later said that he repeatedly lied about his connections to al-Qaeda in order to secure better treatment. According to Ibn Sheikh, the Egyptians told him that a ‘long list of methods could be used against him which were extreme’ and that ‘he would confess because three thousand individuals had been in the chair before him and that each had confessed.’ He was asked about al-Qaeda’s connections to Iraq, and when the interrogators didn’t like his answers they ‘placed him in a small box approximately 50 cm x 50 cm’ for about 17 hours and then punched him for 15 minutes. He then says that he concocted a story about al-Qaeda’s connections with Iraq and their interest in nuclear weapons. Other CIA records have noted that Ibn Sheikh also claimed that ‘Iraq was supporting al-Qa’ida and providing assistance with chemical and biological weapons.’ These claims were recanted after his transfer into CIA custody, but were cited by the Secretary of State Colin Powell in his February 2003 speech to the United Nations designed to build support for the US-led invasion of Iraq. Ibn Sheikh told the CIA that ‘he had been tortured by the Egyptians, and only told them what he assessed they wanted to hear.’

Ibn Sheikh was rendered to CIA custody on February 2003. Our investigation has identified this rendition operation, connecting Egypt and Afghanistan, which took place on 9 February 2003 on board the aircraft N379P (Circuit 17). Once in Afghanistan, it appears that he was held in an
Afghan-run prison over the summer, before being transferred to the Dark Prison. Qa‘id says that this was in October 2003.\textsuperscript{236} He was then held at this site for ‘a few months’, and transferred out ‘a few weeks’ before Khaled al-Maqtari’s (#96) arrival (which was 22 January 2004).\textsuperscript{237}

CIA records reveal that Ibn Sheikh was one of five detainees held in the CIA black sites at Guantánamo Bay between September 2003 and April 2004.\textsuperscript{238} Our investigation has identified the rendition operation which transferred him from Afghanistan to Guantánamo Bay, alongside Mustafa al-Hawsawi (#46). This took place on 21 November 2003, on board the aircraft N313P (Circuit 33).

In 2004, the DoJ recommended that the other four CIA detainees held secretly at Guantánamo Bay should be moved to other sites, pending the US Supreme Court ruling in Rasul v. Bush (which risked giving habeas corpus rights to CIA prisoners on the island). However, it concluded that Ibn Sheikh did not need to be moved, given that he had been detained initially under US military authority and his detention declared to the ICRC. Nonetheless, CIA records document that all five CIA prisoners had been moved back off the island by xx April 2004, and taken ‘to other CIA detention facilities.’\textsuperscript{239}

Our investigation has identified two rendition operations which transferred prisoners to Morocco and Romania, on 12 and 13 April 2004. The first was on board the aircraft N85VM, which flew to Romania and then Morocco (Circuit 42). The second was on board the aircraft N368CE, which flew direct to Morocco (Circuit 43). Ibn Sheikh could have been on either of these two flights, given that we have established that he was rendered to Morocco at this point. He later told CIA debriefers that he could hear cries of pain from other prisoners at the site, which reminded him of his experience in Egyptian custody.\textsuperscript{240}

By February 2005, all CIA prisoners had been moved out of Morocco to other locations.\textsuperscript{241} We have identified a number of rendition operations connecting Morocco to other secret prisons in late 2004 and early 2005, with detainees taken to Romania, Lithuania and possibly Jordan (Circuit 51, Circuit 54 and Circuit 55). It is likely that Ibn Sheikh was on one of these flights, and some reporting has suggested that he was in Jordanian custody during 2004 or 2005 (which would place him on Circuit 54, on 17 February 2005). One prisoner at the GID facility reported that Ibn Sheikh was held on the top floor, away from all other prisoners, having been rendered by the Americans. Ibn Sheikh himself also believed he was held in Jordan for a couple of months.\textsuperscript{242}

If Ibn Sheikh was in Jordan from February 2005, it is likely that he was rendered to Afghanistan on 5 November 2005, on board the aircraft N248AB (Circuit 59). Regardless, he was certainly held in Afghanistan (in DETENTION SITE ORANGE or DETENTION SITE BROWN) from at least March 2006, as the CIA had closed its secret prisons in all other countries by then.\textsuperscript{243}

Our investigation has established that Ibn Sheikh was transferred out of CIA custody between 14-23 April 2006, and has identified the rendition operation that transferred him to Libya, on 14 April 2006 (Circuit 61).

On arrival in Libya, Ibn Sheikh was held at the Abu Salim prison, where he was sentenced to life imprisonment. He died on 9 May 2009, two weeks after an aborted interview with researchers from Human Rights Watch, in what the Libyan authorities claimed was a suicide.\textsuperscript{244}
ASADALLAH (#43)

Nationality: Egyptian
Capture: Quetta, Pakistan, 12 February 2003
Pre-CIA detention: Pakistan
Entered CIA custody: 14-23 February 2003
Period of CIA custody: 150-159 days
Left CIA custody: 23 July 2003
CIA detention locations: Afghanistan
After CIA detention: transferred to Egyptian custody. Released, late 2010.

Asadallah (also known as Muhammad Umar ‘Abd al-Rahman) is an Egyptian national who was captured in Quetta, Pakistan, on 12 February 2003. Our investigation has established that he was transferred into CIA custody between 14-23 February 2003, and was held for around 5 months (150-159 days). Asadallah has said that he was detained and tortured at Bagram Airbase, including being subjected to waterboarding. In fact, he was held at the Dark Prison, with CIA cables confirming his torture. At some point at the end of February or beginning of March, he was placed in a 'small isolation box' for 30 minutes, without authorisation. Interrogators at the site also used water dousing, nudity, and cramped confinement on Asadallah, without having sought or received authorisation from CIA Headquarters. The application of 'bathing' was used as an interrogation technique, and in his case was done punitively.

Asadallah was transferred out of CIA custody after 150-159 days, whereupon he was rendered to secret detention in Egypt for around a year. Our investigation has identified this rendition operation, which took place on 23 July 2003 on board the aircraft N379P (Circuit 26). After his period of secret detention, Asadallah was transferred to Tora Prison in Egypt. He was released in late 2010.
**KHALED SHEIKH MOHAMMED (#45)**

**Nationality:** Pakistani  
**Capture:** Rawalpindi, Pakistan, 1 March 2003  
**Captured alongside:** Mustafa al-Hawsawi (#46)  
**Pre-CIA detention:** Pakistan  
**Entered CIA custody:** 3-5 March 2003  
**Period of CIA custody:** 1280-1282 days  
**Left CIA custody:** 5 September 2006  
**Detentions:** Afghanistan; Poland; Romania; Lithuania; Afghanistan  
**After CIA detention:** transferred to US military custody at Guantánamo Bay. Detained, as of May 2019.

Khaled Sheikh Mohammed is a Pakistani national who was captured in a joint raid by the CIA and Pakistani intelligence in Rawalpindi, Pakistan, on 1 March 2003. He was captured alongside Mustafa al-Hawsawi (#46), and both were held for a number of days in Pakistani custody. CIA cables document the use of sleep deprivation on Mohammed during this time, and Mohammed himself has testified that he could hear his young children crying in a nearby room and was threatened with their torture.

Anticipating Mohammed’s transfer to CIA custody in Afghanistan, the Chief of Interrogations at the Dark Prison sent an email to Headquarters on 1 March 2003, subject: ‘Let’s roll with the new guy’, requesting authorisation to subject him to ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’. These were approved two days before Mohammed was transferred to CIA custody, which was between 3-5 March 2003. By 5 March, Mohammed’s torture had begun, and he was subjected to facial and abdominal slaps, the facial grab, stress positions, standing sleep deprivation (with his hands at or above head level), nudity, water dousing and rectal rehydration. Mohammed’s own testimony regarding his treatment in Afghanistan closely matches the account provided by CIA records.

> I was then placed in a cell, about 2m x 4m, naked, where I was kept in a standing position with my hands cuffed and chained to a bar above my head. My feet were flat on the floor. At first I was questioned for about one hour with no other forms of ill-treatment. After about one hour I was taken to another room where I was made to stand on tiptoes for about two hours during questioning. Approximately thirteen persons were in the room... From time to time one of the muscle guys would punch me in the chest and stomach. This was repeated during two nights.

> On one occasion during the interrogation I was offered water to drink, when I refused I was again taken to another room where I was made to lie on the floor with three persons holding me down. A tube was inserted into my anus and water poured inside. Afterwards I wanted to go to the toilet as I had a feeling as if I had diarrhoea. No toilet access was provided until four hours later when I was given a bucket to use.
During Mohammed’s torture at the Dark Prison, he provided fabricated information which led to the capture, detention and torture of two innocent individuals, Sayed Habib (#50) and Shaistah Khan (#66). He was then rendered out of Afghanistan and transferred to the Polish black site. Our investigation has identified this rendition operation, which took place on 7 March 2003 on board the aircraft N379P (Circuit 19).

CIA records confirm his arrival at the Polish site at 18:00 local time on 7 March 2003. The Committee Study has provided a detailed account of Mohammed’s torture at this site, including the use of nudity, standing sleep deprivation, the attention grab and insult slap, the facial grab, the abdominal slap, the kneeling stress position, and walling. Between 10-24 March, he was subjected to 15 separate waterboarding sessions which, taken together, saw the technique applied at least 183 times. He was also subjected to a period of sleep deprivation lasting seven and a half days.

Apart from when I was taken for interrogation to another room, I was kept for one month in the cell in a standing position with my hands cuffed and shackled above my head and my feet cuffed and shackled to a point in the floor. Of course during this month I fell asleep on some occasions while still being held in this position. This resulted in all my weight being applied to the handcuffs around my wrists resulting in open and bleeding wounds... Both my feet became very swollen after one month of almost continual standing.

Initially I was interrogated for approximately eight hours each day... If I was perceived not to be cooperating I would be put against a wall and punched and slapped in the body, head and face. A thick black plastic collar would be placed around my neck so that it could then be held at the two ends by a guard who would use it to slam me repeatedly against the wall. The beatings were combined with the use of cold water, which was poured over me using a hose-pipe. The beatings and use of cold water occurred on a daily basis during the first month.

In addition I was also subjected to ‘water-boarding’ on five occasions, all of which occurred during the first month. I would be strapped to a special bed which can be rotated into a vertical position. A cloth would be placed over my face. Water was then poured onto the cloth by one of the guards so that I could not breathe.

On 22 September 2003, Khaled Sheikh Mohammed and the other detainees still held in Poland were transferred out of the country, as the black site was closed (Circuit 31). Mohammed was transferred to the newly-opened Romanian black site, alongside Walid bin Attash (#56), Samr al-Barq (#67), Abu Yasir al-Jaza’iri (#47), and likely Ammar al-Baluchi (#55). Mohammed has stated that, at this site, ‘they kept our clothes on, but our feet shackled. The rooms were about four feet wide by nine feet long. The walls were ceramic, there was a hook in the ceiling and two hooks on the floor, and there was a drain in the floor. From time to time I would hear other detainees screaming.’ Nothing much is known about Mohammed’s time in Romania. CIA cables from the site document his presence there in June 2004, but do not provide any detail about his treatment.
He was then transferred to DETENTION SITE VIOLET on 3 October 2005, alongside Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri (#26). Our investigation has identified this rendition operation, which took place on 5-6 October 2005 on board two aircraft, N308AB and N787WH (Circuit 58).

Little is known about Mohammed’s treatment in Lithuania, although CIA cables document his detention at the site. Mohammed has stated that the conditions were better, with bigger cells and better food, and a gym. He was held at the site for over five months, until it was closed in March 2006. At that point, all CIA prisoners at the site – including Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, Mustafa al-Hawsawi and Abu Zubaydah (#1) – were transferred to DETENTION SITE BROWN in Afghanistan, on 16 March 2006. Our investigation has identified this rendition operation, which took place on 25-26 March 2006 on board two aircraft, N733MA and N740EH (Circuit 60).

Mohammed was held in Afghanistan for the rest of his time in CIA custody, given that all CIA detainees were held in the country between March and September 2006. He was then transferred into US military detention in Guantánamo Bay between 4-5 September 2006, as one of the 14 CIA prisoners handed over to the DoD at that time. As of May 2019, Mohammed remains detained at Guantánamo Bay.
Mustafa al-Hawsawi is a Saudi national who was captured in Rawalpindi, Pakistan, alongside Khaled Sheikh Mohammed (#45), on 1 March 2003. Both men were initially held in Pakistani detention, with CIA cables documenting Mohammed’s interrogation by CIA officers and Pakistani officials whilst in Pakistani custody, as well as the use of sleep deprivation. They were then rendered together to the Dark Prison in Afghanistan, with this transfer taking place between 3-5 March 2003.

Whereas the torture of Mohammed began almost immediately upon their arrival at the Dark Prison, staff shortages at the site meant that al-Hawsawi was not interrogated or debriefed for several days. His first interrogation by the CIA was by the Chief of Interrogations, on 10 March 2003, where he was subjected to water dousing without authorisation from Headquarters. Interrogators used the facial slap, stomach slap, a range of stress positions, and gave al-Hawsawi a ‘bath’. This consisted of laying al-Hawsawi on a blue tarp on the floor, and dousing him with cold water while questioning him. One of his interrogators later cabled Headquarters to request information on what al-Hawsawi may actually know, given that ‘he does not appear to the (sic) be a person that is a financial mastermind. However, we lack facts with which to confront [al-Hawsawi]. What we need at this point is substantive information vice supposition.’

Rotation of staff during March 2003 saw a lull in the interrogation of al-Hawsawi. By 2 April 2003, however, the new team of interrogators concluded that he was withholding information, and re-requested authorisation for his torture. On 4 April 2003, Headquarters approved the use of slapping, grasping, stress positions, cramped confinement and walling, and on 6 April al-Hawsawi was tortured for 14 hours, with interrogators using ‘continuous rotational sessions of water-dousing,walling, attention grasps, facial holds, cramped confinement and psychological pressures.’

Much of the information which relates to this interrogation session, and which is contained in an Office of Inspector General (OIG) report into al-Hawsawi’s torture – some two-and-a-half pages – remains redacted. From al-Hawsawi’s own testimony, however, (which was provided while he was still being held incommunicado, and therefore unaware of other detainee
experiences), it appears that he was waterboarded during this session. He has testified that he was strapped to the board, which was 'a rotating table made of wood with a bed of shiny metal.' According to his account, 'his head was tilted in the down position' and 'several bottles of water were poured on his chest so that the water ran into his face and nose and he thought he was drowning. He said he was put on the table many times during that interrogation period, with multiple bottles of water each time.'

Later, in November 2003, an email from a different CIA interrogator outlined that al-Hawsawi had described his treatment during the April 2003 interrogation in terms which suggest he might have been waterboarded, or else subjected to treatment that 'could be indistinguishable from the water board.' According to this interrogator: '[h]e explained to [redacted] and me a process that sounded like more than water dousing.... We did not prompt al-Hawsawi – he described the process and the table on his own. Another CIA officer, interviewed by the OIG, also 'recalled that [redacted] used the water board on either Hawsawi or KSM in March and that several personnel witnessed this usage.'

Other CIA officers interviewed by the OIG confirmed that there was a waterboard in the interrogation room, and that al-Hawsawi was given a clear indication that it was there. Most of those interviewed deny that he was strapped to the board, instead claiming that he was doused while prone on the floor. The waterboard was, according to these witnesses, 'located at the back of the conditioning room collecting dust and used by the analysts to sit on or lean on during water dousing.'

Photographs seen by the Committee Study include one of a waterboard at the site, which was 'surrounded by buckets, with a bottle of unknown pink solution (filled two thirds of the way to the top) and a watering can resting on the wooden beams of the water board,' while others detained at the site during the same period as al-Hawsawi also testified to the use of the waterboard, as did CIA staff at the site.

I have serious reservations about watering them in a prone position because if not done with care, the net effect can approach the effect of the water board. If one is held down on his back, on the table or on the floor, with water poured in his face I think it goes beyond dousing and the effect, to the recipient, could be indistinguishable from the water board.

Interrogator at Dark Prison

It is possible that the redacted sections of the 6 April interrogation session may include details of the use of rectal rehydration on al-Hawsawi without medical necessity. This technique had been used on Khaled Sheikh Mohammed immediately upon his arrival at the site. Al-Hawsawi was one of two men subjected to this technique at the Dark Prison with 'excessive force', being diagnosed later with 'chronic haemorrhoids, an anal fissure, and symptomatic rectal prolapse.'

Al-Hawsawi was judged to be cooperative after the 6 April torture session. By 7 May 2003, however, officers moved back from debriefing to interrogation mode, and a third request for authorisation was cabled to Headquarters. During this torture session, al-Hawsawi was 'bathed',
and subjected to standing sleep deprivation. This interrogation phase lasted until 12 May, whereupon he was again judged to be cooperative.293

The torture of al-Hawsawi at the Dark Prison appears to have been authorised without any concrete information concerning his knowledge of other terror suspects, or future plots. The Chief of Interrogations at the site logged concern that the rationale for the use of these techniques was based on ‘supposition’ rather than hard facts,294 and that interrogation instructions from Headquarters at that time were ‘not valid or well thought out’, including in the case of al-Hawsawi.295

Al-Hawsawi remained in the Dark Prison until November 2003, whereupon he was rendered to another location.296 Our investigation has identified this location as Guantánamo Bay, given that there just one flight out of Afghanistan by a rendition aircraft during that period: on 21 November 2003, the aircraft N313P flew from Afghanistan to Guantánamo Bay via a stopover in Morocco (Circuit 33). The email from al-Hawsawi’s interrogator in the Dark Prison was sent to CIA Headquarters on the same day, suggesting that this communication was sparked by his transfer.297 Other reporting has also placed al-Hawsawi in the black sites at Guantánamo Bay.298

He was held at the black sites in Guantánamo Bay from November 2003 until April 2004, at which point all CIA detainees there were rendered to other sites.299 Our investigation has identified two rendition operations which transferred prisoners to Morocco and Romania, on 12 and 13 April 2004. The first was on board the aircraft N85VM, which flew to Romania and then Morocco (Circuit 42). The second was on board the aircraft N368CE, which flew direct to Morocco (Circuit 43). Some reporting has placed al-Hawsawi in Morocco, although there is no confirmatory evidence for this claim.300 If correct, he could have been on either of these two flights, and is likely to have been held there until February 2005, at which point the site was closed. If this was the case, he was then rendered directly to the Lithuanian black site (Circuit 55). Alternatively, he may have been rendered to the Romanian black site in April or October 2004 (Circuit 42 or Circuit 51), and then onwards to Lithuania in February or October 2005 (Circuit 55 or Circuit 58). Regardless, one cable from the Lithuanian site documents his medical complications after the earlier use of rectal rehydration.301 Lithuanian officers refused to admit al-Hawsawi to a local hospital, and as such care for his serious medical issues was delayed.302 He was ultimately transferred to a third-party country for treatment, which in turn received payment from the CIA.303

The difficulties between the CIA and the Lithuanian authorities regarding the treatment of al-Hawsawi resulted in the closure of the black site in March 2006.304 At that point, all CIA prisoners at the site were transferred to DETENTION SITE BROWN in Afghanistan.305 Our investigation has identified this rendition operation, which took place on 25-26 March 2006 on board two aircraft, N733MA and N740EH (Circuit 60).

Al-Hawsawi was held in Afghanistan towards the end of his time in CIA custody, given that all CIA detainees were held in the country between March and September 2006.306 He was then transferred into US military detention in Guantánamo Bay between 4-5 September 2006, as one of the 14 CIA prisoners handed over to the DoD at that time. As of May 2019, al-Hawsawi remains detained at Guantánamo Bay.
Abu Yasir al-Jaza’iri (also known as Abu Bakr Bougithi) is an Algerian national who, according to research conducted by the Open Society Justice Initiative, was captured in Lahore, Pakistan, in March 2003. He may have initially spent some time in Pakistani detention before rendition to CIA custody.

Al-Jaza’iri was transferred into CIA custody between 15-25 March 2003, and held initially at the Dark Prison. There, he was tortured immediately and before any questioning, and was ‘stripped and shackled, nude, in the standing stress position for sleep deprivation.’ He was also ‘bathed’ during this time, a term used to describe water dousing. At least some of these techniques were unauthorised by Headquarters, although it appears that, later on, Headquarters exerted pressure on CIA interrogators to continue his torture.

Al-Jaza’iri was then transferred to the black site in Poland. Our investigation has identified this rendition operation, which took place on 25 March 2003 on board the aircraft N379P (Circuit 20). Immediately upon arrival, officers at the Polish site cabled Headquarters with a request to continue al-Jaza’iri’s torture. This did not include a request for water dousing, but did follow closely the interrogation plan submitted by the site the month earlier, for Ramzi bin al-Shibh (#41). Not much is known about al-Jaza’iri’s treatment while at this site, although he was clearly providing information to interrogators throughout the summer.

Our analysis of CIA cables also suggests that al-Jaza’iri was held at the Romanian black site during mid-October 2003, where he was still being subjected to interrogations. If so, he was on board the rendition flight from Poland to Romania on 22 September 2003 (Circuit 31).

By early 2004, if not before, al-Jaza’iri was back in Afghanistan, in the Dark Prison. It is likely that he was rendered there from Romania, via Jordan, on 25 October 2003 (Circuit 32). In April 2004, al-Jaza’iri was transferred to DETENTION SITE ORANGE, along with a group of other prisoners. He was held there for more than two years and, between February and July 2006, was allowed to meet with Marwan al-Jabour (#108). He is recorded as being held in CIA secret detention for around three and a half years (1260-1269 days), and was transferred out from CIA custody between 26 August – 6 September 2006.

What happened to al-Jaza’iri subsequently is unknown. In June 2017, the United Nations Security Council noted that he was resident in Algeria as at April 2010, and continued to include him on its al-Qaeda sanctions list.
SULEIMAN ABDULLAH (#48)

**Nationality:** Tanzanian  
**Capture:** Mogadishu, Somalia, 15 March 2003  
**Pre-CIA detention:** Somalia; Kenya; Somalia; Djibouti  
**Entered CIA custody:** 28 March 2003  
**Period of CIA custody:** 439 days  
**Left CIA custody:** 9 June 2004  
**CIA detention locations:** Afghanistan  
**After CIA detention:** transferred to US military custody at Bagram Airbase. Released to Tanzania, 17 August 2008.

Suleiman Abdullah (also known as Suleiman Abdullah Salim) is a Tanzanian national who was captured in Mogadishu, Somalia, on or around 15 March 2003, in a joint operation between the CIA and the Kenyan National Intelligence Service.\(^{319}\) It has been reported that he was captured as part of a bounty system which emerged in Somalia in 2002, whereby local warlords sold individuals to the CIA as ‘terror suspects’ for cash.\(^{320}\) After being apprehended in Mogadishu, Abdullah was flown by CIA agents to Nairobi, Kenya. While in hospital in Nairobi, he was visited by FBI agents. Abdullah was detained in Kenya for eight days, before being transferred to US control and rendered to a US Air Force base in Bosaso, Somalia, and then on to Djibouti.\(^{321}\) Shortly after this, he was rendered once more, to the Dark Prison in Afghanistan. Our investigation has identified this rendition operation, which took place between 27-28 March 2003 on board the aircraft N63MU (Circuit 21).

Abdullah has given a detailed account of his time at the Dark Prison, which included his sustained torture. He was subjected to painful stress positions, sleep deprivation, water dousing with ice cold water which approximated waterboarding, confinement in extremely small boxes, and severe beatings.\(^{322}\)

> I was held in solitary confinement, chained and shackled in a small, pitch-black windowless, filthy cell. Western pop-music, sometimes interrupted by a mixture of cacophonous sounds like yowling and the clanging of bells, blared continuously at ear-splitting levels, inside and outside my cell. I felt completely isolated and disoriented. I had little or no sense of time, and I never knew whether it was day or night...

> In my cell, for about the first week of my detention, guards chained me, naked except for a diaper, by my arms and legs to a rusty hoop that was attached to the wall, my arms outstretched at eye level... This excruciating stress position, together with the putrid smell and the deafening noise, made it impossible for me to sleep... Interrogators subjected me to other violent and terrifying methods of interrogation involving water. These water sessions lasted about four or five consecutive days. Interrogations followed similar procedures each session. They first stripped me
naked and forced me to lie down in the center of a large plastic sheet. They then repeatedly doused me in gallons of ice-cold water. The water was so cold it left me gasping for air and unable to breathe. My heart felt as if it would jump out of my chest. As I lay naked and shivering on the soaking wet floor, the men would forcefully slap me in the face and stomach. They also kicked me in the stomach and back. During some of the later sessions, the men placed a hood over my head. When the freezing water soaked in, the hood clung to my face and caused me to choke and suffocate. I felt like I was drowning...

Interrogators showed me a small wooden box, measuring about three square feet. There were holes on one side and another was hinged with a lock and padlock. Interrogators stuffed me inside the box, naked, chained and shackled, and then locked it shut... Interrogators kept me locked inside for about half an hour, though it felt much longer. I vomited out of pain and fear... 

CIA records confirm that Abdullah was tortured by the CIA while at the site. One CIA cable from the site at the end of March 2003 notes that he was subjected to ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’ before any questioning took place. By mid-April 2003, interrogators at the site requested formal authorisation to use EITs, including water dousing. Despite this specific technique not being authorised by Headquarters, Abdullah was subjected to it several days later.

After about five weeks in the Dark Prison, Abdullah was transferred to a second site, about 15-20 minutes' drive away. According to another prisoner, Hassan Abu Bakr Qa'id (#5), this is likely to have been the site ‘Rissat 2’. He was held in solitary confinement at the site for around 14 months, and was visited on a number of occasions by two Americans who identified themselves as FBI. He has described this site as having continuous light, with Afghan guards who would occasionally urinate on the detainees' food.

Abdullah was transferred out of CIA custody on 9 June 2004 and held at Bagram Airbase for the next four years. There he was given prisoner number 1075. He relates that he never saw the sun, only blinding lights hanging above his wire mesh cage. He was released on 17 August 2008 and flown back to Tanzania. He was given a piece of paper that confirmed his detention and stated that he had been 'determined to pose no threat' to the US.
HAMID AICH (#49)

**Nationality:** unknown  
**Capture:** unknown  
**Entered CIA custody:** 10-17 April 2003  
**Period of CIA custody:** 40-47 days  
**Left CIA custody:** 20-27 May 2003  
**CIA detention locations:** Afghanistan  
**After CIA detention:** transferred to Pakistani custody. Thereafter, fate and whereabouts unknown.

Little is known about Hamid Aich. He was one of a number of prisoners whom CIA Headquarters explicitly acknowledged did not pose a ‘continuing, serious threat’ to US interests, and therefore recommended transferring to a ‘host country detention facility’. CIA cables from Afghanistan document that Aich was transferred to Afghan custody between 10-18 April 2003, with the Committee Study noting that, ‘the host country had no independent reason to detain these individuals and held them solely at the behest of the CIA.’

Aich was held in the programme – including his time at the Afghan-run site – for around 6-7 weeks (40-47 days), and was transferred out between 20-27 May 2003. At this point he was transferred to Pakistani custody. His fate and whereabouts after this point are unknown.
KHALID AL-SHARIF (#51)

Nationality: Libyan
Capture: 3 April 2003, Peshawar, Pakistan
Captured alongside: Mohammed al-Shoroeiya (#52)
Pre-CIA detention: Pakistan
Entered CIA custody: 13 April 2003 – 18 April 2003
Period of CIA custody: 734-739 days
Left CIA custody: 21 April 2005
CIA detention locations: Afghanistan
After CIA detention: transferred to Libyan custody. Released, 23 March 2010.

MOHAMMED AL-SHOROEIYA (#52)

Nationality: Libyan
Capture: 3 April 2003, Peshawar, Pakistan
Captured alongside: Khalid al-Sharif (#51)
Pre-CIA detention: Pakistan
Entered CIA custody: 13 April 2003 – 18 April 2003
Period of CIA custody: 492-497 days
Left CIA custody: 22 August 2004
CIA detention locations: Afghanistan
After CIA detention: transferred to Libyan custody. Released, 16 February 2011.

Mohammed al-Shoroeiya (also known as Hassan Rabi’i, Mohamed Ben Soud and Abd al-Karim) and Khalid al-Sharif (also known as Abu Hazim al-Libi) were both captured on 3 April 2003 by Pakistani police. Al-Sharif had been staying in al-Shoroeiya’s house in Peshawar. During the arrest, al-Shoroeiya broke his leg, and al-Sharif broke his foot. Al-Shoroeiya was detained for about 10 days in a building he called the ‘Khyber’. Al-Sharif said he was held for 7 days in a building he called the ‘army stadium’ somewhere in Peshawar. It is not clear if these were the same locations. While in Peshawar, al-Sharif described being kicked in the groin and beaten so hard on his head with a whip that he nearly fainted. Pakistani personnel also deliberately stood on his broken foot to cause pain. He describes an American interrogator sitting on a chair in front of him while the Pakistani officer beat him. Al-Shoroeiya stated that on some occasions, the Americans ordered their Pakistani colleagues to beat him, although they would leave the room while this took place.336

They were then both transferred to a detention facility in Islamabad, and were held in cells next door to each other. They were both interrogated by Pakistani and US personnel, and subjected to beatings during some of the interrogations. After around a week in Islamabad, at some
Al-Shoroeiya and al-Sharif were held in almost total darkness throughout their time at the Dark Prison. They were denied clothing throughout their first few months. Al-Shoroeiya described having a small mat and bucket for a toilet in the cell, and describes a terrible stench from the excrement and cleaning chemicals combined. Al-Sharif described the size of his cell as being about 4m x 3m, with a steel door with a barred window at the top. They were chained throughout the first 3-4 months to two iron rings attached to the wall, about one metre high. They were sometimes chained by one arm, sometimes by both arms, and sometimes by both arms and both legs. After four months they were allowed to remain in their cells without being shackled. They were not allowed to wash, cut their nails or hair in the first few months.339

During the first four months, both men were subjected to intense interrogation and abuse. Al-Sharif describes being sent to a small cell where his hands were suspended above his head for long periods, on one occasion for three days. He was barely fed.

They only gave me water once, at night. They gave me a milkshake and a small cup of milk with cocoa. That was all I had for three days. They banned me from going to the restroom for those three days. I had to pass urine and go to the bathroom standing up. I wasn’t wearing clothes. At night, they gave me some water to drink but poured the rest of it over my body. I was trying to move to create some warmth in my body. Because of the lack of sleep for three days, I went hysterical. I thought I was going crazy. Everything was spinning around me and it was totally dark.340

Khalid al-Sharif

Al-Shoroeiya describes similar treatment shortly after arriving at the facility. He described being placed in a box of about half a metre wide, just high enough to stand, with his hands cuffed to a bar above his head. Loud music was blasted and it was dark with what looked like blood stains on the walls. He was left there for a day and half, naked, with no food. Al-Shoroeiya also described being locked in a wooden box, about 1m x 1m with small holes in the sides, through which interrogators would prod him with long, thin objects. He was also taken to a room with wooden walls against which he was beaten. Al-Shoroeiya described the facility as comprising several different types of rooms used for interrogation and torture: ‘One was a group of rooms where he was interrogated. Another set of rooms were freezing cold and were used to submerge the prisoners in icy water while lying on plastic sheeting on the ground. A third set of rooms he called the “torture rooms,” where they used specific instruments. One of these instruments was a wood plank that they used to abuse him with water.’341

In this facility, al-Shoroeiya and al-Sharif were subjected to waterboarding. Al-Shoroeiya said that after being strapped to the board, held with his head lower than his feet, and hooded,
they would pour buckets of very cold water over his nose and mouth to the point that he felt he would suffocate. He said it happened over and over again. Both men reported that doctors were present throughout. The doctors would monitor their body temperatures and they would have warm water poured over him if he got too cold. Al-Sharif had the plaster cast for his broken leg removed before the waterboarding.342

CIA records confirm the use of torture on these two men while at the Dark Prison. One cable, dated 18 April 2003, requested the use of ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’, although given their injuries stated that interrogators would ‘forego cramped confinement, stress positions, walling, and vertical shackling.’ In order to accommodate their injuries, the cable stated that rather than being shackled standing during sleep deprivation, the detainees would be ‘seated, secured to a cell wall, with intermittent disruptions of normal sleeping patterns.’ For water dousing the detainees’ injured legs would be ‘wrapped in plastic.’343

These requests were approved and, six days later, on 24 April 2003, Headquarters further approved the use on al-Sharif of the attention grasp, facial insult slap, abdominal slap, water dousing and sleep deprivation of up to 72 hours. A 10 May 2003 cable then extended authorisation to include the use of walling and the facial grasp on al-Sharif, and the use of walling and stress positions on al-Shoroeiya.

In reality, however, CIA records show that both men were subjected to a range of unauthorised techniques. Al-Sharif was subjected to walling on 28-29 April 2003, and the facial hold on 27 April 2003. Al-Shoroeiya was subjected to cramped confinement on 19-20 April 2003, stress positions on 21 April and walling on 21 April and 29 April. Cables noted that al-Shoroeiya’s head was placed on a wall, he was bent at the waist, and ‘shuffled backwards to a safe, yet uncomfortable position.’ During sleep deprivation use, he was ‘walked for 15 minutes every half-hour through the night and into the morning.’ A few days later a cable stated that, even given the best prognosis, al-Shoroeiya would have arthritis and limitation of motion for the rest of his life.344 Likewise, an investigation by the OIG was sparked after one CIA officer alleged that the use of water dousing on al-Sharif approximated, or was equivalent to, waterboarding. During this torture, al-Sharif turned blue as water was poured onto a cloth placed over his mouth to disrupt his breathing.345

By 12 May 2003, both men had been assessed by a CIA physician as having injuries that were ‘sufficiently healed to allow being placed in the standing sleep deprivation position.’346 Approval for this came shortly after from Headquarters, and al-Sharif was subjected to 52 hours of standing sleep deprivation from 3-5 June 2003,347 and al-Shoroeiya for an undisclosed amount of time on 15 May 2003.348 CIA records also document that al-Sharif was denied a bucket for his waste as a punishment during interrogation sessions, and was subjected to nudity and dietary manipulation.

In April 2004, likely to have been either 24 or 25 April, both men were transferred alongside several other detainees to a second CIA black site, DETENTION SITE ORANGE, where they would continue to be held in secret detention for four months (in the case of al-Shoroeiya) and one year (for al-Sharif). While in DETENTION SITE ORANGE, al-Shoroeiya and al-Sharif say they were
chained to the wall of their cells with a long chain that allowed them to walk around. Each had
a toilet, a basin and a mattress, and there were cameras, microphones and speakers everywhere.
There was constant noise at the facility – both loud music and sounds through the loudspeakers,
and also the sound of a turbine – and the cells had no ventilation. Both stated that the treatment
was different here, more psychological than physical, and involved mainly noise, isolation, restraint
and continuous interrogation. The guards were Afghans, wearing all black with facemasks, and
the interrogators were American, unmasked and in civilian clothes.349

Al-Shoroeiya was held for about four months at this second facility. On 22 August 2004, he
was rendered to Libya alongside two other detainees, Majid al-Maghrebi (#91) and Saleh Di’iki
(#94). The three men were held in a shipping container before being loaded onto an aircraft and
flown to Libya. Our investigation has identified this rendition operation, which took place on
board the aircraft N63MU (Circuit 49).

It was many months after al-Shoroeiya was transferred that al-Sharif was also rendered to
Libya. His rendition took place on 21 April 2005, alongside Mustafa al-Mehdi (#107). Again, he
was taken by car to a shipping container that appeared to be a form of military storage facility
(with boxes of ammunition and other equipment), and then flown to Libya. Our investigation has
identified this rendition operation, which took place on board the aircraft N740JA (Circuit 56).

Once in Libya, both men were held in a number of prisons, including Tajoura and Abu Salim.
Al-Shoroeiya says that he spent long periods in solitary confinement, and was beaten with whips,
steel pipes, electrical cables and sticks. He was eventually taken to court and sentenced to life
in prison, but was released on 16 February 2011 as the uprising against Gaddafi was beginning.
Al-Sharif was tried and convicted in January 2008 of attempting to overthrow the regime, and
sentenced to death by firing squad. At one point he reports being interrogated by agents of the
French intelligence service. He was released on 23 March 2010, along with two other Libyan
rendition victims (Abdel Hakim Belhadj and Sami al-Saadi), having publicly renounced their
opposition to the regime. Al-Sharif was, however, re-arrested on 28 April 2011, a couple of months
after the uprising had begun, and was tortured. It is not clear when he was finally released, but
he went on to head the Libyan National Guard following the fall of Gaddafi.350
AMMAR AL-BALUCHI (#55)

**Nationality:** Kuwaiti  
**Capture:** Karachi, Pakistan, 29 April 2003  
**Captured alongside:** Walid bin Attash (#56)  
**Pre-CIA detention:** Pakistan  
**Entered CIA custody:** 15-16 May 2003  
**Period of CIA custody:** 1207-1209 days  
**Left CIA custody:** 4-5 September 2006  
**CIA detention locations:** Afghanistan; Poland; Romania; Afghanistan  
**After CIA detention:** transferred to US military custody at Guantánamo Bay. Detained, as of May 2019.

WALID BIN ATTASH (#56)

**Nationality:** Yemeni  
**Capture:** Karachi, Pakistan, 29 April 2003  
**Captured alongside:** Ammar al-Baluchi (#55)  
**Pre-CIA detention:** Pakistan  
**Entered CIA custody:** 15-16 May 2003  
**Period of CIA custody:** 1207-1209 days  
**Left CIA custody:** 4-5 September 2006  
**CIA detention locations:** Afghanistan; Poland; Romania; Afghanistan  
**After CIA detention:** transferred to US military custody at Guantánamo Bay. Detained, as of May 2019.

Ammar al-Baluchi (also known as Ali Abdul Aziz Ali) is a Kuwaiti national and the nephew of Khaled Sheikh Mohammed (#45). Walid bin Attash (also known as Tawfiq or Khalid bin Attash) is a Yemeni national whose brother, Hassan bin Attash (#10), was disappeared by the CIA in September 2002, and is also currently held in Guantánamo Bay. Al-Baluchi and bin Attash were captured, alongside four others, on 29 April 2003 in Karachi, Pakistan, as part of an operation by the Pakistani Intelligence Bureau and a team of Pakistani rangers.351

Both men were initially held and interrogated in Pakistan,352 and CIA officers sought to participate in the interrogations (although one cable, dated 2 May 2003, mentions that al-Baluchi’s ‘strong reticence towards the US’ meant that CIA officers had to observe the interrogations via a video feed).353 According to al-Baluchi, the interrogators ‘used their fists and cricket bats to force me to talk. After days of standing blindfolded they moved me to another location to be interrogated from well before the sun came up to well after it went down. I felt as if someone outside was manipulating the interrogations.’354 The detainees remained in foreign government
custody ‘for approximately two weeks,’ which would mean that they were rendered to CIA custody in mid-May 2003.

Cables from the Dark Prison, dated 16 May 2003, document the torture of both men immediately after their transfer to CIA custody, suggesting a rendition from Pakistan on 15-16 May 2003. Elsewhere, the Committee Study cites records documenting the torture of al-Baluchi between 17-20 May 2003, and of bin Attash between 16-18 May 2003. Between 17-18 May 2003, CIA cables document that bin Attash was subjected to facial grabs, facial insult slaps, abdominal slaps, walling and water dousing. In the case of bin Attash at least, he was tortured before any questioning at all. Bin Attash’s own testimony confirms details of his torture. He has said that he was held in Afghanistan for around three weeks, from mid-May to the beginning of June 2003. For the first two weeks of his detention in Afghanistan, he was placed in stress positions for extended periods, beaten, and doused in cold water.

On arrival at the place of detention in Afghanistan I was stripped naked. I remained naked for the next two weeks. I was put in a cell measuring approximately 1m x 2m. I was kept in a standing position, feet flat on the floor, but with my arms above my head and fixed with handcuffs and a chain to a metal bar running across the width of the cell. The cell was dark with no light, artificial or natural...

For interrogation I was blindfolded and removed from the cell and taken to another room. Every day for the first two weeks I was subjected to slaps to my face and punches to my body during the interrogation... on a daily basis during the first two weeks a collar was looped around my neck and then used to slam me against the walls of the interrogation room. It was also placed around my neck when being taken out of my cell for interrogation and was used to lead me along the corridor... Also on a daily basis during the first two weeks I was made to lie on a plastic sheet placed on the floor which would then be lifted at the edges. Cold water was then poured onto my body with buckets...

The interrogators threatened to infect me with HIV. I was given at least two injections by the doctor during this period, but I have no idea what they were for.

Walid bin Attash

After around three weeks in this detention facility, which was on or around 5 June 2003, bin Attash says that he was blindfolded, had earphones placed on his ears, and was transferred to another location: ‘I was transported in a sitting position, shackled by the ankles and by the wrists with my hands in front of my body. I think that the flight lasted probably more than eight hours... If I shifted my position too much during the journey somebody hit me by hand on the head.’

Our investigation has established that he was transferred to the Polish black site, and we have also identified this rendition operation, which took place 5 June 2003 on board the aircraft N379P (Circuit 23).

It appears that al-Baluchi remained in Afghanistan during June and July 2003. One cable from Headquarters, dated 16 July 2003, makes clear that he was at that time being held at the
same location as Mustafa al-Hawsawi (#46), while another cable from Afghanistan, dated 21 July 2003, makes reference to al-Baluchi’s statements under questioning. Al-Baluchi’s own account documents a series of moves between sites. His account of what appears to be the Dark Prison suggests that it was a ‘place of complete darkness, where I was naked, thirsty, starving, and shackled while suspended from the ceiling and waiting for them to come for me with more questions. When they did come, I was taken to a room so bright it hurt to open my eyes.’ At some point at the end of May or early June 2003, he says that his head was shaved and then repeatedly smashed against the wall until he lost consciousness.

Al-Baluchi then appears to have been moved to one of the more modern facilities: ‘after the place of darkness was the place of sterile, white light… Here they blazed light that was bright and intense because of the sterile white of the walls, floors and ceilings. Here it felt as if I was living in a refrigerator.’ It seems likely that this was the Polish black site, and if so then al-Baluchi would have been rendered there alongside Samr al-Barq at the end of July 2003. Our investigation has identified this rendition operation, which took place 29 July 2003 on board the aircraft N379P (Circuit 27).

Bin Attash, meanwhile, has stated that while in the Polish black site – a location which he has referred to only as his ‘next place of detention’ – he was kept in a cell for the first month before the torture started again. He was kept naked and shackled to a metal ring in the ceiling, and left to defecate in an unchanged diaper. He was also subjected to water dousing, and heard the sounds of others being tortured.

This account of his torture at the Polish black site is confirmed by CIA records. After more than a month at the site, the Committee Study documents bin Attash’s torture between 18-29 July 2003. CIA cables from the site recount the extensive use of sleep deprivation between 21-23 July 2003, including more than 110 hours of deprivation in one session with only four hours rest between. This had begun as standing sleep deprivation, but due to the swelling of his one leg he was moved to seated sleep deprivation after 93 hours. Bin Attash himself has confirmed that he was eventually allowed to sit on the floor, although he still had his arms extended above his head. Cables document the use of nudity and dietary manipulation during this period, with one cable, dated 22 July 2003, noting that threats were made to subject bin Attash to rectal rehydration.

Bin Attash and al-Baluchi were detained in Poland until 22 September 2003, whereupon they and the other detainees at the site were rendered out of the country (Circuit 31). Along with three others, bin Attash and al-Baluchi were transferred to the newly-opened black site in Romania. Here, bin Attash was placed in the standing stress position for several days, and forced to defecate into a diaper.

Little else is publicly known about their time in Romania, or the length of their detention. One cable from the site, dated January 2004, reports that bin Attash was able to identify another individual, Hassan Ghul (#98), who was at that time in US military custody (and was subsequently rendered to CIA custody). Al-Baluchi testifies that he was held in at least two further places after Poland, including one ‘where they used drugs to make me hallucinate and music to
disorientate me.”

Officials speaking off-the-record to investigative journalist Adam Goldman place him in Morocco during 2004, although there is no confirmatory evidence for this claim.

Both bin Attash and al-Baluchi were held in Afghanistan towards the end of their time in CIA custody, given that all CIA detainees were held in the country between March and September 2006. A CIA cable from DETENTION SITE BROWN suggests that they were detained there in September 2006. They were then transferred into US military detention in Guantánamo Bay between 4-5 September 2006, as two of the 14 CIA prisoners handed over to the DoD at that time. As of May 2019, both men remain detained at Guantánamo Bay.
Laid Saidi (also known as Ramzi ben Fraj and Abu Hudhaifa) is an Algerian national who was captured by Tanzanian police on 10 May 2003. He was taken to Dar es Salaam and detained for three days before being taken to the Malawian border and handed over to a group of Malawians and two middle-aged white men. Saidi was taken to a detention site somewhere in the Malawian mountains, and held there for about a week. At some point towards the end of May 2003, a group of white men and women arrived, wearing black masks, and subjected Saidi to the standard CIA rendition operation procedures. He was then driven to an airport and flown overnight to Afghanistan. Our investigation has identified this rendition operation, which took place between 15-19 May 2003 on board the aircraft N379P (Circuit 22).

Saidi was detained initially at the Dark Prison, which he described as filled with deafening music. He was chained to the cell wall and left there for about a week. He then says that he was blindfolded and shackled, and taken to a second prison, where he was hung from the ceiling and tortured for five days.

_They put me in a room, suspended me by my arms and attached my feet to the floor... they cut off my clothes very fast and took off my blindfold. They beat me and threw cold water on me, spat at me and sometimes gave me dirty water to drink... The American man told me I would die there._

CIA cables from Afghanistan confirm details of Saidi’s torture, which began 19-20 May, before any questioning. Throughout the following week, Saidi was subjected to baths with iced water (where he was fully immersed), 66 hours of standing sleep deprivation, nudity and dietary manipulation. There had been no request to CIA Headquarters for the use of these techniques on Saidi, and this treatment had not been approved. The use of standing sleep deprivation was halted after Saidi’s leg began to swell.

Although Saidi was certainly detained and tortured at the Dark Prison, it appears that the use of ice baths on Saidi took place at an informal safe-house in Afghanistan. The same location held Majid Khan (#58), who was also subjected to ice baths in May 2003. Cables from July 2003 document the further use of ice water on Saidi, and an email from 15 March 2004 discusses submersion in an ice bath during a period of enforced sleep deprivation. At this point,
one CIA psychologist stated that ‘I heard [him] gasp out loud several times as he was placed in the tub.’ The incident was reported to CIA’s Inspector General in March 2004, and after an investigation the IG noted that as a result of being bathed in ice water, Saidi was ‘shivering’ and interrogators were concerned about his body temperature dropping.388

After five days at the safe-house, Saidi was moved back to the Dark Prison, where he was held overnight before being transferred once again to a third site, which we have identified as the Afghan-run facility known by some as ‘Rissat 2’. This, he says, had Afghan guards, one of whom told him he was outside Kabul. Saidi recollects there being two rows of six underground cells, each with a small opening in the door.389 He was held at this site for over a year, during which time he was able to communicate with some of the other detainees held there as well. In January 2004, Khaled el-Masri (#97) was rendered to Afghanistan and held alongside Saidi. Both men have sketched identical floorplans of the prison, and both men recall talking to one another. Indeed, these two men, along with two further prisoners – Abdul Rabbani (#23) and Ahmed Rabbani (#25) – spent hours each night memorising each other’s phone numbers.390

Saidi was interrogated daily at this site, before it transpired that a mistranslation of his telephone conversations had led to intelligence agents believing he was involved in terrorism. After he had explained this, they never asked him about it again, and the interrogations eventually stopped.

On 9 June 2004, Saidi was rendered for a second time. Believing that he was Tunisian, the CIA flew him to Tunisia, where Saidi told the security personnel who entered the aircraft that he was in fact Algerian. At this point, he was sent back to Afghanistan on the same aircraft. Our investigation has identified this rendition operation, which took place between 9-10 June 2004 on board the aircraft N982RK (Circuit 46).

On return to Afghanistan, Saidi has testified that he was held for a further 75 days, although the exact detention site is unclear (the Dark Prison had closed by then). He was then rendered for a third time, and taken to Algeria. Our investigation has identified this rendition operation, which took place on 26 August 2004 on board the aircraft N308AB (Circuit 50).

Once in Algeria, Saidi was handed over to Algerian intelligence. They detained him for several days before releasing him at a bus stop in Algiers.391
Majid Khan is a Pakistani national who was captured in the early hours of 6 March 2003, by Pakistani forces in Karachi, Pakistan. He was held in Pakistani custody for over two months, first in a prison in Karachi for around five weeks, and then in a facility in Islamabad. Khan has described the first site as adjacent to a well-known hotel, and he was driven daily to a second location for interrogation. During these days, he was kept in a small cage, about 2m x 1m. CIA cables from Pakistan document his interrogations throughout March-May 2003. Some of these sessions led to the provision of intelligence that was passed on to the CIA and led to the waterboarding of Khaled Sheikh Mohammed (##45) between 21-22 March 2003.

Khan was rendered to CIA custody in Afghanistan between 15-24 May 2003, whereupon he was subjected to torture prior to any questioning. He was stripped and shackled nude, and placed in the standing sleep deprivation position. It appears from Khan’s testimony that he was held initially in the Afghan intelligence facility in Kabul, referred to by others as Rissat 2. As with other detainees held at the site, he speaks of a small window at the top of the cell letting in daylight, and being allowed weekly showers.

On the second day at this site, Khan was taken to a different location, for three days. There he was placed in a standing sleep deprivation position, naked, and dunked in an ice cold bath. This treatment is confirmed by CIA cables dated May-July 2003 and the Committee Study makes clear that the ice bath took place at the safe-house in Afghanistan where another prisoner, Laid Saidi (##57), was also held and subjected to an ice bath. Declassified notes from Khan’s lawyer in Guantánamo Bay, made public in June 2015, make clear that this was a form of waterboarding: ‘Shackled and hooded, they placed Khan feet-first into the freezing water and ice. They lowered his entire body into the water and held him down, face-up in the water. An interrogator forced Khan’s head under the water until he thought he would drown. The interrogator would pull Khan’s head out of the water to demand answers to questions, and then force his head back under the water, repeatedly. Water and ice were also poured from a bucket onto Khan’s mouth and nose when his head was not submerged.

Khan was then moved back to Rissat 2, and held there until July 2003. He says that he was unable to stand on his own feet by this point, due to swelling and pain. One email from Afghanistan,
dated 30 June 2003, was titled ‘Re: i hope the approvals for enhanced comes through quickly for this guy...this does not look good’. In July 2003 it appears that Khan was moved to the Dark Prison, where he was subjected to more water torture and extended sleep deprivation.

So when I arrived there first, they hanged me or pulled my hands up to make me stand. This cell was extremely small in size, pitched dark... I was hanged for seven days straight and while I was standing I use to pee on the floor and I was so afraid from this environment that I did diarrhoea while I was standing.... But since my hands were tied and my legs were shackled I could only scream or cry without tears. And also, there were western pop songs and Eminem... on extremely high volume, enough to shake the walls, and with that smell of my shit and pee...

After six days they took me to this torture bathroom cell for water torture again, but this time not in a tub but in large plastic. And they will throw large bucket of ice water on my face in a way until this water goes through my nose and throat.

Khan was held at the Dark Prison for a number of weeks, and then moved back to Rissat 2, where he was held until April 2004. During this period, he was held alongside Khaled el-Masri (#97); a fact which has been confirmed by el-Masri, who says he was held alongside Khan in Afghanistan, at a site where ‘prisoners slept on the floor, wore diapers and were given tainted water that made them vomit.’

In April 2004, Khan was transferred to the CIA-run DETENTION SITE ORANGE in Afghanistan, and was held there until his transfer to Guantánamo Bay in September 2006. This was confirmed in December 2004, when another detainee at the site, Marwan al-Jabour (#108), found an inscription under the sink in his cell which read ‘Majid Khan, 15 December 2004, American-Pakistani.’ Al-Jabour also believed Khan was still held at the site during May 2006.

From at least September 2004, Khan engaged in a series of hunger strikes and acts of self-harm. In response to the hunger strikes, medical personnel at the site initially provided a nasogastric tube and intravenous fluids, and Khan cooperated with this. The CIA’s approach changed, however, and over a number of days in September 2004 Khan was subjected to involuntary rectal feeding and rectal hydration. This included the insertion of two bottles of Ensure, as well as his ‘lunch tray’, consisting of hummus, pasta with sauce, nuts, and raisins, which was ‘pureed’ and rectally infused. It also appears that he was subjected to this form of torture in December 2004, when one CIA cable documents that he was ‘very hostile' to the treatment.

So anyway, my worst day in [DETENTION SITE ORANGE] was December 31, 04. They had to send some kind of report that day... First they put so much food in me, through my rectum, that I didn't have any option but to dump it out... They nose fed me, but this time I threw up by putting my finger in my throat. So now that was the big problem for them. So now they decided to feed me again, but this time they put me on one chair, hands cuffed behind, and taped me and my whole body with duct tape... then they overdosed me forcefully by injection. So I passed out until they sent reports but since then I was in so much pain, I get up in pain and go back
to sleep, then get up, then back to sleep. So I broke my strike the next day, but still they kept me in the cold, freezing cell for another week or so to teach me a lesson.409

While at DETENTION SITE ORANGE, Majid Khan also engaged in multiple acts of self-harm, including attempts to cut his wrists,410 chew into his arm at the inner elbow,411 cut the vein in the top of his foot,412 and cut into his skin at the elbow joint using a filed toothbrush.413

Khan was transferred into US military detention in Guantánamo Bay between 4-5 September 2006, as one of the 14 CIA prisoners handed over to the DoD at that time. As of May 2019, he remains detained at Guantánamo Bay.
MOHAMMAD DINSHAH (#59)

Nationality: unknown
Capture: unknown
Entered CIA custody: 15 May – 9 June 2003
Period of CIA custody: 260-269 days
Left CIA custody: 30 January – 4 March 2004
CIA detention locations: Afghanistan
After CIA detention: fate and whereabouts unknown

Little is known about Mohammad Dinshah. He was one of a number of prisoners whom CIA Headquarters explicitly acknowledged did not pose a ‘continuing, serious threat’ to US interests, and therefore recommended transferring to a ‘host country detention facility’. CIA cables from Afghanistan document that Dinshah was transferred to what was almost certainly Afghan custody by 12 July 2003,\textsuperscript{414} with the Committee Study noting that, ‘the host country had no independent reason to detain these individuals and held them solely at the behest of the CIA.’\textsuperscript{515}

Dinshah was held in the programme – including his time at the Afghan-run site – for 8-9 months (260-269 days), and was transferred out between 30 January – 4 March 2004. His fate and whereabouts after this point are unknown.
ZUBAIR (#62)

**Nationality:** Malaysian

**Capture:** Bangkok, Thailand, 8 June 2003

**Pre-CIA detention:** Thailand

**Entered CIA custody:** 18-20 June 2003

**Period of CIA custody:** 1172-1175 days

**Left CIA custody:** 4-5 September 2006

**CIA detention locations:** Afghanistan

**After CIA detention:** transferred to US military custody at Guantánamo Bay. Detained, as of May 2019.

Zubair (also known as Mohammed Farik bin Amin) was captured in Bangkok, Thailand on 8 June 2003, after leaving a bookshop.\(^{416}\) The capture was described in one report as a ‘low-key covert joint Thai-CIA operation’.\(^{417}\) He was held in Thai custody and interrogated for around ten days,\(^ {418}\) before being rendered to CIA custody in Afghanistan. Our investigation has identified this rendition operation, which took place between 18-20 June 2003 on board the aircraft N614RD (Circuit 24). CIA cables from Afghanistan document that Zubair was held initially at the Dark Prison, and was tortured immediately upon his arrival.\(^{419}\) During this time, interrogators went beyond the authorised techniques, subjecting him to (among other things) stress positions using a broomstick behind the knees.\(^{420}\) Another cable from Afghanistan, reporting that a detainee suffered from oedema after prolonged standing sleep deprivation, is also likely to refer to Zubair.\(^{421}\)

Little is known of Zubair’s detention history after July 2003. Whether or not he was rendered out of the Afghanistan during his time in CIA custody, he was there (in DETENTION SITE ORANGE or DETENTION SITE BROWN) between March and September 2006.\(^{422}\) He was then transferred into US military detention in Guantánamo Bay between 4-5 September 2006, as one of the 14 CIA prisoners handed over to the DoD at that time. As of May 2019, Zubair remains detained at Guantánamo Bay.
Hiwa Rashul is an Iraqi national who was a suspected member of Ansar al-Islam. He was captured by Kurdish forces in June or July 2003 and turned over to CIA agents, who rendered him to Afghanistan. Our investigation has identified this rendition operation, which took place on 3 July 2003 on board the aircraft N379P (Circuit 25).

While in CIA custody, the White House asked the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) to rule on Rashul’s status under the Geneva Conventions. The OLC concluded that he was a ‘protected person’ under the Conventions, and therefore had to be returned to Iraq. Rashul was kept by the CIA for over three months before being transferred back to DoD control, reportedly on 29 October 2003. Our investigation has identified this rendition operation, which took place on board the aircraft N379P (Circuit 32).

On his return to Iraq, Rashul, who was nicknamed ‘Triple X’ by CIA and US military officials, was kept away from the ICRC and not given a prisoner number. It has been reported that he was held at Camp Cropper, near Baghdad International Airport, and that ‘it was assumed the CIA would want him back at some point,’ although this never happened. One classified military order directed guards to keep Rashul ‘segregated and isolated from the remainder of the detainee population. Under no circumstances will his presence be made known to the detainee population... Only military personnel and debriefers will have access to the detainee... Knowledge of the presence of this detainee will be strictly limited on a need-to-know basis.

Rashul was kept in secret military detention for an unknown period of time. In June 2004, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld acknowledged that he had authorised the secret detention of Rashul for the seven months up until that point: ‘I was requested by the Director of Central Intelligence to take custody of an Iraqi national who was believed to be a high-ranking member of Ansar al-Islam. And we did so. We were asked to not immediately register the individual. And we did that... The decision was made that it would be appropriate not to for a period. And he wasn’t lost in the system. They’ve known where he was, and that he was there in Iraq, for this period of time.

It is unclear what happened to Rashul after his period of secret detention in CIA and then US military custody.
Adel ben Hamlili is an Algerian national who was captured by Pakistani authorities during a raid in Peshawar, Pakistan, on 17 June 2003. He was held in Pakistani custody for around two weeks.\(^{429}\) Our investigation has established that he was transferred into CIA custody between 10-24 July 2003, and held for around 10 months. During this period, Hamlili was held in Kabul, likely in the Dark Prison.\(^{430}\) Little is known about his treatment during this time.

Hamlili was transferred out of CIA custody between 5-28 May 2004, and moved to Bagram Airbase. DoD records then document his transfer to Guantánamo Bay on 19 September 2004,\(^{431}\) on board a military aircraft with call-sign RCH947Y.\(^{432}\) Hamlili was held at Guantánamo Bay from September 2004 until 20 January 2010, at which point he was transferred back to Algeria, where he was released.\(^{433}\)
Samr al-Barq (also known as Abd al-Latif al-Barq and Abu Bakr al-Filistini) is a Palestinian national who was captured by Pakistani ISI in Islamabad, Pakistan, on 15 July 2003. According to research by the Open Society Justice Initiative, al-Barq was held in ISI detention in Islamabad for about two weeks, and interrogated each day by US officials. He was then rendered to a secret prison in Afghanistan where he was shackled and hung naked from the ceiling for several days, and subjected to constant lighting and loud music.

Our investigation has established that al-Barq was transferred into CIA custody in Afghanistan between 28-29 July 2003, where he was held for 1-2 days before being rendered to Poland. We have identified this rendition operation, which took place on 29 July 2003 on board the aircraft N379P (Circuit 27).

The torture of al-Barq in Poland commenced before any questioning. While being tortured, he changed his answers to questions about al-Qaeda’s anthrax efforts multiple times. On 1 August 2003, al-Barq told CIA interrogators that ‘we never made anthrax.’ He was told that the torture would not stop until he ‘told the truth’. According to CIA cables, crying, al-Barq then said ‘I made the anthrax.’ Asked if he was lying, al-Barq said that he was. After CIA interrogators ‘demonstrated the penalty for lying,’ al-Barq stated that ‘I made the anthrax’ and then immediately recanted, and then again stated that he made anthrax. Two days later, al-Barq stated that he had lied about the anthrax production ‘only because he thought that was what interrogators wanted.’

Our analysis of CIA cables places al-Barq at the black site in Romania during October 2003, where he was still being subjected to interrogations. This implies that he was on board the rendition flight from Poland to Romania, on 22 September 2003, with a number of other prisoners (Circuit 31).

Al-Barq was detained in Romania until 25 October 2003, when he was rendered to Jordan. Our investigation has identified this rendition operation, which took place on board the aircraft N379P (Circuit 32). Al-Barq was held in GID custody until his release in January 2009, then re-arrested in April 2010 and deported to Israel in July 2010 where, as of July 2013, he remained in administrative detention.
LILLIE (#72)

**Nationality:** Malaysian  
**Capture:** Bangkok, Thailand, 11 August 2003  
**Captured alongside:** Hambali (#73)  
**Pre-CIA detention:** Thailand  
**Entered CIA custody:** 13-14 August 2003  
**Period of CIA custody:** 1117-1119 days  
**Left CIA custody:** 4-5 September 2006  
**CIA detention locations:** Afghanistan  
**After CIA detention:** transferred to US military custody at Guantánamo Bay. Detained, as of May 2019.

HAMBALI (#73)

**Nationality:** Indonesian  
**Capture:** Bangkok, Thailand, 11 August 2003  
**Captured alongside:** Lillie (#72)  
**Pre-CIA detention:** Thailand  
**Entered CIA custody:** 13-14 August 2003  
**Period of CIA custody:** 1117-1118 days  
**Left CIA custody:** 4 September 2006  
**CIA detention locations:** Afghanistan; Romania; Morocco; Afghanistan  
**After CIA detention:** transferred to US military custody at Guantánamo Bay. Detained, as of May 2019.

Lillie (also known as Bashir bin Lap) and Hambali (also known as Riduan bin Isomuddin and Encep Nurjaman) were captured in a series of joint Thai-CIA operations in and around Bangkok on 11 August 2003, with Lillie’s capture in the morning leading to the capture of Hambali within four hours.\(^{442}\)

CIA cables confirm that both men were held in Thai custody before being transferred to the CIA.\(^{443}\) According to separate testimony given by both men to the ICRC when each was being held incommunicado at Guantánamo Bay, they were held naked for 3-4 days in a detention facility in Thailand. Hambali stated that he was made to stand in a stress position with his hands cuffed to a hook in the ceiling, and kept naked, blindfolded and with a sack over his head.\(^{444}\) Both men were then rendered from Thailand to CIA custody in Afghanistan. Our investigation has identified this rendition operation, which took place between 13-14 August 2003 on board the aircraft N85VM (Circuit 28).
Lillie and Hambali were initially detained at the Dark Prison. A request for authorisation for the torture of both men was submitted to CIA Headquarters using a template devised in the interrogation of Ramzi bin al-Shibh (#41) in February 2003. The request was approved within 24 hours, and the torture began ‘almost immediately.’ In the case of Hambali at least, this commenced before any questioning took place. At some point on 14-15 August, Lillie was ‘stripped of his clothing’ and ‘placed in a cell in the standing sleep deprivation position, in darkness.’ Both men were subjected to loud noise, specifically to ‘prevent concentrating, planning and derailing of the exploitation/interrogation process with interrogation countermeasures (resistance).’

Lillie has testified that, once in Afghanistan, he was kept naked and shackled to the ceiling in a painful standing position for the first week, and that he ‘had to defecate and urinate on [himself] and remain standing in [his] own bodily fluids’. He also stated that he did not receive any solid food until his twelfth day in captivity. Likewise, Hambali has testified that he was kept naked for most of the first six weeks of his detention in Afghanistan. Clothes were provided during the second week, but then removed again. He has also said that he was beaten repeatedly, with his interrogators placing a thick collar around his neck and then slamming him against walls. CIA cables confirm that the torture of Hambali at the site continued until at least mid-September 2003.

Little is known about the detention history of either man after their initial detention at the Dark Prison. It appears that Lillie was still in Afghanistan in January 2004, at which point one CIA cable suggests that the supposed ‘resistance’ to interrogations might in fact simply be ‘issues related to culture and... poor English language skills,’ with the absence of a Malay interpreter identified as a problem.

Hambali was clearly moved at some point, and has testified that in his third place of detention ‘he was threatened with a return to previous methods of ill-treatment (namely, having his head slammed against the wall by use of a collar), by his interrogators showing him the collar during interrogation sessions.’ He has also testified that this transfer took place around two months after his initial capture, and that the new site had air conditioning designed to keep the cells very cold.

CIA cables from the Romanian black site, dated October–December 2003, document the fact that Hambali recanted most of the information he had provided under torture. CIA officers assessed these recantations to be credible, and that he had given false information ‘in an attempt to reduce the pressure on himself... and to give an account that was consistent with what he assessed the questioners wanted to hear.’ An Indonesian-speaking debriefer suggested that Hambali had not in fact been resistant to initial questioning (the rationale for the torture), with his poor English language skills and cultural norms dictating his answers instead.

These cables suggest that Hambali may have been held in Romania from early October 2003, although they are not definitive. His presence in Romania has also been suggested by the investigative journalist Adam Goldman, who then places him subsequently in Morocco for a portion
of his time in secret detention. Although we are currently unable to confirm this, if he was moved to Romania it is likely that he would have been transferred on 22 September 2003 on board the aircraft N313P (Circuit 31).

Whether or not either man was rendered out of Afghanistan during their time in CIA custody, they were both held there (in DETENTION SITE ORANGE or DETENTION SITE BROWN) between March and September 2006. One CIA cable from DETENTION SITE BROWN suggests that Hambali was detained there in September 2006. Both Hambali and Lillie were transferred into US military detention in Guantánamo Bay between 4-5 September 2006, among the 14 CIA prisoners handed over to the DoD at that time. As of May 2019, both men remain detained at Guantánamo Bay.
**SANAD AL-KAZIMI (#74)**

**Nationality:** Yemeni  
**Capture:** Dubai, United Arab Emirates, January 2003  
**Pre-CIA detention:** UAE  
**Entered CIA custody:** 14-17 August 2003  
**Period of CIA custody:** 270-273 days  
**Left CIA custody:** 13 May 2004  
**CIA detention locations:** Afghanistan  
**After CIA detention:** transferred to US military custody at Bagram Airbase, and then Guantánamo Bay. Detained, as of May 2019.

Sanad al-Kazimi was captured by UAE authorities in Dubai at some point in January 2003. According to Amnesty International, he was initially held for around two months in or near Dubai before being driven for about two hours to a second location. Whilst in UAE custody, he was hooded, kept in a dark room, and shackled naked for days on end. Interrogators beat him with fists, threatened him with rape, and subjected him to simulated drowning: ‘His eyes were covered with black goggles, his arms and legs shackled and he was lifted by a machine and submerged into a pool of cold water.’ After around seven months in Emirati custody, al-Kazimi was rendered to Afghanistan. Our investigation has identified this rendition operation, which took place between 14-17 August 2003 on board the aircraft N379P (Circuit 29).

Al-Kazimi was held in the Dark Prison for nine months, during which time he was ‘subjected to severe physical and psychological torture, including by being suspended with his arms above his head for extended periods of time and beaten with electric cables.’ He attempted suicide several times by ramming his head into the wall until he lost consciousness.

According to DoD records, al-Kazimi was transferred into US military custody at Bagram Airbase on 13 May 2004. He was then transferred to US military custody at Guantánamo Bay on 19 September 2004, on board a military aircraft with call-sign RCH947Y. As of May 2019, he remains detained in Guantánamo Bay.
SALAH QARU (#75)

Nationality: Yemeni  
Capture: Jakarta, Indonesia, August 2003  
Pre-CIA detention: Indonesia; Jordan  
Entered CIA custody: 10 September 2003  
Period of CIA custody: 600-605 days  
Left CIA custody: 1-7 May 2005  
CIA detention locations: Afghanistan  

MOHAMED BASHMILAH (#89)

Nationality: Yemeni  
Capture: Amman, Jordan, 21 October 2003  
Pre-CIA detention: Jordan  
Entered CIA custody: 26 October 2003  
Period of CIA custody: 553-559 days  
Left CIA custody: 1-7 May 2005  
CIA detention locations: Afghanistan  

MOHAMMED AL-ASAD (#92)

Nationality: Yemeni  
Capture: Tanzania, 26 December 2003  
Pre-CIA detention: Tanzania; Djibouti  
Entered CIA custody: 8 January 2004  
Period of CIA custody: 480-489 days  
Left CIA custody: 1-7 May 2005  
CIA detention locations: Afghanistan  
After CIA detention: transferred to Yemeni custody. Released, 14 March 2006.

Salah Qaru (also known as Salah Nasir Salim Ali, Marwan al-Adeni, and Mushin), Mohamed Bashmilah (also known as Mohammad al-Shomaila) and Mohammed al-Asad (also known as Muhammad Abdullah Saleh) are three Yemenis who were captured at various points in 2003, each held in proxy detention for a number of days, and then rendered to the Dark Prison in
Afghanistan. Once there, they were moved around together, first to DETENTION SITE ORANGE in April 2004 (as the Dark Prison was being closed), and then to Yemen in May 2005.

Salah Qaru was captured in Indonesia in August 2003 and held in an intelligence services building, where he was chained to the wall for three days. He was then transferred to a deportation centre and held there for three weeks before being flown to Jordan. In Jordan, he was detained by the GID for around 10 days, where he says that ‘I was tortured horribly. It was very bad.’ Qaru was suspended from the ceiling, and the soles of his feet were beaten so much that he had to crawl back to his cell. He was also stripped and beaten by a ring of masked soldiers with sticks. As Qaru has testified: ‘When one got tired of hitting me, they would replace him. They tried to force me to walk like an animal, on my hands and feet, and I refused, so they stretched me out on the floor and walked on me and put their shoes in my mouth.’

After this detention at the Jordanian site, Qaru was rendered to the Dark Prison in Afghanistan. Our investigation has identified this rendition operation, which took place on 10 September 2003 on board the aircraft N379P (Circuit 30).

Mohamed Bashmilah was also arrested and held by the Indonesian authorities for several weeks, before being deported to Jordan on 26 September 2003. On arrival, his passport was confiscated, and he was told to report to the GID. He did this several times, and on 21 October he was detained and moved to a nearby building. Over the next five days, Bashmilah was repeatedly tortured and interrogated by Jordanian intelligence. He was tied to a chair, hit, and threatened with the rape of his wife and mother (who, he was told, were also in detention).

Soon after seeing my mother and wife, some guards came and took me from my cell to a large hall in the same building, known as the Yard, where several guards were waiting in a circle, holding canes. The guards surrounded me and commanded me to run around in circles. When I became too fatigued to run any further they beat me with their canes. When I could no longer withstand the pain of being beaten by the canes I collapsed into the middle of the circle. The guards in the Yard tried to demean me by ordering me to imitate animals. They forced me to imitate a donkey's bray and the antics of dogs. After torturing me in the Yard the guards then took me to another room and suspended me, upside down, from the ceiling.

Mohamed Bashmilah

In the early hours of 26 October, Bashmilah was told that he was being released, and was taken to a room in order to retrieve his possessions. However, at that point he was blindfolded and his hands were tied behind his back. He was led down a corridor, and could hear an American accent. He then had ear defenders placed on his head, and was driven to the airport, where he was rendered to the Dark Prison in Afghanistan. Our investigation has identified this rendition operation, which took place on 26 October on board the aircraft N379P (Circuit 32).

Mohammed al-Asad was captured on 26 December 2003 by Tanzanian officers, blindfolded, bound and taken to an airport. When he asked where he was being taken, the guards responded,
'We can't tell you. We are just following orders. We have nothing to do with this. People in charge know where we are taking you. We are just following orders.' Al-Asad was flown to Djibouti, where he was driven for 20-30 minutes to a detention facility and held for around two weeks. During the second week, he was interrogated by an English-speaking woman who identified herself as an American, and an Arabic language interpreter who looked Syrian or Lebanese. A third man was sometimes present, and al-Asad remembered him saying he was from Djibouti. Other indicators confirm that al-Asad was held in Djibouti: he saw a picture of the President of Djibouti on the wall of the interrogation room; the guards looked like they were from the Horn of Africa; and he felt an earthquake during his time in detention (seismological records document two earthquakes in Djibouti, less than an hour apart, in early January 2004).

After about two weeks in this facility, al-Asad was prepared for transfer according to the standard CIA procedure, and flown from Djibouti to Afghanistan, where he was held in the Dark Prison. Our investigation has identified this rendition operation, which took place on 8 January 2004 on board the aircraft N313P (Circuit 36). Both Bashmilah and al-Asad have given detailed testimony of their time in the Dark Prison. Bashmilah has provided a floorplan of the prison, which depicts twenty cells in one large space, in two rows of ten, and then a separate set of interrogation rooms. For the first three months in this prison, he was held in Cell 6, which measured 2m x 3m and had a bucket, a mattress, a blanket and water in Nestlé bottles. He was shackled to the wall and kept in the diaper worn during the rendition for the first two weeks. The cell had a camera and speakers, and Bashmilah was blasted with 'excruciatingly loud western rap and Arabic music', 24 hours a day, for the first month. He became so depressed that he attempted suicide on three separate occasions.

The maltreatment I suffered during my first three months in Afghanistan had a serious impact on my mental state, which was already extremely bad following my torture in Jordan and rendition to Afghanistan... I did not eat very much food. I became so depressed that I tried to take my own life... One time I tried hanging myself with a string I pulled out of my blanket. On another occasion I tried to overdose by swallowing pills I was given daily, and the third time I tried to slash my wrists. At one point I was so distraught that I banged my head against the wall, trying to lose consciousness.

Mohamed Bashmilah

Al-Asad has also described the abuse he suffered, including the small dark cells, the constant video surveillance, the rare access to showers, extreme cold, and the humiliating CIA 'takedown' process every time he was moved. He was subjected to extremely loud music and constant bright light at night. At one point he was fed only on liquid diet replacement drinks, and was almost never allowed to speak to other prisoners.

In April 2004 all three men were transferred (with others) to DETENTION SITE ORANGE, where they were held for more than a year.
Being by myself all the time, not being told where I was, and thinking that I might never leave, caused me to suffer enormous stress and psychological torment. One time I used a piece of metal that I smuggled from Afghanistan to slash my wrists… After cutting myself, I used my blood to write ‘I am innocent’ and ‘this is unjust’ on the walls of my cell…

Out of desperation and a sense of injustice I also went on hunger strike for ten days about three or four weeks after I slashed my wrists… The guards untied my hands and sat me in a chair and strapped my arms to the arms of the chair. They then used a chain to connect the shackles on my feet to a metal ring in the floor. I saw blue cans on the table that contained what looked like pink colored liquid. There were also tubes like those used for IVs and a metal IV pole. After I was strapped to the chair and chained to the floor they shoved a tube up into my nose and I began screaming because of the pain. I resisted because I was beginning to choke and the guards held my head back. In this way they forced the tube all the way into my stomach.477

Mohamed Bashmilah

All three men were transferred out of CIA custody in May 2005 and flown to Yemen. Their testimony suggests that this rendition took place on 5 May 2005 and, although we have not been able to identify the rendition operation for this transfer, cross-referencing our calculations for them enables us to independently establish that it took place between 1-7 May 2005.478

In Yemen, they were taken to a Political Security detention facility in Sana’a. The next day, Bashmilah and Qaru were flown on a passenger plane to Aden, and taken to Fateh Prison, where they were detained for a further 10 months. Al-Asad was imprisoned in Sana’a and then al-Ghaydhah. On 13 February 2006 they were brought to trial. They pled guilty to charges of forging travel documents, and although the judge sentenced them to two years in prison, taking into account their 9 months in Yemeni detention, and approximately two years in US detention, on 27 February 2006 the judge ordered their release. Mohammed al-Asad was released from custody in Sana’a on 14 March. Mohamed Bashmilah and Salah Qaru were transferred to Aden, where they were released at around midnight on 27-28 March.
**ARSALA KHAN (#87)**

- **Nationality:** Afghan
- **Capture:** unknown
- **Entered CIA custody:** 1-9 October 2003
- **Period of CIA custody:** 50-59 days
- **Left CIA custody:** 20 November – 7 December 2003
- **CIA detention locations:** Afghanistan
- **After CIA detention:** transferred to US military custody at Bagram Airbase. Released, 2007.

Arsala Khan (also known as Majid bin Muhammad bin Sulayman Khayil) is an Afghan national who was captured in September-October 2003, and transferred into CIA custody between 1-9 October 2003. He was held for around two months in the Dark Prison.

Although the CIA had identified Khan as someone who may have helped bin Laden escape through the Tora Bora Mountains in late 2001, Headquarters initially resisted approving his capture given a lack of information confirming that he was a ‘continuing threat.’ Given this uncertainty, interrogators at the Dark Prison began torturing Khan in order to ‘make a better assessment regarding [his] willingness to start talking, or assess if our subject is, in fact the man we are looking for.’

A CIA cable from Afghanistan documents that Khan was subjected to 56 hours of standing sleep deprivation in mid-October, during which time he experienced disturbing hallucinations. The cable notes that he was barely able to speak, and was ‘visibly shaken by his hallucinations depicting dogs mauling and killing his sons and family.’ Khan was convinced that his interrogator ‘was responsible for killing them and feeding them to the dogs.’

After this use of sleep deprivation, Khan was allowed to sleep. However, two days later he was returned to standing sleep deprivation, in a session which lasted 21 hours. After this point, interrogators stopped the use of ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’, given the ‘lack of information from [Khan] pinning him directly to a recent activity.’

After this treatment, CIA Headquarters concluded that Khan ‘does not appear to be the subject involved in... current plans or activities against US personnel or facilities,’ and recommended that he be released to his village with a cash payment. However, although Khan was transferred out of CIA custody between 20 November – 7 December 2003, he was not released, but instead transferred to DoD custody at Bagram Airbase. He was given prisoner number 1220, held for four more years, and interrogated by US Army Intelligence. He was finally released in 2007.
ASO HAWLERI (#88)

**Nationality:** Kurdish  
**Capture:** Mosul, Iraq, 10 October 2003  
**Pre-CIA detention:** Iraq (US military custody)  
**Entered CIA custody:** 10-19 October 2003  
**Period of CIA custody:** 10-19 days  
**Left CIA custody:** 29 October 2003  
**CIA detention locations:** Afghanistan

**After CIA detention:** transferred to Iraqi (Kurdish) custody. Thereafter, fate and whereabouts unknown.

It has been reported that Aso Hawleri was captured by US forces on 10 October 2002, in Mosul, Iraq. Our investigation has established that he was transferred into CIA custody between 10-19 October 2003, most likely in Afghanistan.

Hawleri was rendered back to Iraq after 10-19 days in CIA custody, and our investigation has identified the rendition operation which transferred him from Afghanistan, on 29 October 2003 on board the aircraft N379P (Circuit 32). Once back in Iraq, he was detained by Kurdish authorities, where he remained until at least May 2014.

ALI SAEED AWADH (#90)

**Capture:** Djibouti (possibly)  
**Entered CIA custody:** 15-18 December 2003  
**Period of CIA custody:** 178-179 days  
**Left CIA custody:** 13-14 June 2004  
**CIA detention locations:** Afghanistan

**After CIA detention:** released to Djibouti

Little is known about Ali Saeed Awadh. Our analysis of CIA cables indicates that he was held in Afghanistan from December 2003 to at least March 2004. He was later identified by the CIA as being held as a result of mistaken identity, and released with a cash payment in June 2004.

Our investigation has identified two rendition operations linking Djibouti and Afghanistan which correspond very closely with the period of Awadh's detention in Afghanistan (Circuit 35 and Circuit 47). It is likely that Awadh was on both of these flights.
Majid al-Maghrebi (also known as Adnan al-Libi) was arrested at his home by Pakistani forces in the early hours of 14 November 2003, and taken to a detention facility where he was held for several weeks. Throughout this period, he was interrogated and tortured repeatedly, including many times via electric shocks until he lost consciousness, as well as beatings (including with a leather whip) and the use of stress positions and positional torture (including tying him to a frame and 'stretching' him). He could hear the screams of others being tortured at the facility, as well as their pleas for mercy: 'I can still hear the voice of one of the guys in my head asking them to stop, saying blood was coming out of his mouth.'

Al-Maghrebi was transferred to Islamabad towards the end of December 2003, and shortly thereafter rendered to Afghanistan. Our investigation has established that he was transferred into CIA custody between 17-26 December 2003, and held initially in the Dark Prison. For the first five days he was denied any food, and on requesting a doctor he was stripped naked, shackled to the wall, and had his blankets taken away. At this point, he heard Mohammed al-Shoroeiya (#52) and Khalid al-Sharif (#51) talking and was able to communicate with them a little. Saleh Di’iki (#94) has also said that he and al-Maghrebi talked while in this prison. Al-Maghrebi was later transferred to a different cell where his hands were cuffed above his head and his legs were shackled to the floor; he was held in this position for 15 days and interrogated repeatedly, including in the presence of a woman while he was completely naked, and with extremely loud music blared constantly: 'I was there for 15 days, hanging from my arms, another chain from the ground. They put a diaper on me but it overflowed so there was every type of stool everywhere, the temperature was freezing.'

He was then transferred to a cell where he was held in complete darkness. Just as other detainees held at this facility have described, he was handcuffed to a ring low to the ground, sometimes by one arm, sometimes by both arms and with legs shackled together and sometimes with arms and legs all shackled to the ring. Towards the end of his one and a half to two months in this cell he was permitted to move around freely. The water he was given to drink was putrid, and he stated that insects were put in his food. CIA cables from March 2004 confirm that al-Maghrebi was tortured while held at the Dark Prison. He was subjected to an extended sleep deprivation session of over 118 hours, with just three hours of sleep in the middle. An email
dated from the same period also discusses the fact that al-Maghrebi had been threatened with rectal rehydration.\textsuperscript{494}

In April 2004, likely to have been either 24 or 25 April, al-Maghrebi was transferred alongside several other detainees to a second CIA black site, DENTENTION SITE ORANGE, where he would continue to be held in secret detention for four months. He was held in a cell which he describes as measuring 2m x 2m. Shackling was routine and he was often hooded, although the hood was removed during interrogations. There was only a small rug despite the cold. At this facility, he made contact with Di'i ki again. He describes nearly going insane in this cell, to the point that he would bang his own head against the wall and would refuse food.\textsuperscript{494}

Al-Maghrebi was rendered again on 22 August 2004, alongside Saleh Di'i ki and Mohammed al-Shoroei ya. They were prepared for the flight according to standard CIA rendition operation procedures, and were held in a shipping container before being loaded onto an aircraft and flown to Libya.\textsuperscript{495} Our investigation has identified this rendition operation, which took place on board the aircraft N63MU (\textbf{Circuit 49}).

On arrival in Libya, al-Maghrebi was held in various different prisons, including Tajoura, for the first nine months. He was beaten and threatened with rape. Subsequently he was held at an internal intelligence facility, Amen Dakhali, and was then taken on to the Sikka Road and Abu Salim prisons, before being transferred to the Nasser bureau, Ain Zara, and finally, Abu Salim again. He was beaten and tortured repeatedly, including through long periods of solitary confinement. He faced charges in December 2007 of attempting to overthrow the government, and was sentenced to 10 years in prison. He was finally released on 16 February 2011.
Ali al-Hajj al-Sharqawi (#93)

Nationality: Yemeni
Capture: Karachi, Pakistan, 7 February 2002
Captured alongside: 16 others, all taken to Guantánamo Bay
Pre-CIA detention: Pakistan; Jordan
Entered CIA custody: 8 January 2004
Period of CIA custody: 123-129 days
Left CIA custody: 10-16 May 2004
CIA detention locations: Afghanistan

After CIA detention: transferred to US military custody at Bagram Airbase, and then Guantánamo Bay. Detained, as of May 2019.

Ali al-Hajj al-Sharqawi (also known as Riyadh the Facilitator) was captured in Karachi, Pakistan, on 7 February 2002, in a raid on a ‘suspected al-Qaeda safe house’ by Pakistani intelligence (ISI) and US forces.1496 16 others were captured in the raid, all of whom were eventually transferred to US military custody at Guantánamo Bay.1497 According to the Committee Study, al-Sharqawi was then ‘transferred to Jordanian custody on February xx, 2002.’1498 Our investigation has identified this rendition operation, which took place between 10-15 February 2002 on board the aircraft N379P (Circuit 4).

In Jordan, al-Sharqawi was held at the GID Headquarters in Wadi Sir, Amman for almost two years, until January 2004. For most of this time, he was held alongside Hassan bin Attash (#10). During his detention, al-Sharqawi penned a long account of his treatment and signed it with his thumbprint. This note was smuggled out in 2003 and handed to Joanne Mariner from Human Rights Watch.1499 The organisation also has a statement of his treatment written by al-Sharqawi in 2006.1500

I was being interrogated all the time, in the evening and in the day. I was shown thousands of photos, and I really mean thousands, I am not exaggerating... And in between all this you have the torture, the abuse, the cursing, humiliation. They had threatened me with being sexually abused and electrocuted. I was told that if I wanted to leave with permanent disability both mental and physical, that that could be arranged. They said they had all the facilities of Jordan to achieve that. I was told that I had to talk, I had to tell them everything. They beat me in a way that does not know any limits. They threatened me with electricity, with snakes and dogs. They say we’ll make you see death.1501

He also said that his interrogators acknowledged asking questions passed on by the Americans, and that: ‘Every time that the interrogator asks me about a certain piece of information, and I talk, he asks me if I told this to the Americans. And if I say no he jumps for joy, and he leaves me and goes to report it to his superiors, and they rejoice’.1502 CIA records confirm that the CIA had
access to al-Sharqawi while he was in Jordanian custody, and that he provided information on various other suspects. \textsuperscript{503} Al-Sharqawi has also told his lawyers that he was hidden in the soldiers' lecture room whenever the ICRC came to visit.

Al-Sharqawi says he was subjected to ‘continuous torture and interrogation for the whole of two years.’ \textsuperscript{504} Then, at about 11pm on 7 January 2004, he was taken from his cell, put in a car and handed over to the Americans, who drove him to the airport and rendered him to Afghanistan. \textsuperscript{505} Our investigation has identified this rendition operation, which took place on board the aircraft N313P (\textbf{Circuit 36}). CIA cables from Afghanistan confirm his rendition to the country, \textsuperscript{506} as do others held in the Dark Prison during early 2004. \textsuperscript{507} Al-Sharqawi’s own account, penned in 2006, described the prison as ‘a pitch dark place, with extremely loud scary sounds.’ \textsuperscript{508} He was held there for around four months, before being transferred to US military custody between 10-16 May 2004. \textsuperscript{509} He was held at Bagram Airbase, alongside a number of other CIA prisoners transferred at the same time.

Al-Sharqawi was held at Bagram until 19 September 2004, when he was transferred to US military custody at Guantánamo Bay on board a US military aircraft with call-sign RCH948Y. \textsuperscript{510} As of May 2019, he remains detained in Guantánamo Bay.
**SALEH DI’IKI (#94)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Nationality:</strong></th>
<th>Libyan</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Capture:</strong></td>
<td>Mauritania, 12 October 2003</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Pre-CIA detention:</strong></td>
<td>Mauritania; Morocco</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Entered CIA custody:</strong></td>
<td>22 January 2004</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Period of CIA custody:</strong></td>
<td>213 days</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Left CIA custody:</strong></td>
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<td><strong>CIA detention locations:</strong></td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>After CIA detention:</strong></td>
<td>transferred to Libyan custody. Released, 16 February 2011.</td>
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Saleh Di’iki (also known as Abu Abdallah al-Zulaytini) was captured on 12 October 2003 by Mauritanian intelligence agents. He was held and interrogated for 2-3 weeks at the headquarters of the Mauritanian military intelligence agency, where he was told that he was being detained on behalf of the CIA. After two weeks a new group of interrogators arrived who Di’iki believes were Israeli; they accused him of plotting to blow up the Israeli embassy in Mauritania. He was held for another two weeks, and was questioned further by an American.511

At some point in early November 2003, Di’iki was rendered to Morocco on a small Fokker aircraft. There, he was detained in a prison cell where lots of names had been written on the walls, along with messages, by individuals who were to be transferred to US military custody at Guantánamo Bay. One of the messages was from Ramzi bin al-Shibh (#41), who had written: ‘For the one who is going to read this, I am Ramzi bin al-Shibh and for anyone who can read these lines, I ask him to please inform my family in Yemen that I believe that on this date ___ I will be transferred to Guantánamo tomorrow.’512 Di’iki could not remember the date, but given what is known about bin al-Shibh it was likely to have been written in November or December 2003.

Di’iki was detained and interrogated in Morocco for several weeks. Our investigation has established that he was rendered from Morocco to CIA custody in Afghanistan on 22 January 2004, on board the aircraft N313P (Circuit 37). He says that his transfer was alongside at least one other prisoner,513 and we have identified this as Binyam Mohamed (#95). He was prepared for this transfer in line with normal CIA rendition operation procedures, by a team of American personnel who used sign language and wore face masks. He recalls: ‘I was totally naked ... They did horrible things to me that I can’t talk about. They didn't rape me but they did terribly humiliating things.’514

On arrival at the Dark Prison in Afghanistan, Di’iki was held in a cell which he described as being 2m x 2m. For the first month, he was handcuffed and shackled, with one arm attached by a steel ring to the wall of the cell. He was subjected to music played continuously at high volume, and was held in darkness throughout. His cell was rat-infested, with the rats ‘going all over my head and body.’515 Di’iki was able to speak to some of the other prisoners when the music was not too loud, including Mohammed al-Shoroeiya (#52), Majid al-Maghrebi (#91) and Khalid al-Sharif (#51).
In April 2004, likely to have been either 24 or 25 April, he was transferred alongside several other detainees to a second CIA black site, DETENTION SITE ORANGE, where he was held in secret detention for four months before being rendered to Libya. At this second facility, Di’iki thinks that his captors were trying to make him think that he was no longer in Afghanistan, for example, by providing non-Afghan food. The cell was larger and the building seemed much more modern than the first site.

His cell in the second facility was gray, including painted concrete floors that had a lacquer finish. His cell had two doors, one in front of the other. His feet were shackled the entire three to four months he was there, but not to the wall, so he was able to walk around. Occasionally, his hands were cuffed as well. There was a camera in his cell in this second location. In the middle of the room there was a hole connected to a sewage line so his whole cell smelled every time a toilet flushed. There was loud music playing constantly, but it seemed to be mostly outside his cell, not inside. They also played other sounds, like the sound of water dripping or the sound of an electric shock. They would use the loud electric shock sound sometimes to wake the detainees up.516

Again, he was kept naked for several weeks, with only a very uncomfortable, prickly blanket for cover. He went on hunger strike to demand clothing. He was interrogated less frequently here but he found his time at this facility to be even more harmful psychologically. It was much more difficult to communicate with other detainees, so he felt very isolated. He also described finding the uncertainty about his fate incredibly hard to deal with.

On 22 August 2004, Di’iki was rendered to Libya alongside al-Shoroeiya and al-Maghrebi. They were prepared for the flight according to standard CIA rendition operation procedures, and were held in a shipping container before being loaded onto an aircraft and flown to Libya.517 Our investigation has identified this rendition operation, which took place on board the aircraft N63MU (Circuit 49). It was only when he arrived in Libya that he realised that was where he was being taken, and this filled him with terror: ‘When I realized I was being sent back to Libya, I thought they would hang me by my tongue. There was a guy from the east that died that way and I was sure, because of what I had been writing and saying about the regime, I would die that way too.’518

On arrival in Libya, Di’iki was held in various different prisons, including Tajoura, Ain Zara and Abu Salim. After four years, he was sentenced to life in prison. He was released on 16 February 2011 as the uprisings against Gaddafi began, but was then rearrested on 18 June 2011 and held until the regime was finally toppled later that summer.
Binyam Mohamed (#95)

**Nationality:** Ethiopian (British resident)
**Capture:** Karachi, Pakistan, 12 April 2002
**Pre-CIA detention:** Pakistan; Morocco
**Entered CIA custody:** 22 January 2004
**Period of CIA custody:** 110-119 days
**Left CIA custody:** 11-20 May 2004
**CIA detention locations:** Afghanistan

After CIA detention: transferred to US military custody at Bagram Airbase, and then Guantánamo Bay. Released to United Kingdom, 23 February 2009.

Binyam Mohamed is an Ethiopian national who had been legally resident in the UK since 1994. He travelled to Afghanistan in the summer of 2001. On 12 April 2002, he was arrested by Pakistani officials in Karachi Airport while attempting to return to the UK. He was transferred to Landi Prison, run by Pakistani prison officials. He was held there for seven days, until 20 April, when he was transferred to an interrogation centre run by Pakistani intelligence services (ISI) in Karachi.

He was held at this facility for three months, in a cell 2m x 2.5m, and hung from the ceiling for a week. While in the ISI facility, Mohamed was interrogated by four FBI agents, three of whom were identified as ‘Chuck’, ‘Terry’ and ‘Jenny’. During their interrogations of Mohamed, they threatened him with torture by foreign security forces. The interrogator ‘Chuck’ threatened: ‘If you don’t talk to me, you’re going to Jordan. We can’t do what we want here, the Pakistanis can’t do exactly what we want them to. The Arabs will deal with you’. ‘Terry’ also threatened him with transfer to Israel or Jordan, and even to the British: ‘The SAS know how to deal with people like you’.

When the Americans were not present, Mohamed was beaten repeatedly with a leather strap. At one point, a Pakistani pressed a gun into his chest and waited: ‘I knew I was going to die. He stood like that for five minutes. I looked into his eyes, and I saw my own fear reflected there. I had time to think about it. Maybe he will pull the trigger and I will not die, but be paralyzed. There was enough time to think the possibilities through.’ After that incident, ‘Chuck’ came into the room, said nothing, but just stared at Mohamed.

Mohamed claims that he was also interrogated by two MI6 officers, one of whom identified as ‘John’. According to Mohamed: ‘They gave me a cup of tea with a lot of sugar in it. I initially only took one. ‘No, you need a lot more. Where you’re going, you need a lot of sugar.’ I didn’t know exactly what he meant by this, but I figured he meant some poor country in Arabia. One of them did tell me I was going to get tortured by the Arabs.

On 19 July, after three months in the ISI facility, Mohamed was transferred by air to Islamabad. On landing, he was transferred to a cell at a Special Branch facility until the evening of 21 July. At about 10pm that evening, he was taken to what he describes as a military airport in Islamabad with two other detainees. This is likely to have been the Pakistani Air Force base at Nur Khan / Chakala, which is co-located with Islamabad’s Benazir Bhutto International Airport. There he...
was turned over to the Americans, and prepared for rendition. He was stripped naked, photographed, searched, had a suppository inserted into his anus, and was then dressed in a tracksuit, shackled, blindfolded, had ear defenders placed over his head, and was strapped to the seat of an aircraft.\textsuperscript{522} Our investigation has confirmed this rendition operation, which took place on 21 July 2002 on board the aircraft N379P (Circuit 8).

For 18 months, between 22 July 2002 and 21 January 2004, Binyam Mohamed was held and tortured in Morocco. He was first held in Témara prison, which he described as containing a series of semi-underground buildings, each of which contained three cells, a guard room and an interrogation room. While in Témara, Mohamed was subjected to what he describes as a ‘softening up process’. The guards would ask him questions, and would threaten him with the torture to come: ‘They’ll come in wearing masks and beat you up. They’ll beat you with sticks. They’ll rape you first, then they’ll take a glass bottle, they break the top off and make you sit on it.’\textsuperscript{523} Then, on the night of 6 August, the torture began:

\begin{quote}
They came in and cuffed my hands behind my back. But then three men came in with black masks, some kind of ski masks that only showed their eyes. They had military trousers and different coloured shirts. When they came in my head stopped. I ceased really knowing I was alive. One stood on each of my shoulders and the third punched me in the stomach. The first punch... turned everything inside me upside down. I felt I was going to vomit... It seemed to go on for hours... I was meant to stand, but I was in so much pain I’d fall to my knees. They’d pull me back up and hit me again. They’d kick me in the thighs as I got up. I vomited within the first few punches...\textsuperscript{524}
\end{quote}

The beatings continued over the following days and weeks, interspersed with interrogations: ‘They’d say there’s this guy who says you’re the big man in al Qaeda. I’d say it’s a lie. They’d torture me. I’d say, okay it’s true. They’d say, okay, tell us more. I’d say, I don’t know more. They’d torture me again’. During this time, Mohamed also began to be tortured with a scalpel:

\begin{quote}
They cut off my clothes with some kind of doctor’s scalpel. I was totally naked... I tried to put on a brave face. But maybe I was going to be raped. Maybe they’d electrocute me. Maybe castrate me... They took the scalpel to my right chest. It was only a small cut. Maybe an inch. At first I just screamed because the pain was just... I was shocked, I wasn’t expecting...

One of them took my penis in his hand and began to make cuts. He did it once and they stood for a minute, watching my reaction. I was in agony, crying, trying desperately to suppress myself, but I was screaming. I remember Marwan [the lead torturer] seemed to smoke half a cigarette, throw it down, and start another. They must have done this 20 or 30 times, in maybe two hours. There was blood all over... They cut all over my private parts. One of them said it would be better just to cut it off, as I would only breed terrorists.\textsuperscript{525}
\end{quote}
Once this form of torture started, Mohamed was subjected to it about once a month until he was transferred out of Morocco. He also says that there ‘were even worse things, too horrible to remember, let alone talk about’, and that these things happened about once a month as well.

At some point in September 2002, Mohamed was moved by car to a different facility, where he was held until January 2004. At this site, he was subjected to loud music played all day and night into headphones strapped to his ears. He remembers Meatloaf, Aerosmith and Tupac going round and round, as well as the sound of pornographic films. For eighteen months, he suffered extreme sleep deprivation, sometimes going 48 hours without sleep. He was also exposed to extremes of cold and unsanitary conditions, had his food laced with drugs, and when he undertook a hunger strike in protest, he was strapped to a mattress and forcibly injected with drugs. The scalpel torture continued, approximately once a month.526

In the evening of 21 January 2004, Binyam Mohamed was taken by van to the airport. There he waited for about two hours, before being handed over to the Americans and subjected to the CIA’s standard rendition procedures. Our investigation has confirmed this rendition operation, which took place on board the aircraft N313P (Circuit 37).

Once in Afghanistan, Mohamed was placed in a truck and driven to the Dark Prison. He was held here until late May 2004, and subjected to repeated interrogations and torture by the CIA. It was pitch-black for most of the time. Mohamed was hung from the ceiling at various points, and interrogated most days, in particular about the Jose Padilla and the ‘dirty bomb plot’. Loud music was played on a loop through speakers in the cell. Other sounds were played too, including ghostly laughter, children screaming, and other ‘horror’ sounds. This was played incredibly loudly, 24 hours a day, for weeks on end. As Mohamed has testified, ‘They used this music to torture us. It was blasting all around. There were speakers in every cell. There was hardly any way to sleep. It was like a perpetual nightmare... it was meant to drive you nuts. There’s a prisoner here in Guantánamo who was there who had totally lost his head.’527

In May 2004, Mohamed allowed outside for the first time in two years: ‘it was like being given chocolate.’ Shortly thereafter, he was transferred by helicopter with other detainees, ‘tied like hens going for slaughter’, on a flight lasting 20-30 minutes. He was blindfolded and had head phones placed over his head for the duration of the flight.528 From May to September 2004, he was held at Bagram, and describes being subjected to one 12-hour interrogation and various other 6-hour interrogations, during which he was forced to sign a confession regarding an association with Jose Padilla, whom he had never met.529

On 19 September 2004, Mohamed was flown with eight other detainees – including Hassan bin Attash (#10), Ali al-Haji al-Sharqawi (#93) and Sanad al-Kazimi (#74) – to Guantánamo Bay on a US military aircraft with call-sign RCH948Y.530 He was released from Guantánamo Bay and returned to the UK on 23 February 2009.
KHALED AL-MAQTARI (#96)

**Nationality:** Yemeni

**Capture:** Fallujah, Iraq, 13 January 2004

**Pre-CIA detention:** Iraq (US military custody)

**Entered CIA custody:** 22 January 2004

**Period of CIA custody:** 955 days

**Left CIA custody:** 29 August – 6 September 2006

**CIA detention locations:** Afghanistan

**After CIA detention:** transferred to Yemeni custody. Released, May 2007.

Khaled al-Maqtari (also known as Firas al-Yemeni) is a Yemeni national who was captured on 13 January 2004, during a US raid on the Al-Ghufran Market in Fallujah, Iraq. All those captured during the raid were cuffed and hooded, and al-Maqtari was transferred by truck to a US military base on the outskirts of Fallujah. At the base, US soldiers forced him to crawl while they kicked and beat him, and he was forced to remain standing while hooded and cuffed. A soldier would periodically creep into al-Maqtari’s cell and ‘scream or laugh maniacally into Khaled al-Maqtari’s ear.’ According to al-Maqtari, ‘[h]e was just shouting at me like a beast, I don’t think he was saying words, just shouting.’

Later that day, al-Maqtari was transferred by helicopter, alongside at least two other detainees, to Abu Ghraib Prison on the outskirts of Baghdad. He has provided a detailed account of his torture at this site, which included beating, water dousing, and being hung upside down from a chain in the ceiling. Interrogators used dogs to frighten him and threatened him with rape. He was also placed in a small box for extended periods of time, and was subjected to extensive sleep deprivation.

Al-Maqtari was held in Iraq until 22 January 2004, and then rendered to the Dark Prison in Afghanistan. Our investigation has confirmed this rendition operation, which took place on board the aircraft N379P (Circuit 38).

On arrival at the Dark Prison, al-Maqtari was placed in a small cell close to a bathroom. He has given an extensive account of his time at this site, including the layout of the prison and the identity of others who were held there.

In April 2004, he was transferred alongside several other detainees to a second CIA black site, which our investigation has established was DETENTION SITE ORANGE, also in Afghanistan.

On arrival at this site, al-Maqtari, along with the detainees he had been transferred with, was held in a large container for a few hours. When he was taken into the site, al-Maqtari saw that the facility was new or recently refurbished, extremely well organised and was run to ‘ensure maximum security and secrecy, as well as disorientation, dependence and stress for the detainees.’ Again, he has provided a detailed account of this site and of the 28 months he was held there.

In early August 2006 al-Maqtari was transferred once more, this time to a medical facility for treatment for persistent stomach pain and bleeding. This episode is alluded to in the Committee
Study, which lists al-Maqtari as one of a number of detainees who, ‘due to a lack of adequate medical care at CIA detention sites and the unwillingness of host governments to make hospital facilities available... had care delayed for serious medical issues.’ According to al-Maqtari, he was flown alongside another detainee on two flights; the first about five to six hours long and the second about eight hours long. This second prisoner is likely to have been Ramzi bin al-Shibh (#41), given that he was transferred to the same third country as al-Maqtari for medical care. Once they had landed the two detainees were driven on a bus for about 30 minutes. Security at the medical facility was as tight as at the second CIA site. Al-Maqtari states that he was told that an endoscopy would be performed. Once this procedure was carried out he was taken straight back to the second site. This transfer took place alongside the same detainee that had been brought to the medical facility with al-Maqtari.

Calculations show that al-Maqtari was transferred out of CIA custody between 29 August – 6 September 2006, and flown to Yemen. There, he was taken to the Political Security Prison in Sana’a, and held for 16 days. He was then transferred to a prison in Hodeidah, Yemen, in mid-September 2006, and finally released in May 2007.
KHALED EL-MASRI (#97)

**Nationality:** Kuwaiti (German citizen)

**Capture:** 31 December 2003, Macedonia

**Pre-CIA detention:** Macedonia

**Entered CIA custody:** 24 January 2004

**Period of CIA custody:** 125 days

**Left CIA custody:** 28 May 2004

**CIA detention locations:** Afghanistan

**After CIA detention:** released to Albania

Khaled el-Masri is a Kuwaiti-German citizen who was apprehended at a border crossing between Serbia and Macedonia on 31 December 2003, where officials confiscated his passport and detained him for several hours before transferring him to a hotel in Skopje. He was held in a hotel room for 23 days, and interrogated throughout this period. After 13 days, he went on a hunger strike which lasted for the remainder of his detention in Skopje. On 23 January, he was forced to give a statement that was filmed, indicating that he had not been ill-treated, and was told he would be flown back to Germany. He was then driven to an airport and rendered to Afghanistan.

Our investigation has confirmed this rendition operation, which took place on board the aircraft N313P (Circuit 37).

The cable from CIA Headquarters authorising el-Masri’s rendition justified the operation with reference to the fact that ‘we believe al-Masri knows key information that could assist in the capture of other al-Qa’ida operatives that pose a serious threat of violence or death to US persons and interests.’ This language did not fit within the required standard for CIA detention, whereby only those who themselves pose a serious threat could be rendered and detained. Indeed, a 2007 investigation by the CIA’s OIG found that the operation ‘was characterised by a number of mis-steps from the beginning that were compounded by subsequent failures of both legal and managerial oversight.’ In particular, the grounds for el-Masri’s detention and rendition were found to be spurious, as ‘the purported connections to [al-Qaeda], which served as the underpinning for the rendition, were tenuous, circumstantial, and produced no further incriminating information.’ Regardless, the CIA officers involved in the case ‘justified their commitment to his continuing detention, despite the diminishing rationale, by insisting that they knew he was “bad”’.

On arrival in Afghanistan, el-Masri was transferred to what the Committee Study called a ‘Country [redacted] facility used by the CIA for detention purposes.’ Our investigation has established that this was the Afghan-run facility known by some as ‘Rissat 2’. According to el-Masri, on his first night he was stripped, photographed naked and medically examined by a masked doctor with an American accent. His captors also took blood and urine samples. The next night, his interrogations began again. He was repeatedly threatened, insulted and pushed and shoved around, and his requests for access to lawyers and representatives of the German government were repeatedly denied. CIA cables from Afghanistan, dated 27-28 January 2004
note that el-Masri ‘seemed bewildered on why he had been sent to his particular prison,’ and was ‘adamant that [the CIA] has the wrong person.’

After adjusting my eyes to the light, I could see that I was lying in a small, filthy, concrete cell. The walls were covered in crude Arabic, Urdu and Farsi writing. In place of a bed there was one dirty, military-style blanket and some old, torn clothes bundled into a thin pillow. It was cold and dark. Through a small opening near the roof of the cell I could see the red, setting sun. Through a small grille on the metal door of the cell I could see a man dressed in Afghan clothes standing in front of the cell. I was very thirsty at this point and called out to the man for some water. The man pointed to a small bottle in the corner of my cell. It was a very old plastic bottle, dirty outside as well as in. The colour of the water was greenish-brown. It stank. I could smell the water from the other side of the cell. After I held the bottle, the smell stayed on my hands for quite some time. I was extremely thirsty but when I tried to drink the water, it caused me to vomit.

El-Masri was held at this site for four months. In March 2004, he and other inmates began a hunger strike. After 27 days without eating, senior personnel finally met with el-Masri. They stated that they could not release him without permission from Washington, but that he should not be detained. He continued his hunger strike, and on the 37th day, was taken to the interrogation room where he was force fed through a feeding tube that had been inserted through his nose. The force-feeding made him very ill and he had to receive medical treatment.

By mid-March, Headquarters had finally determined that it had no basis for detaining el-Masri. Nonetheless, he continued to be detained while senior CIA officials disagreed over the ‘exit strategy’. On 27 May 2004, after more than four months in CIA secret detention, el-Masri was prepared for his rendition back to Europe, which took place the next day. Our investigation has identified this rendition operation, which took place on board the aircraft N982RK (Circuit 45). The aircraft landed in Albania, near the Macedonian border, and el-Masri was transported by car through the mountains in a journey that lasted three hours. He was finally taken out of the vehicle, had his handcuffs removed and his possessions returned to him along with 14,500 Euros.
HASSAN GHUL (#98)

**Nationality:** Pakistani

**Capture:** Iraqi Kurdistan Region, 23 January 2004

**Pre-CIA detention:** Iraq (Kurdish and US military custody)

**Entered CIA custody:** 24 January 2004

**Period of CIA custody:** 940-949 days

**Left CIA custody:** 21-30 August 2006

**CIA detention locations:** Afghanistan; Romania; Afghanistan

**After CIA detention:** transferred to Pakistani custody. Released, May 2007.

Hassan Ghul is a Pakistani national who was captured by Kurdish forces on 23 January 2004.\(^{550}\) The Committee Study cites a former CIA officer, Nada Bakos, who has stated that he was interrogated but not tortured by Kurdish officials whilst the CIA sought confirmation of his identity from other prisoners in the programme. He was then transferred to US military custody and, once his identity had been confirmed, was rendered to the Dark Prison in Afghanistan.\(^{551}\) Our investigation has identified this rendition operation, which took place on 24 January 2004 on board the aircraft N313P (Circuit 37).

Ghul was held for less than two days in Afghanistan, where he was interrogated but not subjected to ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’. During this time, he was held in both the Dark Prison and a nearby facility.\(^{552}\) He was then rendered to the Romanian black site on board the same aircraft (Circuit 37). CIA cables from the Romanian site document Ghul’s torture. Interrogators submitted a plan for approval to CIA Headquarters closely mirroring that requested for other detainees.\(^{553}\) Upon arrival, Ghul was ‘shaved and barbered, stripped, and placed in the standing position against the wall’ with ‘his hands above his head.’\(^{555}\) Interrogators then requested specific use of ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’, claiming that ‘his al-Qa’ida briefings and his earlier experiences with US military interrogators have convinced him there are limits to the physical contact interrogators can have with him,’ and that ‘the approval and employment of enhanced measures should sufficiently shift his paradigm of what he expects to happen.’\(^{556}\)

CIA Headquarters approved the request the same day, and the torture began immediately. CIA cables document one session of 59 hours’ sleep deprivation, whereupon Ghul experienced hallucinations, followed by further deprivation and other techniques, alongside further hallucinations.\(^{557}\) Ghul complained of back pain and asked to see a doctor, but interrogators responded that the ‘pain was normal, and would stop when he was confirmed as telling the truth.’\(^{558}\) One CIA doctor later noted that Ghul was experiencing ‘notable physiological fatigue,’ including ‘abdominal and back muscle pain/spasm, “heaviness” and mild paralysis of arms, legs and feet [that] are secondary to his hanging position and extreme degree of sleep deprivation.’ Notwithstanding these signs, the doctor commented that Ghul was stable and had ‘essentially normal vital signs,’ despite an ‘occasional premature heartbeat.’\(^{559}\)
Ghul was most likely held in Romania until 2005, whereupon he was transferred to either Lithuania or Afghanistan (Circuit 55, Circuit 58 and Circuit 59). Regardless of whether or not he was held in Lithuania, he was certainly in Afghanistan (in DETENTION SITE ORANGE or DETENTION SITE BROWN) from at least March 2006.\(^{560}\)

Ghul was transferred out of CIA custody between 21-30 August 2006, and rendered to Pakistan.\(^{561}\) He was released from Pakistani custody on xx May 2007.\(^{562}\) It has since been reported that he was killed in a US drone strike in October 2012.\(^{563}\)

**MUHAMMAD IBRAHIM (#99)**

| Nationality: | unknown |
| Entered CIA custody: | 25-27 January 2004 |
| Period of CIA custody: | 267-269 days |
| Left CIA custody: | 20 October 2004 |
| CIA detention locations: | Romania |
| After CIA detention: | transferred to Jordan or Afghanistan. Thereafter, fate and whereabouts unknown. |

Our investigation has established that Muhammad Ibrahim was transferred into CIA custody between 25-27 January 2004, and almost immediately rendered to the Romanian black site. We have identified two possible rendition operations for this transfer, one from Afghanistan which took place on 25 January 2004 on board the aircraft N313P (Circuit 37) and one from Jordan which took place on 26 January 2004 on board the aircraft N85VM (Circuit 39).

Cables from the Romanian black site describe the use of sleep deprivation on Ibrahim for three days straight, from 27-30 January 2004,\(^{564}\) exceeding the 48 hours authorised by CIA Headquarters at the beginning of this period.\(^{565}\) On 1 February 2004, five days after the torture had begun, interrogators cabled Headquarters to request information that would ‘definitively link [Ibrahim] to nefarious activity or knowledge by [the detainee] of known nefarious activities of al-Qa’ida members, if this is possible.’\(^{566}\) With no response from Headquarters, interrogators continued to torture Ibrahim. CIA Headquarters would later conclude that it was ‘uncertain’ that Ibrahim ‘would meet the requirements for US military or [redacted] detention.’\(^{567}\)

Ibrahim was held at the Romanian black site for over eight months, before either being released or transferred to foreign custody in Jordan or Afghanistan. Our investigation has identified this rendition operation which took place on 20 October 2004 on board the aircraft N789DK (Circuit 52). His fate and whereabouts after this point are unknown.
SAUD MEMON (#100)

Nationality: Pakistani  
Capture: South Africa, 7 March 2003  
Pre-CIA detention: South Africa; Pakistan  
Entered CIA custody: 10-29 February 2004  
Period of CIA custody: 740-749 days  
Left CIA custody: 19 February – 19 March 2006  
CIA detention locations: Afghanistan  

Little is known about Saud Memon. He is a Pakistani national who was reportedly captured in South Africa and rendered to Pakistan on 7 March 2003. There it has been reported that he was held by Pakistani intelligence. We have established that he entered CIA custody between 10-29 February 2004.

Memon was held by the CIA for around two years (740-749 days), although his location during his time in CIA secret detention is unknown. He would have left CIA custody between 19 February – 19 March 2006. He was then passed over to Pakistani custody, and was released in April 2007. It is reported that he was ‘dropped off, emaciated and near death, at the doorstep of his family home,’ and died around two weeks later.
Gouled Hassan Dourad (also known as Hassan Ahmed Guleed) is a Somali national who was living in Djibouti when he was captured by Djiboutian authorities on 4 March 2004. During interrogations while in Djiboutian custody, Dourad ‘provided detailed information on his casing of Camp Lemonier’ for a potential terrorist attack. He was then rendered to CIA custody on xx March 2004. Our investigation has identified this rendition operation, which took place 8-12 March 2004 on board the aircraft N379P (Circuit 41).

Given that the rendition aircraft flew to Afghanistan, Morocco and then Guantánamo Bay after taking off from Djibouti, it is unclear exactly where Dourad was taken. We consider it most likely that he was rendered to Afghanistan, given the indications that no CIA detainees were held in Morocco between December 2003 and April 2004, and that it also appears that all CIA detainees held at Guantánamo Bay were at the sites there by early February 2004 at the very latest. We are not able to fully confirm this suggestion, however, and there exist contradictions in the data regarding Dourad’s location after rendition to CIA custody.

CIA cables document Dourad’s interrogation by 16 March 2004, although there is no evidence that he was subjected to ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’. The Committee Study notes that Dourad had serious medical issues at some point during his detention, and was one of a number of detainees whose care was delayed ‘due to a lack of adequate medical care at CIA detention sites and the unwillingness of host governments to make hospital facilities available.’ Our investigation has established that he was transferred to a third-party country for treatment at some point after January 2006. That country also received Janat Gul (#110) for treatment, and was subsequently compensated with a significant sum of money. This may suggest that Dourad and Gul were held at the same site during 2006, although there is no confirmation of this.

Regardless of his previous location, Dourad was held in Afghanistan (in DETENTION SITE ORANGE or DETENTION SITE BROWN) between March and September 2006. He was then transferred into US military detention in Guantánamo Bay between 4-5 September 2006, as one of the 14 CIA prisoners handed over to the DoD at that time. As of May 2019, Dourad remains detained at Guantánamo Bay.
Little is known about Abu ‘Abdallah. Khaled al-Maqtari (#96) has stated that, while he was in the Dark Prison, a prisoner called Abu Abdallah al-Saudi arrived at the facility 6-8 weeks after he did (which would have been in March-April 2004). According to al-Maqtari, Abu ‘Abdallah had been held in secret detention in Iraq, where he had been captured in February 2004. This account is consistent with other information concerning Abu ‘Abdallah’s entry into CIA custody, and our investigation has identified a matching flight between Iraq and Afghanistan on 12 March 2004 on board the aircraft N313P (Circuit 40).

Abu ‘Abdallah’s fate and whereabouts after March 2004 are unknown. Calculations show that he was transferred out of CIA custody between 30 July – 6 September 2006. We have identified a rendition operation which includes a flight from Afghanistan to Saudi Arabia between 29 July – 1 August 2006, on board the aircraft N17ND (Circuit 62), and it is possible that this rendered Abu ‘Abdallah back to his home country.
**ABD AL-BARI AL-FILISTINI (#106)**

- **Nationality:** Palestinian
- **Capture:** Pakistan (likely)
- **Pre-CIA detention:** Pakistan
- **Entered CIA custody:** 16 June 2004
- **Period of CIA custody:** 773-776 days
- **Left CIA custody:** 29 July – 1 August 2006
- **CIA detention locations:** Afghanistan
- **After CIA detention:** transferred to Jordanian custody. Thereafter, fate and whereabouts unknown.

**MARWAN AL-JABOUR (#108)**

- **Nationality:** Palestinian
- **Capture:** Lahore, Pakistan, 9 May 2004
- **Pre-CIA detention:** Pakistan
- **Entered CIA custody:** 16 June 2004
- **Period of CIA custody:** 773-776 days
- **Left CIA custody:** 29 July – 1 August 2006
- **CIA detention locations:** Afghanistan
- **After CIA detention:** transferred to Jordanian custody, and then Israeli custody. Released, October 2006.

Abd al-Bari al-Filistini and Marwan al-Jabour are both Palestinians, and are likely to have been transferred together into CIA detention and held for over two years before being transferred to Jordan. Although al-Jabour has given an extensive account of his time in CIA custody, little is known about al-Filistini. Given his proximity to al-Jabour on the Committee Study list, and the identical length of custody, he is likely to have been the Palestinian prisoner that al-Jabour has said accompanied him from Pakistan to a CIA-run site in Afghanistan. Given that the others transferred into CIA custody at the same time were captured in Pakistan, it is likely that al-Filistini was as well.

Al-Jabour was captured by Pakistan’s ISI on 9 May 2004 while at a friend’s house in Lahore, Pakistan. He was captured alongside two others, and all three men were transferred to the local ISI station. There, he was shackled and beaten, and subjected to extensive sleep deprivation. He was also burned with an iron rod, and interrogated by both Pakistani and American officers. He was held at this site for four days, and then transferred by car to a ‘villa’ in Islamabad. This was a large private compound that had been converted to hold detainees, and al-Jabour said that it appeared to be run by Americans. There, he was beaten and only allowed to sleep for one
hour at a time. He was held alongside a number of prisoners including a Yemeni, an Afghan, a Libyan, an Algerian, a Palestinian and two 16 year old boys. He was held at this site for more than a month.\footnote{584}

On 16 June 2004, al-Jabour was flown to Afghanistan, alongside the Palestinian, the Afghan and the Libyan from his detention at the villa.\footnote{585} Our investigation has established that these men are likely to have been Abd al-Bari al-Filistini, Qattal al-Uzbeki (#109) and Mustafa al-Mehdi (#107). Upon landing, they were put into a Jeep and driven along an unpaved road to a detention site.

We have established that this was DETENTION SITE ORANGE, and al-Jabour has provided an extensive account of the site and his 25 months in detention there.\footnote{586} Some of his torture is confirmed by CIA cables from Afghanistan, which document his forced rectal rehydration.\footnote{587}

Al-Jabour was transferred out of CIA custody between 29 July – 1 August 2006 and rendered to Jordan. He has provided an account of his rendition, and said that it was alongside another prisoner (who is likely to have been al-Filistini).\footnote{588} Our investigation has identified this rendition operation, which took place on board the aircraft N17ND (\textit{Circuit 62}).

Al-Filistini’s fate and whereabouts after his transfer to Jordan are unknown. Al-Jabour was held at the headquarters of the Jordanian GID in Amman, and was visited by the ICRC on 14 August 2006, and then by family members two weeks later. On 18 September 2006, he was driven to King Hussein Bridge (on the border between Jordan and the Israeli occupied West Bank) and transferred to Israeli custody.\footnote{589} While held in Israel, al-Jabour was given access to a lawyer and brought before a judge. He was released into Gaza after six weeks in Israeli custody.
Mustafa al-Mehdi (also known as Ayyub al-Libi) is a Libyan national. He left Libya in 1989 as a result of persecution by the Gaddafi regime, going first to Saudi Arabia, and then to Afghanistan. There, he joined the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG). Following his marriage in 1993 he settled in Pakistan.

Al-Mehdi was captured on 23 February 2004, in Peshawar, Pakistan. He was initially detained by the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), and held at the Army Stadium for about 40 days while he was interrogated by ISI and American officers. While in Peshawar he was subjected to constant strong lighting, held incommunicado, and his captors threatened to bring his wife and rape her. He also heard the screams of other prisoners.

On or around 3 April 2004, al-Mehdi was taken to Islamabad, where he was held for a further two and a half months. There were 8-10 other prisoners at the site. He states that the same interrogators questioned him in Islamabad, now unhooded, and they appeared again when he was held in Afghanistan. In Islamabad he describes being repeatedly assaulted by the Pakistani guards, who beat him with broomsticks, and forcibly removed his clothes. He reported this to the American interrogators, who accused him of lying and threatened him with worse places.

Al-Mehdi was rendered to CIA custody in Afghanistan on 16 June 2004, alongside Marwan al-Jabour (#108), Abd al-Bari al-Filistini (#106) and possibly Qattal al-Uzbeki (#109) and held at DETENTION SITE ORANGE. On arrival at his cell his clothes were forcibly removed and he was shackled and then chained to the cell wall by one arm, so that he could only sit or lie down, but not stand. He remained in this position, naked, for two months. After two months, he was given trousers and, later, a shirt. After the fifth month they stopped shackling him to the wall and he could move about his cell, which was just 2 x 2 metres. The lights were on all the time, and cameras and microphones were also on the whole time. There was no mattress, just a thin blanket, the floor was painted concrete, and there was a small bucket with a chemical for the toilet, and a rubber spoon for eating. Loud music was played constantly. Guards were a mixture of Americans and Afghans, and dressed in black. He describes having breathing difficulties as a result of vapours from the chemical toilet. It was often extremely cold.

Interrogations occurred daily, sometimes twice, and often while al-Mehdi was naked in front of his female interrogators. He recounts that they would scream and yell at him, throw chairs
and push tables. He believes he was held in this facility for 10 months, although it was difficult to keep track of time while in custody.

On 21 April 2005, he was told he would be taken to Libya. He begged not to be sent back, believing his life was in danger if returned to Colonel Gaddafi’s regime. He was subjected to the usual CIA preparations for transfer, including stripping naked, photographing, and dressing him in a diaper, placing ear defenders over his ears and blindfolding and hooding him. Before boarding the aircraft one blindfold was swapped for another and he could see he was in a large hangar with military equipment. He was handcuffed to a seat and strapped down. He later learned that Khalid al-Sharif (#51) was also on board. Our investigation has identified this rendition operation, which took place on board the aircraft N740JA (Circuit 56).

In Libya, al-Mehdi was held in various detention sites. He spent 14 months in Tajoura where he was held in solitary confinement for a number of months, and subjected to long interrogations. At the Nasser bureau, for four and a half months, he was held in solitary confinement in a cell measuring about 2 x 0.5 metres with no light. He was moved again to the political wing of the Ain Zara prison, for two months, and then finally to the military section of the Abu Salim prison, alongside Abdel Hakim Belhadj, Sami al-Saadi and other senior LIFG members. In 2006 he was charged and prosecuted for membership of the LIFG, but states that he confessed under duress, because the solitary confinement had become unbearable. Mehdi was finally released on 16 February 2011, as the uprisings against Gaddafi began.
QATTAL AL-UBZEKI (#109)

**Nationality:** unknown  
**Capture:** Pakistan  
**Pre-CIA detention:** Pakistan  
**Entered CIA custody:** 16 June 2004  
**Period of CIA custody:** 800-809 days  
**Left CIA custody:** 25 August – 3 September 2006  
**CIA detention locations:** Afghanistan  
**After CIA detention:** fate and whereabouts unknown

Given Qattal al-Uzbeki’s position next to Marwan al-Jabour (#108) on the Committee Study list, he is likely to have been the ‘Afghan’ whom al-Jabour says was with him when he was transferred from Pakistani detention to a CIA-run site in Afghanistan. This took place on 16 June 2004, and given that others transferred at the same time were captured in Pakistan, it is likely that al-Uzbeki was as well. This supposition is supported by intelligence reporting gained from Hassan Ghul (#98) while he was in secret CIA detention in Afghanistan in January 2004. According to Ghul, at that time al-Uzbeki was a resident of a so-called ‘bachelor house’ in Shkai, Pakistan, alongside a number of other men.

If al-Uzbeki was indeed transferred with al-Jabour, he was held (at least initially) at DETENTION SITE ORANGE in Afghanistan. He was held by the CIA for over 26 months, although we have been unable to ascertain any further details about his detention or treatment. Al-Uzbeki was transferred out of CIA custody between 25 August – 3 September 2006. His fate and whereabouts after this point are unknown.
JANAT GUL (#110)

**Nationality:** unknown  
**Capture:** Pakistan, 10-30 June 2004.  
**Pre-CIA detention:** Pakistan  
**Entered CIA custody:** 10-22 July 2004  
**Period of CIA custody:** 750-759 days  
**Left CIA custody:** 30 July – 20 August 2006  
**CIA detention locations:** Afghanistan; Romania  
**After CIA detention:** transferred to foreign custody. Released.

Janat Gul was captured by a foreign government, most likely Pakistan, on 25 June 2004. On 2 July 2004, whilst Gul was still in foreign custody, the CIA met with National Security Advisor Rice and other high-level officials at the White House in order to seek authorisation for his torture. On 6 July 2004, Rice approved the use of all ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’ on Gul, with the exception of the waterboard. This authorisation was confirmed on 20 July 2004 by the National Security Council (NSC) principals, including the Vice President, and again in a legal opinion on 22 July 2004 written by Attorney General John Ashcroft.

Gul was rendered into CIA custody on 22 July 2004. It appears that he was held initially in Afghanistan, and given the timing this was likely to have been at the facility referred to as DETENTION SITE ORANGE. He was then rendered to the Romanian black site. Our investigation has identified this rendition operation, which took place on 31 July 2004 on board the aircraft N288KA (Circuit 48).

An investigation conducted under the auspices of the Council of Europe found that, once in Romania, Gul was subjected to ‘extensive, customised application of “enhanced interrogation techniques”’. CIA cables from the Romanian site document that Gul was tortured from 3-10 August 2004 and again from 21-25 August 2004 and that this included continuous sleep deprivation, facial holds, attention grasps, facial slaps, stress positions, and walling, until he experienced auditory and visual hallucinations. Gul became hugely disorientated, and could see ‘his wife and children in the mirror and heard their voices in the white noise.’ After continued torture, Gul ‘asked to die, or just be killed.’ One session of standing sleep deprivation lasted 47 hours.

CIA records demonstrate that Gul was held at the Romanian black site until at least 30 April 2005. Our investigation has established that he was most likely held in Romania until October or November 2005, whereupon he was transferred to either Lithuania or Afghanistan (Circuit 58 and Circuit 59). Regardless of whether or not he was held in Lithuania, he was certainly in Afghanistan (in DETENTION SITE ORANGE or DETENTION SITE BROWN) from at least March 2006. CIA records show that he was eventually transferred to a foreign government between 30 July – 20 August 2006, and subsequently released.
Ahmed Ghailani is a Tanzanian national who was captured by Pakistani forces on 24 July 2004. He was held and interrogated in foreign government custody (likely in Pakistan) throughout August 2004, with the CIA assessing these interrogations as ‘ineffective’.

Ghailani was rendered to CIA custody on 1-5 September 2004, which our investigation has narrowed to 1-5 September. He was held by the CIA in Afghanistan, where cables document his torture from 17 September 2004. This included the use of extended sleep deprivation, after which Ghailani experienced auditory hallucinations.

Ghailani was held by the CIA for two years. It is unclear whether he was moved out of Afghanistan at any point, and he would at any rate have been held there towards the end of his time in CIA custody, given that all CIA detainees were held in the country between March and September 2006. He was then transferred into US military detention in Guantánamo Bay between 4-5 September 2006, as one of the 14 CIA prisoners handed over to the DoD at that time. Ghailani was held at Guantánamo Bay until his transfer to mainland United States on 9 June 2009. He became the first Guantánamo Bay detainee to be tried in a civilian court, and was eventually convicted on a charge of conspiracy and sentenced to life in prison.
Sharif al-Masri is an Egyptian national who was captured by Pakistani authorities in Quetta, Pakistan, on 29 August 2004. He was initially held in Pakistani custody, where he claimed to have been tortured. He was then rendered to CIA custody on 17-20 September 2004. Our analysis indicates that this date was between 17-20 September.

Al-Masri was held at a CIA site in Afghanistan, and, given his experience under torture in Pakistan, immediately expressed his intent to cooperate. Despite this, and despite doubts by CIA officials that al-Masri had knowledge of terror threats or senior al-Qaeda leadership, the CIA requested approval to use ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’. Al-Masri was subsequently tortured for at least a week, during which time the use of sleep deprivation led to auditory hallucinations.

After approximately three months (87-89 days) of CIA detention, al-Masri was rendered back to Egypt, despite the fact that he had provided repeated descriptions of his torture at Egyptian hands. Our investigation has identified this rendition operation, which took place on 16 December 2004 on board the aircraft N85VM (Circuit 53).

Once in Egypt, al-Masri says that he was interrogated for seven months in an intelligence headquarters, before being transferred to the State Security headquarters in Cairo. According to al-Masri: ‘I saw there kinds of torture you would never imagine and even the Americans were better.’ He was finally released after the uprising in January 2011.
ABDI RASHID SAMATAR (#113)

**Nationality:** unknown  
**Entered CIA custody:** 17 September – 25 November 2004  
**Period of CIA custody:** 650-659 days  
**Left CIA custody:** 30 June – 6 September 2006  
**CIA detention locations:** Afghanistan  
**After CIA detention:** fate and whereabouts unknown

Little is known about Abdi Rashid Samatar. Given the dates of his detention, he was held in Afghanistan for at least some of his time in CIA custody, at either DETENTION SITE ORANGE or DETENTION SITE BROWN.

Samatar was transferred out of CIA custody between 30 June – 6 September 2006. His fate and whereabouts after this point are unknown.
ABU FARAJ AL-LIBI (#114)

**Nationality:** Libyan  
**Capture:** Mardan, Pakistan, 2 May 2005  
**Pre-CIA detention:** Pakistan  
**Entered CIA custody:** 24-25 May 2005  
**Period of CIA custody:** 467-469 days  
**Left CIA custody:** 4-5 September 2006  
**CIA detention locations:** Afghanistan; Romania; Afghanistan  
**After CIA detention:** transferred to US military custody at Guantánamo Bay. Detained, as of May 2019.

Abu Faraj al-Libi is a Libyan national who was captured by Pakistani special forces in Mardan, Pakistan, on 2 May 2005. He was initially held in Pakistani detention, and CIA cables show that discussions regarding his rendition to CIA custody took place on 6-7 May 2005. Our investigation has established that Abu Faraj was eventually rendered to the CIA-run DETENTION SITE ORANGE in Afghanistan between 24-25 May 2005, and almost immediately rendered onwards to the black site in Romania. We have also identified this rendition operation, which took place 25-26 May 2005 on board two aircraft, N450DR and N308AB, which met in Jordan (Circuit 57).

Abu Faraj was tortured on arrival in Romania, and throughout June 2005, with two key periods: from 28 May until 2 June, and then again from 17-28 June. This treatment continued even after he complained of loss of hearing (he was eventually fitted with a hearing aid after his transfer to US military custody at Guantánamo Bay).

Our investigation has established that Abu Faraj was most likely held in Romania until October or November 2005, whereupon he was transferred to either Lithuania or Afghanistan (Circuit 58, Circuit 59). Regardless of whether or not he was held in Lithuania, he was certainly in Afghanistan (in DETENTION SITE ORANGE or DETENTION SITE BROWN) between March and September 2006. He was then transferred into US military detention in Guantánamo Bay between 4-5 September 2006, as one of the 14 CIA prisoners handed over to the DoD at that time. As of May 2019, Abu Faraj remains detained at Guantánamo Bay.
Given his position next to Abu Faraj al-Libi (#114) on the Committee Study list, we have established that Abu Munthir al-Magrebi entered CIA custody on or after 24 May 2005. Abu Faraj was rendered from Afghanistan to Romania on 25-26 May 2005, in an operation which involved a plane switch in Jordan. The second aircraft, which took Abu Faraj onwards to Romania, had previously flown from Tunisia. Given al-Magrebi’s name, his proximity to Abu Faraj on the Committee Study list, and the fact that the CIA rendition aircraft had landed in Tunisia on the way to Jordan, it is likely that al-Magrebi was captured in North Africa and rendered to secret detention at the Romanian black site. However, there is no independent confirmation of this.

Our investigation has established that al-Magrebi was most likely held in Romania until October or November 2005, whereupon he was transferred to either Lithuania or Afghanistan (Circuit 58 or Circuit 59). Regardless of whether or not he was held in Lithuania, he was certainly in Afghanistan (in DETENTION SITE ORANGE or DETENTION SITE BROWN) from at least March 2006 until his transfer from CIA custody. Al-Magrebi was transferred out of CIA custody between 29 August – 6 September 2006. His fate and whereabouts after this point are unknown.
**IBRAHIM JAN (#116)**

**Nationality:** unknown  
**Capture:** unknown  
**Pre-CIA detention:** Iraq or Afghanistan (US military custody)  
**Entered CIA custody:** 10-31 October 2005  
**Period of CIA custody:** 310-319 days  
**Left CIA custody:** 16 August – 6 September 2006  
**CIA detention locations:** Afghanistan  
**After CIA detention:** fate and whereabouts unknown

**ABU JA’FAR AL-IRAQI (#117)**

**Nationality:** Iraqi  
**Capture:** unknown  
**Pre-CIA detention:** Iraq (US military custody)  
**Entered CIA custody:** 16-30 November 2005  
**Period of CIA custody:** 280-289 days  
**Left CIA custody:** 1-6 September 2006  
**CIA detention locations:** Afghanistan  
**After CIA detention:** transferred to US military custody in Iraq. Thereafter, fate and whereabouts unknown.

Ibrahim Jan and Abu Ja’far al-Iraqi were both held as secret prisoners by the US military for more than a month in late 2005. These detentions took place pending transfer to CIA custody, pursuant to a September 2005 Memorandum of Understanding between the CIA and the DoD relating to US military involvement in CIA detention activities. Our investigation has established that they were transferred at separate times: Ibrahim Jan in October 2005; al-Iraqi in November 2005. While there is no information regarding the location of their CIA detention, given the dates of their custody it is likely they were held in Afghanistan.

US Government records show that al-Iraqi’s transfer to CIA detention took place ‘notwithstanding Department of State concerns that the transfer would be inconsistent with statements made by the Secretary of State that US forces in Iraq would remain committed to the law of armed conflict, including the Geneva Conventions.’ Once in CIA detention, al-Iraqi was subjected to a range of ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’. Cables dated December 2005 document that he was ‘subjected to nudity, dietary manipulation, insult slaps, abdominal slaps, attention grasps, facial holds, walling, stress positions for 54 hours as part of sleep deprivation, and experienced swelling in his lower legs requiring blood thinner and spiral ace bandages. He was moved to a sitting position, and his sleep deprivation was extended to 78 hours. After the swelling
subsided, he was provided with more blood thinner and was returned to the standing position. The sleep deprivation was extended to 102 hours.' After four hours of sleep, al-Iraqi ‘was subjected to an additional 52 hours of sleep deprivation, after which CIA Headquarters informed interrogators that eight hours was the minimum rest period between sleep deprivation sessions exceeding 48 hours.' In addition to the swelling, al-Iraqi also ‘experienced an enema on his head due to walling, abrasions on his neck, and blisters on his ankles from shackles."^633

Despite the intensive torture of al-Iraqi, CIA records show that he provided ‘almost no information that could be used to locate former colleagues or disrupt attack plots.’ This language was inserted into a Presidential Daily Brief for President Bush, but later dropped to minimise the appearance that the torture of detainees wasn’t working.^634

Al-Iraqi was transferred from CIA to DoD custody in Iraq between 1-6 September 2006.^635 His fate and whereabouts after this point are unknown. Ibrahim Jan was transferred out of CIA custody between 16 August – 6 September 2006. His fate and whereabouts after this point are unknown. He may have been rendered alongside al-Iraqi although, unlike al-Iraqi, there is currently no indication that he was transferred to US military custody in Iraq.
ABD AL-HADI AL-IRAQI (#118)

**Nationality:** Iraqi  
**Capture:** Turkey, late 2006  
**Pre-CIA detention:** Turkey (likely)  
**Entered CIA custody:** 1-9 November 2006  
**Period of CIA custody:** 170-177 days  
**Left CIA custody:** 20-27 April 2007  
**CIA detention locations:** Afghanistan  
**Current status:** transferred to US military custody at Guantánamo Bay, Detained, as of May 2019.

Little is known about Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi, one of the final prisoners acknowledged to have been held as part of the CIA’s detention programme. It has been reported that he was captured in Turkey in late 2006. He was rendered to CIA custody on November 2006. Abd al-Hadi was held at DETENTION SITE BROWN in Afghanistan, and cables from the site document his willingness to cooperate throughout November 2006 – January 2007. Despite this, interrogators believed he was withholding information on operational plots and the locations of high-value targets, and during February 2007 Headquarters discussed the possible use of ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’ against him. By the end of the month, however, they had determined that there was ‘insufficient intelligence… that [al-Iraqi] possesses actionable information…to justify’ his torture.

Abd al-Hadi was held in CIA custody until 20-27 April 2007, when he was transferred to DoD custody at Guantánamo Bay. As of May 2019, Abd al-Hadi remains detained at Guantánamo Bay.
Muhammad Rahim is an Afghan national who was captured in Lahore, Pakistan, on 25 June 2007. Rahim was the last prisoner to be held in the CIA programme, and the only prisoner in the programme for the duration of his secret detention. He was held in foreign government custody after capture, where he was interrogated, and by early July the CIA was planning his rendition to CIA custody. This took place between 10-14 July 2007, when he was rendered to DETENTION SITE BROWN in Afghanistan.

Once Rahim was in CIA custody, CIA Director Michael Hayden requested that President Bush sign an Executive Order to allow the use of ‘enhanced interrogation techniques' on him within the framework of the Geneva Conventions. The proposed techniques included sleep deprivation, dietary manipulation, facial grasp, facial slap, abdominal slap, and the attention grab. On 20 July, a classified legal opinion was issued from OLC, alongside an unclassified Executive Order, which concluded that the proposed interrogation techniques were lawful.

The next day, four interrogators at the site began to torture Rahim, with extensive sleep deprivation sessions throughout July and August, including one in excess of 100 hours (after which Rahim experienced visual and auditory hallucinations). During these sessions, Rahim was shackled in a standing position, wearing a diaper. He was also subjected to the attention grasp, facial holds, abdominal slaps, and the facial slap. These sessions were halted in September 2007, and Rahim was left in isolation for around six weeks. Torture resumed on 2 November 2007, with a sleep deprivation session lasting 138.5 hours straight, until 8 November 2007. Throughout, CIA lawyers sought, and received, successive authorisation from the DoJ for the torture of Rahim. Interrogations continued until 9 December 2007, and then stopped for nearly three weeks whilst personnel ‘discussed and proposed new ways to encourage Rahim's cooperation.' Under consideration was telling Rahim that audiotapes of his interrogations might be passed to his family, or threatening him with leaking information that he was cooperating with US forces.

Rahim was rendered by the CIA on 10-14 March 2008 to another location, where it appears that a foreign government took custody. This government then transferred Rahim to the custody of another authority, at which point he was transferred back to CIA custody and rendered to US military custody at Guantánamo Bay, where he was detained by 14 March 2008. As of May 2019, Rahim remains detained at Guantánamo Bay.
## FURTHER DETAINES SENT TO BAGRAM AIRBASE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name (#)</th>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Entered CIA custody</th>
<th>Period of CIA custody</th>
<th>Left CIA custody</th>
<th>After Bagram</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Muhammad Khan (#53)</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>13-30 April 2003</td>
<td>390-399 days</td>
<td>7 May – 2 June 2004</td>
<td>unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muhammad al-Qahtani (#60)</td>
<td>Saudi</td>
<td>1-9 June 2003</td>
<td>340-349 days</td>
<td>6-23 May 2004</td>
<td>escaped, 10 July 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ali Jan (#68)</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>1-14 August 2003</td>
<td>280-289 days</td>
<td>7-29 May 2004</td>
<td>released, July 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdullah Ashami (#71)</td>
<td>Syrian</td>
<td>10-14 August 2003</td>
<td>270-279 days</td>
<td>6-19 May 2004</td>
<td>escaped, 10 July 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noor Jalal (#86)</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>16-30 September 2003</td>
<td>230-239 days</td>
<td>3-26 May 2004</td>
<td>unknown</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Little is known about these seven men, although we have established that they were all transferred to US military custody at Bagram after their time in CIA detention. Nazar Ali (#28) was held at the Dark Prison for around one month towards the end of 2002, where he was beaten, after his capture in Kandahar.\(^{653}\) From here, he was transferred to US military custody at Bagram Airbase in December, possibly alongside several other CIA prisoners moved at around the same time (including his brother, Shah Wali Khan, #33).\(^{564}\)

Our analysis indicates that the other six men were among the 18 prisoners transferred to US military custody at Bagram around May 2004. It has been reported that Ashami (#71) was captured by US forces in the Khost region of Afghanistan in 2003.\(^{655}\) Likewise, Ali Jan (#68) was captured in early August 2003, during a US military operation in Zormat Valley, Paktia Province,
Afghanistan. One CIA cable from May 2004 documents that he was subsequently transferred to CIA custody after his satellite phone rang, and the translator indicated the caller was speaking in Arabic. Our investigation has established that Jan was transferred into CIA custody between 1-14 August 2003, and held for around 9-10 months. However, the Committee Study noted that there was ‘no derogatory information’ on his satellite phone, and that in fact he was ‘wrongfully detained’ by the CIA.

We have independent confirmation, in some cases, that these men were held at Bagram. Ali Jan was released from Bagram in early July 2004. Al-Tunisi (#61) (under his alias Fezzani) appears on a September 2009 DoD list of Bagram detainees, with prisoner number 1455. We also know that al-Qahtani (#60) and Ashami (#71) escaped from Bagram on 10 July 2005 (along with two other ex-CIA prisoners, Hassan Abu Bakr Qa‘id, #5, and Umar Faruq, #14). It has been reported that US forces recaptured al-Qahtani in November 2006 and that he was subsequently transferred to Saudi custody, although his current fate and whereabouts are unknown. It has also been reported that Ashami was killed during a US airstrike in Afghanistan in July 2008.

Nazar Ali and Ali Jan were both released directly from Bagram. The fate and whereabouts of Muhammad Khan (#53), al-Tunisi and Jalal (#86) after their time at the Airbase are unknown.
**DETAINEES RELEASED FROM CIA CUSTODY**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name (#)</th>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Entered CIA custody</th>
<th>Period of CIA custody</th>
<th>Left CIA custody</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Juma Gul (#29)</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>13 November 2002</td>
<td>90-99 days</td>
<td>11-20 February 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qari Rehman (#32)</td>
<td>Afghan</td>
<td>13 November 2002</td>
<td>60-69 days</td>
<td>12-21 January 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sayed Habib (#50)</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>10-18 April 2003</td>
<td>500-509 days</td>
<td>22-31 August 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zarmein (#63)</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>18 June – 3 July 2003</td>
<td>200-209 days</td>
<td>4-28 January 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modin Muhammad (#70)</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>10-14 August 2003</td>
<td>120-129 days</td>
<td>8-21 December 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bismullah (#77)</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>16-30 September 2003</td>
<td>1-9 days</td>
<td>17 September – 9 October 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abu Bahar Al-Turki (#104)</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>30 March – 7 May 2004</td>
<td>130-139 days (approx.)</td>
<td>12 August – 19 September 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abu Talha Al-Magrebi (#105)</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>30 March – 7 May 2004</td>
<td>130-139 days (approx.)</td>
<td>12 August – 19 September 2004</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Little information is available about these ten men, all of whom were released directly from CIA custody during 2003 and 2004. They were held for a wide range of periods, from around a week, in the rise of Bismullah (#77), to over 16 months in the case of Sayed Habib (#50). In all these cases, the fate and whereabouts of these detainees after their release remains unknown.
It is likely that all these detainees were held in Afghanistan during their time in CIA custody, although in at least one case the capture and initial period of detention was in Pakistan. CIA cables from Afghanistan discuss Juma Gul (#29), Zarmein (#63), Modin Muhammad (#70), Bismullah (#77), Gul Rahman (#101), Abu Bahar al-Turki (#104) and Abu Talha al-Magrebi (#105). The exact locations of these detentions is unknown, although Sayed Habib was held at the facility referred to as DETENTION SITE ORANGE for the latter part of his time in CIA custody.

Except for Qari Rehman (#32), all of these detainees were 'wrongfully detained' by the CIA, given the absence of evidence that they posed a 'continuing, serious threat' to US interests. Two of the men, Sayed Habib and Shaistah Habibullah Khan (#66), were brothers who had been mistakenly named by Khaled Sheikh Mohammed (#45) while under torture. CIA cables document that Modin Muhammad had 'been purposefully misidentified by a source due to a blood feud,' while Bismullah and Gul Rahman had both been mistakenly arrested.

Abu Bahar al-Turki and Abu Talha al-Magrebi are pseudonyms for two prisoners who were in fact former CIA sources. Both were transferred into CIA custody at some point between 30 March and 7 May 2004, and held at a site in Afghanistan. One CIA cable from the country records a request to Headquarters for the torture of al-Turki, with an interrogation plan following the standard pattern. At around the same time interrogators at the site sought specific authorisation to torture al-Magrebi in order to identify inconsistencies in al-Turki's story. Both men were subsequently subjected to 24 hours shackled in the standing sleep deprivation position, as well as dietary manipulation. It was only after the torture had begun that the prisoners' previous messages to the CIA regarding intelligence on future attacks were translated, and Headquarters confirmed that they were former CIA sources. Despite the realisation that they should not be in CIA custody, both al-Turki and al-Magrebi were held for several months before their release.

At least four detainees – Juma Gul, Sayed Habib, Zarmein and Modin Muhammad – were provided with cash payments on their release, although the exact amounts remain classified and appear to have been nominal.
## FATE AND WHEREABOUTS UNKNOWN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name (#)</th>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Entered CIA custody</th>
<th>Period of CIA custody</th>
<th>Left CIA custody</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Asat Sar Jan (#16)</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>29-30 September 2002</td>
<td>60-69 days</td>
<td>28 November – 8 December 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zakaria Zeineddin (#17)</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>1-9 October 2002</td>
<td>50-59 days</td>
<td>20 November – 7 December 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yaqub al-Baluchi (#22)</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>16-24 October 2002.</td>
<td>80-89 days</td>
<td>4-21 January 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haji Ghalgi (#27)</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>10-13 November 2002</td>
<td>190-199 days</td>
<td>19-31 May 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adel (#31)</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>13 November 2002</td>
<td>60-69 days</td>
<td>12-21 January 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hayatullah Haqqani (#34)</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>13-30 November 2002</td>
<td>80-89 days</td>
<td>1-27 February 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdullah Mursi (#40)</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>10 January – 8 February 2003</td>
<td>110-119 days</td>
<td>30 April – 7 June 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abu Khalid (#44)</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>1-5 March 2003</td>
<td>20-29 days</td>
<td>21 March – 3 April 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ibrahim Haqqani (#54)</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>1-9 May 2003</td>
<td>20-29 days</td>
<td>21 May – 7 June 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muhammad Khan (#69)</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>1-14 August 2003</td>
<td>200-209 days</td>
<td>17 February – 10 March 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Nationality</td>
<td>Start Date</td>
<td>Detention Period</td>
<td>Release Date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abd Qudra al-Hadi (#76)</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>16-30 September 2003</td>
<td>90-99 days</td>
<td>15 December 2003 – 7 January 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sa'id Allam (#78)</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>16-30 September 2003</td>
<td>90-99 days</td>
<td>15 December 2003 – 7 January 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sa'ida Gul (#79)</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>16-30 September 2003</td>
<td>90-99 days</td>
<td>15 December 2003 – 7 January 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yahya (#81)</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>16-30 September 2003</td>
<td>90-99 days</td>
<td>15 December 2003 – 7 January 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zakariya al-Rauf (#82)</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>16-30 September 2003</td>
<td>90-99 days</td>
<td>15 December 2003 – 7 January 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zamarai Khan (#83)</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>16-30 September 2003</td>
<td>90-99 days</td>
<td>15 December 2003 – 7 January 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdullah al-Qahtani (#84)</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>16-30 September 2003</td>
<td>20-29 days</td>
<td>6-29 October 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Awwad al-Shammari (#85)</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>16-30 September 2003</td>
<td>20-29 days</td>
<td>6-29 October 2003</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Little is known about these 20 prisoners, with the CIA failing to notify the SSCI about its detention of 12 of them. We know little about the location and circumstances of these men’s capture, with the exception being an account by Hikmat Shaukat’s family (#21). His son, Mustafa, has discussed being witness to a joint FBI-Pakistani operation to seize his father. Dozens of commandos, he claimed, came ‘pouncing upon us like an enemy army’ and took him away. Shaukat's wife, Ahlam, has stated that three Americans were amongst those involved in the operation, which took place in Quetta, Pakistan, on 16 October 2002.

We know that all 20 prisoners were detained for periods between September 2002 and March 2004. They were likely held solely in Afghanistan, either in the Dark Prison, at DETENTION SITE GRAY, or in one of the CIA safe-houses or proxy detention facilities in the country. CIA
cables from Afghanistan throughout 2002 and 2003 discuss the treatment of a number of these prisoners confirming that they were held in the country, and our investigation has established that five were certainly held in the Dark Prison during October 2002.

Several of these men were held contrary to the MoN standard for detention, as there was no evidence that they posed the requisite ‘continuing, serious threat of violence or death to US persons or interests.’ These include the seven men – Abu Qudra al-Hadi (#76), Sa’id Allam (#78), Sa’ida Gul (#79), Shah Khan Wali (#80), Yahya (#81), Zakariya al-Rauf (#82) and Zamarai Khan (#83) – that our investigation has established were detained on the basis of ‘thin’ evidence of involvement in terrorism, with allegations that they were travelling to Iraq to join al-Qaeda. Likewise, Haji Ghalgi (#27) was detained solely as ‘useful leverage’ to be used against one of his family members. Others seem to have been held as a result of slander by rival factions, of relationships with people in their local community, or of simply being ‘in the wrong place at the wrong time.’

At least some of these prisoners were tortured during their detention. For example, one CIA cable from Afghanistan documents a ‘regimen of limited sleep deprivation’ applied to Hikmat Shaukat while he was in the Dark Prison in October 2002. Similarly, Abu Khalid (#44) was held in the Dark Prison for 3-4 weeks in the first quarter of 2003. One cable from the site in March 2003 documents the use of sleep deprivation, while another appears to describe the torture of Khalid at a separate safe-house in the country. In neither of these cases was the torture approved by Headquarters.

Little is known about the fate and whereabouts of these men after their time in CIA secret detention. It is likely that they were either released or transferred to US military or foreign custody. In at least one case, Hikmat Shaukat had not returned home by March 2003, five months after his disappearance, despite having been transferred out of CIA custody in December 2002 or January 2003. The seven men detained together in September or October 2003 appear to have all been held for the same amount of time, and were likely released or transferred together.
Endnotes

1. SSCI, Committee Study, 9 December 2014 (redacted), p. 21, 46.
3. SSCI, Committee Study, 9 December 2014 (redacted), pp. 22-23.
4. Ibid., p. 67.
5. CIA, DETENTION SITE BLUE, Interrogation/ Psychological Assessment of Abu Zubaydah, cable, July 2003 (redacted).
8. CIA, DETENTION SITE VIOLET, cable 2166, 7 March 2005, 06:47.
10. Ibid., pp. 96, 154.
15. The Dark Prison had 20 prisoners after the first month of operation, meaning that all detainees in the programme during October 2002, except for Abu Zubaydah (#1) and Hassan bin Attash (#10), were held there. CIA (OIG), Special Review: Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities (September 2001 - October 2003), 2003-7123-IG, 7 May 2004 (redacted), p. 48.
21. The Dark Prison had 20 prisoners after the first month of operation, meaning that all detainees in the programme during October 2002, except for Abu Zubaydah (#1) and Hassan bin Attash (#10), were held there. CIA (OIG), Special Review: Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities (September 2001 - October 2003), 2003-7123-IG, 7 May 2004 (redacted), p. 48.
24. Ibid.
27. CIA, Pakistan, cable 11542, 5-11 June 2002.
29. Ibid.
30. Andy Worthington, Judge Denies Guantánamo Prisoner’s Habeas Petition, Ignores Torture in Secret CIA Prisons, 22 October 2010. The term ‘Rissat’ seems likely to come from the Arabic word for ‘directorate’, a term used for the departments of Afghan intelligence, NDS. See, also: Hassan Abu Bakr Qa'id, Some Information on Bagram Prisoners, Al Mouminine Forum, 1 November 2005.
32. The Dark Prison had 20 prisoners after the first month of operation, meaning that all detainees in the programme during October 2002, except for Abu Zubaydah (#1) and Hassan bin Attash (#10), were held there. CIA (OIG), Special Review: Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities (September 2001 - October 2003), 2003-7123-IG, 7 May 2004 (redacted), p. 48.


42. CIA, *Afghanistan*, cable 25107, 26 July 2002, 09:03.


47. SSCI, *Committee Study*, 9 December 2014 (redacted), p. 53.

48. Ibid., p. 54.


50. Ibid.

51. Ibid.


73. Ibid., para 6-8.
74. Ibid., para 9-10.
80. Ibid., para 12.
89. Ibid., p. 2
92. Ibid., p. 3.
100. Hassan Abu Bakr Qa’id, Some Information on Bagram Prisoners, Al Moumineen Forum, 1 November 2005.
112. SSCI, Committee Study, 9 December 2014 (redacted), p. 102.
114. Ibid.
118. SSCI, Committee Study, 9 December 2014 (redacted), p. 325
121. Ibid.
122. SSCI, Committee Study, 9 December 2014 (redacted), p. 368.
124. Ibid.
125. CIA, Afghanistan, cable 29963, 11-18 November 2002.
126. SSCI, Committee Study, 9 December 2014 (redacted), p. 54.
129. Ibid.
137. SSCI, Committee Study, 9 December 2014 (redacted), pp. 66-67.
140. SSCI, Committee Study, 9 December 2014 (redacted), p. 67.
141. DoJ (OPR), Investigation into the Office of Legal Counsel’s Memoranda Concerning Issues Relating to the Central Intelligence Agency’s Use of “Enhanced Interrogation Techniques” on Suspected Terrorists, 29 July 2009, p. 85.
143. SSCI, Committee Study, 9 December 2014 (redacted), p. 67.
144. DoD (CSRT), Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, 14 March 2007, p. 16.
145. CIA (OIG), Special Review: Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities (September 2001 - October 2003), 2003-7123-IG, 7 May 2004 (redacted), p. 36.
146. SSCI, Committee Study, 9 December 2014 (redacted), p. 67.
147. Ibid., pp. 67-72.
148. Ibid., p. 139.
150. SSCI, Committee Study, 9 December 2014 (redacted), p. 140.
151. CIA, Morocco, cable 1756, 19 September 2003, 08:00.
152. CIA, Guantánamo, cable 1091, 3 November 2003, 18:35.
155. For earlier reporting placing al-Nashiri on this flight, see: Thomas Hammarberg, Advancing Accountability in Respect of the CIA Black Site in Romania, memo, Council of Europe, CommDH(2012)38, 30 March 2012, p. 14.


158. CIA, DETENTION SITE BLACK, cable 3051, 30 September 2005, 12:35.

159. CIA, DETENTION SITE VIOLET, cable 3910, 24 January 2006, 18:52.


161. Ibid., pp. 96, 154.


228. Ibid., p. 141.
233. Ibid.
235. Ibid.
239. Ibid.
240. Ibid., pp. 141-142.
241. Ibid., p. 142.
243. SSCI, *Committee Study*, 9 December 2014 (redacted), pp. 61, 154.
260. SSCI, *Committee Study*, 9 December 2014 (redacted), p. 84.
261. Ibid., pp. 84–93.
264. CIA, DETENTION SITE BLACK, cable 1281, 13 June 2004, 08:01.
269. Ibid., pp. 96, 154.
270. Ibid., pp. 61, 154.
272. CIA, Pakistan, cable 41403, 2 March 2003, 09:49; CIA, Pakistan, cable 41484, 3 March 2003, 13:15.
274. One cable from the site, dated March 2003 and authorising the torture of Khaled Sheikh Mohammed (#45), was sent two days before his transfer to Afghanistan. See: CIA, Afghanistan, cable 34355, 13 March 2003. Similarly, cables from Afghanistan dated 5 March document KSM’s torture. See CIA, Afghanistan, cable 34491, 5 March 2003, 14:00.
275. CIA, Afghanistan, cable 34491, 5 March 2003, 14:00.
277. CIA, Afghanistan, cable 34757, 10 March 2003, 17:42.
279. SSCI, Committee Study, 9 December 2014 (redacted), pp. 431-432.
281. Ibid., p. 13.
283. Ibid., p. 6.
284. SSCI, Committee Study, 9 December 2014 (redacted), p. 106.
287. Ibid., p. 17.
288. SSCI, Committee Study, 9 December 2014 (redacted), p. 51. The report goes on to say: ‘In meetings between the Committee Staff and the CIA in the summer of 2013, the CIA was unable to explain the details of the photograph, to include the buckets, solution, and watering can, as well as the water board’s presence at COBALT.’
289. See, for example, the experience of Khalid al-Sharif (#51); and SSCI, Committee Study, 9 December 2014 (redacted), pp. 107-108.
291. CIA, Afghanistan, cable 34491, 5 March 2003, 14:00; CIA, Afghanistan, cable 34575, 6 March 2003, 19:29.
292. SSCI, Committee Study, 9 December 2014 (redacted), p. 100.
293. CIA (OIG), Disposition Memorandum: Alleged Use of Unauthorized Interrogation Techniques, 2004-7604-IG, 6 December 2006 (redacted), pp. 16-17.
294. CIA, Afghanistan, cable 34491, 5 March 2003, 14:00.
295. SSCI, Committee Study, 9 December 2014 (redacted), p. 121.
297. Email, 21 November 2003, subject: Al-Hawsawi
incident, reproduced in CIA (OIG), Disposition Memorandum: Alleged Use of Unauthorized Interrogation Techniques, 2004-7604-IG, 6 December 2006 (redacted), Exhibit 1.


301. CIA, DETENTION SITE VIOLET, cable 3223, date redacted.


303. Al-Hawaswi (#46) was one of five CIA prisoners transferred to third-party countries for medical care, the others being Janat Gul (#110), Gouled Dourad (#102), Ramzi bin al-Shibh (#41), and Khaled al-Maqtari (#96). Ibid., pp. 154, 493.

304. Ibid., p. 154.

305. Ibid., pp. 96, 154.

306. Ibid., pp. 61, 154.


308. SSCI, Committee Study, 9 December 2014 (redacted), p. 393.


310. SSCI, Committee Study, 9 December 2014 (redacted), p. 103.

311. Ibid., p. 122.


313. SSCI, Committee Study, 9 December 2014 (redacted), p. 76.

314. Ibid., p. 394.


316. Al-Jaza’iri (#47) provided this account to Marwan al-Jabour (#108) in 2006, while both were detained at DETENTION SITE ORANGE. Human Rights Watch, Ghost Prisoner: Two Years in Secret CIA Detention, February 2007, pp. 22-23.


324. SSCI, Committee Study, 9 December 2014 (redacted), p. 96; CIA, Bios [Redacted], undated (redacted), p. 17.


327. CIA, Afghanistan, cable 37117, 18-22 April 2003.


330. CIA, Bios [Redacted], undated (redacted), p. 17.


337. Ibid., pp. 35-37.


340. Ibid., p. 44.

341. Ibid., pp. 45-47.

342. Ibid., pp. 48-49.


344. CIA, Afghanistan, cable 36908, 18-22 April 2003.


365. Ammar al-Baluchi, Testimony: End of May, Early June 2003 (Head Trauma), CR-133-AAA, 6 August 2015.


390. Ibid.
391. Ibid.
392. SSCI, Committee Study, 9 December 2014 (redacted), p. 89; DoD (JTF-GTMO), Detainee Assessment: Majid Khan, 13 June 2008, p. 4; DoD (CSRT), Majid Khan, 15 April 2007, p. 22.
393. DoD (CSRT), Majid Khan, 15 April 2007, pp. 22-23.
394. CIA, Pakistan, cable 13658, 5 March 2003, 03:18; CIA, Pakistan, cable 13678, 7 March 2003, 07:24; CIA, Pakistan, cable 13833, 20 March 2003, 04:54; CIA, Pakistan, cable 13932, 27 March 2003, 12:44.
396. CIA, Pakistan, cable 46471, 24 May 2003, 12:42.
397. DoD (CSRT), Majid Khan, 15 April 2007, p. 25.
400. Center for Constitutional Rights, Former CIA Detainee Majid Khan’s Torture Finally Public, 2 June 2015.
401. DoD (CSRT), Majid Khan, 15 April 2007, p. 25.
402. SSCI, Committee Study, 9 December 2014 (redacted), p. 89.
406. See, for example, CIA, Afghanistan, cable 3183, 16 September 2004, 16:26; CIA, Afghanistan, cable 3206, 21 September 2004, 18:19.
408. CIA, Afghanistan, cable 3868, 29 December 2004, 15:34.
409. DoD (CSRT), Majid Khan, 15 April 2007, p. 29.
412. CIA, Afghanistan, cable 3835, 26 December 2004, 06:59.
413. CIA, Afghanistan, cable 4614, 7 June 2005, 13:58.
420. SSCI, Committee Study, 9 December 2014 (redacted), pp. 96, 104.
422. Along with all those still in CIA custody after March 2006. SSCI, Committee Study, 9 December 2014 (redacted), pp. 61, 154.
424. Ibid.


437. CIA, DETENTION SITE BLUE, cable 1015, 1 August 2003, 20:57; CIA, DETENTION SITE BLUE, cable 1017, 3 August 2003, 08:12.


441. Palestinian Prisoner Solidarity Network (Samidoun), Samer al-Barq Enters Fourth Year in Administrative Detention Without Charge or Trial, 14 July 2013; Amnesty International, Israel Must Hospitalize or Release Palestinian Hunger Striker on Verge of Death, 6 September 2012.


446. SSCI, Committee Study, 9 December 2014 (redacted), pp. 108, 311.


455. Ibid., p. 20.

456. CIA, DETENTION SITE BLACK, cable 1144, 1 December 2003, 08:23.


459. Along with all those still in CIA custody after March 2006. SSCI, Committee Study, 9 December 2014 (redacted), pp. 61, 154.

460. CIA, DETENTION SITE BROWN, cable 1242, 5 September 2006, 07:44.


462. Ibid.


467. Ibid., para 27-29.

468. Ibid., para 35-41.


470. Ibid., para 17-22.

474. Ibid., para 66.
477. Binyam Mohamed et al v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Declaration of Mohamed Farag Ahmad Bashmilah, 5 December 2007, para 116-19. At this point, Bashmilah thought he was being held at a location outside of Afghanistan.
478. Qaru (#75) was held in CIA custody for 600-609 days from 9 September 2003 (i.e., until 1-10 May 2005); Bashmilah (#89) was held for 550-559 days from 26 October 2003 (i.e., until 28 April – 7 May 2005); and al-Asad (#92) was held for 480-489 days from 3-8 January 2004 (i.e. until 27 April – 11 May 2005).
479. SSCI, Committee Study, 9 December 2014 (redacted), pp. 109, 432.
481. CIA, Afghanistan cable 1393, 20 October 2003, 10:06.
482. CIA, Afghanistan cable 1396, 23 October 2003.
485. SSCI, Committee Study, 9 December 2014 (redacted), p. 110; Sam Stein, This May Be the Most Remarkable Story in the CIA Torture Report, Huffington Post, 9 December 2014.
489. SSCI, Committee Study, 9 December 2014 (redacted), pp. 15, 111.
491. Ibid., pp. 62-63.
492. Ibid., p. 64.
494. SSCI, Committee Study, 9 December 2014 (redacted), p. 100.
496. Ibid., p. 66.
498. Ibid.
504. SSCI, Committee Study, 9 December 2014 (redacted), pp. 380, 382-3, 385.
506. Ibid., p. 25.
507. CIA, Afghanistan cable 1591, 8-10 January 2004.
509. Cited in Ibid., p. 23.
513. Ibid., pp. 68-69.
514. Ibid., p. 69.
515. Ibid., p. 70.
516. Ibid., pp. 71-72.
517. Ibid., p. 73.
518. Ibid., p. 75.
519. Ibid., p. 75.
521. Ibid., p. 3.
522. Ibid.
523. Ibid., p. 4.
524. Ibid., p. 7.
525. Ibid., p. 9.
527. Ibid., pp. 14-16.
528. Ibid., pp. 17-19.
529. Ibid., p. 19.
530. Ibid., pp. 19-20.
533. Ibid., para 8-25.
537. Ibid., para 47-57.
541. SSCI, Committee Study, 9 December 2014 (redacted), pp. 130-131.
548. Ibid., para 72-75.
549. SSCI, Committee Study, 9 December 2014 (redacted), pp. 130-131.
550. Along with all those still in CIA custody after March 2006. SSCI, Committee Study, 9 December 2014 (redacted), pp. 154, 156.
552. SSCI, Committee Study, 9 December 2014 (redacted), p. 326.


567. CIA, DETENTION SITE BLACK, cable 1324, 1 February 2004.


574. SSCI, Committee Study, 9 December 2014 (redacted), p. 337.

575. Ibid., p. 339.

576. Ibid., pp. 141-143.

577. For example, the rendition aircraft landed in Afghanistan on 9 March, in Morocco between 10-11 March, and in Guantánamo Bay on 12 March. Given that the earliest date for his entry into CIA custody was 10 March, this would suggest he was still on board the aircraft when it left Afghanistan.


579. Ibid., p. 493.


581. Along with all those still in CIA custody after March 2006. SSCI, Committee Study, 9 December 2014 (redacted), pp. 61, 154.


583. ‘Abdallah (#103) entered CIA custody on the same day as, or after, Gouled Dourad (#102). Dourad entered CIA custody between 10-12 March 2004. ‘Abdallah was held for 870-879 days, and given that he would have left CIA custody no later than 6 September 2006, he will have been in detention by 19 April 2004.


585. Ibid., pp. 9-12.

586. Ibid., p. 13.

587. Ibid., pp. 13-23.


592. According to al-Jabour (#108), he was transferred alongside a Palestinian, a Libyan and an Afghan, all of whom were then held with him at DETENTION SITE ORANGE. Our investigation has determined that the Palestinian was Abd al-Bari al-Filistini (#106) and the Libyan was Mustafa al-Mehdi (#107). See Human Rights Watch, Ghost Prisoner: Two Years in Secret CIA Detention, February 2007, pp. 12-13.


595. Ibid., pp. 135-136.

596. Ibid., p. 136.

597. See, also: Thomas Hammarberg, Advancing Accountability in Respect of the CIA Black Site in Romania, memo, Council of Europe, CommDH(2012)38, 30 March 2012, p. 15.

598. Ibid.


APPENDIX 1


605. Along with all those still in CIA custody after March 2006. Ibid., pp. 61, 154.

606. Ibid., p. 137.


609. SSCI, Committee Study, 9 December 2014 (redacted), pp. 61, 154.


611. CIA, Afghanistan, cable 3189, 18 September 2004, 15:58.


617. SSCI, Committee Study, 9 December 2014 (redacted), pp. 476-477.


629. Along with all those still in CIA custody after March 2006. SSCI, Committee Study, 9 December 2014 (redacted), pp. 61, 154.


631. Along with all those still in CIA custody after March 2006. SSCI, Committee Study, 9 December 2014 (redacted), pp. 61, 154.


633. Ibid., p. 148.

634. Ibid., pp. 148-149.

635. Ibid., p. 149.

636. Ibid.


642. SSCI, Committee Study, 9 December 2014 (redacted), p. 163.

643. Ibid.
prisoner, who was taped crying during interrogations. The tapes were later used as leverage. CIA, Afghanistan, cable 29864, 11-12 November 2002. See, also: Interview transcript, Shah Wali Khan and Nazar Ali, with Singeli Agnew and Sebastian Walker, Kandahar, Afghanistan, 12 February 2016.


656. SSCI, Committee Study, 9 December 2014 (redacted), p. 120.

657. CIA, Afghanistan, cable 2296, 10 May 2004, 17:09.

658. SSCI, Committee Study, 9 December 2014 (redacted), p. 16.

659. Ibid., p. 120.


665. Qari Rehman was captured by the FBI in Quetta, Pakistan, a week after the capture of Hikmat Shaukat (#21) on 16 October 2002. See Shahzada Zulfiqar, Silence of the Mullahs, Newsline, March 2003.


671. CIA, Afghanistan, cable 2179, 31 March – 7

672. SSCI, Committee Study, 9 December 2014 (redacted), p. 83.

673. Ibid., p. 16. Mohammed has testified that he was shown a photo of Habib by interrogators, and that he had been ‘stripped and hanged’. DoD (CSRT), Khaled Sheikh Mohammed, 10 March 2007, p. 16.


676. SSCI, Committee Study, 9 December 2014 (redacted), p. 83.


680. Ibid., pp. 16, 111.

681. These twelve are: Asat Sar Jan (#16), Zakaria Zeineddin (#17), Hikmat Shaukat (#21), Yaqub al-Baluchi (#22), Haji Ghalgi (#27), Nazar Ali (#28), Adel (#31), Hayatullah Haqqani (#34), Abu Khalid (#44), Ibrahim Haqqani (#54), Abdullah al-Qahtani (#84) and Awwad al-Shammari (#85).


685. These five are: Asat Sar Jan (#16), Zakaria Zeineddin (#17), Hikmat Shaukat (#21), Yaqub al-Baluchi (#22) and Abu Khalid (#44). The Dark Prison had 20 prisoners after the first month of operation, meaning that all detainees in the programme during October 2002, except for Abu Zubaydah (#1) and Hassan bin Attash (#10), were held there. CIA (OIG), Special Review: Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities (September 2001 - October 2003), 2003-7123-IG, 7 May 2004 (redacted), p. 48.


687. These names have been identified through our analysis of the dates that CIA prisoners entered and left the programme, cross-matched with a September 2003 CIA email cited in: Ibid., p. 16.


692. This safe-house had not been formally designated a detention site. CIA, Afghanistan, cable 35341, 16-22 March 2003.

693. SSCI, Committee Study, 9 December 2014 (redacted), pp. 102-103.

APPENDIX 2

THE RENDITIONS
APPENDIX 2: THE RENDITIONS

This appendix provides detailed profiles of 62 separate rendition circuits by CIA aircraft between October 2001 and August 2006. Through triangulating our flight data with the facts we have established regarding the locations of individuals held within the torture programme, we document here 121 renditions as part of these 62 operations. Some of these renditions were to US military or foreign custody, either directly or after a period of CIA detention. Others were into, out of, or between CIA black sites. Most were for the purposes of (continued) secret detention and torture. All took place outside of the law.

Each profile sets out our evidence regarding the dates and destinations of individual prisoner transfers, alongside an account of the corresponding movements of a known CIA rendition aircraft. Where we have them, each profile also provides links to billing and other documents which pertain to the specific circuit, and which provide confirmatory evidence that the circuit was situated within the overall rendition programme.

Where our claims derive from calculations based on known detention periods and other aspects of an individual’s time in the CIA programme, we provide enough detail here for others to understand fully the basis of our claims and the corresponding degree of certainty in each case. Profiles also include an extract from our CIA Flights Database. This extract provides a leg-by-leg account of the aircraft’s movements, with specific departure and arrival times (in GMT) where we have these. For ease of interpretation, we have replaced the airport-specific ICAO codes with the names of the city or region which the airport serves. Where false flight plans were filed to disguise landings at black site destinations, we have noted this in the table (which primarily lists the true destination). Rows in bold denote those flights which transported prisoners.
CIA FLIGHTS DATABASE: SOURCES

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<th>Agency</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AG</td>
<td>Portuguese MEP Ana Gomes</td>
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<tr>
<td>ATC</td>
<td>Aircraft and airport data, such as pilot logs and communications over the AFTN, all of which are footnoted in the profiles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BMVBS</td>
<td>German Federal Ministry of Transport, Building and Urban Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAA-LT</td>
<td>Lithuanian Civil Aviation Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAA-NO</td>
<td>Norwegian Civil Aviation Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNSD</td>
<td>Lithuanian Parliament (Seimas) inquiry into CIA rendition and secret detention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSC</td>
<td>Billing documents from within DynCorp/Computer Sciences Corporation network</td>
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<td>DTTAS</td>
<td>Irish Department of Transport, Tourism and Sport</td>
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<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>Eurocontrol</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAA</td>
<td>US Federal Aviation Administration</td>
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<tr>
<td>GC</td>
<td>Documents from a Guardia Civil inquiry in Spain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMWG</td>
<td>Danish Inter-Ministerial Working Group relating to CIA rendition flights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISAVIA</td>
<td>Icelandic air navigation provider</td>
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<tr>
<td>PANS A</td>
<td>Polish Air Navigation Services Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SG</td>
<td>Straż Graniczna (Polish Border Guard)</td>
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</table>

In some cases, our profiles simply confirm the findings of earlier investigations, some of which have formed the basis of legal action or parliamentary investigation. We have reproduced this data here to paint as full a picture as possible. In most cases, however, our profiles present for the first time a full account of particular renditions, including many newly-identified operations.

A word is needed here about our thresholds for determining which circuits – and which particular renditions – to profile. If a circuit is profiled here, it is because our data documents the movement of an aircraft which we know to have been part of the CIA rendition network, between locations which correlate strongly with known prisoner transfers, at a time which also correlates. In some cases, the exact destination and date of the transfer is known, and there is an exact match with the flight data. In other cases, the destination is known but the date is within a range of a number of days or weeks. Here, we profile circuits when we have only one or two corresponding flights between the two locations during the relevant period (where there are two flights, we profile both as possible). At other times, we know the date of a prisoner’s transfer, but only the location from which, or to which, they were moved (but not both). These cases are profiled where there is only one corresponding flight in our data, and the flight lands at a location known to have played a role in the torture programme.

These thresholds are relatively high, and there are many possible (indeed, likely) rendition operations in our data which we do not profile here. In some cases, profiled operations include flights which are possible additional renditions, but which we have not listed as such (as they
do not meet our thresholds). For example, we have identified that Ramzi bin al-Shibh was rendered from Morocco to Romania in October 2004 (Circuit 51). The aircraft involved, N227SV, stopped off in Jordan en route, with no obvious reason to do so. It is possible that a second prisoner was rendered from Morocco on this flight, and taken to further detention in Jordan. But without independent evidence of this transfer, we have not been able to list this here.

In other cases, there are additional flight circuits by known rendition aircraft in our data which are highly suggestive of rendition operations, moving between black site locations during their periods of operation. For example, N63MU flew between Afghanistan and Jordan on 3 September 2006, as the two remaining black sites in Afghanistan were being emptied. This is the only flight in our data by a known rendition aircraft from Afghanistan during this time, and is likely to have transferred prisoners out of the CIA’s programme. Possible candidates include Khaled al-Maqtari (#96), rendered from Afghanistan to Yemen between 29 August – 6 September 2006; Abu Ja’far al-Iraqi (#117), rendered from Afghanistan to US military custody in Iraq between 1-6 September 2006; and four prisoners who were transferred from the programme during this time but whose fate and whereabouts afterwards are unknown (Abu Yasir al-Jaza’iri (#47), Abdi Rashid Samatar (#113); Abu Munthir al-Magrebi (#115) and Ibrahim Jan (#116)). However, without additional evidence of these men’s fate, we are unable to confirm their presence on board this flight.

Our full Flights Database, available on The Rendition Project website (www.therenditionproject.co.uk), provides access to all of our flight data, including records of flights likely to have involved renditions but not profiled here.
CIRCUIT 1: 15-24 OCTOBER 2001 (N379P)
RENDITION: JAMIL QASIM SAEED MOHAMMED, PAKISTAN TO JORDAN

Jamil Qasim Saeed Mohammed was a Yemeni microbiology student, who is reported to have been rendered from Pakistan to Jordan on 23 October 2001. The original report – the first to refer to the use of rendition in the ‘War on Terror’ – identified the aircraft N379P on the ground at Karachi airport in the early hours of 23 October, and claimed that Pakistani intelligence handed Mohammed over to US agents. According to this report, the aircraft landed from Amman, Jordan, at around 1am local time, and departed back to Amman with Mohammed on board at around 2.40am.

Flight data for N379P shows that it was on the ground in Jordan on both 22 October and 23 October, with enough time between its arrival and departure to fly to Karachi and back. Although our data does not document this part of the circuit, a landing in Karachi at 01:00 local time (20:00 GMT the day before) fits with a departure from Amman at around 15:00-16:00 GMT on 22 October. Likewise, a departure at 02:40 local time (21:40 GMT the day before) fits with a landing in Amman at around 02:00-03:00 GMT on 23 October.

FLIGHT DATA EXTRACT FOR N379P

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<th>DATE</th>
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<th>DEPART</th>
<th>ARRIVE</th>
<th>SOURCES</th>
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<td>Prestwick, UK</td>
<td>23:53</td>
<td>05:48</td>
<td>EC; FAA</td>
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<td>Frankfurt, Germany</td>
<td>06:40</td>
<td>08:09</td>
<td>EC</td>
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<td>Lisbon, Portugal</td>
<td>12:22</td>
<td>14:55</td>
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<td>Frankfurt, Germany</td>
<td>15:52</td>
<td>18:07</td>
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</table>

Several flights between Germany, Georgia and Jordan, 18-19 October. Not shown here.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>FROM</th>
<th>TO</th>
<th>DEPART</th>
<th>ARRIVE</th>
<th>SOURCES</th>
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Return flight, Jordan → Pakistan → Jordan

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CIRCUIT 2: 18-20 DECEMBER 2001 (N379P)
RENDITION: MOHAMED EL-ZERY, SWEDEN TO EGYPT
AHMED AGIZA, SWEDEN TO EGYPT

On 18 December 2001, Mohamed el-Zery and Ahmed Agiza were rendered from Sweden to Egypt, where they were detained and tortured for several months before being brought to trial. An investigation by the Swedish Parliamentary Ombudsman found that this rendition was conducted with the full knowledge of the Swedish authorities, who rejected the men’s asylum applications, arrested them, and drove them to Stockholm-Bromma Airport. Once there, the Swedish Security Police (SÄPO) handed them over to US and Egyptian officials, with the CIA renditions team preparing the men for transfer using the CIA’s standard modus operandi.

Just before 9 p.m. the American plane touched down. Officer Y went to speak to the occupants of the plane. These included, in addition to its crew, a security team of seven or eight, among them a doctor and two Egyptian officials. Officer Y informed the American officials that A. and E.Z. were waiting in the vehicles parked in front of the police station and the Americans were taken to them.

The security team, all of whom were disguised by hoods around their heads, then went up to the vehicles in which A. and E.Z. were sitting. One of the men was taken first to the police station by the team. Inside the station, in a small changing room, the American officials conducted what they had referred to as a security check. According to reports, a doctor was present in the changing room. When the check had been completed, the second man was sent for and the same procedure repeated.

The inquiry has revealed that this security check comprised at least the following. A and E.Z. were subjected to a body search, their clothes were cut to pieces and placed in bags, their hair was thoroughly examined, as were their oral cavities and ears. In addition they were handcuffed and their ankles fettered, each was then dressed in an overall and photographed. Finally loose hoods without holes for their eyes were placed over their heads. A and E.Z. were then taken out of the police station in bare feet and led to the aircraft.³

Swedish Ombudsman

N379P flew between Sweden and Egypt on 18 December 2001, matching the transfer of el-Zery and Agiza between the two countries. Eurocontrol data lists the shell company Premier Executive Transport Services as the operator, and Jeppesen Dataplan acted as trip planners for the circuit, filing flight plans that were coded STS/STATE.⁴ Billing documents for this circuit include invoices to Jeppesen Dataplan from Luftfartsverket, the Swedish air navigation service,⁵ and from the Swedish Civil Aviation Administration.⁶
CIRCUIT 3: 9-15 JANUARY 2002 (N379P)
RENDITION: MOHAMMED SAAD IQBAL MADNI, INDONESIA TO EGYPT (VIA DIEGO GARCIA)

On 10 January 2002, Mohammed Saad Iqbal Madni was rendered from Jakarta, Indonesia, to Egypt, having been detained since the early hours of 9 January at the request of the CIA. Once in Egypt, Madni says that he was detained and tortured for 92 days before being rendered to Bagram Airbase in Afghanistan. Our calculations show that this further rendition took place on 12 April 2002, and we have identified the rendition circuit involved (Circuit 5).

N379P left its home base of Johnston County Airport in the afternoon of 9 January, just hours after Madni had been arrested in Jakarta. It then flew to Cairo (via Washington), before disappearing from flight records until 15 January, when it reappears in Cairo, heading back to the United States (via the UK).

Although there are no flight records documenting the whereabouts of N379P between 10-15 January, evidence points to this aircraft being involved in the rendition of Madni. Eyewitnesses have spoken of an unmarked Gulfstream V jet on the ground in Jakarta on the night of 10 January, and Madni himself has testified that there were Egyptian officials at the airport, one of whom confirmed that he had travelled to Indonesia specifically to pick him up. These officials would have been picked up during the stopover in Cairo on the way out.

Madni has testified that he was flown for 5-7 hours before landing for around 30 minutes, during which time he was photographed but kept on the plane. The aircraft then took off again, flying for a further 3-4 hours before landing in Cairo in the morning of 11 January. These flying times, the distances involved, and the known speed of a Gulfstream V all suggest that the stopover location was Diego Garcia. Confirmatory evidence for the role of Diego Garcia comes from the former UK Foreign Secretary, David Miliband, who has acknowledged that an aircraft with a detainee on board refuelled in Diego Garcia in January 2002. There is no other known detainee transfer at that time whose route would have taken them via Diego Garcia.
I was detained in Jakarta around 4.30am on 9 January 2002. Twenty Indonesian officers came to my house and took me away. The following day, 10 January, at around 8.00pm, I was taken to the airport at Jakarta. I was met by seven or eight people... They took me to a room. A man picked me by the scruff of the neck and threw me against the wall. The left side of my face banged against the wall and my ear drum burst. It even started bleeding. Then they took me to a room and stripped me naked. They shackled me from my neck all the way down to my feet... They then dressed me in other clothes, threw me in the car and drove me to a plane... The intelligence personnel covered my eyes with a hood, and pushed me aboard a jet aircraft. I was then put in a coffin-shaped wooden box lying horizontal on the floor. The box was open but I was bound with plastic, with shackles wound so tightly all around my body that I was unable to move. A plastic sheet was then placed over the box. The plane took off around two hours later, I would estimate at around 10.00pm. As a result of the beating, I was bleeding from my nose, mouth and ears, and I later learned that there was blood in my urine....

Once N379P landed in Cairo on 11 January, it stayed on the ground for four days before heading back to the US. Again this matches with Madni’s testimony: he has said that masked men were present during a series of long interrogations by Egyptian agents on 11-12 January. These masked men did not speak, but passed notes with questions to the Egyptians.

Eurocontrol data lists the shell company Premier Executive Transport Services as the operator.

**FLIGHT DATA EXTRACT FOR N379P**

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Likely return flight, Egypt → Indonesia → Egypt, via a stopover in Diego Garcia on return

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CIRCUIT 4: 6-16 FEBRUARY 2002 (N379P)
RENDITION: ALI AL-HAJJ AL-SHARQAWI (#93), PAKISTAN TO JORDAN

Ali al-Hajj al-Sharqawi was captured in Karachi, Pakistan, on 7 February 2002, and then transferred to Jordanian custody on 16 February 2002. Al-Sharqawi has confirmed his detention in Jordan, where he was held and tortured for nearly two years, before being rendered to Afghanistan in January 2004. This second transfer has also been matched with flight data (Circuit 36).

Flight data for N379P shows that the aircraft left the United States the day before al-Sharqawi’s capture, and was in the region at the time of his transfer to Jordan. While gaps in the data do not allow us to track the aircraft’s full movements, it was on the ground in Jordan on both 11 and 15 February, with preceding gaps in the data allowing for flights to and from Pakistan. No other rendition aircraft landed in Jordan during this time. Eurocontrol data lists the shell company Premier Executive Transport Services as the operator.

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Possible flights, UAE → Pakistan → Jordan

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Possible flights, Bahrain → Pakistan → Jordan

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CIRCUIT 5: 8-15 APRIL 2002 (N379P)
RENDITION: MOHAMMED SAAD IQBAL MADNI, EGYPT TO AFGHANISTAN (VIA UZBEKISTAN)
MAMDOUH HABIB, EGYPT TO AFGHANISTAN (VIA UZBEKISTAN)

Mohammed Saad Iqbal Madni was rendered from Indonesia to Egypt on 10 January 2002 (Circuit 3). According to Madni, he was held in Egyptian custody for 92 days before being rendered again,
this time to Bagram Airbase in Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{19} Calculation shows that this further rendition took place on 12 April 2002, and this is confirmed by a Department of Defense (DoD) document which notes his handover to US forces on 13 April.\textsuperscript{20}

Madni has testified that he was rendered alongside another prisoner, Mamdouh Habib, and that they were both shackled in the foetal position, and beaten and given electric shocks by the guards on the flight. After several hours, the aircraft landed, and they were transferred to a second aircraft and flown to Bagram.\textsuperscript{21} A DoD document confirms that Habib was transferred from Egyptian to American custody at around this time, having spent six months in Egyptian detention after his October 2001 capture in Pakistan.\textsuperscript{22}

\begin{quote}
On or around 11 April 2002, I was taken to an office in the Egyptian Intelligence building where I was being held, and forced to sign a piece of paper saying that I had been given excellent treatment and that no-one had tortured me. I was then taken out of the building to an airport in Cairo. I was handed over to some US personnel dressed in back uniforms with a US flag on one arm. They taped my mouth and put me on a plane. On the plane was another man I later learned was an Egyptian/Australian citizen called Mamdouh Habib... For the duration of the flight, Mamdouh and I were shackled in a foetal position and we were beaten and given electric shocks by the American guards if we tried to ask for anything. After several hours our plane stopped and we were unshackled. We were brought off the plane and made to run by our US guards dragging us by our shackles, for ten minutes to another plane, which we were taken onto. This plane took off and flew us to our final destination, which I later learned was Bagram Airbase, near Kabul in Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{23}
\end{quote}

Mohammed Saad Iqbal Madni

N379P flew between Egypt and Uzbekistan on 12 April 2002, matching Madni and Habib’s transfer from Egypt to a location where they were loaded onto a second aircraft and flown to Afghanistan. Eurocontrol data lists the shell company Premier Executive Transport Services as the operator.

\begin{table}[h]
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\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
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\textbf{DATE} & \textbf{FROM} & \textbf{TO} & \textbf{DEPART} & \textbf{ARRIVE} & \textbf{SOURCES} \\
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9 Apr 02 & Washington, DC & Cairo, Egypt & 02:04 & 13:06 & EC; FAA \\
12 Apr 02 & Cairo, Egypt & Tashkent, Uzbekistan & 17:45 & 22:47 & EC \\
13 Apr 02 & Tashkent, Uzbekistan & Frankfurt, Germany & 06:09 & 12:08 & EC; PANSA\textsuperscript{24} \\
15 Apr 02 & Frankfurt, Germany & Washington, DC & 11:45 & 19:14 & EC; FAA \\
15 Apr 02 & Washington, DC & Williamsburg, VA & 21:40 & 22:14 & FAA \\
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\end{tabular}
\caption{Flight Data Extract for N379P}
\end{table}
Zakariya, Jamal Boudraa and Abbar al-Hawari were captured together in Georgia on 28 April 2002. After being held in a warehouse for four days, they were transferred to Afghanistan. Our own calculations have established that the latest date these men were rendered to CIA custody was 2 May 2002. These are based on the fact that Boudraa was later rendered to Algeria on 22 January 2004 (Circuit 37), and that he was held in CIA custody for 630-639 days.

When I was first captured, a car came around and the people inside were talking Russian and Georgian. I also heard a little Chechnya. We were delivered to another group who spoke perfect Russian. They sold us to the dogs. The Americans came two days later with a brief case full of money. They took us to a forest, then a private plane to Kabul, Afghanistan.

Abbar al-Hawari

N63MU flew from Georgia to Uzbekistan on 1-2 May 2002, matching the transfer of these three men. It is likely that another aircraft then took them from Uzbekistan to Afghanistan.

N63MU was operated by FirstFlight, and billing documents for this circuit include an invoice from FirstFlight to AirMarketing for $203,388.65, one from AirMarketing to SportsFlight, and another from Capital Aviation to the prime contractor, DynCorp.
Abou Elkassim Britel has testified that he was captured on 10 March 2002 in Lahore, Pakistan, and detained and tortured by Pakistani forces for several weeks. He was moved to the headquarters of the ISI in Islamabad on 5 May 2002, where he was interrogated on multiple occasions by US officials. He was then rendered to Morocco on 24 May 2002, alongside another prisoner (whom we have, as yet, been unable to identify).

On the night of May 24, 2002, I was handcuffed, blindfolded, and taken by car to an airport. About one half hour thereafter, I was grabbed around the neck from behind so tightly I thought I would suffocate. I was forced into what seemed to me to be a small bathroom where my clothes were sliced off me. My blindfold was then removed and I saw four or five men dressed in black from head to toe, with only their eyes showing. I was photographed, had a diaper put on me, and was dressed in a torn t-shirt. I was again blindfolded and placed in a metallic slip and chained to the shackles that bound my hands and feet. I was then dragged on board a small aircraft and forced onto my back... I was instructed not to move, and when I did I was hit or kicked. My back began to hurt during the flight and I asked for permission to change positions. My request was refused and instead I had my mouth taped shut.

N379P flew from Pakistan to Morocco on 24 May 2002, matching these transfers. Eurocontrol data lists the shell company Premier Executive Transport Services as the operator, and Jeppesen Dataplan filed flight plans, which were coded STS/STATE.
CIRCUIT 8: 17-23 JULY 2002 (N379P)

RENDITION: MOHAMEDOU OULD SLAHI, JORDAN TO AFGHANISTAN

BINYAM MOHAMED (#95), PAKISTAN TO MOROCCO

TWO UNKNOWN DETAINEES, PAKISTAN TO MOROCCO

According to a DoD document, Mohamedou Ould Slahi was captured in Mauritania on 20 November 2001, and transferred to Jordan on 28 November. He was held in Jordan for around eight months before being transferred to US custody in Bagram on 19 July 2002. Slahi has confirmed the date of this rendition in an extensive account.

According to the Committee Study, Binyam Mohamed was rendered from Pakistan to proxy detention in [redacted] on xx July 2002. Mohamed himself has testified that the rendition took place on 21 July 2002, and that he was flown to Morocco. During the 8-10 hour flight, he was strapped to his seat alongside two other detainees.

N379P flew between Jordan and Afghanistan on 19 July 2002, matching Slahi’s transfer between the two countries. It then flew between Pakistan and Morocco on 21 July 2002, matching Binyam Mohamed’s rendition. Eurocontrol data lists the shell company Premier Executive Transport Services as the operator.

### FLIGHT DATA EXTRACT FOR N379P

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Flight, Afghanistan to Pakistan

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| 22 Jul 02| Rabat, Morocco                | Shannon, Ireland                | 04:44   | 07:21  | EC      |
| 23 Jul 02| Shannon, Ireland              | Washington, DC                  | 09:55   | 16:07  | EC; FAA |
| 23 Jul 02| Washington, DC                | Johnston County, NC             | 17:55   | 18:37  | FAA     |
It has been reported that Umar Faruq was captured in Jakarta, Indonesia, in early June 2002, and our investigation has established that he was transferred into CIA custody between 14-29 September 2002. It is possible that Faruq was the prisoner who was flown through Diego Garcia in September 2002, as acknowledged by the British Government in 2008. N379P is the only known rendition aircraft to land in Diego Garcia during September 2002 and, while there are gaps in the flight data, the known movements of the aircraft at this time are consistent with a rendition flight from Southeast Asia to North Africa. It is possible that Faruq was rendered to Egypt, and then onwards to CIA custody in Afghanistan on 29 September 2002. 

On 15 February British officials were informed by their US counterparts that, contrary to earlier assurances by the US that Diego Garcia had not been used for rendition flights, recent US investigations had revealed two occasions, in January and September 2002, when this had in fact occurred. In both cases a US plane refuelled in Diego Garcia whilst a detainee was on board. UK Foreign Secretary David Miliband

Hassan bin Attash and Ramzi bin al-Shibh were captured together in Karachi, Pakistan, on 11 September 2002, and held in Pakistan for 3-4 days. Bin Attash has testified that he was then transferred to the Dark Prison in Afghanistan, and held for 2-3 days before being rendered onwards to Jordan. This transfer would have been between 16-18 September 2002.

Bin al-Shibh's testimony suggests a similar length of time at the Dark Prison: he was shackled in a standing stress position for 2-3 days while in Afghanistan, his second place of detention. The Committee Study notes that bin al-Shibh was rendered to a foreign government on September 2002, and that he was rendered into CIA custody in Poland on February 2003.

We have identified this second rendition operation – a flight from Morocco to Poland on 8 February 2003 – and thus can verify that bin al-Shibh was held in Morocco from September 2002. Video and audio recordings of bin al-Shibh’s interrogations in Morocco are also reported to be held by the CIA.

N379P flew between Afghanistan, Jordan and Morocco on 17 September 2002, matching the transfer of bin Attash to Jordan, and bin al-Shibh to Morocco. Eurocontrol data lists the shell company Premier Executive Transport Services as the operator.
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**Possible flights, Diego Garcia → Jakarta → Diego Garcia → Egypt**

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Abd al-Salam al-Hilah was captured in Egypt on or around 20 September, and held in Egyptian custody for about a week before being rendered to CIA custody. According to Amnesty International, he was initially held in the Dark Prison in Afghanistan, a fact confirmed by his description of the site, as well as the testimony of other prisoners.

It is possible that Umar Faruq was rendered between Egypt and Afghanistan alongside al-Hilah, having been captured in Indonesia and rendered to Egypt two weeks previously (Circuit 9). Faruq entered CIA custody at the same time as, or before, al-Hilah, and if he was in Egypt during September 2002 it is likely that both men were rendered together.

N379P flew between Egypt and Afghanistan on 29 September 2002, matching al-Hilah’s (and possibly Faruq’s) transfer between the two countries. Eurocontrol data lists the shell company Premier Executive Transport Services as the operator.

**FLIGHT DATA EXTRACT FOR N379P**

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Pacha Wazir was captured in the United Arab Emirates in late 2002.\textsuperscript{56} An account by a former CIA interrogator, Glenn Carle, describes his ongoing interrogation of a man whose description fits closely with Wazir’s, in a location whose description fits closely with Morocco.\textsuperscript{57}

N63MU flew from Dubai to Morocco between 7-8 October 2002, and is the only flight by a known rendition aircraft between the two countries during this time. It is therefore likely that Wazir was on board this flight. The aircraft was operated by Airborne, and flight plans were filed by Universal Weather and Aviation. Billing documents for this circuit include an invoice from Universal Weather to Airborne for overflight permissions, the submission of flight plans, and the arrangement of diplomatic permits,\textsuperscript{58} and an invoice from brokers AirMarketing Services to SportsFlight, for $174,103.90.\textsuperscript{59} In turn, costs were passed up the contracting chain, with brokers Capital Aviation submitting an invoice to DynCorp for $217,890.00.\textsuperscript{60}

**FLIGHT DATA EXTRACT FOR N63MU**

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CIRCUIT 12: 8-10 OCTOBER 2002 (N829MG)
RENDITION: MAHER ARAR, US TO JORDAN (VIA ITALY)

On 8 October 2002, Maher Arar was rendered from New York, where he had been held for almost two weeks by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), to Jordan, where he was taken overland to Syria and transferred into the custody of Syrian military intelligence. He was held in secret detention in Syria, and repeatedly tortured, for almost a year.62

On October 8, 2002, Mr. Arar was awakened at three o’clock in the morning and told that he was to be removed to Syria. Mr. Arar [said] that, at that point, he had begun to cry and say that he would be tortured if sent to Syria. He said he had felt ‘destroyed’. Mr. Arar was taken to New Jersey, put on a corporate jet, and flown to Amman, Jordan, with brief stops in Washington, D.C., Portland, Maine, and Rome, Italy. Throughout the journey, he was chained and shackled in the back of the plane. The shackles were removed only at the end of the trip, when he was given the opportunity to have a meal with his guards. He could not eat.63

Canadian Commission of Inquiry

N829MG flew between Maine (US) and Jordan on 8 October 2002, via a stopover in Italy, matching Arar’s transfer between the two countries. Eurocontrol data lists the shell company Presidential Aviation as the operator.

FLIGHT DATA EXTRACT FOR N829MG

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**CIRCUIT 13: 8-13 NOVEMBER 2002 (N85VM)**

**RENDITION: ABD AL-RAHIM AL-NASHIRI (#26), DUBAI TO AFGHANISTAN**

Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri was captured in the UAE in mid-October 2002, and held in proxy detention until his rendition to the Dark Prison in Afghanistan on xx November 2002. One CIA cable from the site, dated no later than 18 November, documents this rendition. Al-Nashiri was held at the site for five days, and then rendered again to the CIA black site in Thailand. A declassified report by the Department of Justice (DoJ) makes clear that al-Nashiri was brought to the Thai site on 15 November, and our investigation has identified a possible rendition flight for this onward transfer (Circuit 14). This would suggest that al-Nashiri was flown from Dubai to Afghanistan on 10 November 2002.

*During the rendition subject was alert and appeared orientated to the situation. No evidence of psychosis or severe mental disorder was observed. He was tearful and distressed, but not in excess to the situation. He was able to understand complex nonverbal commands. During the flight to [redacted] the subject slept or remained quiet approximately [redacted] hours. He made one request in English for water immediately upon entering the aircraft, and did not speak again. He displayed no emotions during the flight.*

**CIA cable**

Flight data for the known rendition aircraft N85VM includes a flight from Dubai to Afghanistan between 8-12 November 2002, matching al-Nashiri’s transfer between the two countries on 10 November. Eurocontrol data shows Richmor Aviation as the aircraft operator for this circuit, and billing documentation includes an invoice from Richmor Aviation to SportsFlight Air for $198,930.30.

**FLIGHT DATA EXTRACT FOR N85VM**

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Circuit 14: 12-18 November 2002 (N379P)

Rendition: Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri (#26), Afghanistan to Thailand

Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri was rendered to Afghanistan on 10 November 2002 (Circuit 13), and held at the Dark Prison for five days before being rendered again to the CIA black site in Thailand.70 Although there are no records in our data of a flight between Afghanistan and Thailand in November 2002, N379P was in the area during that time, with incomplete data regarding its full circuit. Moreover, the known legs of this circuit suggest that the missing data – relating to its movements between Central Asia and Southeast Asia between 13-16 November 2002 – may well have included the rendition of al-Nashiri to the CIA site in Thailand. The circuit includes a stopover in Hawaii for 24 hours towards the end, as in Circuit 16, and such rest stopovers post-rendition are a common feature of rendition circuits. Eurocontrol data lists the shell company Premier Executive Transport Services as the operator for this circuit.

Flight Data Extract for N379P

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Possible flight, Afghanistan to Thailand

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CIRCUIT 15: 3-6 DECEMBER 2002 (N63MU)

RENDITION: ABU ZUBAYDAH (#1), THAILAND TO POLAND (VIA DUBAI)
ABD AL-RAHIM AL-NASHIRI (#26), THAILAND TO POLAND (VIA DUBAI)

Between 4-5 December 2002, Abu Zubaydah and Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri were rendered from the CIA black site in Thailand to the newly-opened black site in Poland. The Committee Study acknowledges that this transfer took place ‘in December 2002’, and it is clear that al-Nashiri was subjected to sustained torture at the Thai site up until 4 December, and again at the new site from 5 December.

N63MU flew between Thailand and Poland, 4-5 December 2002, matching Zubaydah and al-Nashiri’s transfer between the two countries. The aircraft was operated by FirstFlight Management, with trip planner Universal Weather filing the flight plans. Although flight plans filed with Eurocontrol attempt to disguise the aircraft’s landing at Szymany airport, Polish Border Guard records document its landing at the airport, and note that the aircraft had eight passengers on landing, and left with none. The owner of N63MU’s registered company International Group LLC, Steve Marchionda, has also admitted that the aircraft landed at Szymany during the circuit, and airport documentation confirms this.

Billing documentation for this circuit includes a series of invoices passed up the contracting chain, involving Universal Weather and Aviation, AirMarketing, Capital Aviation and DynCorp, as well as a payment receipt from Capital Aviation to SportsFlight Air.

FLIGHT DATA EXTRACT FOR N63MU

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On 8 December 2002, Bisher al-Rawi and Jamil el-Banna were rendered from The Gambia, where they had been held in a US-controlled safe-house, to Afghanistan, where they were detained and interrogated at the Dark Prison.

Jamil and I were driven to the airport in Banjul. At the airport we were taken into a dark room where Americans placed hoods over our heads, cuffed our hands behind our backs, and shackled our feet. I was placed on a seat between two Gambian officials and I could hear the sound of jet engines as we neared the airport... I was immediately grabbed from behind by two other men and dragged into a small, dark room located somewhere on the airport perimeter. In this room there were several men and women present. All of them wore hoods. Using flashlights to guide them in the darkness and in complete silence, they quickly removed my handcuffs and shackles, cut off my clothes, and dressed me in what I later learned to be a diaper and a different set of clothing. They cuffed my hands and shackled my legs again and thereafter placed me in some sort of restraining harness. I then had something placed in and around my ears that impaired my hearing and both a blindfold and goggles were placed over my eyes. I was then roughly manhandled onboard an awaiting aircraft and placed on a stretcher-like platform and restrained. For the entire flight I was unable to move. I was also denied access to food, water, or even a toilet. The aircraft landed once before reaching its final destination. I was restrained the whole time.

Bisher al-Rawi

Pacha Wazir was held in Morocco from 8 October 2002, where he was interrogated by Glenn Carle. We have established that he was formally transferred into CIA custody between 9-31 December 2002, and know that this was to Afghanistan.

N379P flew between The Gambia and Afghanistan on 8 December 2002, via a stopover in Egypt. This matches the transfer of al-Rawi and el-Banna between the two countries. After an overnight stop in Frankfurt the aircraft flew from Morocco to Afghanistan on 12 December 2002. This is the only flight by a known or suspected rendition aircraft between the two countries in December 2002, and is therefore likely to have rendered Wazir.

The aircraft is then documented as flying to Bangkok, Thailand. Given that the CIA black site close to the airport was closed the week before, is possible that it was picking up US officials, materials or equipment for return to the United States.
Eurocontrol data lists the shell company Premier Executive Transport Services as the operator, while flight plans were submitted by Jeppesen Dataplan. These were marked as STS/ATFMEXEMPTAPPROVED and STS/STATE.86

### FLIGHT DATA EXTRACT FOR N379P

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Flight, Afghanistan to Uzbekistan

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Ramzi bin al-Shibh was rendered from proxy detention into CIA custody on 6 February 2003. Our investigation has established that he had been held in Morocco since September 2002 (Circuit 9), and that he was transferred from there to the CIA black site in Poland by 10 February 2003 at the latest.

Ibn Sheikh al-Libi was also rendered from proxy detention into CIA custody on 6 February 2003. He had been held and tortured while in Egyptian custody, and was transferred from there to CIA custody in Afghanistan.

N379P flew between Morocco and Poland on 7-8 February 2003, and between Egypt and Afghanistan on 9-10 February 2003, matching the rendition dates of both bin al-Shibh and Ibn Sheikh. Eurocontrol data lists the shell company Premier Executive Transport Services as the operator. Jeppesen Dataplan filed flight plans for the circuit, including false plans designed to disguise the landing at Szymany. Polish flight records, however, document the landing at Szymany, with seven passengers on board (three of whom disembarked).

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**FLIGHT DATA EXTRACT FOR N379P**

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Flight, Afghanistan to Uzbekistan

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CIRCUIT 18: 4-19 FEBRUARY 2003 (N85VM)
RENDITION: ABU OMAR, ITALY TO EGYPT (VIA GERMANY)

On 17 February 2003, Abu Omar (Hassan Mustafa Osama Nasr) was rendered from Italy, where he had been captured in Milan in a joint CIA-Italian operation, to Germany. The operation was undertaken onboard a US military aircraft, which flew Abu Omar from the US airbase at Aviano to the US airbase at Ramstein. He was then flown from Germany to Egypt, where he was held and tortured for a total of four years.97

N85VM flew from Germany to Egypt on 17 February 2003, matching Abu Omar’s transfer. Eurocontrol data shows that the aircraft was operated by Richmor Aviation, and billing documentation for this circuit includes an invoice from Richmor Aviation to SportsFlight Air for $138,389.70.98

FLIGHT DATA EXTRACT FOR N85VM

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Khaled Sheikh Mohammed was captured in Pakistan on 1 March 2003, and rendered to the Dark Prison in Afghanistan by 5 March 2003. He was held at the site until at least 6 March, before being rendered to the Polish black site on 8 March 2003. CIA cables from the Polish site, dated between 7-9 March, document Mohammed’s torture immediately upon his arrival. Mohammed’s own testimony confirms these dates, and in particular a rendition in early March to a site he thought was Poland.

After three days in Afghanistan I was dressed in a tracksuit. My eyes were covered with a cloth tied around my head. A cloth bag was then pulled over my head. Headphones were placed over my ears – playing music, but not too loud. I was transported about ten minutes by vehicle and then placed in a plane sitting, leaning back, with my hands and ankles shackled in a high chair. I fell asleep. The first proper sleep in over five days.

N379P left the United States on 1 March 2003, just several hours after Mohammed was captured. It then flew between Afghanistan and Poland on 7 March 2003, matching Mohammed’s transfer between the two countries. Eurocontrol data lists the shell company Premier Executive Transport Services as the operator, while Jeppesen Dataplan filed flight plans for the circuit. These were coded as both ATFMMEMPTAPPROVED and ‘Department of State Support’, and included false plans to disguise the landing at Szymany. Polish flight records, however, document the landing at Szymany, with the aircraft flying without a flight plan. Two passengers were on board, both of whom disembarked.

**FLIGHT DATA EXTRACT FOR N379P**

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Abu Yasir al-Jaza’iri was captured in Pakistan in March 2003, and was transferred into CIA detention in Afghanistan that same month, where he was tortured in the Dark Prison. He was then transferred relatively quickly to the black site in Poland, with one CIA cable from the site, dated between 24-26 March 2003, documenting a request to CIA Headquarters to use ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’ on al-Jaza’iri.

N379P flew between Afghanistan and Poland on 25 March 2003, matching al-Jaza’iri’s transfer between the two countries. Eurocontrol data lists the shell company Premier Executive Transport Services as the operator, and Jeppesen Dataplan filed flight plans for the circuit. These included false plans designed to disguise the flight into Szymany, listing Warsaw as the destination instead. However, Polish records document the landing at Szymany, with the aircraft flying in with no flight plan. There was one passenger listed on landing, who disembarked before the aircraft took off again. Flights were given the status STS/ATFMEXEMPTAPPROVED.

### Flight Data Extract for N379P

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Flight, Uzbekistan to Afghanistan

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CIRCUIT 21: 25-29 MARCH 2003 (N63MU)
RENDITION: SULEIMAN ABDULLAH (#48), DJIBOUTI TO AFGHANISTAN

On or around 26 March 2003, Suleiman Abdullah was rendered from Djibouti to Afghanistan, where he was held at the Dark Prison and subjected to sustained torture. The CIA began its torture of Mr. Salim [Abdullah] during his rendition, subjecting him to severe physical and mental pain and suffering through humiliation, extreme sensory deprivation, and other forms of abusive treatment... CIA personnel first cut Mr. Salim's clothes from his body. Once he was naked, they forcibly inserted an object into his anus, causing him excruciating pain. They photographed him... He was then dressed in a diaper, a pair of trousers, and a short-sleeved shirt. CIA personnel stuffed earplugs in his ears, placed a hood over his head, and over those, placed a pair of goggles and headphones. They cuffed and shackled him. Disorientated and terrified, Mr. Salim was shoved aboard a small aircraft, chained to the floor between two guards, and flown some eight or more hours. Upon landing, CIA personnel unchained Mr. Salim, forced him off the plane, and threw him into the back of a truck. He was pinned to the floor on his stomach – with someone’s knee pressing into the small of his back – and driven a short distance down a bumpy dirt track road.

Suleiman Abdullah’s account

N63MU flew between Djibouti and Afghanistan on 27-28 March 2003, matching Abdullah’s transfer between the two countries. Airborne/FirstFlight operated the aircraft during this circuit, and Universal Weather and Aviation filed flight plans. These included a false flight plan to disguise the flights from US to East Africa. Billing documents for the circuit include an invoice from Universal Weather to Airborne, an invoice from brokers AirMarketing Services to SportsFlight, and an invoice from Capital Aviation to DynCorp. They also include a flight log which documents each of the flights in the circuit.
Laid Saidi has testified that he was captured in Tanzania on 10 May, and held in Malawi for about a week, before being rendered to Afghanistan in an operation which followed the established modus operandi for CIA renditions.\(^{125}\)

We have been able to independently establish a date range for Saidi’s rendition to Afghanistan. Said has testified that he was rendered from CIA custody to Tunisia in late spring or early summer 2004, and then immediately returned to Afghanistan when it was realised that he was not Tunisian. He then spent a further 75 days in CIA custody, before being rendered to Algeria.\(^ {126}\) Our investigation has identified both of these flights, which took place 9-10 June 2004 and 26-27 August 2004 respectively (\textit{Circuit 46} and \textit{Circuit 50}). Given that he was held in CIA custody for 460-469 days,\(^ {127}\) our calculations show that Saidi entered CIA custody no earlier than 15 May 2003. Further, we have established that was in detention in Afghanistan by 20 May at the latest, given that one CIA cable from the country, dated between 19-20 May, documents his torture.\(^ {128}\)

N379P flew from East Africa to Afghanistan between 15-19 May 2003, at a time which matches Laid Saidi’s transfer into CIA custody. Eurocontrol data lists the shell company Premier Executive Transport Services as the operator. As part of this circuit, N379P also flew between Afghanistan and Egypt, and made a return flight from Algeria to Afghanistan. These may have been further rendition operations.

### Flight Data Extract for N379P

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**Flights, Djibouti → Malawi → Afghanistan**

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CIRCUIT 23: 3-7 JUNE 2003 (N379P)

RENDITION:  WALID BIN ATTASH (#56), AFGHANISTAN TO POLAND
ABD AL-RAHIM AL-NASHIRI (#26), POLAND TO MOROCCO
RAMZI BIN AL-SHIBH (#41), POLAND TO MOROCCO

Walid bin Attash was captured together with Ammar al-Baluchi (#55) in Karachi, Pakistan, on 29 April 2003,\textsuperscript{129} and rendered to CIA custody in Afghanistan 15-16 May 2003, at which point he was immediately subjected to torture.\textsuperscript{130} Bin Attash has testified that he was held at this site for around three weeks (i.e. until around 5-6 June 2003), before being rendered on an aircraft to another black site.\textsuperscript{131} CIA cables from the Polish black site make clear that bin Attash was rendered to this location, where he was detained and tortured throughout July 2003.\textsuperscript{132}

After approximately three weeks in Afghanistan I was transferred to another place. I was blindfolded and earphones were placed over my ears. I was transported in a sitting position, shackled by the ankles and by the wrists with my hands in front of my body…. If I shifted my position too much during the journey somebody hit me by hand on the head.\textsuperscript{133}

Walid bin Attash

Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri was held at the Polish black site from December 2002 until June 2003,\textsuperscript{134} while Ramzi bin al-Shibh was also held at the site from February 2003.\textsuperscript{135} Then, in June 2003, the CIA placed both men ‘within an already existing Country [redacted] detention facility.’ This was seen as a ‘temporary patch’, while discussions continued around the construction of a permanent CIA facility in the country.\textsuperscript{136} Our investigation has confirmed definitively that this country was Morocco.

N379P flew between Afghanistan and Poland on 5 June 2003, and then between Poland and Morocco on 6 June 2003, matching the transfer dates of bin Attash, al-Nashiri and bin al-Shibh. Eurocontrol data state that the aircraft was operated by the shell company Premier Executive Transport Services, while Jeppesen Dataplan filed flight plans for the circuit. These were given the status STS/STATE and ATFMEXEMPTAPPROVED, and included false plans to and from Warsaw to disguise the true destination.\textsuperscript{137} Polish flight records, however, document the landing at Szymany, as well as the fact that there was one passenger on board, who disembarked.\textsuperscript{138}

### FLIGHT DATA EXTRACT FOR N379P

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Flight, Uzbekistan to Afghanistan

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**CIRCUIT 24: 17-21 JUNE 2003 (N614RD)**

**RENDITION: ZUBAIR (#62), THAILAND TO AFGHANISTAN (VIA SRI LANKA)**

Zubair was captured in Thailand on 8 June 2003, and held initially in Thai custody. He was then rendered to the Dark Prison in Afghanistan, where cables dated no later than 25 June document his torture.

N614RD flew from Thailand to Afghanistan on 19-20 June 2003, with a stopover in Sri Lanka. These dates match Zubair’s transfer between the two countries. Universal Weather and Aviation paid for charges through European airspace, and billing documents for this circuit include an invoice from AirMarketing to SportsFlight for $243,278.73. They also include a flight log which documents each of the flights in the circuit.

**FLIGHT DATA EXTRACT FOR N614RD**

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Hiwa Rashul was captured in Iraq in June or July 2003, and turned over to the CIA, who subsequently rendered him to Afghanistan.\(^\text{147}\) He was held in CIA custody for 110-119 days,\(^\text{148}\) during which time the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) ruled that he was a ‘protected person’ under the Geneva Conventions, and therefore had to be returned to Iraq. It has been reported that this transfer back to Iraq took place on 29 October 2003,\(^\text{149}\) and this matches a flight between Afghanistan and Iraq by N379P (Circuit 32). Given this, our calculations show that Rashul’s initial rendition to Afghanistan took place between 2-11 July 2003.

Saifullah Paracha has testified that he was captured at Bangkok International Airport on 6 July 2003, and driven to a detention facility where he was held ‘for a few days’. He then says that he was then rendered from Thailand to Afghanistan, where he was held and interrogated for 15 months before being transferred to Guantánamo Bay.\(^\text{150}\) A DoD document confirms that the CIA led the capture operation,\(^\text{151}\) while the Committee Study states that he was detained in Thailand on 5 July 2003 and rendered to US military custody at Bagram Airbase ‘shortly thereafter’.\(^\text{152}\)

N379P flew between Iraq and Afghanistan on 3 July 2003, matching Rashul’s transfer between the two countries. It then disappears from the flight data until 9 July 2003, when it reappears in Azerbaijan. This gap in the data would be consistent with a flight from Afghanistan to Thailand and back in order to render Paracha to Bagram Airbase. There are no other flights into Afghanistan by known rendition aircraft at that time. Eurocontrol data lists the shell company Premier Executive Transport Services as the operator.

### FLIGHT DATA EXTRACT FOR N379P

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Asadallah was captured in Quetta, Pakistan, on 12 February 2003, and transferred into CIA custody in Afghanistan before 26 February, by which time he was being tortured. He was held in CIA custody for 150-159 days, before being rendered to secret detention in Egypt for around a year. Our calculations show that this rendition would have taken place between 12 July – 4 August 2003.

N379P flew between Afghanistan and Egypt on 23 July 2003, matching Asadallah's transfer between the two countries. Eurocontrol data lists the shell company Premier Executive Transport Services as the operator.

Samr al-Barq was captured in Pakistan on 15 July 2003, and held for around two weeks in Pakistani detention before being rendered to CIA custody at a secret prison in Afghanistan. Given that he was held in CIA custody for 80-89 days, before being rendered to Jordan on 26 October 2003, our calculations confirm that he would have entered CIA custody no earlier than 28 July 2003. Al-Barq was almost immediately transferred onward to Poland, and CIA cables from the site document his torture from 1 August.

Ammar al-Baluchi was captured on 29 April 2003, alongside Walid bin Attash (#56), and held...
in Pakistani custody ‘for approximately two weeks.’ Both men were then rendered to the Dark Prison in Afghanistan and tortured. By early June, bin Attash had been rendered to the Polish black site (Circuit 23). CIA cables from Afghanistan suggest that al-Baluchi remained in Afghanistan throughout July, and he has testified that at some point ‘after the place of darkness was the place of sterile, white light... Here they blazed light that was bright and intense because of the sterile white of the walls, floors and ceilings. Here it felt as if I was “living in a refrigerator”.’ The facility described matches what is known about the Polish black site, and our analysis of prisoner numbers in Poland leads us to conclude that a detainee was moved to the site alongside either bin Attash (in June) or al-Barq (in July). Al-Baluchi is the most likely person.

N379P flew between Afghanistan and Poland on 28-29 July 2003, matching al-Barq and (likely) al-Baluchi’s rendition between the two countries. Eurocontrol data show that the aircraft was operated by the shell company Premier Executive Transport Services, and flight plans were submitted by Jeppesen Dataplan. These were given the status STS/STATE and STS/ATFMEXEMPTAPPROVED, included false flight plans to and from Warsaw, disguising the landing at Szymany. Polish records document its actual landing at Szymany.

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Flight, Uzbekistan to Afghanistan

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Flight, Afghanistan to Uzbekistan

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Hambali (Riduan Isamuddin) and Lillie (Mohammed Nazir Bin Lep) were captured in Thailand on 11 August 2003, in a joint operation between the Thai security forces and the CIA. CIA cables confirm that both men were held in Thai custody for a number of days, and a short period of initial detention has been verified by the prisoners themselves. We have established that both men had been rendered to CIA detention in Afghanistan by 15 August, by which time their torture had begun.

N85VM left the United States on 12 August, the day after Hambali and Lillie were captured, and flew a global circuit which included a flight from Thailand to Afghanistan between 13-14 August 2003 (via a stopover in Sri Lanka), matching Hambali and Lillie's transfer between the two countries. The aircraft was operated by Richmor Aviation, which filed flight plans with Eurocontrol. Billing documentation for this circuit includes an invoice from Richmor Aviation to SportsFlight Air for $301,113.92.

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CIRCUIT 29: 11-18 AUGUST 2003 (N379P)
RENDITION: SANAD AL-KAZIMI (#74), UAE TO AFGHANISTAN

Sanad al-Kazimi was captured in Dubai, UAE, in January 2003, and held there for a number of months. No public source gives an account of al-Kazimi’s transfer to CIA custody, although it has been established that he was held at the Dark Prison in Afghanistan. A DoD document suggests that he was transferred out of CIA custody on 13 May 2004. Given that he was held in CIA detention for 270-279 days, our calculations show that he entered CIA custody between 8-17 August 2003.

N379P likely flew between UAE and Afghanistan between 14-17 August 2003, matching al-Kazimi’s entry into CIA custody and his likely location of initial detention. Although there are no records which document this flight, the aircraft was on the ground in Dubai on 14 August, and a flight plan was filed from Uzbekistan to the United Kingdom on 17 August. It is unclear whether this was a false flight plan, disguising the true flight from Afghanistan, or whether there was an additional flight from Afghanistan to Uzbekistan not captured in the data. Eurocontrol data lists the shell company Premier Executive Transport Services as the operator for this circuit.

### FLIGHT DATA EXTRACT FOR N379P

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**Flight, Dubai to Afghanistan**

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Salah Qaru was captured in Jakarta, Indonesia, in August 2003, before being transferred to Jordan, where he was tortured by Jordanian intelligence for approximately 10 days. At this point, he has testified that he was hooded and shackled, had foam stuffed into his ears, and was taken to a plane where he was chained to the floor while laid on his back. His description of the prison to which he was taken makes it clear that Qaru was held in the Dark Prison in Afghanistan, and other detainees at the site have confirmed that he was held there. Mohamed Bashmilah (#89), who was detained alongside Qaru during their time in CIA custody, has also given a clear account of the site, matching other descriptions of the Dark Prison.

It has been reported that Qaru was rendered from CIA custody to Yemen, alongside Bashmilah and Mohammed al-Asad (#92), on 5 May 2005. Although we have not been able to identify the rendition circuit for this transfer, cross-referencing our calculations for the three men enables us to independently establish that it took place between 1-7 May 2005. Given that Qaru was held in CIA custody for 600-609 days, our calculations show that he was transferred into CIA custody between 28 August – 15 September 2003.

On 10 September 2003, N379P flew between Jordan and Afghanistan, matching Salah Qaru’s transfer between the two countries. Eurocontrol data lists the shell company Premier Executive Transport Services as the operator.

### FLIGHT DATA EXTRACT FOR N379P

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Flight, Jordan to Iraq

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Flight, Iraq to Jordan

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September 2003 saw a reshuffling of detainees in CIA custody, as facilities were closed and opened. As acknowledged in the Committee Study, the Polish black site was closed in September 2003, after ‘multiple, ongoing difficulties’ between the host and the CIA. Likewise, ‘CIA detainees were transferred to DETENTION SITE BLACK... in the fall of 2003,’ while the CIA detention facility at Guantánamo Bay also began holding detainees from September 2003.

Between 20-25 September 2003, N313P completed a circuit which included stopovers in Afghanistan, Poland, Romania, Morocco and Guantánamo Bay. One anonymous official labelled this circuit a ‘five-card straight revealing the program to outsiders: five stops, five secret facilities, all documented’. Our investigation has established that this circuit involved the rendition of Samr al-Barq, Khaled Sheikh Mohammed, Abu Yasir al-Jaza’iri and Walid bin Attash from Poland to Romania; the rendition of Abu Zubaydah from Poland to a black site at Guantánamo Bay; and the rendition of Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri from Morocco to Guantánamo Bay. Ammar al-Baluchi is likely to have been held in Poland from July 2003, and moved to Romania on this flight. It is also possible that Hambali was rendered from Afghanistan to Romania, although evidence for this is not definitive.

Eurocontrol data lists the shell company Stevens Express Leasing as the operator, and Jeppesen Dataplan filed the flight plans. These were coded as STS/STATE and STS/ATFM EXEMPT APPROVED throughout, and included false flight plans to disguise the landings at Szymany and Bucharest. Polish data confirms the landing in Szymany on 22 September, where it picked up five passengers.
## Flight Data Extract for N313P

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Flight, Uzbekistan to Afghanistan

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Circuit 32: 24-30 October 2003 (N379P)

Rendition:
Samr al-Barq (#67), Romania to Jordan
Abu Yasir al-Jaza’iri (#47), Romania to Afghanistan
Mohamed Bashmilah (#89), Jordan to Afghanistan
Hiwa Rashul (#64), Afghanistan to Iraq
Aso Hawleri (#88), Afghanistan to Iraq

N379P flew between a number of detention locations in October 2003, with a series of flights matching the dates we have established for a number of prisoner transfer operations.

The flight from Romania to Jordan on 25 October matches Samr al-Barq’s transfer between the two countries. It has been reported that he was rendered to Jordanian custody on 26 October 2003, and although this report was unclear where he had been held, we have established that he was at the Romanian black site during mid-October 2003.

Our analysis of CIA cables also suggests that Abu Yasir al-Jaza’iri was held at the Romanian black site during mid-October 2003, where he was still being subjected to interrogations. We also know that he was in Afghanistan in early 2004, and this circuit is the only flight in our data between the two countries during this period.

The onward flight from Jordan to Afghanistan on 26 October also matches Mohamed Bashmilah’s rendition date. Bashmilah was captured in Amman on 21 October 2003, and was held and repeatedly tortured by Jordanian intelligence in Amman. According to Bashmilah’s own testimony, in the early hours of 26 October he was blindfolded and his hands were tied behind his back. He was led down a corridor, driven to the airport, and rendered to the Dark Prison in Afghanistan. Bashmilah’s account of the Dark Prison matches that of others, and other detainees at the site have confirmed that he was held there.

I was driven for about thirty minutes to the airport. At the airport I was pulled from the car and placed in a room. I was seated on a chair with my hands still in cuffs and my blindfold still on. Very shortly thereafter, I was taken violently to another room where my clothing was rapidly cut off until I was entirely naked. My blindfold was taken off and strong light beams were directed at my face while someone put their hand over my eyes. I was not able to see clearly because of this, but I could see some things in the room by peeking through the fingers of the hand over my face. There were at least three people there. One of them was the one holding me from behind and covering my eyes with his hand. I didn’t see the person holding me, but the other two that I did see were dressed head to toe in black, with black masks covering their faces and surgical gloves on their hands. They beat me and kicked me,
roughing me up badly. Another person took pictures of me, and then one of them forcefully stuck his finger into my anus. I was in severe pain and began to faint.\textsuperscript{205} 

Mohamed Bashmilah

Finally, the flight from Afghanistan to Iraq on 29 October matches our information regarding the rendition of two men – Hiwa Rashul and Aso Hawleri – who had been captured in Iraq, held in Afghanistan, and then transferred back to Iraq. It has been reported that Rashul was transferred back to Iraq on 29 October 2003,\textsuperscript{206} and we have been able to confirm this by identifying an earlier rendition flight from Iraq to Afghanistan on 3 July 2003 (Circuit 25), which matches with his known period of time in CIA custody (110-119 days).\textsuperscript{207}

It has been reported that Aso Hawleri was captured by US forces on 10 October 2002, in Mosul, Iraq.\textsuperscript{208} We have established that he was transferred into CIA custody on or before 26 October 2003,\textsuperscript{209} and almost certainly held in a secret prison in Afghanistan. Hawleri was held by the CIA for 10-19 days,\textsuperscript{210} and was subsequently rendered back to Iraq.\textsuperscript{211} Our calculations show that this second rendition took place between 20 October – 14 November 2003. The flight by N379P on 29 October is the only flight by a known or suspected rendition aircraft between Afghanistan and Iraq during this time.

Eurocontrol data state that the aircraft was operated by the shell company Stevens Express Leasing for this circuit, while Jeppesen Dataplan filed the flight plans.\textsuperscript{212} These included at least one false flight plan, filed to disguise the landing at Bucharest.

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CIRCUIT 33: 13-23 NOVEMBER 2003 (N313P)
RENDITION: MUSTAFA AL-HAWSAWI (#46), AFGHANISTAN TO GUANTÁNAMO BAY (VIA MOROCCO)
IBN SHEIKH AL-LIBI (#42), AFGHANISTAN TO GUANTÁNAMO BAY (VIA MOROCCO)

Mustafa al-Hawsawi was detained in the Dark Prison in Afghanistan from March to November 2003, with CIA cables documenting his detention and torture in the country. He was then ‘rendered to another location.’ Ibn Sheikh al-Libi was also held in the Dark Prison in 2003, arriving there at the end of the summer and staying for ‘a few months.’

CIA records cited by the Committee Study reveal that Ibn Sheikh was one of five detainees held at one of the CIA black sites at Guantánamo Bay between September 2003 and April 2004. Other reporting has also placed al-Hawsawi as one of these detainees.

N313P flew between Afghanistan and Guantánamo Bay, 21-22 November 2003, via a stopover in Morocco. It is the only flight in our data between the two countries during the period that the black sites were open in Guantánamo Bay, and indeed the only flight out of Afghanistan by a rendition aircraft in November 2003. It is therefore likely that both al-Hawsawi and Ibn Sheikh were on board this flight. Eurocontrol data lists the shell company Stevens Express Leasing as the operator for this circuit.

**FLIGHT DATA EXTRACT FOR N313P**

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Flight, Iraq to UAE

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CIRCUIT 34: 2-4 DECEMBER 2003 (N379P)
RENDITION: RAMZI BIN AL-SHIBH (#41), MOROCCO TO GUANTÁNAMO BAY

Ramzi bin al-Shibh was held in secret detention in Morocco alongside Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri (#26) for several months from June 2003. By December 2003, both men had been ‘transferred out of Country [redacted] to the CIA detention facility at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba.’ Our cable analysis has established that al-Nashiri was rendered from Morocco in September 2003 (Circuit 31), suggesting that bin al-Shibh was held at the site until December.

N379P flew between Morocco and Guantánamo Bay on 3 December 2003, matching bin al-Shibh’s transfer. Eurocontrol data lists the shell company Stevens Express Leasing as the operator for this circuit.

FLIGHT DATA EXTRACT FOR N379P

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CIRCUIT 35: 15-18 DECEMBER 2003 (N85VM)
RENDITION: ALI SAEED AWADH (#90), DJIBOUTI TO AFGHANISTAN

Although little is known about Ali Saeed Awadh, our analysis of CIA cables indicates that he was held in Afghanistan between at least December 2003 and March 2004. He was held for 170-179 days before being released with a cash payment.

Our investigation has identified two rendition flights between Djibouti and Afghanistan, 179 days apart, which fit with Awadh’s period of CIA custody, and not with any other prisoner. In the first of these, N85VM flew between Djibouti and Afghanistan on 17 December 2003. The aircraft was operated by Richmor Aviation, and billing documents for this circuit include invoices from Air Routing to Richmor Aviation for a range of trip planning services, an invoice from Richmor Aviation to SportsFlight Air for $216,984.61, and invoices to Richmor from Eurocontrol and NATS, charging for overflight fees.
FLIGHT DATA EXTRACT FOR N85VM

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CIRCUIT 36: 5-10 JANUARY 2004 (N313P)

RENDITION: HASSAN BIN ATTASH (#10), JORDAN TO AFGHANISTAN

ALI AL-HAJJ AL-SHARQAWI (#93), JORDAN TO AFGHANISTAN

MOHAMMED AL-ASAD (#92), DJIBOUTI TO AFGHANISTAN

In early January 2004, three men were rendered into CIA custody in Afghanistan: Mohammed al-Asad, who had been secretly detained in Djibouti for a number of days; and Hassan bin Attash and Ali al-Hajj al-Sharqawi, who had both been held and tortured by Jordanian intelligence for 16 and 23 months respectively. Once in Afghanistan, all three were detained at the Dark Prison.

Al-Asad was in Djiboutian custody until at least 3 January 2004, and was rendered to CIA custody either at the same time as, or before, al-Sharqawi. CIA cables document that al-Sharqawi was rendered to CIA custody between 1-9 January 2004, confirming his own account. Hassan bin Attash has stated that he was moved from Jordan to Afghanistan around 7 January 2004.

After riding in the car with these guards for about twenty or twenty-five minutes, we arrived at an airport, where I was assaulted and experienced very humiliating, painful and terrifying treatment. I was pulled roughly out of the car. I was lifted off the ground and my blindfold was ripped off. I saw about five black-clad individuals whose faces were concealed by balaclavas. They tore off all of my clothing. One shoved a finger into my rectum. They photographed me naked. Then they put a diaper on me and... plugged my ears with cotton, placed headphones and a hood over my head, and securely taped the hood. They chained my hands, waist, and feet. I was blind, deaf, and could barely walk. I was in severe pain and felt deeply
humiliated and weak... After experiencing this terrible treatment, I half-walked and was half-carried onto a waiting plane by people holding me on both sides. I was forced to lie on my back on the floor, and then was strapped down around my legs and waist... The position they put me in was very painful. I could not shift my position as I could barely move because of the straps. I have a back injury from before my detention, and I asked to be allowed to change positions to alleviate the pain but the guards did nothing. I even tried using English, pleading ‘Help me, help me please!’ but no one did anything.\textsuperscript{240}

Mohammed al-Asad

N313P flew between Jordan and Afghanistan on 8 January 2004, matching bin Attash and al-Sharqawi’s transfer between the two countries, and al-Asad’s transfer to CIA custody. Moreover, the aircraft had landed in Jordan two days earlier, on 6 January, and – while it disappears from the flight data for two days – it is possible that it either undertook a roundtrip to Djibouti in this time, or met with another aircraft from Djibouti.\textsuperscript{241} Eurocontrol data lists the shell company Stevens Express Leasing as the operator.

He was taken to the airport in a black hood that came down to his shirt. When [he and the Americans] arrived at the airport, they cut his clothes off, searched his anus and gave him diapers, shorts, a sleeveless shirt and plastic handcuffs. He stood in the room for an hour in handcuffs tied to the walls. They took pictures of him. Then they came for him, tied his feet together and tied his hands together. One other man was thrown into a luggage cart, and Shergawi was picked up like a sack and thrown on top of him. Then they carried him like a sack and threw him into the plane. Two men were already in the plane, and they were American.\textsuperscript{242}

Ali al-Hajj al-Sharqawi

\begin{footnotesize}
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9 Jan 04 & Prague, Czech Republic & Washington, DC & 15:21 & 23:52 & EC; FAA; IMWG\textsuperscript{243} \\
10 Jan 04 & Washington, DC & Kinston, NC & 16:49 & 17:28 & FAA \\
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CIRCUIT 37: 15-28 JANUARY 2004 (N313P)

RENDITION: BINYAM MOHAMED (#95), MOROCCO TO AFGHANISTAN
SALEH DI’IKI (#94), MOROCCO TO AFGHANISTAN
JAMAL BOUDRAA (#3), AFGHANISTAN TO ALGERIA
KHALED EL-MASRI (#97), MACEDONIA TO AFGHANISTAN (VIA IRAQ)
HASSAN GHUL (#98), IRAQ TO AFGHANISTAN AND THEN TO ROMANIA
MUHAMMAD IBRAHIM (#99), AFGHANISTAN TO ROMANIA

According to the Committee Study, on xx January 2004 Binyam Mohamed was rendered from proxy detention in [redacted], where he had been held since xx July 2002, to CIA custody.244 One CIA cable from Afghanistan, dated between 19-31 January 2004, details the rendition,245 and Mohamed himself has testified that he was rendered from Morocco to the Dark Prison in Afghanistan on 22 January 2004, alongside other detainees.246

Saleh Di’iki has testified that he was captured in Mauritania on 12 October 2003, and held for 4-5 weeks before being rendered to Morocco. He was held at this site for another month, before being rendered to Afghanistan in January 2004 alongside another detainee.247 Di’iki was held by the CIA for 210-219 days,248 before being rendered to Libya alongside Mohammed al-Shoroeiya. Our investigation has identified the rendition circuit which transferred Di’iki back to Libya, on 22 August 2004 (Circuit 49). Our calculations show that he was therefore transferred into CIA custody between 16-25 January 2004.

After a month, his guards took him to a place where he could hear a plane. This was sometime in early January 2004, possibly January 7. Another detainee was there – he could hear him walking – and he counted six Amerian guards. They used mainly sign language, but sometimes they said a word or two in English, which they spoke with an American accent. They wore military uniforms with American flags on them and had masks on their faces... They told him to bathe, and if he didn't do it himself, they said they would bathe him. His Moroccan handcuffs were removed and he was re-handcuffed and his legs shackled. They cut off all his clothes using sissors... Then they diapered him, put patches over his eyes, plugs in his ears, and a hood over his head. Then they wrapped him in what he described as adhesive tape all around his head... Then they took him to the plane and threw him in the back. They lay him on one side and bound him by rope. It was a very long trip.249

Saleh Di’iki

Jamal Boudraa was rendered to CIA custody between 1-2 May 2002 (Circuit 6), and held for 630-639 days.250 Our calculations show that he was transferred out of CIA detention between 21-31 January 2004, whereupon he was handed over to Algerian authorities.251
On xx January 2004, Khaled el-Masri was rendered by the CIA to ‘a Country [redacted] facility used by the CIA for detention purposes.\textsuperscript{252} This was clearly in Afghanistan: CIA cables from country discussing the rendition are dated between 24-31 January, and make clear that he was in Afghanistan by 27 January.\textsuperscript{253}

\begin{quote}
Once outside [the hotel], two men approached me. They grabbed hold of my arms and a third man then handcuffed and blindfolded me... I was placed in the jeep and it drove off... After about half an hour, the vehicle came to a halt... As I was led into [a] room, I felt two people violently grab my arms, one from the right side and the other from the left. They bent both my arms backwards. This violent motion caused me a lot of pain. I was beaten severely from all sides. I then felt someone else grab my head with both hands so I was unable to move. Others sliced my clothes off. I was left in my underwear. Even this they attempted to take off. I tried to resist at first, shouting out loudly for them to stop, but my efforts were in vain. The pain from the beatings was severe. I was terrified and utterly humiliated... I was then pulled to my feet and pushed into the corner of a room. My feet were tied together, and then, for the first time since the hotel, they took off my blindfold.... I saw seven to eight men standing around me, all dressed in black, with hood and black gloves. I was dressed in a diaper, over which they fitted a dark blue sports suit with short sleeves and legs. I was once again blindfolded, my ears were plugged with cotton, and headphones were placed over my ears. A bag was placed over my head and a belt around my waist. My hands were chained to the belt. They put something hard over my nose. Because of the bag, breathing was getting harder and harder for me. I struggled for breath and began to panic. I pictured myself like the images I had seen in the media of the Muslims that were brought to Guantánamo.\textsuperscript{254}
\end{quote}

Khaled el-Masri

Hassan Ghul was rendered from US military custody in Iraq to the Dark Prison in Afghanistan on xx January 2004, with CIA cables from Afghanistan between 21-31 January discussing the transfer.\textsuperscript{256} After less than two days, during which time he was held at both the Dark Prison and a nearby facility, Ghul was rendered to the Romanian black site.\textsuperscript{258} One cable from the Romanian site, dated 20-31 January 2004, documents a request to begin the torture of Ghul.

Muhammad Ibrahim was transferred into CIA custody between 25-27 January 2004. There were two flights by CIA rendition aircraft into Romania during this time, and this circuit was one of them. The profile for the alternative circuit (Circuit 39) includes a full discussion of the calculations regarding Ibrahim.

N313P flew a circuit, 15-28 January 2004, that matches with all of these prisoner transfers. Thus, it flew between Morocco and Afghanistan on 22 January, between Afghanistan and Algeria on 22 January, between Macedonia, Iraq and Afghanistan on 24 January and between Afghanistan and Romania on 26 January 2004. Eurocontrol data lists the shell company Stevens Express Leasing as the operator, while Jeppesen Dataplan filed the flight plans. These included false
flight plans into Romania, disguising the landing at Bucharest. Further documents obtained from a Guardia Civil inquiry confirm both overnight landings in Mallorca, and include a number of invoices, hotel records and flight communications.

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On 22 January 2004, Khaled al-Maqtari was rendered from Iraq, where he had been tortured for over a week by US forces in Abu Ghraib prison, to Afghanistan, where he was held for several months in the Dark Prison. Al-Maqtari has stated that this transfer took place alongside one, possibly two, other detainees.

_They do not talk, not even a word, the same as the ninjas in the secret prisons. It is clear that they have a lot of experience. They know what they are doing, and each of them had a specific role…. Whenever they put on or take off the chains, they grab you harshly, so that we do not escape. They were very strong, everything was horrifying, they even closed the doors violently to terrify us. I was not able to see anything, everything was black. They did not want you to be comfortable; they wanted us to be in an atmosphere of terror all the way there._

N8068V (previously registered as N379P) flew between Iraq and Afghanistan on 22 January 2004, matching al-Maqtari’s transfer between the two countries. Eurocontrol data lists the shell company Stevens Express Leasing as the operator, and flight plans were filed by Jeppesen Dataplan.
Muhammad Ibrahim was transferred into CIA custody on or after 24 January 2004. We have also established that he was detained in the Romanian black site from, at the latest, 27 January: CIA cables from the site document the use of sleep deprivation for three days straight, from 27-30 January 2004. Ibrahim was held in CIA custody for 260-269 days, and we have identified his likely rendition flight out of Romania on 20 October 2004 (Circuit 52). Our calculations show that he was therefore brought into the programme between 25-27 January 2004.

There were two flights by CIA rendition aircraft into Romania during this time. This one, by N85VM, flew between Jordan and Romania, landing on 26 January 2004. The other was by N313P (Circuit 37). Eurocontrol data shows that Richmor Aviation operated N85VM. Billing documentation for this circuit includes an invoice from Richmor Aviation to SportsFlight Air for $202,248.50.

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Between 6-14 March 2004, N313P completed a circuit involving stops in several key destinations, including Libya, Thailand, Iraq and Afghanistan. These movements match with the rendition of Abdel Hakim Belhadj and Fatima Boudchar from Thailand to Libya, and Abu ‘Abdallah from Iraq to Afghanistan.

A memo from the CIA to Libyan intelligence, discovered in Libya in September 2011, sets out the planned route for the aircraft for the purposes of rendering Belhadj from Thailand to Libya: the aircraft would leave Tripoli at 13:30 on 7 March, and fly to the Seychelles, landing in the evening. It would stay there overnight, with the memo advising the accompanying Libyan agents to ‘have the proper documentation for that location’ in order to be allowed to leave the aircraft. The itinerary then had the aircraft leaving the Seychelles in the afternoon of 8 March, flying direct to Bangkok and landing at 20:30. The aircraft was then scheduled to return to Tripoli two hours later, stopping on the island of Diego Garcia en route for refuelling.268

Before being transferred out of the detention centre for rendition to Libya, Ms Bouchar (sic) was forced onto a stretcher. US agents in balaclavas proceeded to wind tape around her body from her feet to her neck, fixing her to the stretcher. The agents taped one of her hands so that it pressed tightly against her womb. Her eyes were also taped over – when the tape was applied, her left eye had been closed, however, her right eye had been open and it remained taped open for the next 17 or so hours. Ms Bouchar was in such excruciating pain that she almost lost consciousness. She was hooded, made to wear ear-defenders and driven back to the airport. She had no idea whether her husband was being transferred with her, indeed whether he was dead or alive.269

Fatima Boudchar

The question of whether or not this rendition operation used British territory in Diego Garcia for refuelling has generated significant public interest, not least because of legal action taken against the Commissioner for the territory.270 The UK government has acknowledged possession of landing records from the island for March 2004, but has consistently refused to release these.271 The government has also consistently denied that any rendition flights landed in Diego Garcia during March 2004,272 and a recent internal Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) report found no evidence in the flight records for any such landing on the island.273

Whether or not the aircraft landed on Diego Garcia, it was scheduled to touchdown in Tripoli at 16:30 on 9 March. It then flew to Palma de Mallorca, where it stayed on the ground for 48 hours.
Documents obtained from a Guardia Civil inquiry confirm the overnight landing in Mallorca before the rendition, and include a number of invoices, hotel records and flight communications.  

N313P then flew between Iraq and Afghanistan on 11-12 March, probably with Abu ‘Abdallah on board. Abu ‘Abdallah is likely to be the Saudi prisoner who, according to Khaled al-Maqtari (#96), had been captured in Iraq in February 2004 and transferred to Afghanistan. Calculations show that Abu ‘Abdallah was rendered to CIA custody between 10-31 March 2004, fitting closely with this flight.  

Eurocontrol data lists the shell company Stevens Express Leasing as the operator, while Jeppesen Dataplan filed the flight plans.

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Return flight, Libya → Thailand → Libya. CIA memo has full planned schedule, including landing in Seychelles and Diego Garcia for refuelling.

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Gouled Dourad was captured in Djibouti on 4 March 2004, held there, and then rendered to CIA custody on xx March 2004. His whereabouts during his time in CIA detention are unknown.

N8068V (previously registered as N379P) left the US two days after Dourad’s capture, heading to Djibouti. It then flew between Djibouti and Afghanistan on 8-9 March 2004, matching Dourad’s rendition into CIA custody. Further flights between Afghanistan and Morocco, and Morocco and Guantánamo Bay, may have included further renditions, although the Moroccan facility was closed at that point while all five CIA detainees held at Guantánamo Bay appear to have been there by early February 2004 at the very latest. Eurocontrol data lists the shell company Stevens Express Leasing as the operator.

**FLIGHT DATA EXTRACT FOR N8068V**

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Flight, Afghanistan to Morocco

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In April 2004, five prisoners who had been held at the CIA secret prison in Guantánamo Bay for a number of months were rendered to other secret detention facilities. These transfers came as the US Supreme Court was considering whether US prisoners on the island had habeas corpus rights, a legal decision which would have impacted on CIA prisoners in Guantánamo Bay. According to one US official speaking anonymously, ‘anything that could expose these detainees to individuals outside the government was a nonstarter,’ necessitating their removal from Guantánamo Bay. The five prisoners transferred from the island – Mustafa al-Hawsawi, Abu Zubaydah, Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, Ramzi bin al-Shibh and Ibn Sheikh al-Libi – were rendered to Romania and Morocco.

There were two flights from Guantánamo Bay during this period. The first, by N85VM, flew between Guantánamo Bay, Romania and Morocco on 12 April 2004. The second (Circuit 43), flew direct to Morocco. We have established that al-Nashiri was rendered directly to Romania, and so he will have been on the first of these. The other four men will have been on either of these flights. In addition, this operation may have been transferring detainees from secret detention in Romania to further secret detention in Morocco.

Eurocontrol data shows that the aircraft was operated by Richmor Aviation. A false flight plan was filed from Tenerife to the Romanian city of Constanța, disguising the true flight into Bucharest. Billing documentation for this circuit includes an invoice from Richmor Aviation to SportsFlight Air for $165,957.96.
In April 2004, five prisoners who had been held at the CIA secret prison in Guantánamo Bay for a number of months were rendered to other secret detention facilities. These transfers came as the US Supreme Court was considering whether US prisoners on the island had habeas corpus rights, a legal decision which would have impacted on CIA prisoners in Guantánamo Bay. According to one US official speaking anonymously, ‘anything that could expose these detainees to individuals outside the government was a nonstarter,’ necessitating their removal from Guantánamo Bay. The five prisoners transferred from the island – Mustafa al-Hawsawi, Abu Zubaydah, Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, Ramzi bin al-Shibh and Ibn Sheikh al-Libi – were rendered to Romania and Morocco.

There were two flights from Guantánamo Bay during this period. The first (Circuit 42), flew to Romania and Morocco, and will have rendered al-Nashiri to Romania. This second operation, by N368CE, flew direct between Guantánamo Bay and Morocco, and is likely to have rendered some or all of the remaining four men. Eurocontrol data lists Club Excellence as the operator. Billing documents for this circuit include an invoice from SportsFlight Air to Computer Sciences Corporation for $17,725.
Mustafa el-Madaghi was captured in Mauritania on 5 February 2004, and held there until the end of March. He was then transferred to Morocco, where he was held until 5 May 2004. One CIA memo to its Libyan counterparts, dated 15 April 2004, makes it clear that the CIA had access to el-Madaghi while he was detained in Morocco, and that “our service is in a position to deliver [him] to your physical custody, similar to what we have done with other senior LiFG members in the recent past. We respectfully request an expression of interest from your service regarding taking custody of [el-Madaghi].” On 5 May 2004, el-Madaghi says he was rendered to Libya, on a flight which stopped for refuelling en route.

N85VM flew between Morocco and Libya, via a stopover in Italy, on 4–5 May 2004, matching el-Madaghi’s transfer between the two countries. Eurocontrol data shows that the aircraft was operated by Richmor Aviation, and billing documentation for this circuit includes an invoice from Richmor Aviation to SportsFlight Air for $197,192.10 for the trip. Further documents obtained from a Guardia Civil inquiry confirm the overnight landing in Mallorca before the rendition, and include a number of invoices, hotel records and flight communications.
CIRCUIT 45: 25-29 MAY 2004 (N982RK)

RENDITION: KHALED EL-MASRI (#97), AFGHANISTAN TO ALBANIA

Khaled el-Masri was rendered to CIA custody in Afghanistan on 24 January 2004 (Circuit 37), and held for 120-129 days. Calculation shows that he was transferred out of CIA detention between 23 May – 1 June 2004, and the Committee Study notes that he was transferred to Albania on 29 May 2004.

The next morning, May 28, the doctor and the American prison director arrived in my cell. I was handcuffed, shackled, and blindfolded before being led outside and put inside a jeep. I was driven for about ten minutes and then taken inside a large empty shipping container. They sat me down in a chair so that I was unable to see out and was forced to face the wall. From this position I could hear the sound of an approaching aircraft... My hands were cuffed again. My ears were plugged and headphones were placed over my ears. I was blindfolded again and led back to the jeep. We drove a short distance to the waiting airplane. Once inside I was chained to the seat... When the plane landed... I was then bundled out of the plane and placed in the backseat of what I sensed to be a Japanese-made minivan-type vehicle...I was driven in the car, up and down mountains, on paved and unpaved roads for more than three hours. The vehicle came to a halt and I was aware of the three men in the car getting out, closing the doors and then three men climbing in to the vehicle. All of them had South European/Slavic accents, but said very little. The vehicle proceeded to drive for another three hours, again up and down mountains and on paved and unpaved roads. Eventually, the vehicle was brought to a halt. I was taken out of the car and before my blindfold was removed, one of my captors turned me around. He then removed the blindfold, sliced the cuffs from my wrists, gave me my suitcase and passport, and directed me to walk down a path without turning back. I heard the car leave and began to walk as instructed. It was dark. No one was around. As I walked I feared that I was about to be shot in the back and left to die.

N982RK flew between Afghanistan and Albania on 28 May 2004, matching el-Masri’s transfer between the two countries. Eurocontrol data shows that the aircraft was operated by Richmor Aviation, and billing documents for the circuit include an invoice from SportsFlight Air to Computer Sciences Corporation, and invoices from Air Routing to Richmor Aviation for a range of trip planning services (including transport to and from the Golden Bay Beach Hotel in Cyprus).
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**CIRCUIT 46: 7-12 JUNE 2004 (N982RK)**

**RENDITION: LAID SAIDI (#57), AFGHANISTAN TO TUNISIA AND BACK (VIA JORDAN)**

Laid Saidi was rendered into CIA custody in Afghanistan between 15-19 May 2003 (Circuit 22), and held in CIA detention for 460-469 days. He was then transferred to Algeria, where he was handed over to Algerian authorities and eventually released. We have identified the rendition circuit for this transfer, which took place on 26 August 2004 (Circuit 50). However, this rendition followed an earlier attempt to transfer Saidi to his country of origin: he has testified that, in late spring or early summer 2004, he was rendered from Afghanistan to Tunisia before the CIA realised he was not in fact Tunisian, and took him back to Afghanistan. The Tunisian government has confirmed that these events took place on 9-10 June 2004.

*Laid Saidi had arrived with a ‘special flight’ on the 9 June 2004, where he was presented by four foreign security officials to Tunisian authorities at the airport of Tunis Carthage under the name of Ramzi Ben Fredj. The Tunisian security services conducted an audit and concluded that the person had usurped the identity of the real Ramzi Ben Fredj. The person then acknowledged that he was actually Laid Saidi. The next day, on the 10 June 2004, Saidi was sent back with the same special flight to a ‘foreign country’; he was then still accompanied by the same foreign agents.*
N982RK flew a return trip from Afghanistan to Tunisia, 9-10 June 2004, matching Saidi's aborted transfer between the two countries. Eurocontrol data shows that Richmor Aviation operated the aircraft for this circuit, and billing documentation includes billing records from SportsFlight Air, and a number of receipts for landing permits, hotel accommodation and overflight rights. These include an ‘urgent permit’ request for landing in Amman, which points to the unplanned nature of the flight, as well as eight rooms booked at the Marriott Hotel in Palma de Mallorca. However, in the event the aircraft did not stay overnight on the island.

**Tunisian government**

**FLIGHT DATA EXTRACT FOR N982RK**

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CIRCUIT 47: 11-15 JUNE 2004 (N85VM)
RENDITION: ALI SAEED AWADH (#90), AFGHANISTAN TO DJIBOUTI

Although little is known about Ali Saeed Awadh, our analysis of CIA cables indicates that he was held in Afghanistan during both December 2003 and March 2004.\textsuperscript{309} He was held for 170-179 days,\textsuperscript{309} before being released with a cash payment.\textsuperscript{310}

Our investigation has identified two rendition flights between Djibouti and Afghanistan, 179 days apart, which fit with Awadh’s period of CIA custody and not with any other prisoner. In the second of these, N85VM flew between Afghanistan and Djibouti on 13 June 2004.\textsuperscript{311} The aircraft was operated by Richmor Aviation, and billing documents for this circuit include invoices from Air Routing to Richmor Aviation for a range of trip planning services,\textsuperscript{312} an invoice from Richmor Aviation to SportsFlight Air for $218,395.77,\textsuperscript{313} and an invoice to Richmor from Eurocontrol, charging for overflight fees.\textsuperscript{314} Documents obtained from a Guardia Civil inquiry confirm the overnight landing in Mallorca after the rendition, and include a number of invoices, hotel records and flight communications.\textsuperscript{315}

**FLIGHT DATA EXTRACT FOR N85VM**

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CIRCUIT 48: 29 JULY – 2 AUGUST 2004 (N288KA)

RENDITION: JANAT GUL (#110), AFGHANISTAN TO ROMANIA (VIA JORDAN)

Janat Gul was transferred into CIA custody on 29 July 2004, and cables from the black site in Romania document his torture from 3 August 2004.

N288KA flew between Afghanistan and Romania on 31 July 2004, stopping off for refuelling in Jordan en route. This matches Gul’s transfer to the black site in Romania. Eurocontrol data shows that the aircraft was operated by Kookabura Air, and billing documentation for this circuit includes a ‘subcontract task order modification’ between SportsFlight Air and Computer Sciences Corporation.

FLIGHT DATA EXTRACT FOR N288KA

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CIRCUIT 49: 20-24 AUGUST 2004 (N63MU)

RENDITION: MOHAMMED AL-SHOROEIYA (#52), AFGHANISTAN TO LIBYA
MAJID AL-MAGHREBI (#91), AFGHANISTAN TO LIBYA
SALEH DI’IKI (#94), AFGHANISTAN TO LIBYA

Mohammed al-Shoroeiya was captured in Pakistan on 3 April 2003, held for two weeks in Pakistani custody, and then rendered to CIA custody on 18 April 2003. One CIA cable from Afghanistan, dated 18 April, documents his inspection by a CIA physician. He was held in CIA custody for 490-499 days, and calculation shows that he was transferred out between 20-29 August 2004. According to al-Shoroeiya himself, he was rendered back to Libya on 22 August.

Majid al-Maghrebi was captured in Pakistan on 14 November 2003, and states that he was
held in Pakistani detention for around 40 days before rendition to CIA custody.\textsuperscript{324} This will have been on or around 24 December 2003, which matches with our independent findings of the date of his transfer into CIA custody, between 17-31 December 2003.\textsuperscript{325} He was held in CIA custody for 240-249 days,\textsuperscript{326} and our calculations show that he was transferred out between 20-30 August 2004. According to al-Maghrebi himself, he was rendered back to Libya on 22 August, alongside Di’iki and al-Shoroeiya.\textsuperscript{327}

Saleh Di’iki was captured in Mauritania on 12 October 2003,\textsuperscript{328} and transferred to CIA custody in Afghanistan on 22 January 2004 (Circuit 37). He was held in CIA custody for 210-219 days,\textsuperscript{329} and our calculations show that he was transferred out between 19-28 August 2004. According to Di’iki himself, he was rendered back to Libya alongside al-Shoroeiya on 22 August 2004.\textsuperscript{330}

N63MU flew between Afghanistan and Libya on 22 August 2004, matching the transfer dates of these three men. The aircraft was operated by International Group, and billing documents for this circuit include a series of invoices passed up the contracting chain – involving Air Culinaire (for catering), trip planners Universal Weather Aviation, International Group, SportsFlight and Computer Sciences Corporation – as well as a ‘subcontract task order modification’ between SportsFlight Air and Computer Sciences Corporation.\textsuperscript{331} They also include a flight log which documents the flights between Dubai, Afghanistan, Libya and Palma de Mallorca.\textsuperscript{332}

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CIRCUIT 50:  23-28 AUGUST 2004 (N308AB)

RENDITION:  LAID SAIDI (#57), AFGHANISTAN TO ALGERIA (VIA JORDAN)

Laid Saidi was rendered into CIA custody in Afghanistan between 15-19 May 2003 (Circuit 22), and held in CIA detention for 460-469 days.\(^{333}\) Our calculations show that he left the programme between 17-30 August 2004, and he was transferred to Algeria, where he was handed over to Algerian authorities and eventually released.\(^ {334}\) This rendition followed an earlier attempt to transfer Saidi to his country of origin: believing that he was Tunisian, in June 2004 the CIA had rendered him from Afghanistan to Tunisia before realising their mistake and taking him back to Afghanistan (Circuit 46).

N308AB flew between Afghanistan and Algeria on 26 August 2004, matching Saidi’s transfer between the two countries. As part of this circuit, the aircraft also flew between Romania, Morocco and Afghanistan, and these flights may have involved further rendition operations.

Eurocontrol data shows that the aircraft was operated by Prime Jet, while Baseops provided trip planning services. Billing documentation for this circuit includes a series of invoices passed up the contracting chain – involving Baseops, Prime Jet, AirMarketing, SportsFlight and Computer Sciences Corporation – as well as a ‘subcontract task order modification’ between SportsFlight Air and Computer Sciences Corporation.\(^ {335}\)

**FLIGHT DATA EXTRACT FOR N308AB**

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Flight, Dubai to Afghanistan

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Ramzi bin al-Shibh was held in Morocco from April 2004, having been transferred from secret detention in Guantánamo Bay. It has been reported that he was then rendered to the Romanian black site on 1 October 2004, and one CIA cable from the site confirms that he was held there on 2 October 2004. This cable reported a psychological assessment of bin al-Shibh, which may have taken place upon his arrival at the site.

N227SV (previously N85VM) flew between Morocco, Jordan and Romania on 1 October 2004, matching bin al-Shibh’s transfer to Romania. The stopover in Jordan may have involved another rendition, either from Morocco to Jordan or from Jordan to Romania. Billing documents for this circuit include an invoice from Richmor Aviation to SportsFlight Air for $196,449.71 and a 'sub-contract task order modification' between SportsFlight Air and Computer Sciences Corporation.
Muhammad Ibrahim entered CIA custody between 24-26 January 2004, and was rendered to the black site in Romania on either 25 or 26 January (Circuit 37 or Circuit 39). He was held in the programme for 260-269 days, and our calculations show that he was transferred out of CIA custody between 10-21 October 2004.

N789DK flew between Romania, Jordan and Afghanistan on 20 October 2004, matching Ibrahim’s exit dates from the programme. Billing documentation for this circuit includes an invoice from SportsFlight Air to Computer Sciences Corporation for $337,605.65, and a ‘subcontract task order modification’ between SportsFlight and Computer Sciences Corporation.

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Flight, Afghanistan to Dubai

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Sharif al-Masri was captured in Pakistan on 29 August 2004, and held in foreign custody before being rendered to the CIA on September 2004. This transfer took place after the CIA had initiated a ‘counterintelligence review’, which began on 17 September 2004. CIA cables from Afghanistan document al-Masri’s presence in CIA custody by 20 September 2004, including a request to Headquarters to approve his torture. Al-Masri was held for 80-89 days, at which point he was rendered to Egypt. CIA cables documenting this rendition come from Afghanistan, and our calculations show that he left the CIA programme between 7-18 December 2004.

N227SV (previously registered as N85VM) flew between Afghanistan and Egypt on 16 December 2004, matching al-Masri’s transfer between the two countries. Billing documents for this circuit include invoices from Air Routing to Richmor Aviation for a range of trip planning services, and an invoice from Richmor Aviation to SportsFlight Air for $240,937.95. SportsFlight billing records show that they passed the costs onto Computer Sciences Corporation (with a commission of over $48,000 added on). Documents also include a 'subcontract task order modification' between SportsFlight Air and Computer Sciences Corporation.

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CIRCUIT 54: 16-17 FEBRUARY 2005 (N724CL)

RENDITION: IBN SHEIKH AL-LIBI (#42), MOROCCO TO JORDAN

CIA detainees held in Morocco were transferred out in February 2005 as a result of developing tensions between the CIA and its Moroccan counterparts. Our investigation has established that those likely to have been held at the site in February 2005 include Abu Zubaydah, Ibn Sheikh al-Libi and Mustafa al-Hawsawi. Ramzi bin al-Shibh (#41) was also held at the site in 2004, but had been rendered to Romania in October 2004 (Circuit 51).

Between 15-18 February 2005, two rendition aircraft flew between Morocco and other key locations, in operations that likely transferred prisoners to other sites in the programme. As one of these circuits, N724CL flew between Morocco, Jordan and Lithuania on 17 February. Reports have suggested that Ibn Sheikh was held in Jordan during 2004 and 2005, and if so then this circuit probably rendered him there. Although the aircraft then landed in Lithuania, pilot logs suggest that no one was on board at this point, with all passengers having disembarked in Jordan.

N724CL was owned and operated by Classic Limited Air, while Eurocontrol data shows that Universal Weather and Aviation provided trip planning services. The investigation by the Lithuanian Parliament into CIA rendition and detention in the country did not identify this flight, but data obtained from the Lithuanian Civil Aviation Administration, as well as airport documents from Vilnius, confirm the landing of the aircraft on 17 February 2005.

Billing documents for this circuit include a private carriage agreement between Classic Limited Air and Computer Sciences Corporation, outlining the agreement to supply Computer Sciences Corporation with the use of N724CL. They also include an invoice from Classic Limited Air to Computer Sciences Corporation for $282,419.60, a ‘subcontract task order modification’ between SportsFlight Air and Computer Sciences Corporation, and a flight log which documents each of the flights in the circuit.

**FLIGHT DATA EXTRACT FOR N724CL**

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</table>
CIA detainees held in Morocco were transferred out in February 2005 as a result of developing tensions between the CIA and its Moroccan counterparts. Our investigation has established that those likely to have been held at the site in February 2005 include Abu Zubaydah (#1), Ibn Sheikh al-Libi (#42) and Mustafa al-Hawsawi (#46). Ramzi bin al-Shibh (#41) was also held at the site in 2004, but had been rendered to Romania in October 2004 (Circuit 51).

Between 15-18 February 2005, two rendition aircraft flew between Morocco and other key locations, in operations that likely transferred prisoners to other sites in the programme. As one of these circuits, N787WH flew between Morocco, Romania and Lithuania on 18 February. The Lithuanian black site received its first detainees in February 2005 and this is the flight which brought them to the facility. CIA cables document the presence of Abu Zubaydah in Lithuania by March 2005, and he will have been on this flight. Mustafa al-Hawsawi was also held in Lithuania during 2005, and it is likely that he was on board as well.

Eurocontrol data shows that N787WH was operated by Victory Aviation, while Baseops International filed the flight plans, including false plans to disguise the landing in Lithuania. The true flight, from Romania to Lithuania on 18 February 2005, is confirmed by the Lithuanian Parliament investigation, which noted that 'the aircraft arrived carrying five passengers and three crew members.' Data from the Lithuanian Civil Aviation Administration, and airport documents from Palanga, also confirm the landing.

Billing documents for this circuit include an invoice from Palanga Air and Terminal Navigations Service to Victory Air Transport, for the landing of N787WH at Palanga, as well as a 'subcontract task order modification' between SportsFlight Air and Computer Sciences Corporation.

### Flight Data Extract for N787WH

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<td>01:02</td>
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</table>
Khalid al-Sharif was captured in Pakistan on 3 April 2003, and rendered to CIA custody alongside another prisoner, Mohammed al-Shoroeiya (#52). Although al-Sharif was unclear of the date of this transfer, al-Shoroeiya has testified that it took place on 18 April, and a CIA cable from Afghanistan dated 18 April documents his inspection by a CIA physician. Al-Sharif was held in CIA custody for 730-739 days, and our calculations show that he was transferred out between 17-26 April 2005. According to al-Sharif himself, he was rendered back to Libya on 20 April.

His US captors secured his hands, blindfolded him, took off his clothes, examined his body, and took photographs of him naked. They then drove him by car somewhere five or ten minutes away. When they took the hood off his head, he found himself in a shipping container and his arm was handcuffed to a steel ring welded to the wall of the container. The container was in a hangar that appeared to be some sort of military storage facility. He said he could tell because it was filled with boxes of ammunition and other military equipment, even large airplane bombs. At that point he was informed he was being transported to Libya.

Khalid al-Sharif

Mustafa al-Mehdi was captured in Pakistan on 23 February 2004, held in Peshawar and then Islamabad for several months, and then transferred to CIA custody in Afghanistan ‘one night in June’. Another prisoner, Marwan al-Jabour (#108), testified to being rendered to Afghanistan on 16 June 2004 alongside three men who had been held with him in Islamabad (one of whom was a Libyan). Given al-Mehdi’s position next to al-Jabour on the Committee Study list, it is likely that both entered the CIA programme on this date. Al-Mehdi was held in CIA custody for 300-309 days, and our calculations show that he was transferred out between 12-21 April 2005. According to al-Mehdi himself, he was rendered back to Libya on 21 April, alongside al-Sharif.

The next day the US personnel overseeing his detention transferred him to another room where they took off all his clothes. They made note on a human body chart of every mark on his body. They also took photographs of him naked. Before boarding a plane, they replaced one blindfold with another, which allowed him to see a huge hangar with military equipment and large aerial bombs, indicating he was at an air base. He said he was put into a container containing a three-person American team wearing black T-shirts. These men accompanied him on the flight back to Libya. He was stripped again and more photos were taken of him naked. Then they put him in diapers and put on earplugs, eye patches, and a hood over his head. He was given something to drink and some clothes. They handcuffed him to the seat and wrapped an adhesive or belt around him. He did not know it at the time but later
learned that Khalid Sharif was with him. Upon arrival he heard Libyan voices all around him. ‘Being returned to Libya was the worst fear I had,’ he said. ‘I thought this was the end – that the real interrogations were going to start and the real suffering was going to begin.’

Mustafa al-Mehdi

N740JA filed a flight plan between Uzbekistan and Tunisia on 21 April 2005, matching the transfer of both men from Afghanistan to Libya. This is likely to have been a false flight plan, given that the aircraft was on the ground in Libya at the end of the day on 21 April, less than an hour after the plan shows a landing in Tunis. From Tripoli, the aircraft filed a flight back to Europe. Eurocontrol data shows that the aircraft was operated by Air Castle, while billing documents for this circuit include an invoice from the operating company Jet Alliance to Air Marketing, and SportsFlight billing records which show that Air Marketing passed the costs onto SportsFlight, who subsequently passed them onto Computer Sciences Corporation (with a commission of over $25,000 added on).

**FLIGHT DATA EXTRACT FOR N740JA**

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Flight, Tunisia to Libya (alternatively, aircraft may have flown to Libya directly, with Tunisia as a false flight plan)

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CIRCUIT 57: 23-28 MAY 2005 (N450DR / N308AB)

RENDITION: ABU FARAJ AL-LIBI (#114), AFGHANISTAN TO ROMANIA (VIA JORDAN)
ABU MUNTHIR AL-MAGREBI (#115), TUNISIA TO ROMANIA (VIA JORDAN)

Abu Faraj al-Libi was captured in Pakistan on 2 May 2005, and rendered to CIA custody at DETENTION SITE ORANGE (in Afghanistan) on 24 May 2005. This rendition took place after 24 May. After at least one day at DETENTION SITE ORANGE, Abu Faraj was rendered from Afghanistan to Romania, where he was tortured from 28 May.

N450DR flew from Afghanistan to Jordan between 25-26 May, and was on the ground in Amman in the afternoon of 26 May, at the same time as another rendition aircraft, N308AB. This second aircraft then flew to Romania, landing on 26 May. Together, these two aircraft provided a connection between Afghanistan and Romania, matching Abu Faraj’s rendition between the two countries.

Prior to its landing in Jordan and onward flight to Romania, N308AB had flown to Tunisia. Given that we know that another CIA detainee, Abu Munthir al-Magrebi, entered the programme at the same time as, or after Abu Faraj, it is likely that he was picked up in Tunisia and rendered from there to the CIA prison in Romania.

Eurocontrol data shows that N450DR was operated by Colt International, whereas N308AB was operated by Prime Jet. Trip planning services were provided by Universal Weather and Aviation (in the case of N450DR) and Baseops International (for N308AB). Billing documents for this circuit include an invoice from Richmor Aviation to SportsFlight Air for $204,612.92, relating to the aircraft N450DR, and a ‘subcontract task order modification’ for the same aircraft between SportsFlight Air and Computer Sciences Corporation.

### FLIGHT DATA EXTRACT FOR N450DR

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**Flight, Afghanistan to Jordan**

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</table>
CIRCUIT 58: 1-8 OCTOBER 2005 (N308AB / N787WH)

RENDITION: KHALED SHEIKH MOHAMMED (#45), ROMANIA TO LITHUANIA

ABD AL-RAHIM AL-NASHIRI (#26), ROMANIA TO LITHUANIA

In October 2005 the CIA rendered at least two men from its site in Romania to continued secret detention in Lithuania. Khaled Sheikh Mohammed, who was detained in Romania at the time, was rendered to DETENTION SITE VIOLET on October 2005. CIA cables from Lithuania document his detention at this new site. Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri was also detained in Romania up until October 2005 and was then moved to Lithuania.

Flight data shows that two rendition aircraft – N308AB and N787WH – met on the ground in Tirana, Albania, between 22:38 and 23:35 on 5 October 2005. The first of these had just come from Bucharest, while the second flew onward to Vilnius, thus connecting the black site locations in Romania and Lithuania.

Eurocontrol data shows that the first aircraft, N308AB, was operated by Prime Jet. One email set out the itinerary for the aircraft, specifying the flight from Romania to Albania, where it was to ‘drop all PAX’. A ‘preliminary requirements’ document stated that two passengers were to be picked up in Romania, and also confirmed that all passengers were to be dropped in Albania. Customs help was to be denied.

Eurocontrol data also shows that the second aircraft, N787WH, was operated by Victory Aviation, with Baseops International filing the flight plans, including false plans to disguise the landing in Lithuania. The true flight, from Albania to Lithuania on 6 October 2005, is confirmed by the Lithuanian Parliament investigation, which noted that it was ‘unscheduled’, and that
customs officials ‘were prevented from inspecting the aircraft.’ According to one customs officer, ‘civil aviation officers prevented the SBGS [State Border Guard Service] officer from approaching the aircraft…. A car drove away from the aircraft and left the territory of the airport border control point. Upon contacting the civil aviation officers, it was explained that the heads of the SBGS had been informed of the landing... The letter from the SSD [State Security Department] marked as ‘CLASSIFIED’... was received by the SBGS on 7 October 2005, i.e., post factum.\textsuperscript{109} Data from the Lithuanian Civil Aviation Administration,\textsuperscript{410} and airport documents from Vilnius,\textsuperscript{411} also confirm the landing.

Billing documents for this circuit also include invoices from SportsFlight Air to Computer Sciences Corporation,\textsuperscript{412} and ‘subcontract task order modifications’ between SportsFlight Air and Computer Sciences Corporation.\textsuperscript{413}

**FLIGHT DATA EXTRACT FOR N308AB**

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**FLIGHT DATA EXTRACT FOR N787WH**

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In October 2005, the CIA discovered that the Washington Post had information about the torture programme, and about the existence of secret prisons in Poland and Romania in particular. In response, it began preparing options for the transfer of prisoners, pending publication of the story. After the story was published, on 2 November 2005, Romania demanded the closure of DETENTION SITE BLACK within xx hours. The CIA transferred the three remaining CIA detainees out of the facility shortly after. The stopover in Jordan may also have picked up Ibn Sheikh al-Libi, given that it is reported he was held there in 2004 and 2005, yet ended up in Afghanistan.

Flight data shows that two rendition aircraft – N1HC and N248AB – met on the ground in Amman, Jordan, between 00:21 and 00:55 on 6 November 2005. The first of these had just come from Bucharest, while the second flew onward to Afghanistan, thus connecting the black site locations just as the Romanian site was being closed. Eurocontrol data shows that N1HC was operated by United States Aviation, while N248AB was operated by Prime Jet.
The Committee Study has noted that Khaled Sheikh Mohammed was transferred to DETENTION SITE VIOLET on 21 October 2005, and then to DETENTION SITE BROWN on 21 March 2006.\footnote{425} Furthermore, this transfer came as ‘medical issues resulted in the closing of DETENTION SITE VIOLET… in March 2006,’ at which point ‘the CIA then transferred its remaining detainees to DETENTION SITE BROWN.’\footnote{426} In addition to Mohammed, CIA cables document the presence of three prisoners at the site, all of whom are likely to have been moved out in March 2006: Abu Zubaydah, Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri and Mustafa al-Hawsawi.\footnote{427}

We have been able to identify just one rendition circuit connecting Lithuania with other black sites in March 2006. Flight data shows that two rendition aircraft – N733MA and N740EH – met on the ground in Cairo, Egypt, between 02:19 and 02:45 on 26 March 2006. The first of these had just come from Palanga, Lithuania, while the second flew onward to Kabul, thus connecting the black site locations in Lithuania and Afghanistan.

Eurocontrol data shows that both aircraft, N733MA and N740EH, were operated by Miami Air International, which also filed flight plans for the circuit.\footnote{428} False flight plans were filed both into and out of Lithuania, and the Lithuanian Parliament investigation listed the route as Porto-Palanga-Porto. No customs inspections were carried out on the aircraft, pursuant to a request from the Lithuanian intelligence service.\footnote{429}

Billing documents for this circuit include an invoice from SportsFlight Air to Computer Sciences Corporation, incorporating (and thus clearly connecting) both aircraft,\footnote{430} and a flight schedule which replaced sensitive locations with generic airport codes (‘WWW’, ‘XXX’, and so forth).\footnote{431}

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Flight, Morocco to Egypt

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<td>13:30</td>
<td>19:14</td>
<td>EC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 Mar 06</td>
<td>Amman, Jordan</td>
<td>Heraklion, Greece</td>
<td>20:59</td>
<td>23:07</td>
<td>EC</td>
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<tr>
<td>28 Mar 06</td>
<td>Heraklion, Greece</td>
<td>Reykjavik, Iceland</td>
<td>07:08</td>
<td>13:03</td>
<td>EC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Circuit 61: 12-15 April 2006 (N1HC)

**Rendition: Ibn Sheikh Al-Libi (#42), Afghanistan to Libya**

Ibn Sheikh al-Libi was rendered into CIA custody on February 2003, and we have identified the rendition circuit for this operation, on 9 February (Circuit 17). He was held for 1160-1169 days, and our calculations show that he was transferred out of CIA custody between 14-23 April 2006. At this point, Ibn Sheikh would have been held in Afghanistan, given that black sites in other countries had closed by then. He was rendered to Libya, where he was held until his death in custody in 2009.

N1HC flew between Afghanistan and Libya on 14 April 2006, matching Ibn Sheikh's transfer between the two countries. Eurocontrol data shows that the aircraft was operated by United States Aviation.

### Flight Data Extract for N1HC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>From</th>
<th>To</th>
<th>Depart</th>
<th>Arrive</th>
<th>Sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12 Apr 06</td>
<td>Wilmington, DE</td>
<td>Abu Dhabi, UAE</td>
<td>19:15</td>
<td>08:19</td>
<td>EC; FAA</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Flight, Abu Dhabi to Afghanistan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>From</th>
<th>To</th>
<th>Depart</th>
<th>Arrive</th>
<th>Sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14 Apr 06</td>
<td>Kabul, Afghanistan</td>
<td>Tripoli, Libya</td>
<td>16:34</td>
<td>23:11</td>
<td>EC</td>
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<tr>
<td>15 Apr 06</td>
<td>Tripoli, Libya</td>
<td>Teterboro, NJ</td>
<td>00:52</td>
<td>12:20</td>
<td>EC; FAA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Marwan al-Jabour was transferred into CIA custody on 16 June 2004, and held for 770-779 days. He has testified that he was rendered to the CIA alongside three other prisoners, one of whom was Palestinian. Our investigation has established that this is likely to have been Abd al-Bari al-Filstini, who was also held for 770-779 days. Our calculations show that both men left CIA custody between 26 July – 4 August 2006. Al-Jabour has said that he was eventually rendered to Jordan, and was transferred alongside another prisoner, who again is likely to have been al-Filstini.

*The transfer team picked him up the next evening. They put cotton over his eyes, cotton in his ears, and rubber over that. They put a band around his head, a mask over his face, and head phones over his ears. His hands were cuffed in front and his legs were shackled. A belt was put around his legs, about the knees, and his handcuffs were attached to it... They brought Jabour outside to a car, and laid him down in it. Jabour is fairly certain that another prisoner was next to him. The car drove for about an hour... Suddenly they removed all of his wrappings and took off all his clothes. When his eyes opened, he saw a man pointing a video camera at him. Then the transfer team put a diaper on him, and put the same outfit back on, except this time they used plastic handcuffs. He could only feel the airplane; he could not see it, but it seemed to him to be a small civilian jet. The seats faced forward, as in a normal passenger aircraft. In the plane, during the flight, a doctor took his blood pressure. The flight lasted about three-and-a-half to four hours.*

Marwan al-Jabour

Abu ‘Abdallah was rendered from Iraq to CIA detention in Afghanistan on 12 March 2004 (Circuit 40), and held initially in the Dark Prison. He was held in CIA custody for 870-879 days, and our calculations show that he was transferred out between 30 July – 8 August 2006.

N17ND flew between Afghanistan, Jordan and Saudi Arabia, between 29 July – 1 August 2006, and is likely to have rendered al-Jabour and al-Filstini to Jordan, and Abu ‘Abdallah to Saudi Arabia (given that he is a Saudi national). Eurocontrol data shows that Baseops filed the flight plans for this circuit, while billing documents include an invoice from Integrity Jet Charter to SportsFlight, as well as receipts from SportsFlight as they paid the balance.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>FROM</th>
<th>TO</th>
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<th>ARRIVE</th>
<th>SOURCES</th>
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<td>Baltimore, MD</td>
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<td>19:47</td>
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<tr>
<td>25 Jul 06</td>
<td>Baltimore, MD</td>
<td>Shannon, Ireland</td>
<td>21:54</td>
<td>03:51</td>
<td>CSC; EC; FAA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 Jul 06</td>
<td>Shannon, Ireland</td>
<td>Dubai, UAE</td>
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<td>13:07</td>
<td>CSC; EC; FAA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26-29 Jul 06</td>
<td>Dubai, UAE</td>
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<td>CSC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26-29 Jul 06</td>
<td>Kabul, Afghanistan</td>
<td>Cairo, Egypt</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CSC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Kabul, Afghanistan</td>
<td>03:45</td>
<td>10:56</td>
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<tr>
<td>29 Jul - 1 Aug 06</td>
<td>Kabul, Afghanistan</td>
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<td></td>
<td>CSC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 Jul - 1 Aug 06</td>
<td>Dubai, UAE</td>
<td>Kabul, Afghanistan</td>
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<td>CSC</td>
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<tr>
<td>29 Jul - 1 Aug 06</td>
<td>Kabul, Afghanistan</td>
<td>Amman, Jordan</td>
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<td>CSC</td>
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<tr>
<td>29 Jul - 1 Aug 06</td>
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<tr>
<td>29 Jul - 1 Aug 06</td>
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<td>CSC</td>
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<td>1 Aug 06</td>
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<td>CSC; EC; FAA</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Atlanta, GA</td>
<td>14:25</td>
<td>22:41</td>
<td>FAA</td>
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<td>2 Aug 06</td>
<td>Atlanta, GA</td>
<td>Muskegon, MI</td>
<td>00:19</td>
<td>01:38</td>
<td>FAA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Endnotes

1. The International Civil Aviation Organisation is a specialised agency of the United Nations, and produces a list of ‘location indicators’ – four letter codes for each airport in the world – on a quarterly basis. Most flight data collated by us uses these indicators.


9. Ibid., para 8.


18. Flight tracked through Polish airspace (entered 10:48; left 11:33).


22. SSOCI, Committee Study Appendix 2: CIA Detainees From 2002-2008, 6 February 2015 (redacted and corrected).


24. FirstFlight Management, Invoice to AirMarketing, RB02-017, 7 May 2002.


27. Flight tracked through Danish airspace (entered 08:53).


29. Ibid., para 11-12.


42. Faruq is #14 on the Committee Study's list of detainees, and therefore entered CIA custody on the same day as, or after, Hassan bin Attash (#10), and on the same day as, or before, Abd al-Salam al-Hilah (#15). Bin Attash entered CIA custody no earlier than 14 September, and al-Hilah entered CIA custody on 29 September 2002. See individual prisoner profiles for full details.
44. The other identified landings in Diego Garcia by rendition aircraft were transferring detainees from Southeast Asia to North Africa (Circuit 3 and Circuit 40). Given the geographical location of the island, this is a logical stopover for renditions from Southeast Asia to North Africa (whereas a journey between Pakistan, Afghanistan or the Middle East and North Africa makes little sense).
49. SSCI, Committee Study, 9 December 2014 (redacted), pp. 75-76.
53. Ibid., p.2.
55. Faruq is #14 on the Committee Study's list of detainees, and therefore entered CIA custody on the same day as, or before, al-Hilah (#15). SSCI, Committee Study Appendix 2: CIA Detainees From 2002-2008, 6 February 2015 (redacted and corrected).
58. UWA, Invoice to Airborne, No. 899520, 23 October 2002.
60. Capital Aviation, Invoice to DynCorp Systems and Solutions, SE100602-001, 9 October 2002.
61. Flight tracked through Danish and Icelandic airspace.
63. Ibid., p. 54.
64. SSCI, Committee Study, 9 December 2014 (redacted), pp. 66-67.
65. CIA, Afghanistan, cable 29768, 11-18 November 2002.
70. SSCI, Committee Study, 9 December 2014 (redacted), p. 67.
71. Flight tracked through Polish airspace (entered 10:36; left 11:12).
72. SSCI, Committee Study, 9 December 2014 (redacted), p. 67. See also DoJ (OPR), Investigation into the Office of Legal Counsel's Memoranda Concerning Issues Relating to the...
Central Intelligence Agency’s Use of ‘Enhanced Interrogation Techniques’ on Suspected Terrorists, 29 July 2009, p. 85.


74. SSCI, Committee Study, 9 December 2014 (redacted), p. 67.

75. UWA, AFTN/SITA Text for N63MU: 4-6 December 2002


77. Tom Hundley, Remote Polish Airstrip Holds Clues to Secret CIA Flights, Chicago Tribune, 6 February 2007.


81. Landed 8 passengers, left 0. False flight plans filed, Dubai-Vienna-Luton.


84. Wazir is #38 on the Committee Study’s list of detainees, and we have established that Jamil el-Banna (#36) entered CIA custody on 9 December 2002. The Committee Study makes it clear that Wazir entered CIA custody in 2002. SSCI, Committee Study Appendix 2: CIA Detainees From 2002-2008, 6 February 2015 (redacted and corrected).


88. SSCI, Committee Study, 9 December 2014 (redacted), p. 75.

89. CIA, DETENTION SITE BLUE cable 10406, 8-10 February 2003; CIA, DETENTION SITE BLUE cable 10415, 8-10 February 2003.

90. SSCI, Committee Study, 9 December 2014 (redacted), p. 141.

91. Ibid.


96. Flight tracked through Danish airspace (entered 16:58).


100. Ibid., p. 84.

101. CIA, DETENTION SITE BLUE cable 10711, 7-9 March 2003.


105. Flight tracked through Polish airspace (entered 11:20; left 11:59).

106. Flight landed with 2 passengers, left with 0. False flight plans filed, Kabul-Warsaw-Prague and Kabul-Budapest-Glasgow.

107. Flight tracked through Danish airspace (entered 21:46).


153. Flight tracked through Polish airspace (entered 09:30; left 10:20) and Danish airspace (entered 10:31).

154. Asadallah was taken into custody on the night of Eid-ul-Adha, which in 2003 fell on 12 February. Shahzada Zulfqar, Silence of the Mullahs, Newsline, March 2003.

155. CIA, Afghanistan, cable 34098, 167.

156. CIA, Afghanistan, cable 1243, 15 August 2003, 20:57; CIA, ALEC, 8 July 2003, para 47-83.


158. Flight tracked through Polish airspace (entered 07:06; left 07:46).


161. SSCI, Committee Study Appendix 2: CIA Detainees From 2002-2008, 6 February 2015 (redacted and corrected).


163. CIA, DETENTION SITE BLUE, cable 1015, 1 August 2003, 20:57; CIA, DETENTION SITE BLUE, cable 1017, 3 August 2003, 08:12.

164. SSCI, Committee Study, 9 December 2014 (redacted), pp. 243-244.

165. CIA, ALEC, Questioning Ammar al-Baluchi and Mustafa al-Hawsawi on Heathrow Plot Operatives, cable, 16 July 2003, 18:21 (redacted); CIA, Afghanistan, CT: Comments by Senior al-Qa’ida Operative Ammar al-Baluchi on al-Qa’ida Member Jaffar al-Tayyar, cable 42247, 21 July 2003, 03:57 (redacted).


169. Flight tracked through Polish airspace (entered 07:23; left 08:00).

170. False flight plans filed, Kabul-Warsaw-Kabul.


177. Ibid.


179. SSCI, Committee Study Appendix 2: CIA Detainees From 2002-2008, 6 February 2015 (redacted and corrected).


181. Ibid., p. 9.


185. See the profiles for these three men.

186. SSCI, Committee Study Appendix 2: CIA Detainees From 2002-2008, 6 February 2015 (redacted and corrected).
187. Flight tracked through Polish airspace (entered 12:17; left 13:01).
188. SSCI, Committee Study, 9 December 2014 (redacted), p. 74.
189. Ibid., p. 97.
190. Ibid., p. 140.
194. Flight tracked through Polish airspace (entered 08:02; left 08:25).
195. False flight plan filed, Kabul-Warsaw.
196. False flight plan filed, Szymany-ConstANTA.
197. Flight tracked through Portuguese airspace (entered 21:35; left 00:26).
199. CIA, DETENTION SITE BLACK, cable 10172, 16 October 2003, 08:21.
201. Al-Jaza’iri provided this account to Marwan al-Jabour in 2006, while both were detained at DETENTION SITE ORANGE. Human Rights Watch, Ghost Prisoner: Two Years in Secret CIA Detention, February 2007, pp. 22-23.
203. Ibid., para 35-41, 47-49.
207. SSCI, Committee Study Appendix 2: CIA Detainees From 2002-2008, 6 February 2015 (redacted and corrected).
209. Hawleri is #88 on the Committee Study’s list of detainees, and Mohammed Bashmilah (#89) entered CIA custody on 26 October 2003.
210. SSCI, Committee Study Appendix 2: CIA Detainees From 2002-2008, 6 February 2015 (redacted and corrected).
213. Flight tracked through Danish airspace (entered 00:38).
214. False flight plan filed, Prague-Constanta.
216. See, for example: CIA, Afghanistan cable 34757, 10 March 2003, 17:42.
221. Entered Polish airspace 10:58; left 11:41.
222. Entered Polish airspace 15:17; left 16:04.
223. Entered Polish airspace 05:27; left 05:50.
224. Entered Portuguese airspace 00:57; left 03:39.
225. SSCI, Committee Study, 9 December 2014 (redacted), pp. 139-140.
226. CIA, Guantanamo: cable 1091, 3 November 2003, 18:35.

Bin Attash (#10) had previously spent 2-3 days in CIA custody, in mid-September 2002. See his profile for full details.


SSCI, Committee Study Appendix 2: CIA Detainees From 2002-2008, 6 February 2015 (redacted and corrected).


SSCI, Committee Study Appendix 2: CIA Detainees From 2002-2008, 6 February 2015 (redacted and corrected).


SSCI, Committee Study, 9 December 2014 (redacted), p. 128.


Khaled el-Masri v. George Tenet et al., Declaration of Khaled el-Masri, 6 April 2006, para 25-35.


SSCI, Committee Study, 9 December 2014 (redacted), p. 132.


False flight plan filed, Kabul-Timisoara.


Flight tracked through German airspace.

Flight tracked through German airspace.

Ibrahim is #99 on the Committee Study's list of detainees, and therefore entered CIA custody on the same day as, or after, Hassan Ghul (#98). Ghul entered CIA custody on 24 January 2004. SSCI, Committee Study Appendix 2: CIA Detainees From 2002-2008, 6 February 2015 (redacted and corrected).


SSCI, Committee Study Appendix 2: CIA Detainees From 2002-2008, 6 February 2015
(redacted and corrected).


279. Ibid., pp. 141-143.

280. Flight tracked through Portuguese airspace (entered 00:27, left 02:18).

281. See Chapter 2 for our findings relating to this date.

282. SSCI, Committee Study, 9 December 2014 (redacted), pp. 140-141.


286. Parallel flight plan filed, Bucharest-Casablanca.

287. See Chapter 2 for our findings relating to this date.

288. SSCI, Committee Study, 9 December 2014 (redacted), pp. 140-141.


290. SFA, Invoice to CSC, LTS050602-0412, 27 April 2004.


296. SSCI, Committee Study Appendix 2: CIA Detainees From 2002-2008, 6 February 2015 (redacted and corrected).

297. SSCI, Committee Study, 9 December 2014 (redacted), p. 129.


299. SFA, Invoice to CSC, LTS050602-0525, 2 June 2004.

300. Air Routing, Invoices to Richmor Aviation, various dates.

301. Flight tracked through Danish airspace.

302. SSCI, Committee Study Appendix 2: CIA Detainees From 2002-2008, 6 February 2015 (redacted and corrected).


304. Ibid.


309. SSCI, Committee Study Appendix 2: CIA Detainees From 2002-2008, 6 February 2015 (redacted and corrected).

310. SSCI, Committee Study, 9 December 2014 (redacted), p. 111.
311. For the first, see the profile for Circuit 34.
312. Air Routing, Invoices to Richmor Aviation, various dates.
316. SSCI, Committee Study, 9 December 2014 (redacted), p. 156.
318. For an earlier match of flight data to Gul’s transfer into Romania, see Thomas Hammarberg, Advancing Accountability in Respect of the CIA Black Site in Romania, memo, Council of Europe, CommDH(2012)38, 30 March 2012, p. 15.
322. SSCI, Committee Study Appendix 2: CIA Detainees From 2002-2008, 6 February 2015 (redacted and corrected).
325. The Committee Study’s list of detainees makes clear that al-Maghrebi entered CIA custody in 2003, and after Ali Saeed Awadh, who we have established entered on 17 December 2003.
326. SSCI, Committee Study Appendix 2: CIA Detainees From 2002-2008, 6 February 2015 (redacted and corrected).
328. Ibid, p. 68.
329. SSCI, Committee Study Appendix 2: CIA Detainees From 2002-2008, 6 February 2015 (redacted and corrected).
333. SSCI, Committee Study Appendix 2: CIA Detainees From 2002-2008, 6 February 2015 (redacted and corrected).
336. SSCI, Committee Study, 9 December 2014 (redacted), pp. 141-142.
341. SSCI, Committee Study Appendix 2: CIA Detainees From 2002-2008, 6 February 2015 (redacted and corrected).
342. SFA, Invoice to CSC, LTS050602-01712, 26 October 2004.
344. Amnesty International, Off the Record: US


346. Ibid., pp. 138, 348.


348. SSCI, Committee Study Appendix 2: CIA Detainees From 2002-2008, 6 February 2015 (redacted and corrected).

349. SSCI, Committee Study, 9 December 2014 (redacted), p. 139.


351. Air Routing, Invoices to Richmor Aviation, various dates.


355. Flight tracked through German airspace.

356. Flight tracked through German, Danish and Norwegian airspace (entered Danish airspace at 12:43).

357. Flight tracked through Danish airspace.

358. SSCI, Committee Study, 9 December 2014 (redacted), p. 142.


361. CNSD, Findings of the Investigation Concerning the Alleged Transportation and Confinement of Persons Detained by the Central Intelligence Agency, 22 December 2009.


366. Classic Limited Air, Aircraft Flight Log, N724CL.


368. Ibid., p. 99.

369. CIA, DETENTION SITE VIOLET, cable 2166, 7 March 2005, 06:47.

370. CIA, DETENTION SITE VIOLET, cable 3232, date redacted.


375. Ibid.


378. False flight plan filed, Rabat-Constanta.

379. False flight plan filed, Bucharest-Gothenburg. No customs inspection.

380. Flight tracked through Danish airspace.

381. Flight tracked through Danish airspace.


385. SSCI, Committee Study Appendix 2: CIA Detainees From 2002-2008, 6 February 2015 (redacted and corrected).


387. Ibid., pp. 84-85.


389. SSCI, Committee Study Appendix 2: CIA Detainees From 2002-2008, 6 February 2015
(redacted and corrected).

390. Ibid.
394. SSCI, Committee Study, 9 December 2014 (redacted), pp. 146-147.
395. Email from CIA Director Porter, dated 24 May 2005, instructing officers to 'proceed as planned' with Abu Faraj's rendition into CIA custody. SSCI, Committee Study, 9 December 2014 (redacted), p. 146.
396. SSCI, Committee Study, 9 December 2014 (redacted), p. 147.
397. CIA, DETENTION SITE BLACK, cable 2336, 28 May 2005, 20:03.
398. Al-Magrebi is #115 on the Committee Study's list of detainees, and Abu Faraj al-Libi is #114. SSCI, Committee Study Appendix 2: CIA Detainees From 2002-2008, 6 February 2015 (redacted and corrected).
400. SFA and CSC, Subcontract Task Order Modification, Subcontract S1007312, Task Order 37, 30 June 2005.
401. See, for example: CIA, DETENTION SITE BLACK cable 1281, 13 June 2004, 08:01.
404. CIA, DETENTION SITE BLACK cable 3051, 30 September 2005, 12:35.
405. CIA, DETENTION SITE VIOLET cable 3910, 24 January 2006, 18:52.
406. Email from (redacted) to (redacted), subject: N308AB Itinerary, 29 September 2005, 10:34PM.
411. Vilnius Airport, Invoice to Victory Air Transport, 6 October 2005; Vilnius Airport, Ground Handling Form, 6 October 2005.
414. False flight plan filed, Bratislava-Constanta.
416. Flight tracked through Danish airspace (entered 21:21).
417. False flight plan filed, Tirana-Tallinn.
418. Flight tracked through Danish airspace (left 09:54).
419. SSCI, Committee Study, 9 December 2014 (redacted), pp. 151-152.
423. False flight plan filed, Porto-Constanta.
424. Flight tracked through Danish airspace (entered 05:58).
426. Ibid., p. 154.
427. CIA, DETENTION SITE VIOLET cable 2166, 7 March 2005, 06:47; CIA, DETENTION SITE VIOLET cable 3910, 24 January 2006, 18:52; CIA, DETENTION SITE VIOLET cable 3223, date redacted.
429. CNSD, Findings of the Investigation Concerning the Alleged Transportation and Confinement of Persons Detained by the Central Intelligence Agency, 22 December 2009, pp. 4-5.
430. SFA, Invoice to CSC, LTS050602-0666, 30 March 2006.
432. False flight plan filed, Porto-Helsinki. No customs inspection.
433. False flight plan filed, Palanga-Porto.
434. SSCI, Committee Study, 9 December 2014
380

435. SSCI, Committee Study Appendix 2: CIA Detainees From 2002-2008, 6 February 2015 (redacted and corrected).


438. SSCI, Committee Study Appendix 2: CIA Detainees From 2002-2008, 6 February 2015 (redacted and corrected).

439. Ibid.


442. SSCI, Committee Study Appendix 2: CIA Detainees From 2002-2008, 6 February 2015 (redacted and corrected).


444. SFA, Payment Receipt to Integrity Jet Charter, 11 September 2006.
AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE CIA TORTURE PROGRAMME